OSCE/FSC: WINTER/SPRING 2009 OPENING OF ROUND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 007498

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2015
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: WINTER/SPRING 2009 OPENING OF ROUND
GUIDANCE

REF: (A)USOSCE 310, (B)STATE 150672, (C)MEYER-SILBERBERG
EMAIL 11/13/08 (NOTAL),(D)STATE 125608, (E)USNATO 0004,
(F)USOSCE 318, (G)STATE 134425, (H)WUCHTE-SILBERBERG
EMAIL 1540 PROJECT BUDGET (NOTAL),(I)MARKOFF-WRIGHT
EMAIL WITH INR PAPER 10/28/08 (NOTAL),(J)USNATO 441,
(K)STATE 112027, (L)USOSCE 280

Classified by: Donna A. Phelan, VCI/CCA Acting Office
Director, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action cable. See paras 3-18.


2. (SBU) The events of last fall presented several
challenges to the OSCE. How the international community
decides to respond to these challenges, including
Russia's call for a new European Security Treaty, will
ultimately impact the work of the OSCE and FSC. The U.S.
position remains clear -- that the OSCE is a vital
institution and a crucial link that binds us to Europe
and Eurasia. During the 16th Ministerial Council in
Helsinki in December 2008, the U.S. reaffirmed its
continued support for the OSCE, its principles, and
field missions. USdel should reaffirm our support to
the OSCE through proactive and cooperative engagement in
the FSC.


3. (SBU) The conflict in Georgia in 2008 cast a shadow
over the work of the FSC during both sessions that year,
and the impact of this conflict clearly carries over
into 2009. In this environment, USdel should engage
proactively on topics within the FSC, shaping
discussions to achieve outcomes in line with U.S.
objectives. Maintaining Alliance solidarity continues
to remain a priority U.S. objective, and USdel is
encouraged to solicit Allies' views and offer early
consultations in order to help develop prospective
initiatives into proposals we can support. We are aware
that many Allies and others are interested in resuming
more active engagement, including with Russia, in the
FSC. USdel should seek opportunities to engage more
vigorously on the substance of issues under discussion,
keeping in mind the U.S. goal of seeking ways to improve
the implementation of existing CSBMs and commitments.
Further guidance will be provided as appropriate.


4. (C) USdel priorities for the winter 2009 session are:

-- Continue to support the overall U.S. response to
Russia's military actions in Georgia.

-- Re-affirm the value the U.S. places on the OSCE, and
on the FSC as a forum for addressing practical security
concerns and implementation of CSBMs.

-- Re-establish U.S. leadership in the FSC and its WGs
through proactive engagement with Allies and, as
appropriate, with other pS, on initiatives that support
U.S. interests.

-- Clarify the intent behind Russia's November 2008 F-41
notification (that announced new visa procedures),
identifying its potential impact on other pS, and
reporting Allies' views.

-- Re-assert that the U.S. is eager to engage
internationally on various aspects of cyber security
issues, specifically defense, mitigation, and remedial
strategies while countering/reshaping discussions where
the U.S. is not prepared to go.

-- Promote practical, results-oriented initiatives in
WGs versus development of projects conducted for the
sake of achieving consensus for alternate agendas (i.e.,
end of session; Ministerial; ASRC and/or AIAM agendas).

-- Re-assert U.S. policy with respect to the work on
SA/LW, specifically to resist broadening the current
scope of the already agreed OSCE Document on SA/LW.

-- Continue to support U.S. efforts to engage pS,
including OSCE Mediterranean Partner countries, on
counterproliferation of MANPADS.

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-- Demonstrate U.S. commitment to the Security Dialogue
by proposing value-added topics and engaging U.S.
speakers as appropriate.

-- Continue emphasis in the FSC to further UNSCR 1540
implementation, including finishing the Best Practice
Guide (BPG) and utilizing the Security Dialogue when
appropriate, understanding that efforts to promote UNSCR
1540 implementation and to engage the broader OSCE and
are ongoing.

-- Coordinate with Allies to ensure a united approach to
the AIAM, following up expert discussions in the
Verification Coordination Committee (VCC); solicit
Allied views on the purpose/timing of the next Heads of
Verification (HOV) meeting.

-- Proactively engage the FSC Chairmanships on
activities outlined in the 2009 workplan.


CSBMs
- - -


5. (SBU) Washington will continue to consult with Allies
regarding proposals for new and existing confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs). USdel should remain
focused on seeking ways to improve implementation of
existing CSBMs and commitments. USdel should carefully
consider any new proposals for CSBMs. USdel is reminded
to oppose new proposals that are Russian or others'
attempts to substitute CSBMs for CFE and adapted CFE
provisions. However, USdel may engage constructively on
the substance of new proposals on other topics, but, as
always, should continue to resist consideration of those
that appear to have no genuine merit. Further guidance
will be provided as necessary.


6. (SBU) Russia warned that it will return in 2009 to
all CSBM proposals it has made over the last two years
(Ref A). USdel should refer to standing guidance on
such proposals (Ref B). This includes continuing to
oppose tabled proposals that Washington considers to
have no genuine merit:

-- Concrete parameters for a Specified Area: The VCC
considered the Russian proposal for Concrete parameters
for a Specified Area and decided discussion should
remain in Vienna. With this in mind, Allies may wish to
engage Russia on this proposal. U.S. standing guidance,
Ref B, which outlines U.S. opposition to this proposal
based on a lack of merit, applies and was revalidated
during recent discussions in the VCC.

-- Single Deadline on Submission of Defense Planning
Info: The U.S. has consistently opposed Russia's
proposal for a single deadline of September 20 to submit
defense planning information under VD99
(FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.4). USdel should continue to oppose
engaging on this proposal. It is impractical, given
differing legislative and budgetary procedures and
calendars for pS, and unnecessary, given that most pS
for the last 15 years have regularly submitted their
defense planning information once available.

Ref A reports that Russia has warned it will return in
2009 to all the CSBM proposals it has made over the last
two years, including the proposal on Rapid Reaction
Forces (RRF). Last year, in response to Quad interest
in offering an alternative proposal, Washington shared
with USdel that we had begun a review of possible
options. However, this review was put on hold after
Russia used military force in Georgia in August 2008.
If Quad Allies remind us of the U.S. undertaking to
explore a possible counterproposal, USdel should note
that we do not see the counterproposal as a priority in
the current European security environment. If Quad
delegations indicate they remain interested in offering
a counter to the Russian proposal should it be re-
introduced in 2009, USdel is asked to report to
Washington for further guidance.

Code of Conduct
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7. (SBU) In November 2008 a majority of pS expressed a

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strong desire for all pS to conclude discussion on the
draft decision for an update to the Code of Conduct
questionnaire (FSC.DD/14/08) and determine whether they
could live with the document as it stands. The Russian
delegation, however, made it clear that the document was
still under review in Moscow and Russia would likely
submit substantive changes to both the texts of the
draft decision and the questionnaire. In November 2008,
with the anticipation that additional edits might be
proposed from Moscow, the U.S. suggested some additional
changes (Ref. C),which are still being considered by
the Chair. Should the coordinator re-open the document
for Russian edits, USdel should push for its November
suggestions also to be incorporated. Once the new
version of the document is received, the Department will
consult the interagency.


SALW/SCA
- - - - -


8. (SBU) Decision 11/08 calls for an OSCE meeting on
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) to be held in 2009
to review the OSCE Document on SA/LW (FSC.DOC/1/00) and
its supplementary decisions with a view to explore
possible further actions. As has been consistent U.S.
policy in this area, Washington is reluctant to expand
the nature of work on SA/LW beyond the already agreed
scope of the OSCE Document on SA/LW. U.S. policy also
maintains a distinct separation between SA/LW and
Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA),and we
would oppose any attempt to consolidate the OSCE SA/LW
and SCA normative documents. Should any delegation
indicate that it will initiate such an effort, Mission
should seek early informal consultations to make clear
our objections in order to avoid confrontation in the
WGs. Once the agenda and topics to be addressed during
the 2009 meeting are known, Washington will provide
further guidance.

(If raised):


9. (SBU) If the issue of cluster munitions is raised
under this topic or elsewhere, USdel should be clear on
U.S. policy on cluster munitions, their use, and related
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) concerns (Ref D). The
U.S. does share the concerns of many States regarding
the unintended harm to civilians and civilian
infrastructure caused by the use of cluster munitions.
The U.S. believes that cluster munitions are legitimate
weapons and does not support their total ban. When
employed properly and in accordance with international
humanitarian law, cluster munitions can actually reduce
collateral damage to civilians and civilian
infrastructure. On June 19, 2008, Secretary Gates
signed a new DoD Policy, "Cluster munitions and
Unintended Harm to Civilians" that outlines the steps
that U.S. armed forces will take to minimize the risk to
civilians
(www.defenselink,mil/news/d20080709cmpolicy.p df). As
with the Ottawa Convention the U.S. does not consider
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM),signed by 94
governments in Oslo on December 3-4, 2008, to be
customary international law. The U.S. did not sign the
CCM and continues to strongly support negotiations
within the framework of the Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW) on a protocol that would require states to
phase in technical improvements to cluster munitions
over time, minimizing the humanitarian impact of their
use. As with mine action, any OSCE endeavor on cluster
munitions, including post conflict clearance of
unexploded submunitions, should be fully coordinated
with other international, regional, and national
efforts.


Security Dialogue
- - - - - - - - -


10. (SBU) Washington requests that USdel coordinate
with Chairs to promote inclusion of proposals for
substantive U.S. presentations on topics that
demonstrate U.S. commitment to the Security Dialogue and
advance U.S. strategic objectives. As appropriate,
USdel should explore the possibilities for presentations
on any of the following topics:


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-- Process of transition to a new administration with a
focus on security policy;

-- The new national defense strategy (once it is
published);

-- WMD report (The World at Risk: The Report of the
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism);

-- the Marshall Center on recent transformations in the
school curriculum and how they are staying on the
cutting edge in support of Defense Transformations that
several pS militaries also are undertaking;

-- USEUCOM and/or USAREUR on military-to-military
engagement plans and included spirit of Partnership for
Peace Exercise plan;

-- U.S. efforts on MANPADS counterproliferation.

Washington appreciates Mission's initiative in past
planning for U.S. presentations for the Security
Dialogue. Washington would like to remind USdel that
presentations given on behalf of the USG should be
cleared by Washington agencies.


VD99: Russian F-41 on New Visa Procedures
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (SBU) In November 2008, Russia issued an F-41
(CBM/RU/08/0149/F41/O) that says that due to changes in
legislation, plane-side visas for inspectors/evaluators
who are not from a country with which Russia has an
agreement on visa-free travel will only be issued at
Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg and the three international
airports associated with Moscow (Domodedovor,
Sheremetyevo, and Vnukovo). If inspecting teams plan
to enter at any other Russian point of entry (POE),all
inspectors on the team must obtain visas prior to
arrival at the POE. Since 1992, all U.S. teams
conducting VD99 activities in Russia have used only the
international airports at Moscow and St. Petersburg as
POEs and we expect to continue to request use of these
POEs. The new procedures could affect U.S.
inspectors/evaluators and guest inspectors traveling
with a U.S.-led team who do not already possess Russian
visas if the requested POE is different from those
listed in the F-41. However, because the VD99, per
paras 88 and 121, grants the receiving state (in this
case, Russia) the final decision on determining the POE,
Russia could, while remaining within the letter of VD99,
designate a POE other than one we requested.


12. (SBU) At their December 17 meeting, VCC Experts
agreed that discussion of Russia's new visa procedures,
as announced in the November F-41, should continue in
Vienna (Ref E). Washington has considered the
suggestion by the UK rep in Vienna for a joint statement
that criticizes Russia for its change in procedures
under the assumption that the new procedures are
intended to circumvent VD99 obligations. Discussion
with Russia, Allies, and others, as appropriate (since
the new visa procedures may have implications for all
pS),should take place before we can determine whether
an FSC plenary statement is necessary or appropriate.
During informal meetings and/or on the margins of the
FSC and Working Groups, USdel should seek from Russia
clarification on its intent behind the November F-41
notification as well as solicit the views of both Allies
and non-Allies. USdel should report results to
Washington so that further guidance may be provided as
appropriate.


13. (SBU) Recognizing Russia's good faith effort to
provide information on new visa procedures in an F-41
notification last November, we are not entirely clear on
the impact of the new visa procedures on future
inspections/evaluations. USdel may draw from the
following questions in seeking clarification of the F-41
notification with the Russian delegation:

-- Will Russia routinely divert Vienna Document teams to
POEs other than those exempt from the new visa
procedures (Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and the three
international airports associated with Moscow -

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Domodedovo, Sheremetyevo, and Vnukovo)?

-- If POEs other than those exempt from the new
procedures are selected, will places to obtain entry
visas be designated?

-- How will the new visa procedures impact multinational
inspection/evaluation teams?

-- Does the new visa provision have unlimited duration,
or is it temporary?

-- Could any special provisions be put in place to
ensure that the carrying out of Vienna Document
verification measures is not obstructed?


UNSCR 1540
- - - - - -


14. (SBU) USdel should continue to promote continued
emphasis on furthering the implementation of UNSCR 1540.
For more complete guidance that engages the wider OSCE
on UNSCR 1540, please see Refs F and G. In the context
of the FSC, USdel is encouraged to:

-- Seek completion of the first 1540 Best Practice Guide
(BPG) chapter on export control and transshipment.

-- At the same time, USdel should circulate for comment
a draft decision to welcome the guide and lobby other pS
to author additional chapters, with a view to completing
the full BPG as soon as possible, ideally in 2009.

-- If proposed by other delegations, support a group of
friends to promote dialogue on UNSCR 1540 as well as a
project proposal to second additional staff capacity to
work on nonproliferation. See Ref H.


Cyber Security
- - - - - - - -


15. (SBU) The U.S. reluctantly joined consensus on the
Estonian-Lithuanian sponsored decision to hold a
workshop on cyber security March 17-18, 2009
(FSC.Dec/17/08). Current U.S. policy is that hackers
and cyber criminals, not states, are the most urgent
cyber threat. The workshop's agenda thus leaves room
for discussions to stray into areas the U.S. is not
prepared to go at this point, i.e., discussions of
nation-state actions in cyberspace and concomitant
proposals for treaties or other negotiated constraints
on state cyber capabilities. The U.S. has consistently
opposed constraints on information technology in other
international multinational fora as undesirable,
ineffective, and unverifiable. USdel should continue to
stress, as it did during the Autumn FSC session (Ref I),
that the U.S. believes the most value can come from
exchanges on defensive measures and/or strategies,
mitigation, and remediation.


16. (SBU) During the March workshop, U.S. reps are
encouraged to steer the discussions as much as possible
toward defense, mitigation, remedial measures, and
reducing vulnerabilities, noting that the same defensive
strategies are required regardless of the source of an
attack. Washington requests that USdel engage
informally with the sponsors of the workshop/FSC Chair
as soon as possible to learn of potential panel speakers
and what they may be likely to say during the workshop
as that will likely impact the composition of the U.S.
delegation. During informal consultations, USdel should
also lay down a marker that workshop discussions, as
much as possible, should focus on defensive measures,
lessons learned, and the exchange of best practices.
USdel should continue to push for the participation of a
U.S. speaker (TBC) on one of the panels; our preferences
are sessions 1 and/or 2. USdel is requested to report
to Washington as soon as possible should opportunities
arise for the U.S. to recommend candidates to chair
and/or participate in other working session panels.
Washington will provide additional guidance as detailed
plans for the workshop unfold.


AIAM

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- - -


17. (C) In preparing for the Annual Implementation
Assessment Meeting (AIAM) on March 3-4, USdel should
encourage Allies in Vienna to coordinate in line with
discussions in the VCC over the past several months
(Refs E, J, and K). VCC experts have been working on a
number of papers that Allies can use as references for
ensuring active discussion during the AIAM. Some
delegations have indicated plans to table papers prior
to or during the AIAM that draw from the NATO papers.
At the VCC meeting of Experts in Jan, France announced
its intention of tabling at the AIAM three of the
remaining discussion papers: Briefings by Military
Commanders; Use of Digital Cameras and GPS; and, Size of
Inspection and Evaluation Teams. In addition,
Norway/Denmark may table a paper on
Inspection/Evaluation Quota Calculation System. All
four of these papers remain under discussion in the VCC
while Experts seek consensus on a common NATO approach.
However, regardless of the outcome of debate in the VCC,
the U.S. has supported the position that any pS may
bring up any implementation topic for discussion at the
AIAM. Canada, for example, announced it will table a
paper on Force Majeure, despite the fact that the draft
paper on this topic will not reach consensus in the VCC
on a common NATO approach. USdel should be prepared to
follow up VCC discussions by encouraging coordination
among Allies intent on tabling papers at the AIAM. U.S.
interest for the AIAM remains to maintain a unified
Allied front through coordination of implementation
topics discussed in detail over the past year and to
encourage the most productive conversations on positive
accomplishments as well as identification of areas for
improvement during the March meeting.


Heads of Verification Meeting
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


18. (C) Ref L reported on the incoming French Chair's
decision to move the Heads of Verification (HOV) Meeting
from immediately preceding the AIAM in March 2009 to
coincident with the data exchange in December 2009.
According to Mission's report, despite receiving vocal
support from the UK and Sweden, France's decision was
made with minimal consultation with Allies, based on the
request of one pS. While we objected to holding a
formal HOV meeting in conjunction with the AIAM, we are
concerned that the process led by the French did not
adequately allow for discussion of the issue. We would
have preferred if Allies and other interested
delegations in the FSC had been consulted ahead of time.
Washington also is not convinced that holding an HOV
meeting in conjunction with the data exchange in
December is the best alternative. USdel should
encourage Allies to coordinate, in the future, such
decisions in advance. USdel should also solicit views
from Allies and others on the HOV meeting's purpose and
whether the December date makes sense and report back to
Washington.


Engaging the French Chair
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


19. (C) USdel is encouraged to proactively engage the
FSC chairmanships (France, Georgia, and the UK) on
activities outlined in the 2009 workplan. Washington is
concerned that we will be less responsive in the FSC
than desired because the French Chair does not plan to
consult with pS in as expansive a manner as previous
Chairs. A few recent actions by the French del can be
cited: the process related to the HOV meeting;
declining to invite Dr. David Cooper, in the place of
General Ward (who could not travel to Vienna),to
address the January 28th Security Dialogue on Africom;
and, approaching USdel with a draft workplan for the
Winter/Spring 2009 round only a week before the opening
session. [Note. Past FSC Chairs, for at least the last
three years, have consulted USdel well in advance of
each opening session to discuss their goals/priorities
and the overall workplan of the upcoming FSC session.
We understand similar consultations took place with
other key delegations as well. End Note.] USdel should
seek to determine whether the French are consulting with
other delegations in a similar minimal fashion, or,

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whether it is only the U.S. Taking this as an
indication of how the french plan to carry out their
chairmanship, Washington asks that USdel be more
proactive in engaging the French on FSC work.
CLINTON