Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE59827
2009-06-10 18:36:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TRANSPARENCY

Tags:  LY PARM PREL CWC OPCW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5616
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #9827/01 1611859
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101836Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4726
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5445
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 7764
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 059827 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: LY PARM PREL CWC OPCW
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TRANSPARENCY
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION
FACILITY CONSTRUCTION

REF: A. 2009 THE HAGUE 000295 (MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
OF THE 56TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION)

B. 2007 THE HAGUE 001851 (WRAP-UP FOR THE 50TH
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION)

C. 2008 STATE 058476 (CONVERSION OF THE RABTA CWPF)

D. 2008 TRIPOLI 000662 (JULY 28-30 RABTA PRODUCTION
SITEVISIT)

E. 2009 STATE 038618 (GUIDANCE FOR THE 56TH
EXECUTIVECOUNCIL SESSION)

F. 2009 THE HAGUE 000296 (EC-56 DONORS MEETING AND
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS)

G. 2009 THE HAGUE 001021 (MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
OF CSP-13)

H. 2009 THE HAGUE 000143 (EC-55 DESTRUCTION
INFORMALS)

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 059827

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: LY PARM PREL CWC OPCW
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TRANSPARENCY
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION
FACILITY CONSTRUCTION

REF: A. 2009 THE HAGUE 000295 (MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
OF THE 56TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION)

B. 2007 THE HAGUE 001851 (WRAP-UP FOR THE 50TH
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION)

C. 2008 STATE 058476 (CONVERSION OF THE RABTA CWPF)

D. 2008 TRIPOLI 000662 (JULY 28-30 RABTA PRODUCTION
SITEVISIT)

E. 2009 STATE 038618 (GUIDANCE FOR THE 56TH
EXECUTIVECOUNCIL SESSION)

F. 2009 THE HAGUE 000296 (EC-56 DONORS MEETING AND
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS)

G. 2009 THE HAGUE 001021 (MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
OF CSP-13)

H. 2009 THE HAGUE 000143 (EC-55 DESTRUCTION
INFORMALS)


1. (U) This is an action request for the U.S. Delegation in
The Hague and for Embassy Tripoli; see paragraphs 9 through

11.

--------------
Background
--------------


2. (U) There are two major tasks under the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) that Libya has yet to complete: conversion
of the former Rabta Chemical Weapons Production Facility
(CWPF) for the production of pharmaceuticals, and destruction
of the remaining stockpile of declared chemical weapons
(approximately 25 MT of mustard agent and 860 MT of chemical
agent precursor chemicals). Libya,s transparency on the
status of both tasks has been an issue for some time. This
cable addresses specific actions the United States should
take to address these transparency issues as follow-up to
meetings with the Libyan delegation during the April 2009
56th Session of the CWC,s Executive Council (EC) (Ref. A).

-- Rabta Conversion --


3. (U) The conversion of former Rabta CWPF to the production
of pharmaceuticals and the combined plan for its conversion
and verification were approved in 2004. At that time the
protective sandbag-covered wall that partially surrounds the
facility was identified as a specialized structure and was
scheduled for removal in the approved plan. A request to
retain the wall was first tabled by Libya during the
destruction informals and with U.S. and UK delegations on the
margins of the 50th EC Session in September 2007 (Ref. B).
Since then Libya has approached U.S., UK, and Technical

Secretariat representatives requesting support for a
correction to the approved Rabta conversion plan allowing for
retention of the sandbag wall in order to provide protection
for the operation of the pharmaceutical facility and exposed
equipment from the extreme desert environment.


4. (U) In 2008 the United States proposed transparency
measures and requested Libyan commitment to continue
transparency with the EC before the United States could
support retaining the wall (Ref. C). These transparency
measures included a U.S. request that Libya provide more
detailed information via a paper to the EC at the earliest
possible date. Libya has yet to provide the paper, as such,
but has addressed the details to varying degrees as part of
its subsequent presentations during EC destruction informals.


5. (SBU) In 2008 U.S. and UK delegations visited the Rabta
facility to observe the characteristics of the sandbag wall
and the progress made in the conversion (Ref. D). Based on
the U.S. delegation,s 2008 visit to the Rabta facility, we
agree that the Libyan assertion of the protective
characteristics of the sandbag wall against sandstorms, etc.,
is legitimate. Further, we agree that the retention of the
sandbag wall does not pose a threat to the object and purpose
of the Convention (Ref. E).


6. (SBU) U.S. and UK delegations reengaged the Libyan
representatives during the April 2009 Session of the EC in an
attempt to resolve this open issue and improve the quality of
information provided to the EC on the status of the
conversion (Ref. A). U.S. and UK reps reiterated that both
States Parties would support a correction to the combined
plan that would allow retention of the wall provided that
Libya: provides more detailed presentations at the EC

STATE 00059827 002 OF 004

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TRANSPARENCY
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION
FACILITY CONSTRUCTI
destruction informals; provides sound justification for
making the correction; and permits the U.S. and the UK to
review the correction before submitting it to the Technical
Secretariat. The Libyan delegation reacted positively to this
proposal and to suggestions for expanding its interactions
with other States Parties for additional transparency and
support of its proposed plan correction.

-- CW Destruction --


7. (U) The deadline established by the CWC Conference of the
States Parties for destruction of Libya,s mustard stockpile
is December 31, 2010. Destruction of the remaining inventory
of precursor chemicals is to be completed no later than
December 31, 2011. Libya is obligated to report to the
Council on a 90-day cycle on its destruction activities and
schedule. Libya continues to meet this reporting obligation
through submission of the obligatory reports and
presentations during the destruction informals, which have
included some information on the status of destruction
facility construction.


8. (U) Libya,s plan is for its CW destruction facility to
be located on two sites; the first is for repackaging of
leaking containers within the current, remote storage site;
and the second is the primary destruction facility (the Rabta
Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility (Rabta CWDF),where
destruction will take place),to be located in the general
vicinity of the Rabta plant undergoing conversion. Libya,s
recent reporting to the Council has focused on the
repackaging operations, and has not included much information
on the primary destruction facility, (e.g., Ref. F).
December 2008 was the last time Libya provided specific
information on the Rabta CWDF site (Ref. G). This lack of
transparency on the status of the destruction preparation is
of increasing concern, and is being addressed, along with the
Rabta conversion sandbag wall issue, through a non-paper.

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------


9. (U) The Department requests that U.S. Delegation to the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
and Embassy Tripoli, respectively, deliver the non-paper in
paragraph 11 to the appropriate Libyan representatives in The
Hague and in Tripoli, making clear that the non-paper is
being delivered in both places, and report the response. Both
the U.S. Delegation to the OPCW and Embassy Tripoli should
provide an info copy of the non-paper to their UK contacts
and inform them of the dual delivery in The Hague and Tripoli.


10. (SBU) When delivering the non-paper, both the Delegation
to the OPCW and Embassy Tripoli should emphasize the
following strategic themes:

- The United States appreciates Libyan efforts to provide the
Executive Council with current information on the status of
the Rabta conversion and preparations for CW destruction.

- There are two related areas where there is need for greater
transparency:
-- resolution of the outstanding issue on retention of the
sandbag wall as a part of the Rabta conversion; and
-- the status of Libya,s preparation for CW destruction at
the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility.

- Regarding retention of the sandbag wall:
-- the United States agrees with the protective effect of the
sandbag wall, and that its retention does not pose a threat
to the object and purpose of the Convention;
-- the United States is prepared to support Executive Council
approval of retaining the sandbag wall if Libya commits to
certain transparency measures; and
-- we suggest that a working session be held in The Hague
immediately preceding to the 57th Session of the Executive
Council (EC-57) to review all aspects Libya's destruction
informals presentation for the Session (e.g., Rabta
conversion and destruction facility construction status) and,
if available, to review a draft conversion plan correction
request to allow the sandbag wall,s reteTsui-Ling Yus, as
well as other States Parties, remains keenly interested in
the progress made toward destruction of Libya,s CW
stockpile;
-- since CSP-13 (December 2008),there has been little
information provided to the EC on the status of construction
at the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility or the
fabrication of destruction equipment being conducted
elsewhere; and

STATE 00059827 003 OF 004

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TRANSPARENCY
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION
FACILITY CONSTRUCTI
-- thus, the United States requests that Libya provide States
Parties with a clear update on its preparations for CW
destruction and an update on its Rabta CWDF planning and
construction status at each EC Session, including projected
start-up dates during the informals prior to EC-57.


11. (SBU) Text of Non-Paper: Transparency on the Status of
Libya,s Rabta Conversion and Preparations for Completing
Chemical Weapons Destruction

The United States appreciates Libya,s continued effort to
provide the Executive Council (EC) with current information
on the status of the Rabta conversion and preparations for CW
destruction.

There are two related areas, however, where the United States
sees a need for greater transparency, and would like to
address these through this non-paper:
-- resolution of the outstanding issue on retention of the
sandbag wall as a part of the Rabta conversion; and
-- the status of Libya,s preparation for CW destruction at
the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility.

-- Retention of the Sandbag Wall --

Based on the U.S. delegation,s 2008 visit to the Rabta
facility to observe the progress made in its conversion and
the characteristics of the sandbag wall, the United States
agrees that Libya,s assertion of the protective
characteristics of the wall against sandstorms, etc., is
well-founded. Further, the United States agrees that the
retention of the sandbag wall does not pose a clear threat to
the object and purpose of the Convention.

For these reasons, the United States is prepared to support
EC approval of a correction to the conversion plan allowing
retention of the sandbag wall provided that the Government of
Libya commits to the following:

- that a clear, complete, and legally sound justification of
the requested revision of the approved plan be included as
part of the correction request;

- that the United States and the UK are provided an
opportunity to review and concur in the content of the draft
correction request before it is submitted to the EC for
consideration; and

- that Libya commit to provide the EC at each session,
beginning with the 57th Session of the EC (EC-57) and until
the Rabta conversion is complete, with a presentation at the
informals in at least as much detail as its EC-53
presentation and meeting all four of the criteria defined by
our May 2008 non-paper, which is attached for reference.

The United States suggests that a working session be held in
The Hague immediately preceding EC-57 (e.g., July 9 and 10,
2009) to review all aspects of Libya's destruction informals
presentation for the Session (e.g., Rabta conversion and
destruction facility construction status) and, if available,
to review a draft conversion plan correction request to allow
the sandbag wall,s retention.

-- Progress on the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction
Facility--

The United States remains keenly interested in Libya,s
progress toward destruction of its CW stockpile.

Since the December 2008 Conference of States Parties
(CSP-13),when Dr. Hesnawy discussed the Libyan CW
destruction planning with the U.S. Delegation, there has been
little information provided on the status of infrastructure
construction at the Rabta Toxic Chemical Destruction Facility
or the equipment being produced by the Italian firm SIPSA.

During the informal consultations prior to EC-55 in February
2009, the Libyan delegation promised an update on CW
destruction facility progress at the informals prior to
EC-56. That update did not occur.

The United States, therefore, requests that Libya provide a
detailed update on its Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction
Facility planning and construction status, and projected
start-up dates during the informals prior to EC-57.

-- General Considerations --

To be most effective, future Libyan presentations, both

STATE 00059827 004 OF 004

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TRANSPARENCY
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION
FACILITY CONSTRUCTI
during the destruction informals and to the Council, should
provide States Parties with sufficient detail to understand
the progress that has been made toward completion of the
Rabta conversion in December 2009, and construction of the
Rabta Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in time to meet
established intermediate and final destruction deadlines,
including:

- a clear, updated picture of what has been accomplished
relative to the schedules already provided to the Council;

- specific information on any changes or unanticipated delays
in planned activities and their impact, if any, on meeting
the conversion and destruction deadlines;

- actions taken to overcome these problems;

- a summary of progress in the physical conversion of Rabta
with respect to changes in existing facilities, and the
addition and installation of new equipment; and

- a summary of progress made on Rabta Toxic Chemicals
Destruction Facility infrastructure construction and the
status of the equipment fabrication.

We suggest that the Libyan delegation continue consultations
with other interested delegations to clarify the need for
retaining the sandbag wall and to secure support for the
correction to the conversion plan.

We also suggest that Libya provide representatives from key
delegations on the EC and regional groups with an opportunity
to visit the Rabta in order to see first hand the progress
made on Rabta conversion and the need for retaining the
sandbag wall, and the progress being made on construction of
the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility.

End text of non-paper.


12. (U) The point-of-contact for this action is Tom
Ferguson, ISN/CB, (202-647-9650, fergusontl@state.sgov.gov).
CLINTON