Pandemic Influenza Tripwires

UNCLAS STATE 006306


FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION, ADCMS, PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, AND
MANAGEMENT OFFICERS FROM UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT
PATRICK KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT AMED CASC TBIO ASEC KFLU KSAF KSEO KPAO
SUBJECT: Pandemic Influenza Tripwires

Ref: (A) 08 STATE 67922 (B) 08 STATE 67936



1. This is an ACTION REQUEST: please see paragraphs three,
four and five.


2. The threat of a potentially devastating global influenza
pandemic persists. The National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza calls pandemic influenza "a unique circumstance,"
requiring planning beyond more customary emergency readiness.


3. Posts are to be commended for their thorough and
insightful pandemic planning, and particularly for the
tripwires they developed. Medical knowledge about a
potential pandemic has increased in the time since the
tripwires were developed, and so have some of the recommended
responses. The Department has created the following general
tripwires for pandemic influenza. Posts should include these
new tripwires as part of their current planning as a basic
minimum, but posts are also encouraged to incorporate
additional, country-specific information in the final version
of their pandemic influenza tripwires. This will ensure that
posts' tripwires are consistent and reflect current medical
knowledge and State Department policy - and also that they
give due consideration to specific public health, resource,
infrastructure and other factors at play in each country.
The guidance and instructions concerning tripwires apply to
all USG personnel in country under Chief of Mission
authority.


4. Posts should provide an introductory paragraph generally
describing the host country public health system's current
ability to respond to an outbreak of pandemic influenza, the
current local availability of antiviral medications to
private Americans, whether private Americans are able to
receive prescription medications via mail, as well as the
host country stance on access by uninsured foreigners to its
medical system. Posts are requested to publish their updated
tripwires on the Tripwire Reporting and Integrated Planning
System (TRIPS) located on the classified network, by February
23, 2009.


5. Preface to Tripwires: For easy reference, the
following information should be included in the
introductory materials to posts' tripwires, or otherwise be
easily accessible:


A. Unpredictable Nature of Pandemic

How a pandemic would develop (where the first outbreak
would occur, how it would spread, etc.) is not predictable
at this point. One should not assume that the World Health
Organization (WHO) Phases, the Federal Government Response
Stages or the tripwires that appear below will occur in a
sequential progression during the Pandemic Alert Period or
during the Pandemic Period. (For instance, given the ease
of international transportation, significant human-to-human
transmission may begin in some places without reports of
individual clusters of illness.) Therefore, EACs should
review all of the tripwires when they initially meet
regarding a potentially triggering event. EACs should also
be aware that implementation of the actions listed under
each tripwire may vary depending on the severity of the
pandemic and the assessment of its risks by medical
authorities. In this regard, the Pandemic Severity Index
developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
will serve as a global planning tool for this purpose.


B. Both Planning and Flexibility are Essential

i. Planning is crucial. As noted in ref B, evacuation
should not be expected, and other methods of departure may
not be available, making it essential that posts and
individuals make prior preparations for remaining overseas
during a pandemic. Much of what can be prepared in advance
is discussed in reftels and in the first tripwire below.

ii. The most effective response to any emergency, however,
requires both good planning and the flexibility to depart
from the plan when necessary. Many of the actions
discussed in these tripwires will have to be initiated or
authorized in the State Department (e.g., "authorized
departure" and "ordered departure," as well as other
actions, can only be authorized in Washington, D.C.). It
is likely that a State Department Task Force would be
formed upon USG confirmation that a pandemic had begun.
This Task Force would communicate State Department
instructions, many of which could differ from what appears
in the tripwires below.

iii. In this same vein, tripwires developed in the context
of planning for the initial outbreak of a pandemic may need
modification for subsequent waves of the outbreak, in order
to reflect possible changes in attack rate, changes in the
case fatality ratio, the possibility of an effective
pandemic-specific vaccine 6 to 12 months after an initial
outbreak, as well as other social and economic factors.


C. WHO Phases and USG Stages

Each tripwire includes the relevant WHO Phase and U.S.
Federal Government Response Stage. These pandemic status
markers are applied globally; if one country experiences
increased and sustained transmission in the general
population, which is WHO Phase 6 and Federal Government
Response Stage 3, the pandemic is considered to have
reached those levels globally. Since tripwires are written
from the perspective of the individual post, the WHO Phase
or Federal Government Response Stage listed for each
tripwire may not seem to correspond to what is happening in
the host country. The WHO Phases and Federal Government
Response Stages are nevertheless included to put events at
post into a global perspective.


D. Individuals with Special Needs and Those with
Disabilities

Posts should include a cross section of individuals at
post, including persons with special needs and persons with
disabilities (e.g., visual, hearing, speech, mobility) in
all aspects of emergency planning, including, but not
limited, to overcoming barriers to information exchange and
obtaining transportation. Posts should take practicable
steps to ensure that all plans, communications, information
dissemination, and services, whether via the Internet/Web
or through other electronic means (or non-electronically)
are accessible to and usable by all stakeholders, including
persons with special needs and individuals with
disabilities. Here are a few resources on this topic:
http://www.disabilitypreparedness.gov/ (Internet),
http://impact.state.gov (Intranet),and
http://www.section508.gov (Intranet).


E. Accounting for Employee Absenteeism and Limited Access
to Facilities

Posts should keep likely employee absenteeism in mind when
making plans to maintain essential services, considering
probable absenteeism of those who must care for school age
children if schools are closed, as well as those who must
stay home due to their own illness or illness of a family
member. Possible scenarios include workforce reductions of
forty percent for two weeks at the peak of a pandemic, and
lower levels for a few weeks on either side of the peak.
Posts should also plan for maintaining essential services
during periods when access to Embassy facilities and other
locations may be limited due to social distancing to limit
contagion or due to security concerns. Post should
coordinate planning with contractors, suppliers, and
shippers, etc., and should also consider the availability
of fall-back services, should contracted services not be
available as planned.


F. Water Storage by Individuals

i. The Department continues to recommend that families store
their own supplies of water even though posts are also
required to maintain water for their use. At many posts,
employee housing may not afford sufficient storage space to
permit safe storage of recommended quantities of water (i.e.,
storing the water without stacking or shelving it in an
unsafe manner). As noted under Tripwire One below, families
should nevertheless consider storing as much water as is
safely allowed by their individual circumstances. Posts are
reminded to develop lists of alternate sources of potable
water (and equipment, such as distillers),as well as
procedures for rendering water safe for drinking, and to
develop contingency plans in case expected sources of water
are not available.

ii. Store-bought water, from a reliable source and stored in
its original, sealed container in a cool, dark place, may be
stored until its "use by" date. (Bottled water brands that
have been certified by the National Sanitation Foundation
(http://www.nsf.org/) or by the International Bottled Water
Association (http://www.bottledwater.org),or approved for
U.S. military purchase, meet EPA Drinking Water Standards
(http://www.epa.gov/safewater/standards.html) . The NSF and
IBWA logos appear on the bottles of approved brands.)

iii. Water prepared for drinking by individuals according to
CDC instructions (see
http://emergency.cdc.gov/preparedness/kit/wat er/) may be
stored up to six months.

iv. For more information about drinking water safety, see
the OBO/OM/SHEM website at http://obo.state.gov/opssaf-
shem/PARENT%20PAGES/Policies%20and%20Directiv es/ALDACs/U.S.De
partment_of_State_Drinking_Water_Program.pdf.



G. The No-Double-Standard Policy

In conformance with the No Double Standard policy,
information about any action taken by post that makes
employees and their family members safer, must be provided
at the same time to the general American community as well,
to permit its members to take similar precautions. It is
not necessary to disseminate publicly information about an
EAC meeting or other decision-making group that deliberates
about steps that may be taken, but it is necessary to
disseminate publicly information about resulting actions
that make employees, in general, safer. These actions
could include provision of safety and security information
to official Americans, limitations on employee travel, or
reduction of personnel at post, etc. Many of the actions
listed below fall into this category. The consular section
administers the No Double Standard policy under the
oversight of the Chief of Mission. Any questions about
application of the policy should immediately be referred to
the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Office of American Citizens
Services (CA/OCS/ACS).


H. Health and Human Services Teams

Although mention of a possible visit by a HHS/CDC team for
the assessment and/or containment of cluster cases first
appears in Tripwire Three, posts should be ready to house,
provide transportation for, and otherwise assist such a team
at any point.


I. The Status Quo and Tripwire One

Tripwire One reflects the status quo at the time this cable
was drafted. Posts should review reftels, which provide
information that is still current regarding pandemic
policy, to ensure that action items described in those
cables have been completed. Note that many of the "Actions
to Consider" listed under Tripwire One below are basic
steps that should be taken regularly even without a
pandemic threat.

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6. Tripwire One:

There are domestic animal outbreaks in various countries,
but animal-to-human transmission is rare (Federal
Government Response Stage 0, WHO Phase 3). A pandemic
outbreak is considered likely at some point in the coming
years, and possibly this year or next.


7. Actions to Consider

-- Review USG pandemic policy, as communicated in reftels,
at meetings for staff and their families, as well as with the
American community via warden messages, newsletters, OSAC
discussions and town hall meetings. Points covered should
include the following:

a. At the outset of a pandemic, while commercial
transportation options are still available, the Department
will consider implementing authorized departure for non-
emergency employees and any family members at the
initially affected post, and will suggest that non-
emergency employees and any family members at other posts
who do not wish to remain overseas during a pandemic avail
themselves of appropriate departure options (SMA, R&R,
etc.) in order to return to the U.S. When this
announcement is made to employees, the private American
community will also be advised, so that its members can
make informed decisions about their own actions.

b. Embassy employees, their family members, and private
American citizens who do not leave while commercial
transportation options are still available (and while
borders are still open) should expect to remain in country
for the duration of the pandemic. They will therefore
need to have prepared in advance for such a situation,
having on hand personal supplies of food, water and
medications that will last up to twelve weeks. The U.S.
Government website, Pandemicflu.gov, contains a checklist
of suggested preparations for individuals and families at
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/individual/ch ecklist.html.
(Note that this website advises families in the United
States to keep two weeks of emergency supplies in the
event of an influenza pandemic. Given differences in
local conditions and preparedness overseas and possible
transportation difficulties in a pandemic, the USG
recommends that Americans overseas maintain sufficient
supplies to maintain themselves in country for up to
twelve weeks.)

c. Also see 2008 STATE 67936, which suggests:

Stored food should primarily consist of non-perishable
items that do not require refrigeration, or water for
preparation, and should include adequate amounts of
food for family members on special diets, such as the
elderly or infants on formula . . .

Store one gallon of water per person per day (two
quarts for drinking and two quarts for food preparation
and sanitation) in clean plastic containers (avoiding
containers that will decompose or break, such as milk
cartons or glass bottles). Also have on hand items
that may be needed for water purification, such as camp
stoves and pots . . .

d. It is recommended that families store their own
supplies of water. It may be impractical at many posts,
however, for individual families to store these amounts of
water (see paragraph 5(F) above). All posts should
develop a list of potential sources of potable water,
procedures (and, if necessary, equipment, such as
distillers) for rendering the water safe for drinking, and
contingency plans in case these sources of water are not
available. An example of a potential source of water is a
swimming pool.

e. The Department will consider requesting DOD support
for non-combatant evacuation operations only in the event
of a breakdown in civil order.

-- Review Embassy supplies of food, water, antivirals, other
medications and equipment to ensure that they meet Department
pandemic guidelines (see 2008 STATE 67936).

-- Encourage employees and their families to maintain first
aid kits at home that include hygiene and medical supplies
(see
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/individual/ch ecklist.html for
a checklist of suggested items). Ensure that this
information is shared with the private American community.

-- Review security conditions for employees and their
families at their residences and in public venues.

-- Consult with schools attended by American children about
safety procedures.

-- Review operations of USG agencies with offices or
personnel off-chancery to take into account special security
considerations.

-- Review the availability of alternate operating
facilities, such as homes or other adequate worksites.

-- Review/test emergency preparations, to include
internal/external communication procedures, to ensure these
procedures are adequate, that they can be followed to
completion by all, including individuals with special needs
and persons with disabilities, and that all will have ready
access to information during an emergency.

-- Review back-up procedures for advising staff and the
private American community during a pandemic about where to
obtain up-to-date information about the situation and about
Embassy operations.

-- Review/update information regarding exit visas and other
formalities for departure.

-- Review/update warden system and F-77 Report.

-- Review volume of controlled/classified documents, and
destruction procedures; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
recommends that posts maintain only a "minimum footprint" of
controlled and classified holdings, keeping these down to
amounts requiring less than one hour destruction time.

-- Ensure personnel lists have been updated on WebPASS Post
Personnel System (PS),so that accurate information can be
accessed instantly in the Department.

-- Review/update emergency and minimal staffing lists, as
well as the status of cross-training for individuals who
might have to fill in behind absent colleagues, keeping in
mind that absenteeism is projected at up to forty percent at
the height of a pandemic wave.

-- Review the adequacy of existing contracts for goods and
services as they relate to performance during an emergency
such as a pandemic, with an emphasis on whether vital
supplies, such as water, and essential services, such as
guard services, are covered.

-- Review local healthcare resources, health risk under the
current (non-pandemic) conditions, and public health and
sanitation situation.

-- Perform liaison with host government medical authorities
to learn plans for alternate care sites if hospitals are
full; confirm that Americans, whether official or private,
would be accepted at these sites.

-- Perform liaison with host government medical authorities
to learn mortuary plans in case of mass fatalities, to
include:

-assessments of current capacity for refrigeration of
deceased persons.
-discussions of mass fatality plans with local health
officials and medical examiners.
-coordination with local health officials to identify
temporary morgue sites.
-determination of the scope and volume of supplies
(e.g., body bags) needed to handle an increased number
of deceased persons.

-- Review departure transportation options, and verify
commercial air schedules.

-- Review post's Internet website to ensure that it is up-
to-date and provides detailed information.

-- Review whether post's website is part of Department's
Content Management System (CMS),which enables 24/7 remote
posting of content by the CMS support team at the request
of the mission. (Send test messages or requests to
embassy-help@getusinfo.com.)

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8. Tripwire Two:

There is a confirmed outbreak (clusters of human-to-human
transmission) in another country (Federal Government
Response Stage 2),and human-to-human transmission is
increasing there (WHO Phase 4 or 5, depending upon the
degree of human-to-human transmission).


9. Actions to Consider

-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if applicable, the State
Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been
crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwire One.

-- Provide Mission briefings for employees and dependents
emphasizing procedures in the event that the Under
Secretary for Management encourages employees to exercise
liberal departure options (SMA, R&R, etc.). Also review
health and safety precautions, and social distancing.

-- Hold Town Hall and OSAC meetings with the American
community to cover information provided to employees during
the briefing, and take steps to ensure the information is
also sent to the American community via warden message and
placed on post's Internet website. Information provided
should emphasize that private Americans should strongly
consider departing at the earliest stages of a pandemic,
while commercial options remain available (and those who do
not depart should be prepared to remain in country).

-- If the Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel
Warning, posts should promptly disseminate it to the local
American community.

-- Update information regarding exit visas and other
formalities for departure.

-- Ensure personnel lists have been updated (including
information about TDYers) on WebPASS Post Personnel System
(PS),so that accurate information can be accessed instantly
in the Department.

-- Review the next tripwire to be ready to react quickly
once it is crossed.


-------------- --------------


10. Tripwire Three:

A pandemic influenza outbreak with human-to-human
transmission in the host country has been confirmed
(Federal Government Response Stage 2 or 3, and WHO Phase 5
or 6, depending upon the degree of human-to-human
transmission: "significant" or "efficient and sustained").


11. Actions to Consider

-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if applicable, the State
Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been
crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One and Two.

-- Be ready to house, provide transportation for and
otherwise assist a USG rapid response team led by HHS/CDC,
which may be deployed to the host country for the assessment
and/or containment of cluster cases in the event of an
incipient pandemic.

-- Consider instituting social distancing policy for
employees and their family members, advising them to avoid
crowded venues, including representational events. Since
large meetings of Embassy personnel are inadvisable at this
point, notify personnel of preferred methods of
disseminating information (e-mail, Intranet postings,
telephone, etc.). Take steps to ensure that information
about this action is provided to the American community via
warden message and placed on post's Internet website. Urge
private Americans to practice social distancing.

-- Disseminate information to personnel about the
possibility of host country quarantine and how to cooperate
with local authorities. Disseminate information about this
action via post's warden system and Internet website, noting
that although the Embassy would like to know whenever an
American citizen is taken into quarantine facilities,
consular employees will generally not be permitted to visit
that person or remove them from the facility.

-- Complying within reason with the requirement for "social
distancing," set up and staff a control room with a stable
electrical supply as well as phone and Internet access.

-- Consider setting up, in compliance with the requirement
for "social distancing," a rumor-control hotline staffed by
volunteers and at least one representative of post's press
office. The volunteers would refer callers to appropriate
USG websites, including post's website and PandemicFlu.gov.
The press office representative would prepare and obtain
clearance for press guidance and coordinate messaging with
other USG agencies and local government ministries.

-- Consider advising employees to withdraw children from
local schools, and inform the American community of any
decision to do so via the warden system and post's Internet
website.

-- Consider strongly encouraging use of sick leave for
employees who exhibit flu-like symptoms or have family
member exhibiting flu-like symptoms. Take steps to ensure
that information about this action is provided to the
American community via warden message and placed on post's
Internet website. Urge private Americans to take the same
precautions.

-- Consider limiting the number of TDY personnel at post.
If action adopted, advise American community via post's
warden system and Internet website.

-- Consider restricting official and unofficial travel to
suspect areas. If action adopted, advise American
community via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Consider restricting in-country travel by all
employees, as well as TDY travel by post personnel, and
consider recalling employees already located in remote
areas. Disseminate information about this action via
post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Review host government's emergency mortuary set-up, and
ensure that post will be able to assist both official and
private Americans coordinate with host government medical
authorities when a body must be placed in a mortuary
facility.

-- Evaluate and report on capacity of local government to
deal with epidemic, restore services and ensure domestic
order.

-- Consult with CA about ceasing to provide non-emergency
consular services (including visa services and non-
emergency ACS services),and, if action adopted,
disseminate information about it via post's warden system
and Internet website.

-- Consult with CA about limiting face-to-face contact
with ACS cases. If action adopted, advise American
community via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Reduce embassy operating hours and services, and
disseminate information about this action via post's warden
system and Internet website.

-- Update information regarding exit visas and other
formalities for departure.

-- Request authorized departure for non-essential employees
and any family members. If it is granted, the Department
will issue a Travel Warning, and post should disseminate it
to the American community via post's warden system and
Internet website. The Travel Warning will emphasize that
Americans should strongly consider departing while commercial
options remain available, and that those who do not depart
should be prepared to remain in country. Evacuation should
not be expected. (Note: at the point that seats on
commercial flights become difficult to obtain, the Embassy
may need to assist private Americans in obtaining seats just
as it does employees.) Inform host government and other
foreign missions of drawdown status.

-- If authorized departure is not granted, provide Mission
briefings for employees and dependents emphasizing
procedures in the event that the Under Secretary for
Management encourages employees to exercise liberal
departure options (SMA, R&R, etc.).

-- Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System
(PS),to include TDY personnel, and keep the Emergency
Management System (EMS) module current with departures and
destinations.

-- Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel Warning
to reflect post actions. If the Department issues a revised
Travel Alert or Travel Warning, posts should promptly
disseminate it to the local American community.

-- Review the next tripwire to be ready to react quickly
once it is crossed.

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12. Tripwire Four:

The pandemic situation is such that it is difficult to get
seats on the few commercial flights still operating
(Federal Government Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6).


13. Actions to Consider

-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department Task
Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two and
Three.

-- Under post's social distancing policy, meetings are no
longer routinely held, so reminders to employees about health
precautions, as well as procedures to report an emergency,
are disseminated via e-mail, Intranet or telephone. Take
steps to ensure the same information is provided to the
private American community via warden messages and post's
Internet website. Americans should be further advised how to
obtain food and medications if they run out.

-- Ensure that controlled/classified documents have been
reduced to less than one-hour destruction time.

-- Provide information about host-country alternate care
sites (e.g., school gymnasiums, armories, convention centers)
to employees and family members. Ensure that this
information is provided to the local American community via
warden messages and post's Internet website.

-- If the Embassy needs to assist employees in booking seats
on commercial flights because bookings are difficult to
obtain, the Embassy should assist private Americans in
booking seats as well.

-- Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System
(PS),to include TDY personnel, and keep the Emergency
Management System (EMS) module current with departures and
destinations.

-- Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel Warning
to reflect current circumstances and post actions. If the
Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel Warning,
posts should promptly disseminate it to the local American
community.

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14. Tripwire Five:

The pandemic situation is such that random acts of violence
or an increase in threats are occurring (Federal Government
Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6). (As noted earlier,
non-combatant evacuation operations will be considered only
in the event of a breakdown in civil order; this tripwire
does not describe that situation).


15. Actions to Consider

-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department Task
Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two, Three
and Four.

-- At front office level, meet with government officials and
contacts to express concerns and discuss enhancement of
security around U.S. facilities.

-- Implement security escort of personnel to and from work.

-- Consolidate housing closer to embassy or alternate
command post.

-- Ensure that social distancing and other health
precautions are being observed by mission personnel and
family members.

-- Update information regarding exit visas and other
formalities for departure.

-- Update American community via the warden system and
post's Internet website about general safety precautions
taken vis--vis local travel and housing (see above).

-- Update functional designations, as needed, and create a
shadow roster to make it clear who is on alert, on call, or
on duty, and include back-up personnel. Examples include:

- Senior officers, EAC members, other designees
- Security personnel, including Marine Security Guards
(MSGs)
- Telephone operators, communications personnel
- General Services Office personnel such as electricians,
plumbers, warehouse personnel, etc.
- Others: i.e., secretaries, drivers, key Locally Engaged
Staff, etc.

-- Perform liaison with State Department and appropriate
U.S. military command in event civil order breaks down and
military-assisted Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)
becomes necessary. Brief Department on all other
conversations with the military command. Bear in mind that a
NEO may not be possible, and post's preparations should take
this into account.

-- If not already done, and complying within reason with
"social distancing" requirements, set up and staff a 24-hour
control room with a stable electrical supply as well as phone
and Internet access.

-- Review Tripwire Six to be ready to react quickly to a
potentially volatile situation.

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16. Tripwire Six:

The pandemic situation is such that the local government
cannot contain civil unrest, much of which is directed
against the U.S. Embassy and Americans, who may be
perceived as having food, water and medications, and
refusing to share same. American homes may be broken into
by mobs seeking medications and food, and numbers of
Americans may be seeking refuge at the Embassy. (Federal
Government Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6)


17. Actions to Consider

-- At front office level, call the State Department
Operations Center to report on the developing situation.
This call should be made as soon as it is determined that
Tripwire Six may have been crossed. EAC, in consultation
with the Operations Center's Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-
O/CMS) and the State Department Task Force, confirms that
tripwire has been crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two, Three,
Four and Five.

-- Request conference call via State Operations Center with
CMS (Crisis Management Support),CA/OCS, and the regional
bureau's EX office to discuss requesting ordered departure.

-- Request Ordered Departure status from the Department, and
provide post's assessment of the current situation. Include
information about potential numbers of private Americans
departing, and about transportation availability.

-- If Ordered Departure status is granted, the following
actions will become necessary:

a. If more transportation is needed than is available,
request Department assistance. A/LM is responsible for
arranging increases in regularly scheduled flights to
post, charters, etc.

b. If departure will not be possible via regularly-
scheduled commercial flights or chartered commercial
aircraft, CMS and the regional Bureau will discuss request
for DOD assistance. Ambassador should brief the relevant
combatant command on the situation at hand.

c. Depending on departure option(s) selected, identify
preferred options for internal movement, staging points,
routes, assembly areas, embarkation points, etc. Also,
consider transportation, timing, and size of group
movements.

d. If potential transportation includes stopovers at a
location where there is a U.S. diplomatic post, include
transit post(s) as info addressee on all related cable
traffic. Provide guidance to transit post on services
required for those departing, such as special medical
needs, diapers, etc.

e. Inform other foreign missions of drawdown status.

f. Disseminate the Travel Warning (issued by the
Department when Ordered Departure is granted) to the
American community via post's warden system and Internet
website. The communication to the private American
community should strongly urge private Americans to review
their individual circumstances and consider whether they
should relocate to the United States at this point. It
should note that those who do not depart should be
prepared to remain in country, and that embassy services
may soon become unavailable to those who stay. Note that
warden system and website updates may also become
unavailable, and that Americans who stay should monitor
the State Department website, and, specifically,
http://travel.state.gov.

g. Consult with M/FLO for services to personnel who depart
post.

h. Request that the Department impose Minimize status.

i. Ensure the guidelines in 4 FAH-3 H-830 "Emergency
Evacuation Fiscal Policy" are followed by all agencies at
post.

j. Contact the regional bureau to replenish post operating
funds to sustain post operations, and also contact K Fund
Manager, RM/CFO, for special K funds for evacuation
related operations and evacuee travel. Charter aircraft
will be funded at the Department level.

k. Confirm travel orders are prepared for departing post
personnel. (It is best for post to get all information
when employees check in at post.)

l. Consider actions that must be accomplished in the event
all employees depart post and operations are suspended.
Be ready to initiate document destruction plan.

m. Arrange administrative control of residences and
personal property of departing U.S. Government personnel.

n. Designate liaison officers, arranging at high level to
ensure acceptance by host government and ensuring
communication capability.

o. Consider disposition of pets. (State Department policy
precludes evacuating pets via chartered or military
aircraft or ships, and they therefore require alternate
accommodations. Working animals, such as guide dogs, are
not considered pets and will be accommodated if possible.)

p. Consider assigning officers at the main ports of
departure to offer routine consular services, assist in
liaison with local authorities, and track private
Americans leaving the country via the Consular Task Force
application. Assign personnel only after consultation
with post's Regional Medical Officer or Foreign Service
Health Practitioner in case additional protective measures
are advised.

q. Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System
(PS),making sure that TDY personnel have been included,
and that the Emergency Management System module is current
in its tracking of travels and destinations. If computers
are not functioning, transmit up-to-date staffing pattern
to S/ES-O/CMS, CA and post's regional bureau, including
breakdown of employees and family members by agency and
names of TDY personnel, and indicating who is out of
country and their status (TDY, annual leave, home leave,
R&R).

-- At the discretion of the Chief of Mission, in
coordination with the Department, assistance may be extended
to other foreign nationals when humanitarian or U.S. national
security interests dictate. Post must obtain prior approval
from the Department before offering departure assistance.
Points to cover in such local discussions may include:

(1) The U.S. Government will consider assisting third-
country nationals (TCNs) and host-country nationals in
departure on a case-by-case, space available, and
reimbursable basis when doing so serves U.S. interests and
the passenger(s) has appropriate travel documents,
including a valid visa for entry to the United States.

(2) Priorities of movement and how they will be integrated
into departure plans.

(3) Reimbursement for departure assistance to third-
country nationals is billed directly from the U.S.
Government to the government of the individual (except
where the national is a family member of a U.S. citizen in
which case the national becomes part of the U.S. citizen's
individual promissory note).

(4) Advance travel documentation.

(5) Sharing of personnel assignments, communications and
other management considerations for the departure process.

(6) Screening procedures at assembly and embarkation
areas.

(7) Responsibilities at safe haven, transit points or
final destination.

-------------- --------------


18. Please direct questions to Robin Morritz in M/PRI at
MorritzRX@State.gov or Elias Parra in Crisis Management Staff
at SES-O_CMS@State.gov.


19. Minimize considered.


CLINTON