JUNE 3 U.S.-RUSSIA CFE MEETING: NO BREAKTHROUGHS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 059424

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014
TAGS: GG KCFE MD NATO PARM PREL RS
SUBJECT: JUNE 3 U.S.-RUSSIA CFE MEETING: NO BREAKTHROUGHS,
COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. USOSCE 118 (JCG CABLE DESCRIBING RUSSIAN A-M)

B. 08 STATE 133417 (DEC 2008 CFE MEETING CABLE)

Classified By: VCI A/S Gottemoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary. U.S. and Russian CFE Teams led by VCI A/S
Gottemoeller and Russian MFA Director for Disarmament Antonov
met in Geneva in the afternoon of June 3 to review ideas for
moving forward on CFE. The meeting had an introductory
character, as it was the first time U.S. and Russian
interagency teams met in 2009 on CFE. Discussion keyed off
of the ideas in Russia's recent Aide-Memoire on a "Way
Forward" on CFE, which is based on the U.S/NATO "Parallel
Actions Package." Discussion focused on elements of the
Russian Aide-Memoire dealing with possible provisional
application of CFE, the flank regime, Moldova, and Georgia.
A/S Gottemoeller raised, but there was no time to explore,
the conditions under which Russia would resume implementation
of CFE. Gottemoeller and Antonov agreed, with regard to
Germany's June 10 high-level meeting on "The Future of
Conventional Arms Control in Europe," that they did not
expect any significant developments but hoped it would be
possible to avoid a restatement of maximalist positions.
Antonov told Gottemoeller that the Russian government wants
to keep CFE. They agreed on the importance of the
U.S.-Russia bilateral process to finding a way forward.
Gottemoeller said that, on the margins of upcoming START
exchanges, she and Antonov could follow up on the question of
future bilateral meetings. End Summary.


2. (SBU) VCI A/S Rose Gottemoeller and Russian MFA Director
for Disarmament Anatoly Antonov, supported by interagency
delegations, met at the U.S. Mission in Geneva to discuss CFE
during the afternoon of June 3. Gottemoeller outlined two
goals for the meeting: to explore in a bilateral context some
of the ideas outlined in the Russian Aide-Memoire (ref A),
and to discuss how to move forward. She welcomed Russia's
willingness to use the Parallel Actions Package (which the
Aide-Memoire refers to at the &Russian-U.S. draft8) as the
basis for resolving the CFE impasse, while noting noted that
Russia's Aide-Memoire also repeated previously-stated Russian
positions. She suggested focusing on four core issues:
Russia's ideas on provisional application, the flank,
Moldova, and Georgia.


3. (SBU) In his opening remarks, Antonov welcomed the effort
to revitalize bilateral discussions on CFE. He said it was
important for Russia to know what the new Administration's
policy is on CFE. Despite "resetting" the relationship, he
said that he has not yet seen any changes in the U.S.
approach on CFE, and he noted the U.S. continues to complain
about Russian non-compliance in Vienna. He asked if the U.S.
Administration needs arms control in Europe. Antonov then
made a plea for finding a way to address the "most important
disarmament issue in Europe" separate from the frozen
conflicts, adding that we will not succeed in linking all of
these issues. (Comment: He returned to this point several
times, noting at one point that while Russia had agreed to
inclusion of Georgia and Moldova in the parallel actions
package, Russia considers itself to have fulfilled all the
Istanbul commitments. End Comment.) Antonov suggested that
if Gottemoeller reviewed the history of the bilateral
discussions on CFE, she would see how the Russian position
(now expressed in the Aide-Memoire) has softened. He claimed
that some of the Russian ideas have been supported by U.S.
(CFE) experts, but asserted that parts of the original
parallel actions package had been walked back by the U.S.
Antonov was looking for two things from this meeting: to
understand what is new in the U.S. approach to CFE and to
discuss how to reenergize the bilateral dialogue. In one
difficult moment of his opening presentation, Antonov
asserted that Russia's suspension of CFE implementation had
not changed the actual military situation in Europe ) war
had not broken out, there had been no build-up of Russian
forces. Gottemoeller countered that this assessment appeared
to set aside events in Georgia in 2008, which she
characterized as tragic for all sides.


4. (U) Gottemoeller said the U.S. is committed to the CFE
Treaty and the CFE regime, which continues to be an important
contributor to European security - including Russian

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security. She noted the U.S. remains committed to other
European security instruments, for example the OSCE, Vienna
Document 1999, and the Open Skies Treaty. Gottemoeller
asserted that the U.S. is ready to discuss new ideas for
improving European security, as evidenced by comments by
President Obama and Secretary Clinton on our willingness to
engage in discussions about President Medvedev's proposals
for European security. She cautioned that our problem is in
making all these pieces fit together, including the "frozen
conflicts" and the complex situation in Georgia since last
August. Gottemoeller concluded by suggesting that our
objectives should be to resolve issues and return Russia to
the CFE regime and that we have an opportunity to work
together toward these goals.

-------------- --
Specific Elements of the Aide-Memoire
-------------- ---


5. (U) Provisional Application: Gottemoeller asked Antonov
to explain the point on provisional application. Antonov
indicated that the Aide-Memoire builds on an idea that he
first expressed at the CFE seminar in Paris in November 2007;
namely, allowing for the equivalent of provisional
application while ratification is underway. (Note: At the
Paris CFE seminar, Antonov suggested that provisions could be
made to allow parties to "abide by" the terms of the
agreement until its entry into force, up to the limits of
their domestic legislation. The example he used was the
November 2006 "Agreement on Provisional Application of the
Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International
Fusion Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of
the ITER Project," which includes Russia and the U.S. as
signatories. End Note.) Antonov pointed out that there had
been a period of provisional application for the original CFE
Treaty, and he saw no reason why the same could not be done
for A/CFE. As for the timing, which he said has decreased to
six months in the Aide-Memoire from twelve months in earlier
versions of the Russian position, Antonov noted that after
seeing that all Allies could complete ratification for
Albania and Croatia to join NATO in less than nine months, it
became clear that something as important as ratification of
A/CFE could be done in six months if NATO really considered
it to be a priority. What's important, he said, is that
Parliaments actively take up the CFE ratification issue.
Antonov clarified that provisional application would be for
those who had not completed ratification ) those who had
already ratified A/CFE would simply move to (full)
implementation.

-- In the discussion that followed, the U.S. team underscored
that for the U.S. and many Allies, provisional application of
an entire Treaty was nearly impossible prior to its
ratification by parliaments. Gottemoeller recalled private
comments in which Antonov had appeared to suggest a concept
short of provisional application. The sides agreed that the
issue was very difficult and would require further
exploration.


6. (C) Flank: Gottemoeller noted that the Russian desire to
abolish the flank regime (for Russia) is a core issue and one
that is very important to NATO. She highlighted that there
would be significant complications resulting from any effort
to change a core element of the Adapted CFE Treaty (A/CFE)
before ratification, but noted the reference to possible
transparency measures in the Aide-Memoire and asked for any
further Russian thinking. Antonov responded that the idea of
possible transparency measures was in fact the "raisin" or
sweet spot in the Russian Aide-Memoire on this point. He
noted that Russia has made clear that there is no need to
apply the flank regime to Russia, but that he had no
objection to retaining the flank for others. Although the
U.S. has repeatedly mentioned problems with the flank,
Antonov said that no other state has raised such concerns
with Russia, including Turkey and Norway. He had no idea
what kind of confidence-building measures would be useful
because he does not understand what the specific concerns may
be. He said that Putin had provided the original position as
a political decision and that Russia had tried to find some
complementary measures to allay the concerns of its
neighbors. He declined to be drawn into any discussion of
what possible political commitments or stabilizing measures
Russia might suggest as an alternative to the flank limits
for Russia, claiming he preferred to hear what NATO Allies
wanted to propose. Russia had included this point in the
Aide-Memoire to demonstrate willingness to address the issue.

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Regarding the problem of changing a core element of the
Adapted Treaty before it is ratified, Antonov reverted to a
familiar argument; that the Baltic states had been dropped
from the original CFE Treaty in 1991 via a JCG chairman's
statement; and asserted that the flank regime was no more
momentous. He said that if there is a political will,
everything can be solved.

-- During this discussion Antonov returned to a theme he
voiced earlier; at present, without CFE, nothing bad had
happened; it was hard to imagine that Russia would invade
Norway or Turkey. Gottemoeller suggested that although the
Aide-Memoire could be interpreted as showing that Russia is
interested in maintaining CFE, it appears to express familiar
Russian positions. Was Russia committed to CFE, she asked?
Antonov responded unambiguously ("da, da"),noting that
Russia needs the Treaty and needs to build relations with all
European countries (not just those currently in the Treaty)
on a reliable basis. CFE can provide that basis, although we
are at a difficult time and seem to be watching CFE on its
deathbed.


7. (SBU) Georgia and Moldova: Turning to Georgia and
Moldova, Gottemoeller asked how the ideas in the Aide-Memoire
related to the proposal the U.S. had made in December
updating the Georgia portion of the Parallel Actions Package
(ref B). Antonov replied unequivocally that he viewed the
December proposal as a non-starter, as a half-baked approach
to solving serious, complicated issues. He decried any
attempt to use CFE to resolve "Georgian aggression." Still,
Antonov said, even though Russia wants to separate
discussions on CFE from the frozen conflicts, and in its view
has satisfied all Istanbul commitments related to CFE, Russia
was open to transparency measures on Moldova and the
Transcaucasus. Antonov said that he would like to end on a
positive note, that Russia was ready to talk about what else
was needed and then have states able to ratify. Gottemoeller
noted that she had heard Antonov say that Russia does not
like the U.S. proposal on Georgia; she would like to know
what ideas Russia had as an alternative. Allies would want
to know that, too. On Moldova, Antonov asserted that the
U.S. and Russia were very close to resolution. Russia did
not object to transparency; all that needed to be resolved
were the details. Regarding the status of the Russian PKF in
Moldova, the 2 1 statement (Medvedev, Voronin, Smirnov)
suggested this was a resolved issue, but Russia was open to
observers. Moldova, he asserted, was solvable. Gottemoeller
welcomed this positive assessment but noted that details were
important and would need to be worked out with the Moldovans
as well as others.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------


8. (SBU) Running out of time, Gottemoeller and Antonov
looked at next steps.

-- Antonov noted that Russia would like a written response to
the Aide-Memoire, suggesting that such a response could show
what elements of the Russian proposal are acceptable or not.
Alternatively, the U.S. could provide its own version of what
would be acceptable. (Note: We understand that Russia has
been approaching some Allies in capitals with the same
request for a written response to the Aide-Memoire. End
Note.)

-- In looking toward the immediate future, Gottemoeller noted
that the U.S. was interested in a common approach to the
Berlin meeting not only with Allies, but also with Russia.
Our goal should be to find ways to resolve the CFE impasse
and not lose time in Berlin by repeating maximalist
positions. She highlighted that, as appropriate during the
meeting, the U.S. planned to emphasize the key role of
transparency in advancing European security, the utility of
arms control for verifying information on defense
arrangements, the importance of the entry into force of
A/CFE, and the importance of implementing all legal and
political commitments. Antonov appeared to agree that these
themes were sound, but warned that, if provoked, he would
have to strike back. This was what had happened at Bad
Saarow and in Paris.

-- In addition to future bilateral meetings on CFE, Antonov
was receptive to the idea of meeting with a group of 8-10
NATO Allies. He suggested (in a tone that sounded

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tongue-in-cheek) that the group might be expanded beyond NATO
to include Russia's ally Belarus.

-- Gottemoeller said that, on the margins of upcoming START
exchanges, she and Antonov could follow up on the question of
future bilateral meetings and the timing of an expanded
session. The latter, which the U.S. had envisioned for the
margins of Berlin, could not be accommodated due to the plans
of the German organizers, who wanted to host a NATO-Russia
meeting involving all Allies.


9. (C) Comment. Although Antonov had no interest in moving
discussion beyond what was presented in the Aide-Memoire, he
clearly wanted to demonstrate Russian willingness to engage
the U.S. bilaterally on CFE. The meeting had an introductory
character on both sides. But this did not mask what appeared
to be a reality: that Antonov had a mandate to talk about
CFE, but not to negotiate new ideas or solutions, or
brainstorm beyond the elements of the Aide-Memoire. Antonov
spent a lot of time explaining how comments made in previous
meetings over the course of 2007 and 2008 were still valid
for Russia. He repeated familiar complaints that the
Parallel Actions Package called for concrete Russian actions
in exchange for vague promises that the U.S. and NATO Allies
would "consider" ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty. On one
issue, Georgia, both the rhetoric and substance of his
comments were tougher than in December 2008, when the Russian
team had brainstormed freely on ideas advanced by the U.S.
Antonov is clearly willing to continue to be personally
involved in the effort to end the CFE impasse, and made no
mention of passing any work to the Russian JCG delegation in
Vienna. End comment.


10. (SBU) Delegation members:

Russia:
Amb. Anatoly Antonov
Ms. Maria Ivanova (Russian Mission, Geneva)
Ms. Inna Kotkova (Legal Department, MFA)
Mr. Andrey Belyakov (Russian Mission, Geneva)
Mr. Anton Mazur (MFA)
Mr. Evgeny Ilin (MOD)
Mr. Yuri Zaytsev (MOD)
Mr. Alexander Trifonov (MFA)

U.S.:
A/S Rose Gottemoeller
Mr. Richard Davis
Mr. George Look
Mr. Terryl Kron
Ms. Donna Phelan
Ms. Jennifer Laurendeau
Ms. Jessica Kehl
COL Darren Hartford
Ms. Christa Leman
Mr. Marshall Brown
CLINTON