GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA

S E C R E T STATE 075614

SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT KTIA START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA
NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, GENEVA,
SWITZERLAND, JULY 22-24, 2009

REF: A. STATE 041125

B. STATE 050911

C. STATE 050910

D. STATE 060343

E. STATE 060487

F. STATE 061832

G. MOSCOW 01347

H. GENEVA 00419 (SFO-GVA-I-007)

I. STATE 064643

J. GENEVA 000521 (SFO-GVA-II-004)

K. GENEVA 000514 (SFO-GVA-II-003)

L. 04 GENEVA 1026 (BIC-I-001)

Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, VCI.
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, will head the U.S.
delegation in continuing negotiations regarding a START
Follow-on treaty with Russian MFA Director of Security and
Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, in Geneva, Switzerland
on July 22-24, 2009.


2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw from previous guidance
and U.S. nonpapers (reftels) to discuss U.S. views relating to
a START Follow-on treaty. During discussions on the margins
of the Moscow Summit, Antonov suggested that the next round of
negotiations focus on (1)the offense-defense relationship; (2)
conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs; (3) what will be counted
under the treaty limits; and (4) the interest of Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan in participating in the negotiations.
Delegation is authorized to reach agreement on these
issues as detailed in paragraphs 3 ? 7, below. Delegation
should report on all meetings as expeditiously as
possible.

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Relationship Between Offense and Defense
--------------


3. (S) Delegation may draw from the discussion contained
in Ref K to clarify Russia's concerns on the relationship
between strategic offense and defense. Delegation should
reiterate that the U.S. position remains clear, as was
explained during the drafting of the Joint Understanding
(text in paragraph 8, below) that there would only be a
single mention of defensive arms in the treaty and that
would be in the preamble.

--------------
Conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs
--------------


4. (S) As directed by the White House, on the margins of
the July Moscow Summit, Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed
the earlier U.S. proposal regarding the counting of
non-nuclear warheads. If the Russian Delegation raises
the question of the U.S. proposal on non-nuclear warheads
and treaty limits made in conjunction with the Moscow
Summit Joint Understanding, Delegation should reaffirm
that the United States is willing to resolve the issue of
non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs by counting such
warheads toward the treaty limit on strategic warheads in
exchange for Russian agreement: (a) to a strategic
warhead limit of 1500 and a strategic delivery vehicle
limit of 700-900 (with the specific number within this
range to be agreed through further negotiation); and (b)
to exclude from the treaty strategic delivery vehicles
that are currently counted in START but that are not now
part of the strategic nuclear forces of the parties. As
required, Delegation should draw on previous guidance to
explain which U.S. strategic delivery vehicles currently
counted in START should be excluded from the new treaty.
If Russia proposes alternate numbers for warhead or
delivery vehicle limits, proposes additional limitations
on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs or asks questions about
which non-nuclear warheads are to be counted, delegation
should probe the Russian delegation for its views and
report the Russian position and questions back to
Washington.

--------------
What Will Be Counted Under Treaty Limits
--------------


5. (S) Delegation may draw from discussions contained in
Refs J and K to explain the U.S. views on what should be
counted in the START Follow-on treaty, explaining that the
U.S. was drawing from a Russian proposal tabled at the
first meeting of the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral
Implementation Commission (Ref L). Depending on the
results of discussion on conventionally-armed ICBMs and
SLBMs (see paragraph 4, above),the delegation may delete
the word "nuclear" as appropriate in the U.S. position on
what should be counted in the START Follow-on treaty.

-------------- --------------
Participation of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
-------------- --------------


6. (S) Delegation should draw from points in the U.S.
paper contained in paragraph 7 of Ref I as well as
previous guidance to reiterate the U.S. view that the
START Follow-on treaty will be a bilateral agreement
between the United States and the Russian Federation.
Delegation should also seek to draw out Russian views
regarding the ideas presented earlier by the United States
with respect to possible additional steps that could be
taken to inform and reassure Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan on developments relating to further cuts in
strategic offensive arms.

--------------
Organization for Future Work
--------------


7. (S) Delegation should present a notional plan for
organization of further work on the START Follow-on
treaty, drawing on the experience gained during START
negotiations. In particular, working groups would be
modeled on those that were in place during the negotiation
of START. Such work would begin in earnest at the end of
August and continue until the work was completed.

--------------
Text of the Joint Understanding
--------------


8. (U) On July 6, 2009 during the Moscow Summit, Presidents
Obama and Medvedev signed the following Joint
Understanding:

The President of the United States of America and the
President of the Russian Federation have decided on
further reductions and limitations of their nations'
strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early
date a new legally binding agreement to replace the
current START Treaty, and directed that the new treaty
contain, inter alia, the following elements:


1. A provision to the effect that each Party will
reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that
seven years after entry into force of the treaty and
thereafter, the limits will be in the range of 500-1100
for strategic delivery vehicles, and in the range of
1500-1675 for their associated warheads.


2. Provisions for calculating these limits.


3. Provisions on definitions, data exchanges,
notifications, eliminations, inspections, and verification
procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency
measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as
appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.


4. A provision to the effect that each Party will
determine for itself the composition and structure of its
strategic offensive arms.


5. A provision on the interrelationship of strategic
offensive and strategic defensive arms.


6. A provision on the impact of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic
stability.


7. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms
exclusively on the national territory of each Party.


8. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve
questions related to treaty implementation.


9. A provision to the effect that the treaty will not
apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of
strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third
state.


10. A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is
superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the
reduction of strategic offensive arms.

The two Presidents direct their negotiators to finish
work on the treaty at an early date so that they may sign
and submit it for ratification in their respective
countries.

Signed at Moscow, this sixth day of July, 2009, in
duplicate, in the English and Russian languages.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

End text.
CLINTON