REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN GAZA ARMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006469


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019
TAGS: EG IR IS KPAL MARR MOPS PHSAQ PREL XG NATO
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN GAZA ARMS
INTERDICTION EFFORT

REF: STATE 4900

Classified By: EUR PDAS Marcie Ries for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) This is an action request. Department requests USNATO
and USEU reach out to NATO and EU Secretariat Officials on
the points that follow. Additionally, Embassy Prague is
requested to brief senior Government officials representing
the EU Presidency to:

-- Brief them on ongoing efforts for a new multinational
mechanism to interdict weapons supplies to Hamas at points of
origin and transit routes; a mechanism that will complement
ongoing efforts with Egypt and Israel to disrupt transfer of
weapons at terminal delivery points;

-- Note that, as briefed in an informal discussion January 15
in Washington with key interlocutors, the new mechanism would
likely feature enhanced intelligence sharing,
diplomatic coordination and military operations; and

-- Request NATO and the EU to support plans to organize an
expert workshop in the near future that will develop
practical modalities for the effort.

General Background )


2. (U) The United States and Israel committed to cooperative
efforts in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Washington
on January 16. We expect that the MOU has already had a
positive impact on international efforts to achieve a
ceasefire in the Gaza conflict and will help to support
post-conflict security in the region.


3. (C) In implementing our commitments under the MOU, the
U.S. plans action in two separate but related spheres: (1)
Work with Israel, Egypt and Palestinian Authority security
forces to improve security along Gaza,s border with Egypt;
and (2) Work with other international partners to develop a
new interdiction regime to help prevent the flow of weapons
and explosives from the point of origin and along transit
routes before they reach Egyptian or Gazan territory.


4. (C) This message focuses exclusively on support for the
second element of this strategy.

General Concept of Joint Interdiction Mechanism )


5. (C) The U.S. is exploring the establishment of a new
multilateral mechanism aimed at interdicting the flow of arms
to Hamas at points of origin and in transit routes.


6. (C) On January 15, the Under Secretary of Political
Affairs' Senior Advisor Stephen Mull and other Department
officials held an informal discussion with a group of
Washington-based Ambassadors and DCMs from the embassies of
the UK,
France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway
and Egypt.


7. (C) The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a
prospective new effort to interdict illicit weapons smuggling
to Gaza. Ambassador Mull laid out a vision for an
interdiction regime that would likely include the following
elements:

-- Increased intelligence sharing and coordination on Gaza
arms supply origin and transit routes, through the
establishment of an intelligence fusion cell or similar
mechanism;

-- Coordinated diplomacy, including both bilateral and
multilateral persuasion and the denial of
overflights/territorial sea passage to stop trafficking;

-- A military interdiction regime.


8. (C) The military interdiction regime we envision would be
similar to commitments undertaken under the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI),in which participating states
act on reliable intelligence to prevent the transit of
illicit materials through ship inspections " both at sea and
in port" and denial of overflight privileges to airplanes
suspected of carrying illicit cargo. All such actions are
taken in accordance with national legal
authorities and relevant international laws and frameworks.
We do not envision military operations on land at points of
origin, or anywhere along transit routes. Rather, the
focus will be on maritime operations -- both on the high
seas, and in ports of cooperating
littoral states.


9. (C) We have not yet determined the primary theater(s) of
operation for this mechanism. Intelligence on these weapon
flows is sparse, probably because of their
piecemeal nature. There are claims that such supplies
transit both the Mediterranean and Red Sea. For interdiction
operations in the Red Sea, one option might be expanding the
mission of Coalition Task Force 150 to include specifically
targeting suspected Hamas arms supplies. We could consider
standing up a similar mechanism in the Mediterranean, for
example, NATO naval assets possibly could deploy rapidly, but
Rules of Engagement may be difficult to agree at 26.
Building a new Coalition Task Force may be easier to sustain
over the long run.


10. (C) Clearly, such a joint mechanism would have to be
based on developing actionable intelligence, and obtaining
the cooperation of littoral states in offering their ports
for cargo inspections.


11. (C) In addition, the question of disposition of illicit
cargo seized and detained as a result of interdiction actions
will have to be addressed, along with an evaluation of
existing authorities and the possible need for increased
authorities.


12. (C ) Undertaking the mission represents an important
confidence building measure for the Israeli government to
encourage its constructive participation in efforts to secure
Gaza, and thus to extend and solidify the ceasefire in Gaza.

The February Workshop )


13. (C ) The U.S. has already received sufficiently positive
expressions of interest that we are moving ahead.

-- If asked: We have gotten positive expressions of interest
from UK, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the
Netherlands; no response yet from Norway. Egypt
has publicly announced that they will not be participating in
this joint effort, though we have reason to believe that they
also will not try to block our efforts. We are awaiting an
official reply from the Egyptian government.


14. (C ) Denmark has offered to host a workshop for
contributing states to the new mechanism in the timeframe of
February 4-5.


15. (C ) Notionally, day one of the workshop might consist
of expert level consultations that would break into
sub-groups; day two would be at a more senior level, and
would feature reports from the sub-groups, and hopefully
result in agreement for the way forward.

Deadline/Points of Contact
--------------


16. (U) Department requests missions/post report on interest
in cooperation in both the broader effort and the proposed
workshop by January 28. Please report results to
P Special Assistant Constantinos Nicolaidis, with copies to
NEA/RA Michael Adler and Constance Arvis, and EUR/RPM Peter
Chisholm.


CLINTON