GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA

S E C R E T STATE 064643

SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT KTIA START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA
NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, GENEVA,
SWITZERLAND, JUNE 22-24, 2009

REF: A. STATE 041125

B. STATE 050911

C. STATE 050910

D. STATE 060343

E. STATE 060487

F. STATE 061832

G. MOSCOW 01347

H. GENEVA 00419 (SFO-GVA-I-007)

Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, VCI. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to
head the U.S. delegation in continuing negotiations
regarding a START follow-on treaty with Russian MFA
Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy
Antonov, in Geneva, Switzerland on June 22-24, 2009.


2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw from previous
guidance and U.S. nonpapers (reftels) to discuss U.S.
views relating to a START Follow-on treaty. Delegation is
authorized to reach ad referendum agreement on the text of
a joint understanding for the July 6-8 U.S.-Russia Summit,
containing the U.S. proposals in the draft Joint
Understanding provided in Moscow (Ref E). If agreement is
not possible on a document containing these U.S.
proposals, delegation should work to obtain a bracketed
text with the Russian delegation framing the issues that
prevent agreement. Delegation should report on all
meetings as expeditiously as possible.


3. (S) GUIDANCE, continued: To contribute to the
discussion regarding a START Follow-on treaty, Delegation
may provide the texts in paragraphs 4-10 below to the
Russian Delegation in the form of non-papers. Delegation
should inform the Russian Delegation that these papers
contain official U.S. responses to the Refs G and H papers
that Russia provided in May and early June. If asked
whether the U.S. has a response to the Opening Remarks of
the Russian Head of Delegation at the May 19 first plenary
meeting, Delegation may state that the U.S. believes our
response (Ref F) to the Russian Vision paper also
addresses the points made in the May 19 Opening Remarks
paper.


4. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of
U.S. response to Ref G para 17 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper on "Procedures for
Negotiations between the Russian and U.S. Delegations to
Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement," dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation
paper from the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow entitled
"Procedures for Negotiations between the Russian and U.S.
Delegations to Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement."

- The United States agrees with the proposals of the
Russian Federation concerning the procedures for drafting
the new agreement. The United States notes, however, that
it does not consider the procedures and examples provided
by the Russian Federation to be exhaustive; additional or
alternative procedures, meetings, and forms of documents
may be adopted based on mutual agreement throughout the
negotiating process.

- The United States agrees that negotiations concerning
the START Follow-on agreement will be held in confidence
and the United States will protect the information
provided to it by the Russian Federation, and will presume
the same of the information it provides to the Russian
Federation. In this regard, the United States notes that
some information presented to the Russian Federation by
the United States may be marked SECRET, depending upon its
classification level within the parameters of U.S.
classification guidance.

- The United States notes that, in response to Russian and
U.S. inquiries, the Swiss authorities have already made an
offer that would ensure that Heads and Members of
delegations, as well as experts, translators,
interpreters, and other personnel supporting this work
will be able to obtain the necessary visas and status to
conduct negotiations in Geneva.

- The United States does not consider that this will in
any way have an impact on the possibility of conducting
meetings and negotiations in other locations, including
Moscow, Washington, D.C., or other sites as mutually
agreed.

End text.


5. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of
U.S. response to Ref G para 18 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On
Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the
Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk," dated
May 19, 2009


- The United States has reviewed the Russian paper
provided during the May 19, 2009, meeting in Moscow.

- The United States believes, as stated in its non-paper
of May 19, 2009, "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty,"
that perimeter and portal continuous monitoring is an
example of existing verification provisions in the current
START Treaty that should be carried forward in the new
treaty.

- Continuous portal monitoring at production facilities of
ICBMs for mobile launchers was included in the START
Treaty to assist both sides with the difficult task of
verifying the number of mobile ICBMs that could be
deployed in/on mobile launchers. The United States views
portal monitoring at production facilities of ICBMs for
mobile launchers as an essential transparency and
confidence building measure in the proposed START
follow-on treaty. On a reciprocal basis, the United
States is willing to discuss additional verification
measures to those START measures currently available that
would help Russia assess U.S. strategic offensive systems
that are identified in the START follow-on treaty.

- As for the draft JCIC Agreement on Principles and
Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring
Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and the
letters of exchange on the use of ground transportation
and settlement of accounts in connection with this
provided by the Russian Federation on January 26, 2009,
the United States assures the Russian Federation that the
United States has studied those documents but believes
that it is premature to provide a response at this time.

End text.


6. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of
U.S. response to Ref G para 21 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On U.S. Plans to Equip
ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry
Vehicles," dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation
paper entitled "On U.S. Plans to Equip ICBMs and SLBMs
with Non-nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry Vehicles," which
was provided at the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow.

- The United States cannot agree to the Russian-proposed
bans on ICBMs or SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads.

- As the United States stated in its non-paper of May 19,
2009, entitled "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty,"
non-nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would not
count toward the operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warhead limits of the treaty.

- The United States believes that appropriate verification
measures could be developed for such deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not deployed on
systems declared to be for non-nuclear use.

- As for the Russian Federation's suggestion that the term
"warhead," as it is defined in the START Treaty, should be
retained, the United States notes that, as was pointed out
in the U.S. "Elements" paper of May 19, some terminology
will need to be changed to meet the needs of the new
treaty.

End text.


7. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of
U.S. response to Ref G para 22 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On Security Guarantees
for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the START Treaty
(START) in connection with the Expiration of the Treaty,"
dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation
paper from the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow "On
Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties
to the START Treaty (START) in connection with the
Expiration of the Treaty."

- The United States recognizes the interests and proposals
that have been put forward by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine regarding extension of START, participation in the
START Follow-on agreement, and obtaining reaffirmation of
the security assurances provided in connection with their
accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as
non-nuclear weapons States.

- In general, the United States agrees with the views
expressed by the Russian Federation in its paper.
Specifically, the United States agrees that the expiration
of START does not affect the security assurances for
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine contained in the 1994
Budapest Memoranda.

- The United States believes it is important, however, to
consider, together with the Russian Federation, approaches
for recognizing the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine in the area of nuclear disarmament while also
recognizing that the United States and Russian Federation
remain firmly committed to the security assurances that
they have already provided, and that the expiration of the
START Treaty does not affect these assurances in any way.

- The United States is considering the Russian
Federation's proposal to draft a joint Russian-U.S.
statement. In the context of START expiration, such a
statement could reaffirm the security assurances provided
in 1994 to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

- In sum, the United States believes that it is necessary
to address the interests and concerns expressed by
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in an approach that
includes consultations between the United States and the
Russian Federation. We look forward to continued
consultations on this subject. This work should be
conducted in parallel with our work on negotiating a
bilateral agreement to replace the START Treaty, but it
should not detract from it.

End text.


8. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of
U.S. response to Ref G para 23 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On the
Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and
Strategic Defensive Arms," dated May 19, 2009

- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation
paper from the First Plenary meeting on May 19, 2009, in
Moscow "On the Interrelationship between Strategic
Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms."

- The United States recognizes that the development of the
new treaty concerning reductions and limitations in
strategic offensive arms is directly tied to the national
security interests of both the United States and the
Russian Federation.

- The United States acknowledges that the Russian
Federation has concerns regarding U.S. missile defense
programs. The U.S. and Russia are addressing these
concerns in a separate process.

- As the sides draft the text for the new treaty, the
United States will be willing to consider language Russia
may propose for the preamble that includes a general
reference to this interrelationship on the understanding
that this would be the only reference to defensive arms in
the new treaty.

- The United States believes this reflects a practical
approach for recognizing the interests of both countries
within the parameters of a new treaty, the subject of
which is reductions and limitations in strategic offensive
arms, as agreed by our Presidents.

End text.


9. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of
U.S. response to Ref G para 24 Russian paper:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On the
Intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to
Participate in Working out the New Agreement to Replace
the START Treaty," dated May 20, 2009

- The United States has reviewed your paper from the May
20, 2009, meeting in Moscow and again assures the Russian
Federation that it has made clear to Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine its intention to pursue a bilateral agreement
with Russia on further reductions in our strategic nuclear
forces.

- This commitment was confirmed in the April 1, 2009,
joint statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in
London.

- The United States notes that it is studying the
Ukrainian non-paper, "Ukraine's position in connection
with expiration of the Treaty," provided at JCIC-XXXIV in
Geneva on June 10, 2009. We plan to respond to Ukraine
through diplomatic channels. We would be interested in
hearing the Russian Federation's views on this paper.

End text.


10. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of
U.S. responses to Russian delegation questions presented
in Ref H paper on June 2, 2009:

U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

Responses To Questions of the Russian Side in Connection
with the U.S. Paper "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty"
of May 19, 2009

Question 1. Paragraph (e) of Section I, General
Obligations and Objectives," says that the U.S. seeks to
work cooperatively with Russian Federation to reduce
strategic nuclear arsenals as part of our efforts to
"strengthen deterrence for both sides" (the original
reads: "strengthen deterrence for both sides"; the
translation received from the U.S. delegation reads:
"strengthen mutual deterrence"). We would ask the U.S. to
explain in greater detail exactly what it means here. Are
we really talking about "mutual deterrence" or about
deterrence in a "multilateral" context?

Answer. The primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to
strengthen deterrence for both sides, and as we reduce the
number of nuclear warheads, the reductions must not weaken
our ability to deter but strengthen it on a global scale.
The United States believes that strengthened deterrence
for both sides will strengthen strategic stability. The
United States looks forward to hearing Russia's views on
this idea.

Question 2. In Subsection A of Section II, "Central
Limits and Counting Rules," the U.S. anticipates that a
"small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads" would
not be considered to be operationally deployed. We would
like to receive detailed explanations as to what portion
of the total number of warheads could constitute the
aforementioned "small number."

Answer. The United States continues to study this
question and will provide a response at a later date.

Question 3. The same subsection provides for a "warhead
limit" and goes on to say that "the central limit would be
on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads." We
would request clarification as to whether the U.S. side
has in mind that besides the "central limit" on
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the new
treaty could provide for some other limits on warheads,
and if so, what warheads.

Answer. The U.S. answer to this question was provided in
the U.S. non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW and the U.S.-proposed
text of a joint understanding regarding the START
Follow-on treaty. One limit would be on the aggregate
total of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
for each nation. The other limit would be on the
aggregate total of deployed ICBMs and their associated
launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers,
and deployed heavy bombers for each nation.

Question 4. Why does the U.S. use different approaches to
counting warheads on ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) and
on heavy bombers?

Answer. The U.S. side's approach is drawn directly from
the way it is implementing the Moscow Treaty. The
difference in treatment between ballistic missiles and
bombers reflects a 1991 commitment the U.S. made and
followed through on to remove heavy bombers from
day-to-day alert status. Neither the U.S. nor Russia
routinely maintains ODSNW loaded on their deployed heavy
bombers. However, as SNDVs, deployed heavy bombers
logically have associated ODSNW.

Question 4a. Specifically which facilities does the U.S.
anticipate classifying as "a specified weapon storage area
associated with or directly supporting a heavy bomber
base" (Section II, Subsection A)?

Answer. The specified weapon storage areas (WSAs) would
be agreed by the sides to identify WSA sites that would
contain ODSNW for use by deployed heavy bombers. This
would include specified WSAs containing such ODSNW that
are collocated with the deployed heavy bombers at the same
base, as well as specified WSAs containing such ODSNW that
are located apart from the air base.

Question 5. In Subsection B of Section II, the U.S.
proposes establishing limits on deployed launchers of
ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers. We would request clarification as to the reason
for this proposal, which provides for lumping together in
the same limits deployed launchers for strategic delivery
vehicles - ICBMs and SLBMs - and one of the types of
delivery vehicles - heavy bombers.

Answer. The U.S. answer to this question was provided in
the U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW of June 12, 2009.
For strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. approach
would continue to use the START conventions for counting
deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed
SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy
bombers (subject to agreed changes for non-nuclear
delivery systems and to reduce costs of eliminating
launcher systems).

Question 6. Subsection B of Section II contains the
wording "ICBMs and SLBMs tested for nuclear weapon
delivery." We would ask you to clarify the specifics of
this wording, taking into account that according to the
understanding between the Parties at the time the START
Treaty was concluded, all their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers subject to the Treaty are nuclear weapon delivery
vehicles. Does the U.S. side have in mind producing and
testing new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration?

Answer. The United States believes the START Follow-on
Treaty should limit ODSNWs and SNDVs, and the
U.S.-proposed arms control measures would apply to these
systems. A system specifically developed for and tested
for non-nuclear use will not be subject to treaty limits.

Question 7. We would ask you to provide a more detailed
explanation as to what is meant by launchers "that are no
longer capable of supporting operational ICBMs or SLBMs."
What are the criteria the U.S. side intends to use to
define the transfer of a launcher into this category?
What are the criteria for "considerable time and expense"?

Answer. The U.S. answer to these questions was provided
in the U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW of June 12, 2009.
Specific proposals may be captured under Conversion or
Elimination text to be provided during negotiations.

Question 8. In the context of Subsection D of Section II,
which deals with "deployment of non-nuclear warheads," the
following question arises: do technical methods of
verification exist which would make it possible to
guarantee that the other Party could identify that a
reentry vehicle in flight is conventionally armed?

Answer. The United States believes that appropriate
verification measures could be developed for such deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not
deployed on systems declared to be for non-nuclear use.
These verification measures would not be intended to apply
to the discrimination of ICBMs or SLBMs in flight. The
United States believes that the sides could explore ways
in which special launch notifications and related measures
could mitigate Russian concerns.

Question 9. In the context of Subsection E of Section II,
which deals with terminology: Is a definition of the term
"new type," for example, necessary if the new treaty does
not provide for limitations applicable to ICBMs and SLBMs?

Answer. The terms that will apply in the new treaty will
be subject to negotiation. The United States presumes
some terms from START would be carried forward and may
require modification or adaptation.

Question 10. In Section IV, "Elimination," elimination
procedures for only silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy
bombers are cited as examples of elimination procedures.
Does the U.S. side have in mind that in the new treaty the
application of elimination procedures would be limited
specifically to silo launchers and heavy bombers?

Answer. The examples cited by the United States - silo
launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers - are illustrative
but not necessarily complete. The U.S. side does not
exclude the possibility of simpler and less expensive
elimination procedures for all SNDVs.

Question 11. Section V, "Notifications, Monitoring, and
Verification," proposes retaining and adapting, "as
appropriate," the main START Treaty provisions concerning
data exchange, notifications, and inspections. We would
request clarification as to how the U.S. side intends to
accomplish this task, given its approach that provides for
rejecting the reduction and limitation of an aggregate
number of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Answer. The U.S. approach is to limit both SNDVs and
ODSNW. We propose retaining or adapting, as necessary,
START provisions concerning data exchange, notifications,
and inspections consistent with this approach. This is a
subject for discussion within the negotiations.

Question 12. Subsection C of Section V, which deals with
verification, proposes adapting relevant START Treaty
provisions for new treaty's requirements. Since the U.S.
position does not provide for reduction and limitation of
the aggregate number of ICBMs, a question arises as to
whether verification of ICBMs and SLBMs is necessary,
especially in view of the fact that Russian ICBMs and
SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported either as
assembled missiles without launch canisters or as
assembled missiles in launch canisters, while U.S.
missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages
of such missiles.

Answer. The U.S. approach is to limit both SNDVs and
ODSNW. As such, many START verification provisions remain
applicable. This is a subject for discussion within the
negotiations.

Question 12a. And if ICBMs and SLBMs are subject to
verification, as the U.S. side proposes, then in that case
what should be the goal of verification, given that
counting of ICBMs and SLBMs is not envisaged?

Answer. As stated in the answer to question 3, the other
limit, in addition to an ODSNW limit, would be on the
aggregate total of deployed ICBMs and their associated
launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers,
and deployed heavy bombers for each side. The goal of
verification is to verify that the aggregate number of
ICBMs and their associated launchers, SLBMs and their
associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers does not
exceed the agreed limit. The U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and
ODSNW of June 12, 2009 clarifies that for strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. approach would
continue to use the START conventions for counting
deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed
SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy
bombers.

Question 12b. In this context a question also arises as
to the advisability of conducting exhibitions to confirm
the relevant technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs
and exchanging telemetric information in connection with
flight tests of these missiles -- in the absence of any
qualitative limitations for these strategic delivery
vehicles.

Answer. Exhibitions are valuable transparency and
confidence building measures that afford a side the
opportunity to observe that the declared relationship
between an ICBM or SLBM and its associated launcher is
accurate.

Question 13. Questions concerning Section VIII. In the
U.S. version, the duration of the Treaty is defined as
5-10 years. It is anticipated that the new levels will be
reached in 3-5 years. Does the U.S. side envisage
establishing a strict time line for phasing -- if phasing
is provided for -- as is done in the START Treaty?

Answer. The U.S. side does not envisage a strict timeline
for phasing periods. In addition, the U.S. does not
object to the Russian-proposed seven year reduction
period.

End text.
CLINTON