Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE64170
2009-06-22 01:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE ON

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #4170 1730206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220142Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0000
UNCLAS STATE 064170 

SIPDIS, SENSITIVE - THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE ON
U.S. CW DESTRUCTION FOR SENIOR-LEVEL VISIT, WEEK OF JUNE
22, 2009

REF: A) STATE 051992 CWC: PLANNING FOR THE OPCW EC
TRIP TO VISIT TWO CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES

UNCLAS STATE 064170

SIPDIS, SENSITIVE - THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE ON
U.S. CW DESTRUCTION FOR SENIOR-LEVEL VISIT, WEEK OF JUNE
22, 2009

REF: A) STATE 051992 CWC: PLANNING FOR THE OPCW EC
TRIP TO VISIT TWO CW DESTRUCTION FACILITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES


1. (U) This cable provides guidance for the senior-level
U.S. team that will be in The Hague June 23-25 for
consultations with Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
delegations on the currently anticipated U.S. timeline
for destruction of its stockpile. Several if-raised
question and answers are at para 11.

--------------
Background
--------------


2. (SBU) Based on current plans, the United States is on
track to destroy 90 percent of its declared chemical
weapons stockpile by the extended CWC deadline of April
29, 2012. The United States will continue to make every
effort to find ways to accelerate this process. The
United States is firmly committed to the CWC and has no
intention to violate any of its obligations under the
Convention. The Obama Administration will be taking a
hard look at how best to address the situation which, if
mishandled, could have significant international
political and legal ramifications both within the OPCW
and in other international bodies and in other
international compliance contexts relating to countries
such as Iran and North Korea. It also could undermine
the Administration's broader arms control and
nonproliferation agenda. State and NSC will be
reviewing our domestic and treaty obligations, including
options for managing the legal aspects of missing the
2012 deadline. State will also be developing a strategy
for exploring with key international constituencies our
legal options for missing 2012, including the
feasibility of extending the CWC destruction deadlines
or obtaining OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference
of the States Parties (CSP) approval to identify
benchmarks and additional transparency measures until
destruction is complete.


3. (SBU) The remaining 10 percent of the U.S. stockpile
is located at the two non-incineration facilities: the
Pueblo Chemical Depot (Colorado) and the Blue Grass Army
Depot (Kentucky). Even with increased funding, DoD
currently estimates that CW destruction at Pueblo will
not start until after the destruction deadline, and will
run from 2014 until 2017. The destruction at Blue Grass
is expected to operate from 2019 to 2021. Both

facilities will use non-incineration technology
consisting of neutralization followed by destruction
methods for the by-products. In addition, the current
plan has gaps in CW destruction operations from
approximately 2012 to 2014 and 2017 to 2021. The
Department of Defense will engage Congress on exploring
options for accelerating destruction, to include
transporting the CW stockpiles at Bluegrass to declared
incineration sites, but such measures would not be
enough to meet the 2012 deadline.


4. (SBU) Russia currently asserts that it will meet the
2012 deadline, but we suspect it is unlikely to meet
this milestone judging from delays in facility
construction. We do not know how Russia plans to
address the question of its CWC obligations if it misses
the deadline. Russia, however, is likely to finish CW
destruction before the United States. The Japanese will
not complete destruction of abandoned CW munitions in
China until many years after the deadline. However,
these munitions may present a different treaty issue
since they were only recently discovered. Libya also
has a declared stockpile, but should be able to meet the
2012 deadline. Iraq has residual items that are
unlikely to be destroyed before the deadline. (No other
treaty parties, including Iran and China, have declared
any stockpiles that remain to be destroyed.) Thus, we
do not know with certainty which states will be unable
to meet the 2012 deadline or how long after 2012 their
destruction schedules may extend.


5. (SBU) Since 2006, the United States has explained
that it did not expect to be able to meet even the
extended deadline of 2012, but would continue to seek
opportunities to improve our CW destruction progress.
The ambiguity in this statement was deliberate, and at
no time did the United States say definitively that it
would miss the deadline or that, if it did, treaty
obligations would be violated (for example, the treaty
can be amended, or there may be arguments why the
particular circumstances the U.S. faces might excuse
missing the deadline). The United States, in its
previous request to extend its deadline (which, under
the Convention, did not require a formal amendment),and
in subsequent presentations to other States Parties,
reported projections of only 66 percent of its stocks
being destroyed by 2012, but it stated it would seek
ways to accelerate the program. In addition to the
reporting in 2006, the United States has provided
updates on destruction progress at each Informal Session
of the EC. These briefings have not included program
end-dates. Thus, although the prospect of the U.S.
missing the 2012 deadline is known to many States
Parties and criticism to date has been relatively mild,
we can expect more attention in the wake of a May 2009
DOD report to Congress that we have no realistic
options for meeting the 2012 deadline. Currently, the
United States is on track to complete destruction of 90
percent of its stockpile by the 2012 deadline, 98
percent in 2017 and 100 percent in 2021, as outlined in
the May 2009, Chemical Demilitarization Program Semi-
Annual Report to Congress. The report details options
that DoD considered to accelerate destruction. Our
decision in 2006 to be more forthcoming has helped to
moderate reactions.


6. (SBU) Since 2006, the Iranian CWC delegation has been
questioning, in multiple sessions of the EC, our ability
to meet the 2012 deadline. Starting in 2007, upon
submission of a report every 90 days to the Council on
the status of our CW destruction program, Iran started
to make a political issue out of our inability to
provide dates for the start of operations at Pueblo and
Blue Grass. Although the degree of Iranian
obstructionism has ebbed and flowed with the composition
of its delegation, they have raised this issue at
virtually every EC session. Brazil recently (EC-56)
called for discussions of the feasibility of meeting the
2012 deadline, though at this point we do not know their
intentions. It is also likely that the United States
will not receive much political support from our Allies
if we do not have a plan for addressing the impending
deadline and that they will raise the issue (at some
point) with the United States bilaterally at a senior
political level.


7. (SBU) On May 21, 2009, the U.S. CWC delegation
informally informed OPCW Director-General (DG)
Pfirter(Argentina) and EC Chairman Ambassador Lomonaco
(Mexico) of the likely U.S. inability to complete
destruction by 2012, with destruction completing at
Pueblo in 2017 and Blue Grass in 2021 (ref A). All
other international participants on the trip were
informally notified the week of May 25, 2009, that the
non-incineration sites of Pueblo and Blue Grass would
not be operational until after the 2012 deadline. These
briefings were designed to pave the way for the EC visit
(May 31 June 5, 2009) to Pueblo (and Umatilla, Oregon,
an operational CW destruction facility using
incineration technology). The trip was led by EC
Chairman Lomanoco (Mexico) and DG Pfirter. During the
visit to Pueblo, the EC members heard officially, for
the first time, the projected operational dates for
Pueblo and Blue Grass. The EC members were not
surprised at the receipt of this information and their
responses were constructive.


8. (SBU) The first official multilateral disclosure of
the operational dates for Pueblo and Blue Grass during
the recent EC visit, along with the pending circulation
of the draft trip report, could make for a hostile
political environment for the United States at the
upcoming 57th Session of the OPCW EC, July 14-17. To
mitigate the potential negative political fallout, a
senior-level team will be in The Hague June 23-25 for
consultations. Consultations are being arranged with a
variety of EC members, regional groups, and senior
Technical Secretariat (T.S.) staff. This cable provides
guidance for these consultations with CWC delegations,
along with several answers to difficult questions that
could be raised.


9. (SBU) Goals of the consultations:
--Articulate a positive message by highlighting the
successful elements of the U.S. chemical destruction
program, the U.S. commitment to the CWC, and the Obama
administrations commitment to examining all possible
options for accelerating CW destruction;
--Minimize, to the extent possible, criticism of the
United States timetable for CW destruction;
--Ensure that significant EC delegations and players are
made aware of the current status of the U.S. CW
destruction program, including the projected operational
dates for the Pueblo and Blue Grass facilities in
advance of the T.S. circulating the draft report on the
EC visit to Pueblo and Umatilla; however, note that the
projected dates represent the current schedule and the
United States is actively reviewing what options may be
available to it to accelerate our destruction activity.
--Assuage concerns of any delegations that the United
States is not committed to 100 percent destruction of
the CWC stockpile as rapidly as possible;
-- Emphasize that the Obama Administration is reviewing
options for dealing with the situation and avoid any
statement that the U.S. expects to violate any of its
CWC obligations;
--Make clear in consultations that the United States is,
to the greatest possible extent, committed to pro-active
full disclosure and consultations with other parties;
--Hear concerns of delegations and gain insight into
their positions heading into EC-57 (July 14-17).


10. (SBU) Themes that should be highlighted in
consultations:
--The United States is fully committed to meeting the
objectives of the CWC, including verified destruction of
100 percent of our CW stockpile as rapidly as possible;
--The Obama administration is fully committed to examine
all possible options for accelerating CW destruction;
--On April 29, 2012, the United States is currently
projected to have destroyed approximately ninety-percent
of its CW stockpile, which means that seven of the
original nine storage sites will have eliminated all of
their chemical weapons. (Approximately eight-percent of
the CW stockpile will remain at Pueblo, and
approximately two-percent at Blue Grass.);
--Since 2006, the United States has found ways to
accelerate its CW destruction program. We are exploring
options to accelerate destruction at Pueblo and Blue
Grass consistent with the CWC and safety, technical and
other requirements (e.g., Article IV, para 10
protecting the environment);
--The United States is committed to proactive disclosure
of the U.S. CW destruction program, including schedule
and cost data.


11. (SBU) Answers to questions that may come up during
consultations

Begin questions and answers:

Q1: Will the United States seek, or support, an
amendment to the CWC on the extended destruction
deadline of April 29, 2012?

A1: Article XV of the CWC specifies the process for
amending the Convention: one-third of the States Parties
would need to support an amendment conference; a
majority of all States Parties would have to vote in
favor of the amendment (with no State Party casting a
negative vote); and all States Parties casting a
positive vote would have to ratify the amendment.
Countries may also propose opening up other parts of the
CWC to possible amendments, which could create serious
obstacles to agreement. We would like to hear other
parties views on this option, but we are mindful of the
obstacles to amending the treaty.

Q2: During the EC-56 General Debate, Brazil called for
the Council to address the feasibility of the 2012
deadline sooner rather than later. Does the United
States support this action?

A2: The Council is currently receiving reports from
possessor states every 90 days on CW destruction that
has taken place during that particular period.
Furthermore, the Council has sent representatives to
facilities in both the United States and Russia. Thus,
the Council is already engaged to some extent in
overseeing destruction efforts. We would be interested
in learning more about the Brazilian suggestion.

Q3: Will the United States support additional
transparency measures?

A3: The United States is committed to proactive full
disclosure, to the greatest possible extent, on its CW
destruction program, including schedule and cost data.
The United States supports measures to ensure
transparency of its CW destruction program. We are
willing to consider additional transparency measures as
well. Please let us know of any specific suggestions
that your delegation may have.

Q4: Does the U.S. claim that it does not have an
obligation under the Convention to destroy 100% of its
stockpile by 2012?

A4: The The United States is making no such claim. We
are examining how to address the situation in a manner
that will best address the treatys requirements.

End questions and answers.
CLINTON