ALLIANCE AND USG COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

S E C R E T STATE 064631


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2034
TAGS: MARR PREL PARM KPAO KN KS JN
SUBJECT: ALLIANCE AND USG COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATION

Classified By: EAP AA/S Scot Marciel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Our embassies and military commands in the Republic
of Korea (ROK),Japan, and the region need to work closely
with host governments and provide consistent public messaging
in the event of any further North Korean provocations or
threatening actions such as missile launches, nuclear tests,
incursions into South Korean territorial waters, maritime or
DMZ clashes, or other potentially destabilizing or escalatory
actions, to include a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO)
event. The following guidance should be implemented under
the direction of the Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo,
and in coordination with Commander USPACOM and Commanders at
United States Forces Korea (USFK) and United States Forces
Japan (USFJ).


2. (S/Rel JA, KS) In the event of a North Korean provocation,
Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo may, if
requested/invited, call on the Blue House/Kantei or the
foreign ministries for discussions and to publicly exhibit
coordination. In the event of any such North Korean action,
Commanders at USFK and USFJ should provide to their ROK and
Japanese military counterparts as much real time information
as possible about actual physical events and the actual
responses of U.S. forces (but NOT/NOT prospective or possible
actions or reactions).


3. (S/Rel JA, KS) Either the White House or the Department of
State may issue a public statement following a North Korean
provocation. Embassies should not/not release press
statements absent guidance to do so from the Department of
State. Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may respond to
on-the-record press inquiries using the pre-cleared language
contained in para 7 at any time. Embassies Seoul and Tokyo
may also share the points contained in paragraphs 8 and 9
with the ROKG and GOJ in advance of a provocation and
recommend that the ROKG/GOJ use the same points in order to
ensure a consistent message. Because most actions of this
type by North Korea are likely to occur during the day in
Seoul and Tokyo (overnight in Washington),to ensure roll out
of a coordinated post-provocation message, Embassies Seoul
and Tokyo should limit their on-the-record responses to press
inquiries using the pre-cleared language contained in
paragraphs 8 and 9.


4. (S/Rel JA, KS) In the event of a missile launch, when
directed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(OASD) Public Affairs, and in coordination with a post-launch
White House or State Department public statement, NORTHCOM
will be prepared to issue a press release confirming the
launch, as NORTHCOM has the responsibility and capability
within the Defense Department to provide launch
characterization.


5. (S/Rel JA, KS) Country teams, with the support of the
military commands, should make the following general
consultative points to counterparts in the ROKG and GOJ as
context for coordinating public diplomacy related to a North
Korean provocation.

--It is important to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere that
will reduce our governments' combined flexibility and give
advantage to North Korea's escalatory intentions.

--We understand that North Korea's actions create domestic
pressure in your countries to appear responsive. The demands
of the news cycle only heighten the pressure. However, we
strongly urge you to use public statements as a means to
reduce public anxiety and project our combined, bilateral
preparedness and emphasize the in-depth cooperation that
continues trilaterally with the ROK/Japan.

--We expect that the international response to any North
Korean provocation may be addressed, at least in part, in the
UN Security Council, particularly to the extent such action
constitutes a violation of existing UNSCRs. It would be
unwise and potentially counterproductive to speculate
publicly on the outcome of our joint efforts there.

--We are very concerned by continued intelligence leaks,
which place sources and methods at risk and undermine the
unified careful message we have developed together. It is
important that our governments not confirm leaked information
that appears in the media.

--Each government should refrain from commenting on the plans
and activities or characterizing the positions of the other,
apart from reinforcing agreed policies and principles.


6. (S/Rel JA, KS) U.S. military commands (including PACOM,
USFK, USFJ, the Missile Defense Agency, and STRATCOM) should
not/not release press statements following any DPRK
provocation. As authorized by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and Commander PACOM, USFK and USFJ personnel may
respond to media questions on background, to explain in
general terms, using unclassified information, the extent of
U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK information-sharing and
military-to-military coordination in advance of and during
the provocation.


7. (SBU) Preceeding any specific provocative act, Embassies
Seoul and Tokyo may use the following points to respond to
press inquiries. These points are similar to the standing
guidance being used by the State Department spokesperson.

--We are closely monitoring North Korea's activities and
intentions.

--Through close consultations, the governments of the United
States, Republic of Korea, and Japan, in coordination with
China and Russia, have attempted to discourage North Korea
from taking further provocative actions which could diminish
stability and impair relations in the region.

--Any further provocation would only further isolate North
Korea from the international community.

--North Korea should focus instead on denuclearization, and
on improving its relations with its neighbors.

--Our governments will continue to be in close communication
as this situation further develops.


8. (S/Rel JA, KS; SBU after provocative action) After North
Korea launches a missile, tests a nuclear device, or commits
incursions upon South Korean territorial waters or land,
Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may draw from the following points
in response to press inquiries. All other questions should
be referred to Washington.

If asked about North Korea's motives:

--We will not speculate about North Korea's motives.

If asked about North Korean WMD or missile-related
proliferation activities:

--We are greatly concerned about North Korea's continued
export of ballistic missiles and related equipment,
materials, and technologies to countries of concern. North
Korean exports of such items violate UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR

1874.

--UNSCR 1874 establishes new procedures, expectations and
obligations to counter North Korea's proliferation
activities. The U.S. is committed to fully implementing all
aspects of this resolution and will do so in close
coordination with our international partners.

--North Korea has marketed its missile technology and
equipment worldwide.

--The United States has imposed sanctions on North Korean
entities multiple times for missile-related transfers, most
recently in February 2009.

If asked about the future of the Six-Party Talks:

--The United States remains committed to the Six-Party Talks
process, and calls on the DPRK to fulfill its commitments
under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party
Talks, to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

If asked about U.S.-ROK-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation or
any other form of operational cooperation:

--The United States, ROK, and Japan have worked closely as
alliance partners to better monitor, understand, and respond
appropriately to provocative North Korean actions.

If asked about the U.S. commitment to defend (Japan) (the
ROK):

-- The United States is prepared to meet fully its
obligations under the (U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security) (U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954). Our forces in Korea, Japan, and throughout the region
train rigorously to ensure readiness for upholding our treaty
obligations.

If asked about the U.S. nuclear umbrella:

--The U.S. maintains its firm commitment to the security of
our treaty allies the ROK/Japan, including the U.S. nuclear
umbrella, an integral part of our extended deterrence.

If asked about the Northern Limit Line:

--The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is intended to prevent
maritime incidents, and respecting it serves the best
interests of North Korea, South Korea and the region. We
urge North Korea to avoid (further) provocative actions with
respect to the NLL.


9. (SBU) Regarding Maritime Interdiction Operations,
Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may draw from the following
standing press guidance in response to press inquiries. All
other questions should be referred to Washington.

--The DMZ and the rules that govern it were agreed to by
North Korea in the Armistice Agreement in 1953. The DMZ has
served North Korea, South Korea and the region well for
almost 56 years. North Korea should avoid any (further)
provocative actions with respect to the DMZ.

If asked about the Northwest Islands:

--The Northwest Islands (NWI) and the rules that govern them
were identified and agreed to by North Korea in the Armistice
Agreement in 1953. North Korea should avoid any (further)
provocative actions with respect to the NWI.

If asked regarding Maritime Interdiction Operations:

--Exports and proliferation of ballistic missiles and related
equipment, materials, and technologies to countries of
concern violate UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 1874.

--As obligated by UNSCR 1874, the U.S. will remain vigilant
of any North Korean activities that might contravene the
resolution, and we will respond in line with the provisions
of the resolution.

--We intend to vigorously enforce these resolutions in all
their aspects.

--The military remains ready at all times to defend against
threats in the region.

--We cannot comment on any military planning or operations.

End Text of Press Guidance.


CLINTON