U.S.-EU NONPROLIFRATION CONSULTATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 083574

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL SC EU XO RU IR
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU NONPROLIFRATION CONSULTATIONS

REF: 08 STATE 33804

--------------
INTRODUCTION
--------------

1.(U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified. Please
handle accordingly.


2. (SBU) Summary: On July 20 and 21, the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) and
interagency officials hosted a delegation from the European
Union (EU) to continue discussions on nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Productive talks covered
a wide range of mutual nonproliferation concerns, expressing
broad agreement on initiatives by the G-8, EU, and USG.
Discussions convened in executive joint sessions with both
the European Council Secretariat (Council) and the European
Commission (EC) representatives, after which the Council
representative departed for separate meetings, and
delegations settled in for expert-level discussions with the
EC. Topics included the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review Conference (RevCon),the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),the G-8,s Global Partnership Against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
(Global Partnership or GP),UN Security Council resolution
(UNSCR) 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
export control assistance, the G-77, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA),and other outreach initiatives. At the
conclusion, delegates discussed means to further implement
UNSCRs with regard to Iran. The head of the visiting
delegation commented that the EU,s priorities correspond to
those of the United States.


3. (U) Summary Continued: This meeting is part of a
long-term coordination based on the 2007 U.S.-EU Summit
Declaration, which called for promoting greater coordination
of nonproliferation efforts through UNSCR 1540. The 2008
U.S.-EU Summit Declaration reiterated this call. Last
November U.S. nonproliferation officials hosted consultations
on the stability program and third country assistance
(reftel). The July 20-21 meetings continued this pattern of
transatlantic nonproliferation coordination, and for the
first time under this format with both the Council (which has
primary responsibility for foreign and security policy in the
EU system) and the Commission. Annalisa Giannella, the
Personal Representative of EU High Representative Javier
Solana for WMD Nonproliferation, led the European delegation
along with Richard Wright of the EC,s Directorate-General
for External Relations (RELEX). The delegation also included
RELEX nonproliferation experts Bruno Dupre and Jean-Paul
Joulia. End Summary.

--------------
EXECUTIVE JOINT SESSION
--------------


4. (SBU) After welcoming remarks by EUR Acting DAS William
Lucas, ISN DAS Eliot Kang described our top five
nonproliferation priorities as ensuring success in the NPT
RevCon; dealing with noncompliant states; ratification of the
CTBT, negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty
(FMCT); and ensuring that peaceful nuclear energy does not
contribute to proliferation. Kang also briefed the Europeans
on the Nuclear Security Summit, which the United States plans
to host in March 2010. Noting that the USG plans to use
existing initiatives and fora to carry out the purposes of
the Summit )- securing dangerous nuclear material )- he
stressed that we intend to give priority to control of
fissile materials. Kang also made clear that the
President,s reference to "institutionalizing" PSI and the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (CICNT) does
not mean the United States proposes to establish a
secretariat or other similar body, but rather to secure
multilateral buy-in. Giannella and Wright opened with
presentations of priorities and briefed interagency partners
on the results of the 2009 New Lines of Action. EU
representatives discussed EU/EC contributions to the GP,
GICNT, Centers of Excellence, and the PSI. ISN responded to
each subject and introduced discussions on UNSCR 1540;
multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs); and nuclear,
chemical, and biological safety and security. Giannella
stressed throughout that transatlantic cooperation was

STATE 00083574 002 OF 006


becoming increasingly possible for the EU. Her presence
demonstrated that fact and was also intended to show the
coherence of Council and EC actions.

--------------
MULTILATERAL TREATIES
--------------


5. (SBU) The EU agrees that the NPT RevCon is the most
important event on the horizon and that the three pillars of
nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear
energy must all receive adequate treatment. U.S. leadership
on the post-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement
has set a conducive tone for the disarmament pillar,
Giannella observed, but she remained concerned that the
non-aligned states would hesitate to recognize progress.
This situation requires selling the START follow-on
agreement. Giannella also had concerns regarding how the NPT
review process will deal with peaceful uses, as evidenced by
the opposition of the non-aligned countries to putting
"multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle" on the
agenda of the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG). The
Arab-Israeli dispute also had to be dealt with in the NPT
process, and Giannella wondered what the United States was
ready to do in this area. She again noted a good atmosphere
at the NPT Preparatory Committee, but worried that it was not
stable.


6. (SBU) Giannella described the EU's Action Plan to
promote CTBT ratification and opined that China would ratify
at the same time as the United States. She thought that
Israel, India, and Pakistan were greater problems. On FMCT
she noted the French concern that if negotiations on a
verification protocol were lengthy, the normative prohibition
on fissile material production would not take effect for a
long time. This concern led some to the idea of negotiating
a verification protocol after the basic agreement had been
concluded, and Giannella wondered what the United States
thought of that approach. She also said that the EU had the
practice of always mentioning chemical and biological
disarmament along with nuclear, noting that those issues were
more directly related to terrorism.

--------------
THE G-8
--------------


7. (SBU) Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, U.S. Coordinator for
Threat Reduction Programs, thanked the EU for its strong
support of efforts to expand the GP geographic scope and its
funding for addressing global WMD threats. Giannella
mentioned the EU's interest in details regarding the
announced March Global Summit on Nuclear Security , presuming
the Summit would raise funds for international efforts.
Jenkins reiterated that the United States views the Summit
not as a new initiative but as a launching pad for the new
international effort to secure all vulnerable material
worldwide within four years. Giannella noted that obtaining
Russia,s active participation in the GP would continue to be
a challenge, as a number of G-8 members have not fulfilled
their 2002 GP pledge; however, she declared that de facto
expansion of GP program efforts had already begun and will
continue.


8. (SBU) Wright described the EU,s commitment to the GP
)- one billion euros, of which nine-tenths had been
committed and eight-tenths disbursed. What was important now
is to broaden the scope to the Middle East, Southeast Asia,
and other regions. A key part of the EU,s approach would be
to develop Centers of Excellence. Jenkins told the Europeans
that the United States also supports the expansion of the GP
and wonders how to move forward. Dupre thought the GP could
develop new forms of threat reduction programs, even
"coalitions of the willing," and emphasized the utility of
scientist engagement. Giannella noted that a major problem
with the GP now is the difficulty in convincing states that
they should provide funding to Russia, with which the GP is
closely identified.


9. (SBU) Giannella addressed ISN on the Nonproliferation
Directors' Group (NPDG) )- the policy-oriented
nonproliferation activity of the G-8 )- which she pointed
out, accomplishes little beyond agreeing on statements. She
was concerned that the NPDG had reached an impasse: Russia
absorbed much of the time of its discussions, and Canada )-
the 2010 chair )- was not enthusiastic about multilateral
approaches to nuclear energy, which Giannella considers the

STATE 00083574 003 OF 006


most important G-8 topic. ISN expressed similar concerns
over the way the NPDG had been developing. ISN experts also
raised the subject of the G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group,
noting that this group has held a number of useful workshops
and exercises since 2004, but that there has been little
policy-level discussion of bioterrorism. They suggested that
it might be useful to consider whether the list of topics
agreed in 2004 should be updated, whether policy
recommendations should be forwarded to senior officials, and
if so, in what venue such policy discussions should be held.
ISN experts stressed that the United States is seeking to
stimulate discussion among G-8 partners on these questions,
rather than making specific proposals at this time.


10. (SBU) On UNSCR 1540, Giannella encouraged consultation
about a problem of perception. Since developing countries
see proliferation as a largely Western problem, developed
states must think carefully about promoting 1540 under G-8
auspices; promoting nonproliferation within a broader
organization might encourage more robust international
participation. Despite this, both she and the EC staff were
preparing to participate in the upcoming Berlin G-8
expert-level meeting. U.S. 1540 Coordinator Thomas Wuchte
welcomed the EU 1540 G-8 nonpaper as a good basis of
discussion to address developing countries' perceptions.
Giannella agreed with the United States on the desirability
of expanding the GP, noting existing programs outside Russia
and other former Soviet states.


11. (U) Treasury Department representatives briefed the
Europeans on ongoing efforts of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) to stop proliferation. The FATF has issued
three sets of guidance and one typology report. These
issuances are not part of the FATF 40 plus nine
recommendations and, as such, are not considered as criteria
for assessment in the mutual evaluation process. A
proliferation finance project team is considering the
following four general issues: legal systems, preventive
measures, awareness, and investigation. The team's goal is
to present policy options to an upcoming FATF plenary.

--------------
EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE
--------------


12. (SBU) Visiting delegates stated that the EC has six to
10 million euros for export control assistance, but noted the
absence of a consistent funding rationale. Before the end of
the year, they would like to implement a strategic approach
for selecting countries for their outreach, and hope to
coordinate with the United States to avoid duplication. In
order to determine funding priorities, the EC will evaluate
activities that have been executed, assess risks and threats,
and consult with Member States. Dupre prefers a regional
approach. There will be no additional EC export control
funding this year, since the German export control authority
(BAFA) is still implementing previously-funded activities and
they are wrapping up projects with Russia. ISN notionally
proposed organizing an information-sharing meeting with BAFA
and the EC in Europe in late September or early October. The
EC representatives agreed to this notion.


13. (SBU) ISN provided an overview of the EXBS program and
observed that the EC treats its border security efforts,
including those related to preventing "illicit trafficking,"
as distinct from "export controls" (e.g., laws regulations,
licensing processes). ISN noted that the EXBS program takes
a holistic approach and that enforcement at the border is a
critical component of effective strategic trade controls.
The Europeans noted that funds go separately to export
control and illicit trafficking enforcement groups, which are
not talking to each other, and seemed inclined to try to
combine them the way EXBS does. They mentioned that their
illicit trafficking experts are part of the Energy Department
(DoE)-chaired Border Monitoring Working Group and committed
to look into EC support for expanding the group to include
those working on "export controls." ISN also confirmed
agreement by the EC representatives to the donor coordination
process that had been discussed at the EXBS program's recent
International Export Control Conference in Istanbul, and
proposed working to expand formal coordination beyond
information sharing to include the project planning phase and
development of strategies in approaching key countries. EC
representatives were receptive.


14. (SBU) ISN provided updates on EXBS program activities
in countries of interest to the EC and made suggestions for

STATE 00083574 004 OF 006


engaging most effectively. EC delegates noted they would
like to create more international Centers of Excellence and
discussed countries to which the EC may expand assistance by
next year. The Centers' concept seems to still be evolving,
but is consistent with ISN,s suggestion that the EC take a
regional approach to assistance where possible, given
limitations to date on EXBS' ability to do so. With respect
to Thailand, ISN recommended assistance on the licensing
process, including provision of an automated licensing system
(such as the one developed by South Korea),as well as
support for Thailand,s idea to reach regional agreement on
adoption of an EU-based control list. EC representatives
noted that Tunisia has expressed interest in working with the
EC and that the EC started a regional program in North
Africa. The EU has an existing program in Malaysia and the
Europeans noted that the Malaysians have expressed interest
in moving forward, in careful coordination with other donors.
With respect to EC interest in Egypt, ISN noted a lack of
traction for the EXBS program outside of enforcement, and
suggested the EC focus on legal or regulatory training. ISN
supported the EC's interest in working with Pakistan and
Central Asia, as well as program expansion in Afghanistan.
The EC would like to expand in Africa and is considering
launching programs in South Africa, Kenya, Botswana, Nigeria,
Cameroun, and Ghana. They favor exchanging plans for Africa.
The Europeans also mentioned China and Ukraine as potential
funding priorities. European delegates said they need to
have solid recommendations for specific activities to fund by
spring 2010, and welcomed additional input.

--------------
G-77
--------------


15. (U) ISN described plans to engage key G-77 BOG members
such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines, and
noted that criteria of supply were a major unresolved issue.
Giannella seemed surprised that the USG regards the June GOG
debate as a positive development. She made the point that
Argentina and Brazil already hold technologies for uranium
enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies
(ENR),and speculated that our efforts should instead
concentrate on BOG members that do not already have such
technology. ISN replied that the ENR holders, Argentina,
Brazil, and India, are among the most vocal critics of the
MNA proposals, noting that some of the other BOG members,
e.g. Ghana, Mexico, and Malaysia, where rather positive in
the BOG discussion. EU representatives sought assurances
that ISN does not think the MNA issue was dead after the June
BOG. The Europeans are awaiting political direction before
being able to engage on criteria of supply.

--------------
IAEA
--------------


16. (U) ISN briefed the Europeans on USG commitment to
strong and effective IAEA Nuclear Security and Safety
Programs. Since 2002, the USG has contributed USD 51.8
million through the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund. Supported
activities include physical protection of radioactive
materials. ISN emphasized that it is important for the IAEA
to become more proactive in identifying nations most in need
of security enhancements and encouraging them to seek
assistance. A stable and predictable funding stream for
IAEA's nuclear security activities is vital to its success.
ISN urged support for the IAEA's proposed 2010-2011 budget to
begin regularizing funding for the Office of Nuclear Security.

--------------
OUTREACH
--------------


17. (U) ISN briefed the experts on the Preventing Nuclear
Smuggling Program's collaboration with the Instrument for
Stability on nuclear forensics assistance and efforts to
promote the use of national nuclear forensics libraries as a
basis for cooperation among governments investigating illicit
uses of nuclear material. Joulia and Dupre view the
collaboration as successful and expressed support for nuclear
forensics libraries. ISN will work with the DoE to produce a
cost estimate in response to the Europeans' request.


18. During the executive session, Gianella argued for
official EU participation in the PSI. ISN answered that the
EU provides a complementary and supportive legal basis for
the PSI, but that decisions to participate in any specific

STATE 00083574 005 OF 006


interdiction actions, and thus formal PSI participation,
remain with national governments. Furthermore, since all EU
states are PSI partners and 10 of 20 Operational Experts
Group (OEG) participants are EU states, EU interests are
already well-represented in PSI activities. Additionally, ISN
conveyed that interdictions are conducted on a national basis
and a formal EU role, especially in the OEG, risks
unnecessary bureaucratization of the PSI. ISN also stressed
that the PSI is not a legal forum to write or make new laws
related to interdiction related actions. Regarding future
participation, ISN conveyed that the EU has been invited to
observe PSI activities, and there may be room for formalizing
observer status for the EU in PSI, as is currently done in
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.


19. (SBU) ISN outlined its position on the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and briefed
Wright on indications from Russian officials over the past
year, without elaboration, that their government is giving
serious consideration to withdrawal from the ISTC. Russian
officials argue that the original objectives of the ISTC )-
helping Soviet-era weapons scientists transition to
non-weapons work in order to reduce the chances they might
offer their expertise to proliferant states or terrorist
groups )- have been fully accomplished. From a Russian
perspective, the original mission, paying scientists because
the GoR could not, is now an embarrassment. ISN noted that,
although USG funding has dropped significantly, there is
continued value in an ongoing ISTC mission in some form,
preferably including addressing nonproliferation and
counterterrorism objectives. Despite this, the Russian input
on a viable future for the ISTC is necessary before any real
transformation can take place. ISN strongly encouraged the
EU to join the United States in raising this issue with
high-level Russian officials. Wright noted that it has a
similar view on ISTC transformation and the need for Russian
input and also mentioned that the EC funds for ISTC
activities are decreasing in light of the need to address
other global threats.


20. (U) ISN's Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI)
team continued its discussions with the EC on possible
contributions from the Instrument for Stability Fund to
anti-nuclear smuggling assistance projects in the Caucasus
and Central Asia. The NSOI Coordinator provided to the EC
reps a paper on the detection equipment needs of Georgia and
other Caucasus countries to support monitoring of green
borders. The EC representatives agreed to review hat paper
and provide a response in the coming months. The sides also
discussed EC plans for assisting at ports of entry in Central
Asia. EC delegates confirmed that they had set aside funds
for such assistance, probably to be used in one or more of
the three countries, i.e. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan, on Afghanistan,s northern border. As a next
step, NSOI agreed to provide the Europeans with the names of
contacts in the U.S. Embassies and host governments in these
four countries. The NSOI Coordinator also updated the
delegation on NSOI,s efforts as well as plans to engage
countries in South Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe.


21. (SBU) ISN briefed the experts on the Chemical Security
enhancement program (CSP). The threat consists of
proliferators and terrorists seeking to use industrial
chemicals as a low-cost alternative, recruit scientists, and
use chemical weapons. ISN recalled the 1984 accident in
Bhopal, India, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Tokyo,
and more recent chlorine bomb attacks in Iraq. Terrorist
intent, poor lab security, and widespread availability also
contribute to the threat. CSP seeks to deter malefactors
from accessing expertise and materials. The Program works
with governments and industry to grow capabilities and
engages scientists through training, particularly at the
Centers of Excellence in Thailand and Jordan. Joulia
expressed interest in future EC projects in this area and
mentioned that this could be of interest in the industrial
context.


22. (SBU) Joulia and Dupre expressed the EC's continued
interest in coordinating global biological threat reduction
activities with the Departments of State and Defense
worldwide to reduce the biological threat. ISN expressed a
desire to closely coordinate with international donors such
as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Joulia and
Dupre welcomed this to avoid duplication of effort. ISN
briefed on the Biosecurity Engagement Program, which provides
over USD 27 million in FY2009 to engage biologists, secure
dangerous pathogens, improve biosafety, and build capacity to

STATE 00083574 006 OF 006


combat emerging infectious diseases. Joulia outlined the EC
biological threat reduction priority regions, referencing
future focus in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and possibly
Africa.


23. (SBU) Joulia and Dupre highlighted the 2.5 million
euros that have been earmarked for Iraqi scientist
redirection, and ISN thanked the EC for its significant
contribution. (Note: ISN provided the EC with information
on needs in this area last year, and this funding is a result
of our request. End Note.) Joulia stressed that the funding
was not yet a certainty, but that he would learn the final
outcome of members, decision in the fall. ISN stressed that
the United States stands ready to work with the EC to
coordinate this funding if awarded, which the EC plans to use
for radiation safety and non-destructive testing activities
spearheaded by the Iraq Scientist Engagement Program. Dupre
requested an ISN DAS-level endorsement of the importance of
EC efforts on these activities to help the EC make the case
during an internal management meeting in September.

--------------
IRAN
--------------


24. (SBU) ISN urged the Europeans to maintain robust
implementation of the UNSCRs, uphold a unified message, and,
if necessary, increase the pressure on Iran. The USG is
monitoring UNSCRs 1737 (2006),1747 (2007),and 1803 (2008);
advising our partners on implementation; and effectively
implementing the resolutions through domestic legislation.
ISN proposed cooperation on UNSCR 1737's third operative
paragraph to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
all items, goods, materials, equipment, and technology that
could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related reprocessing or
heavy water-related activities, or to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems. Specifically, ISN singled
out the Stability Instrument as a tool that could be used to
engage African countries in the monitoring of their uranium
mines. Such an effort would serve to help ensure that Africa
does not wittingly or unwittingly transfer uranium, a
proscribed item, to Iran, and to ensure private-sector
compliance with UNSCR obligations. ISN also emphasized to
the Europeans that the United States is committed to
resolving the matter diplomatically, but that the current
opportunity for engagement will not last forever. The USG
will realistically consider the next steps should Iran fail
to respond to our overtures. EC representatives welcomed
these ideas and committed to further discussion.
CLINTON