GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

S E C R E T STATE 071188

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: AF ASEC KCRM KNNP PARM PINR PREL PTER BY XA ZF
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON RESPONDING TO REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
IN IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

REF: A. BUJUMBURA 000302 02-JULY-2009

B. IIR 6 916 0038 09 02-JULY-2009

C. IIR 6 916 0039 09 04-JULY 2009

D. KAMPALA 000086 10-JAN-2003

E. IIR 4 201 0118 05 09-OCT-2004

F. STATE 030541 31-MAR-2009

G. KESSLER-DIAMOND E-MAIL DATED 9-JUL-2009

Classified By: ISN DAS Eliot Kang


1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Bujumbura.
Please see paragraph 6.


2. (S//NF) SUMMARY: Regarding the July 2 report of an illicit
trafficking incident in the Republic of Burundi (ROB),Post
has asked Washington for assistance in identifying potential
nuclear material in a canister, currently in storage at the
Burundian Intelligence Service headquarters. See response and
action request below. END SUMMARY.


3. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: Per REF A and B, on 2 July 2009,
Post alerted Washington that it had received a report
indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in
nuclear and/or radiological material. The Defense Attache
(DATT) generated a report after meeting with ROB intelligence
officials, who asked for United States' assistance in
identifying what was alleged to be a canister of uranium.
Post initially relayed this information to the Political
Military Action Team (PMAT) by telephone at 1035Z, and
additional information was transmitted by email at 1151Z. The
alleged uranium canister viewed by the DATT was described as
a metal container two feet long and six inches in diameter
with accompanying documents that reference "U-A238." The two
photocopied documents appear to be test results verifying the
radioactive nature of the material. The documents purport to
be from Uganda and Zaire while the ROB claims it acquired the
canister from a local citizen who reportedly obtained it from
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The canister is
currently in storage at the Burundian Intelligence Service
headquarters in Kigobe, Bujumbura.


4. (S//NF) ASSESSMENT: Similar "wicker basket" cases have
occurred frequently for several years, often involving
Congolese sources or suppliers and the DRC as the origin and
usually with similar device characteristics and documents.
Apparently another "wicker basket" case occurred in Bujumbura
in 2007 (Bujumbura 000515, 17-Jul-2007). With respect to Refs
A and C, we note that some previous documents include the
same names of the "experts." In Ref D, documentation similar
to that in Ref A and C accompanied a claim of a container in
a wicker basket in Kampala in 2003. The report names Tshika
Mutombo as an expert in this case, making it likely that the
documentation accompanying the current container is an
iteration of the documentation in the Kampala case. Ref E
report is from a walk-in in Nairobi in 2004 who had
documentation originating from Zaire regarding uranium
available for sale that includes the name of another expert,
Mwamba Kalala, also named in Ref A and C documents. As in
previous "wicker basket" cases, the accompanying documents
contain numerous technical inaccuracies and mistakes that
support a current assessment that the container is likely not
of concern and could be a scam.


5. (S//NF) ASSESSMENT (CONT'D) Ref G contains Nuclear
Assessment Program (NAP) Sales Bulletins 1505, 1452, 1372,
and 1348 which provide valuable detailed analysis of trends
observed in past "wicker basket" uranium cases. Additional
information about similarities to previous cases can be found
in intelligence reporting dating back several years.


6. (S//NF) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to coordinate
with the country team and then inform Washington of all
resources available that may be helpful in identifying the
material inside the canister, including possibly transferring
equipment from other posts in the region. Washington believes
this canister is likely not a threat but is interested in
determining what material may be inside and removing it from
circulation because such cases drain law-enforcement
resources and increase demand for such materials. Post is
also requested to provide a coordinated response from the
country team to the questions posed in paragraph 6 in order
to reduce any possible duplicate reporting. Washington
greatly appreciates Post's immediate notification of the
seizure.


7. (S//REL TO ROB) FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS:

--(SBU) Washington is looking into the possibility of an RSO
in a neighboring country providing a radiation detection
pager and radiation identifier to the Defense Attach in
Bujumbura; DIA would provide procedures for use of the
equipment. In the event that Post is unable to locate a
radiation detector in USG custody in Bujumbura, are other
avenues available to obtain this equipment, such as
requesting assistance from allied embassies?

--(S//REL TO ROB) Could Burundian authorities confirm the
veracity of reports of health hazards caused by the material?

--(S//REL TO ROB) Is it possible to identify the "local
citizen" who provided the material to the host government? A
name could provide some insight on if/how this case could be
related to previous cases that involved similar containers
and documents.

--(S//REL TO ROB) Does the host government plan to store or
dispose of the container?

--(S//REL TO ROB) How long has the host government been in
possession of the container?

--(S//REL TO ROB) Who in the DRC provided the material to the
businessman (seller)?

--(S//REL TO ROB) Who provided the documents to the
businessman?

--(S//REL TO ROB) What extremists associations do the
businessman or his associates have?

--(S//REL TO ROB) Who has the businessman tried to sell the
materials to?


8. (SBU) REPORTING DEADLINE: Post is requested to provide a
coordinated response via front-channel cable no later than
July 13, 2009.
CLINTON