U.S. NON-PAPER ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY

S E C R E T STATE 060343

SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT START JCIC US KTIA RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY
VEHICLES AND OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
WARHEADS

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, during continuing
negotiations regarding a START follow-on treaty with
Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs
Anatoliy Antonov, undertook to provide to the Russian
Federation a U.S. non-paper explaining the U.S. approach
for counting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads in the
context of the START follow-on treaty.


2. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Moscow is requested to
provide the text contained in paragraph 3 below to
appropriate host government officials in the form of a
diplomatic note as soon as possible on June 15.
Washington will provide the embassy with a courtesy
Russian-language translation of the note in paragraph 3;
however, delivery of the demarche should not be delayed if
the translation is delayed. Embassy is requested to
confirm the delivery of the note, the name and office of
the official to whom it was delivered, the date of the
delivery, and any comment/reaction provided at that time.


3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation)
Begin text.


U.S. Non-paper
(Date)

On Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles and Operationally
Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads

Limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) and
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW)
- During the Moscow meetings, the U.S. Delegation
committed to explain more fully the U.S. approach with
respect to limits on SNDVs and ODSNW.
- The U.S. approach is a hybrid of the START Treaty limit
on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed
SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy
bombers, and the Moscow Treaty limit on ODSNW.
- The limit on each is independent of the other. There is
no direct relationship between the number of deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; and the
number of ODSNW.
On strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
- For strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S.
approach would continue to use the START conventions for
counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers,
deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and
deployed heavy bombers.
- For the purpose of counting deployed ICBMs and their
associated launchers against the limit for SNDVs, the
general rule would be that each deployed launcher of ICBMs
would be considered to contain a deployed ICBM.
- However, under the U.S. approach, silo launchers that do
not contain an ICBM and are no longer usable for launching
and ICBM would not count against the limit for SNDVs.
These launchers would either be eliminated using
simplified elimination procedures (to be agreed) or
exempted from the limitations of the treaty through an
agreed exemption, which could include transparency
measures.
- ICBMs of a type tested and deployed for the delivery of
nuclear warheads, but equipped with non-nuclear warheads,
would count against the SNDV limit.
- ICBMs of a type tested and deployed solely for the
delivery of non-nuclear warheads would not count against
the SNDV limit.
- For the purpose of counting deployed SLBMs and their
associated launchers against the limit for SNDVs, the
general rule would be that each deployed launcher of SLBMs
would be considered to contain a deployed SLBM.
- SLBMs of a type tested and deployed for the delivery of
nuclear warheads, but equipped with non-nuclear warheads,
would still count against the SNDV limit.
- However, SLBMs of a type tested and deployed solely for
the delivery of non-nuclear warheads would not count
against the SNDV limit.
- Modified SLBM launchers on SSGNs would not be considered
to contain SLBMs and would not count against the SNDV
limit. These launchers, which were modified in shipyards,
are no longer capable of launching an SLBM and thus would
be exempted from the limitations of the treaty through an
agreed exemption for SSGNs, which could include
transparency measures.
- Launchers on SSBNs in refueling overhaul would count
against the SNDV limit.
- For heavy bombers, all heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments would count against the limit for SNDVs.
- Under the U.S. approach, heavy bombers that were
originally equipped for nuclear armaments but that are no
longer usable for the delivery of nuclear armaments would
not count against the limit for SNDVs. These heavy
bombers would either be eliminated using simplified
elimination procedures (to be agreed) or exempted from the
limitations of the treaty through an agreed exemption,
which could include transparency measures.
On operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
(ODSNW)
- For ICBMs in their launchers, the actual number of
nuclear warheads on each ICBM would count against the
ODSNW limit.
- ICBM launchers that do not contain an ICBM subject to
the treaty would not contain ODSNW.
- For SLBMs in their launchers, the actual number of
nuclear warheads on each SLBM would count against the
ODSNW limit.
- SLBM launchers that do not contain an SLBM subject to
the treaty would not contain ODSNW.
- SLBM launchers on SSBNs in refueling overhaul do not
contain SLBMs throughout the lengthy overhaul period and
thus would not contain ODSNW.
- For ICBMs and SLBMs in their launchers, if such ICBMs
and SLBMs are equipped with non-nuclear warheads, those
warheads would not count against the ODSNW limit. Such
launchers could be subject to transparency measures.
- For heavy bombers, nuclear armaments loaded on a heavy
bomber and nuclear armaments for heavy bombers located in
specified weapon storage areas associated with or directly
supporting heavy bomber air bases would count against the
ODSNW limit.

End text.
CLINTON