START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 067127

SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2019
TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-II): JUNE 24 2009, MEETING

REF: A. GENEVA 521 (SFO-GVA-II-004)

B. MOSCOW 01664

C. GENEVA 515 (SFO-GVA-II-008)

Classified By: A/S Rose Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator.
Reason: 1.5(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-005.


2. (U) Meeting Date: June 24, 2009
Time: 11:00 A.M. ) 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The third meeting of the third session of the START
Follow-on negotiations focused on receiving the Russian
Delegation comments on the U.S. Delegation proposed draft of
the merged Joint Understanding that had been tabled on
Tuesday, June 23, 2009 (Ref A).


4. (S) The Russian delegation noted that the revised U.S.
Delegation proposal attempted to meet the Russians half way.
The Russian delegation added, however, that while it could
accept many of the U.S. Delegation proposed changes, the U.S.
proposal did not go far enough.


5. (S) First, the Russian Delegation stated that the future
treaty should not be limited to only the elements in the
Joint Understanding, and proposed to add &inter alia8 to
the chapeau. Second, Russia could not agree to the ¬ to
exceed8 numbers of SNDVs (1100, proposed by the U.S.) and
ODSNW (1675, proposed by Russia) in the U.S. draft. For
Russia, the two numbers were interrelated and one
Russian-proposed number could not be used without including
the other Russian-proposed number (500 delivery vehicles).
The Russian Delegation said that the ceilings for strategic
delivery vehicles and their associated warheads would have to
be agreed upon later. Third, the Russian Delegation stated
that it was premature to describe counting approaches under
the new treaty. Fourth, Russia still sought language
stipulating a ban on the deployment of conventionally-armed
ICBMs and SLBMs, and suggested adding a phrase that notes
such missiles &could impact strategic stability.8 The
Russian delegation noted that this was a particularly
important point for Russia and that if the U.S. could not
address its concerns in this area, there could be no treaty.


6. (S) The U.S. Delegation responded that there could be
alternative ways to resolve Russia,s concerns on
conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, including additional
verification and transparency measures, adding that the U.S.
had no current plans to actually deploy such missiles, but
that, even though Russia was not an enemy, the U.S. had to
prepare for future threats from others. The Russian
Delegation also proposed changes to the closing section that
would not commit the Parties to negotiations on further
reductions in SOAs after the SFO treaty is concluded. The
U.S. Delegation closed by reminding the Russian Delegation
that President Obama expected to have a substantive statement
to sign in Moscow.

END SUMMARY.

--------------
Foreign Minister Lavrov,s Speech
to the OSCE
--------------


7. (S) Gottemoeller welcomed the Russian Delegation to the
U.S. mission by noting that she had read with interest the
speech delivered by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to the
OSCE in Vienna the previous day, especially his points
regarding European arms control. She said that it would be
interesting for our delegations to discuss this issue, but if
we were to do so, we would be here until tomorrow morning.
Gottemoeller said that she had noted with special interest
Lavrov,s reference to Immanuel Kant,s Principle of
Categorical Imperative, i.e., &we should always treat others
in the way we expect them to treat us.8 Gottemoeller said
that Lavrov had paraphrased Kant,s principle by stating that
&no country should strengthen its own security at the
expense of others.8 Gottemoeller said that Lavrov,s quote
was particularly useful in the context of our work in the
START Follow-on negotiations. She closed by complementing FM
Lavrov on this speech and looked forward to continued
dialogue on European security issues.


8. (S) Antonov thanked Gottemoeller for her remarks and said
that he had also read the media reports on the speech,
stating that he took particular note of Lavrov,s use of the
term &indivisibility of security.8 He also said that it is
too bad that we do not have time to discuss its meaning
today; however, he agreed with Gottemoeller that it was an
important issue in the context of our negotiations. Noting
that what he was about to say was &off-the-record,8 Antonov
said that it was hectic working in his department of the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) because of its
&crazy workload.8 He also said that he was jealous that
the some in the MFA had time to research quotes by Kant for
use by the Foreign Minister. He went on to say his office in
the MFA is usually criticized that its talking points were
&too dry and formal.8 Nevertheless, the concept of
&indivisibility of security8 was developed in his office
without the help of Kant.

--------------
Russian Comments on U.S. Non-Paper
on the Joint Understanding
--------------


9. (S) Antonov said that he was prepared to share Russian
Delegation views on the revised U.S. delegation proposal that
was handed over at the previous meeting (Ref A). He said
that the Russian Delegation had worked hard since yesterday
to find common ground with the U.S. proposals contained in
that paper. He appreciated the U.S. attempt to try to
resolve differences in the document so that it would be ready
for signing at the U.S.-Russian Summit. He said that the
Russian Delegation had come up with some proposals that would
meet the U.S. Delegation half way. He said that these
Russian counter-proposals would help to narrow the
differences in the draft Joint Understanding. Before
describing the Russian views, he stated that the Joint
Understanding would serve as a framework for our future work,
but it does not mean that the new START Follow)on Treaty
would only be limited to the provisions contained in the
Joint Understanding. Antonov made the following points that
reflect the Russian Delegation comments:

- First point: In the last sentence of the introductory
paragraph, add the words &among others,8 so that the
sentence would read: &The new Treaty will contain the
following elements, among others:8

- Second point: In paragraph 1, the most critical problem
the Russian Delegation has is with the numbers of strategic
nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles contained in the U.S.
Delegation proposal. Antonov said that he noticed that the
U.S. Delegation had only preserved the number of nuclear
warheads from Russia,s version. He said that it was
unacceptable to have the Joint Understanding only refer to
one number because the two sets of numbers (for warheads and
delivery vehicles) were interrelated. Antonov went on to say
that while the Russian Delegation listened closely to the
U.S. side,s explanations for why the U.S. had proposed 1100
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and they understood that
U.S. and Russian forces were structured differently, this
issue could not be resolved either today or tomorrow. He
said that resolving this issue will be the most important
task for our future negotiations, and he is not quite sure
how we should deal with it. Therefore, since Russia could
not accept the U.S. Delegation-proposed deletion of the
number &5008 for strategic delivery vehicles, he proposed
that both numbers be deleted from the Joint Understanding.
Antonov then read the following Russian-proposed text for
paragraph 1:

&1. A provision to the effect that each Party will reduce
and limit its strategic offensive arms, so that seven years
after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the
aggregate numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and their
associated warheads do not exceed levels to be agreed upon.8

- Third point: Antonov said that since the key issue in
our negotiations is how the sides should account for delivery
vehicles and warheads and we would not be able to agree what
those future counting rules will be before the July Summit,
he suggested that we shorten the U.S. Delegation-proposed
text in paragraph 2 as follows:

&2. Provisions for calculating these limits.8

- Fourth point: Antonov said that the U.S. explanations
provided in Moscow during the previous session (Ref B)
regarding the issue of counting converted ICBMs and SLBMs
against the Treaty,s strategic delivery vehicle limit was
understood but the U.S. position that newly-developed ICBMs
and SLBMs configured with non-nuclear warheads would not
count against that limit only served to aggravate Russia,s
concerns on the issue. He argued newly-developed
conventional ICBMs or SLBMs should be considered strategic
offensive arms and count against the Treaty,s strategic
delivery vehicle limit. He said that not counting these
ICBMs and SLBMs would negatively affect strategic stability
and could lead to serious consequences for Russia,s
security. Therefore, Antonov said that for the wording in
this paragraph, the Russian Delegation went back to President
Medvedev,s June 20 remarks in Amsterdam, while taking into
account Lavrov,s comment about strengthening the security of
one country at the expense of others. He then read the
following Russian Delegation proposal for paragraph 6.

&6. Provisions on non-deployment of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
in a non-nuclear configuration and their impact on strategic
stability.8

- Fifth point: Antonov said that with regard to the last
paragraph on future negotiations, he suggested that the sides
should draw from the April 1, 2009, Joint Statement for the
language. He proposed the following text:

&The two Presidents have also directed that following
conclusion of the treaty, the discussion of the prospects for
effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms
will continue in a step-by-step process.8


10. (S) In conclusion, Antonov said that the Russian
Delegation agreed to the U.S. text in all of the other
paragraphs in the U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding; these
proposals reflected the maximum flexibility the Russian
Delegation could offer at this point. All of these proposed
changes would still have to get approval from Moscow. He
said that his delegation had the courage to take the
initiative to offer these counter-proposals, and he expressed
the hope that Washington would look favorably upon these
proposals as well. Russia, too, wants to move the process
forward on concluding the Joint Understanding. He then
provided a Russian paper, dated June 24, 2009, containing the
language he had proposed. The text of that paper will be
provided septel (Ref C).

--------------
U.S. DELEGATION COMMENTS ON THE
RUSSIAN PAPER
--------------


11. (S) Gottemoeller thanked the Russian Delegation for its
work in responding quickly to the U.S. non-paper on the Joint
Understanding. She remarked that it is odd that the Russian
Delegation was not ready to accept the U.S. formulation in
paragraph 1 for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and
strategic nuclear warheads: the formulation for the language
on strategic nuclear warheads was drawn directly from a
Russian-proposed definition that had been provided during the
initial meeting of the Bilateral Implementation Commission in
April 2004. It was unfortunate that Russia could not accept
it now.


12. (S) Antonov said that Russia was not prepared to discuss
the details of counting rules at this point and that it was
better if the sides could agree to a simple formulation for
the Joint Understanding while retaining &constructive
ambiguity.8 He said that, of course, Russia is always
willing to listen, but the sides should be discussing such
important details in a quiet atmosphere without the pressures
of the Moscow Summit in our immediate future. Gottemoeller
responded by saying that the U.S. needed to have a clear idea
of what we are counting in order to narrow the scope of the
numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles. Antonov said that
he fully agreed, but he just could not do it now.


13. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov to provide more clarity
on why Russia would want to remove the U.S.-proposed language
that the counting rules were drawn from START and the Moscow
Treaty. Antonov replied that the sides have not agreed on
what the counting rules would be and in fact the Russian side
did not have its own views yet on this issue and was open to
all options, in order to work on mutually acceptable
formulations. He went on to state that the U.S. explanations
on counting rules have not clarified the issue for Russia.
References to START and the Moscow Treaty, as applicable, are
ambiguous. Russia wants language that is clear, especially
for such an important issue as calculating limits under the
Treaty, and it was too early to decide what this would be.


14. (S) Regarding paragraph 6 on non-nuclear ICBMs and
SLBMs, Warner asked if the Russia,s use of the term
&non-deployment of8 meant the same thing as a &ban8 from
Russia,s previous text. (Begin Comment: Koshelev,
Antonov,s deputy said &yes8 in a side remark, but Antonov
did not develop the point. End Comment) Antonov said that
the Russian Delegation was not looking at ways to conceal the
Russian position in the Joint Understanding of a ban on
non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs: the sides had already had that
discussion and the Russian side had not yet received
convincing arguments from the U.S. side. He said that is why
they added the phrase &and their impact on strategic
stability8 to the paragraph. Antonov went on to say that
this may not be the best wording for that paragraph, he was
simply looking at ways that might help to resolve if for the
Joint Understanding. He said that the sides had been
discussing this key issue for the last three rounds, and that
Russia position on this issue was set forth by the Russian
President in Helsinki. He said that he was trying to tell
the U.S. that this is a very serious issue for Russia.
Furthermore, as the Russian President had said in his
Helsinki speech, if this issue is not resolved, there would
be no Treaty.


15. (S) Gottemoeller said that Antonov,s message had been
received loud and clear. She underscored that there were
different ways to find solutions. She said that a ban on
deployment of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs is one way, finding
solutions that would increase Russian confidence on future
deployments of such systems could be another. She suggested
that the sides need to remain open to all possible solutions,
in particular, developing transparency and verification
measures regarding deployments on non-nuclear ICBMs and
SLBMs. She said that these types of solutions will require
more substantive discussion and will not be resolved during
this round.


16. (S) Elliott said that he would like to comment on the
term &non-deployment8 from paragraph 6 (non-nuclear ICBMs
and SLBMs). Regarding the earlier points Antonov had made on
how non-nuclear ICBMS and SLBMs impact Russia,s strategic
security, he said that the U.S. does not see Russia as an
enemy. While the U.S. is still unsure of whether such
systems will be deployed in the future, including a
prohibition of deploying such systems in a treaty would
preclude the U.S. from ensuring its own strategic security.
He said he offered this as a way to help the Russian
Delegation understand the U.S. point of view on this issue.
The U.S. understands Russia,s concerns and the U.S. needs to
increase Russia,s comfort levels regarding deployment of
such systems.


17. (S) Antonov said that it was a pleasure to hear the
words from Elliott that the U.S. and Russia are not enemies.
However, he said, words must be reflected in deeds. It was
his view that it should not be the case that in some respects
we are enemies, and in other respects we are not. He said
that each time he saw critical situations where U.S. steps
undermine Russia,s security, he asked himself, are we
friends or are we enemies? He went on to say that such
situations include discussions in the Australia Group,
concerning the proliferation of BW and CW, where the question
arises, just whom are the CIA and FBI fighting against? With
regard to the flank issue under the CFE Treaty, Russia has
explained its needs many times and the U.S. is always against
it, even though it poses no threat to the United States.
With regard to missile defense issues, deployments of
anti-ballistic missile systems in the Czech Republic and
Poland posed serious threats to Russia,s security.
Furthermore, the current NATO enlargement is undermining
Russia,s security, yet the U.S. continues to support it even
as we tell you that it undermines our security. He said that
with all of these issues in mind, he asks the question again,
are we enemies or are we not enemies. He said this is why
Russia is concerned regarding the deployment of non-nuclear
ICBMs and SLBMs: the potential that you are building could be
used at a particular time against Russia. He asked the U.S.
side to think about what he had said, adding that there was
still much to do to strengthen the trust between our two
countries. He said it was good that the U.S. side had said
that the decision to develop such weapons had not yet been
made, but he wanted the U.S. side to know that if such a
decision is made, it would affect Russia,s security. He
said that the same goes for deploying missile defense systems
in Europe. He encouraged the U.S. to stop implementing plans
that would undermine Russia,s security and to please
consider his words before making any implementation decisions.


18. (S) Warner said that he wanted to clarify the two wildly
different positions on conventional ICBMS and SLBMs. He said
that Antonov had made perfectly clear Russia,s position and
he understands it. He pointed out that the U.S. position has
a distinction between the strategic nuclear delivery count
and the warhead count. He said that if the U.S. decided to
deploy such systems in the future, the non-nuclear warheads
placed on existing ICBM and SLBMs would count in the delivery
vehicle limit but the conventional warhead would not count
within the warhead limit. He concluded by stating he
understood that this was not the Russian position. Antonov
said that is why they referenced paragraph 6 the way they
did, because the sides cannot agree at this time. He said
that he appreciated the U.S. explanations for its position,
and he believes that the sides understand each other
perfectly.


19. (S) Antonov said that he had one more suggestion for the
U.S. regarding paragraph 6. He said that if the U.S. could
accept paragraph 6 as proposed by the Russian side, and later
if the U.S. side could convince Russia that deployment of
conventional ICBMS and SLBMs would not impact Russia,s
strategic stability, it would consider removing the
paragraph, on the grounds that ¬hing is agreed until
everything is agreed.8

--------------
Summit Issues ) Other Areas
of Cooperation
--------------


20. (S) Gottemoeller said that President Obama was looking
forward to the discussions on a number of security issues at
the Moscow Summit. She said that President Obama would be
interested in hearing about the maximum amount of work that
we can achieve before the Summit. That is why we should
agree to meet before July 6 as there is much more work that
needs to be done. She said that we have made considerable
progress, and she has hopes to continue the discussions over
the course of the next 10 days before the Summit. She said
that there were also many areas where we can broaden our
cooperation, including in the areas of Afghanistan and
non-proliferation, as well as our cooperation in the NPT
Review Conference, where the work on the joint Statement is
proceeding quite well. We should continue to develop our
cooperation in other areas as well over the next 10 days.
Antonov agreed.


21. (S) Antonov reminded the U.S. Delegation that the
Russian proposals that had been presented today had not been
discussed in Moscow. He said he hoped his bosses would
support them, but he said &bosses will be bosses.8


22. (U) Documents exchanged:

- U.S.

-- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper on "Procedures for
Negotiations between the Russian and U.S. Delegations to
Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement, dated May 20, 2009";

-- U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On
Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the
Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk, dated May
19, 2009";

-- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On U.S. Plans to
Equip ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear ("Conventional")
Reentry Vehicles, dated May 20, 20098;

-- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On Security
Guarantees for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the START
Treaty (START) in connection with the Expiration of the
Treaty, dated May 20, 20098;

-- U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On the
Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and Strategic
Defensive Arms, dated May 19, 2009";

-- U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On
the Intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to
Participate in Working out the New Agreement to Replace the
START Treaty, dated May 20, 2009"; and

-- Responses to Questions of the Russian Side in
Connection with the U.S. Paper "Elements of a START Follow-on
Treaty of May 19, 2009."

(Begin comment: All of these papers were extracted verbatim
from State 64643 and dated June 19, 2009. The papers were
provided to the Russian Delegation at the conclusion of the
meeting with no discussion. End comment.)

- Russia:

-- Russian Paper in response to the U.S. Non-Paper on
the Joint Understanding of June 23, 2009, dated June 24,
2009; and

-- PRESS RELEASE On the Third Round of U.S.-Russian
Talks in Geneva to Work Out a New, Comprehensive Agreement to
Replace the START Treaty, February 22-24 (sic).


23. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.:

Ms. Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Mr. French (Int)
Ms. Gross (Int)

Russia:

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ilin
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Gen Venetsev
Ms. Ivanova
Ms. Komshilova
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
CLINTON