CFE: HLTF MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY: ALLIES DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 058925

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2014
TAGS: KCFE NATO OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE: HLTF MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY: ALLIES DISCUSS
RUSSIA'S AIDE MEMOIRE AND PREP FOR BERLIN

REF: STATE 53816 HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MAY 26-28 AWAY DAY

Classified By: Johnathan Beckett, VCI/CCA Acting Office
Director, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. At the May 26-28 HLTF Away Day at the NATO
School in Oberammergau, Allies reviewed the current situation
regarding CFE; discussed Russia's Aide Memoire on the
Parallel Actions Package; and agreed on general themes and an
approach for the June 10 German-hosted meeting on the future
of conventional arms control. Key insights and conclusions
stemming from the two-day event included:

-- Russia's Aide Memoire: Allies agreed that there is little
new in Russia's non-paper on the Parallel Actions Package,
but considered it helpful that Russia had provided the
substance of its positions in writing and indicated
willingness to intensify efforts to find a solution. Allies
emphasized their own commitment to the Parallel Actions
Package as a vehicle for ending the CFE impasse and
identified areas in Russia's non-paper that needed
clarification or merited further exploration in the
U.S.-Russia bilateral channel, and possible expanded
discussion format involving a number of Allies. The Turks
blasted Russia's insistence on abolition of the flank regime
for Russia; this was the core of the regime for Turkey and
its elimination would make ratification of Adapted CFE by
Turkey impossible. Turkey was willing to consider increases
to the limits to accommodate any Russian security concerns.

-- Berlin Preps: Many allies expressed on the margins concern
that the June 10 seminar could have the effect of undermining
efforts to preserve the CFE regime. Some feared a repeat of
the exchange of maximalist positions they recalled from the
Bad Saarow and Paris seminars in 2007; others suggested that
the wide net of attendees would distract from the core CFE
issue. The Turks made clear privately that they might not
attend the meeting at all (due to Germany's decision to
invite a wide net of Europeans that might one day accede to
CFE, including Cyprus). Allies papered over differences,
agreeing nonetheless that Allies should seek to ensure that
the June 10 meeting contribute to current processes on CFE
and helps build a positive dynamic, but should not be a
decision meeting. All agreed that Alliance unity is
paramount, that comments by NATO Allies should key off of and
be bounded by Alliance positions expressed in, e.g., the
Strasbourg-Kehl declaration, and that it will be useful to
avoid backing Russia into a corner. End Summary.


2. (SBU) HLTF Head of Delegation Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary Richard A. Davis led the U.S. delegation which was
comprised of State/EUR/RPM Laurendeau, DOD/OSD Perenyi,
State/USOSCE Neighbour, State/VCI/CCA Lt Col Ducceschi and
State/CFE Expert Starkey.

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Contacts and Bilaterals: Russia Reaches Out; Moldova Clarifies
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3. (C) Russia: A number of Allies (Turkey, UK, Estonia,
Norway, France, Latvia, Bulgaria, Spain, Romania) reported on
contacts by Russian Embassy reps in capitals seeking feedback
on the Russian aide memoire and intended representation at
and expected outcome of the Berlin seminar. Russia also
explored with some (Turkey, UK, France) interest in meeting
bilaterally on the margins of Berlin; those approached were
receptive but noncommittal. None entered into substantive
discussion of the aide memoire and all reported sticking to
the NATO line on the Parallel Actions Package.

-- In its exchange with Russia, Turkey stressed there was not
much new in the Aide Memoire and expressed firm opposition to
the idea of abolishing the flank limits for Russia (a point
Turkey frequently repeated to Allies throughout the Away
Day).

-- Estonia noted this was the first contact by the Russian
Ambassador on CFE in 5 years. Additionally, Estonia noted
that Russia had again refused to extend the 1998 bilateral
Russia-Estonia CSBM on additional verification and data
exchange. Russia's rationale was that it was minimally
effective and lacked military significance, while noting,
paradoxically, the Estonians thought, that a CSBM developed
in the context of the NRC concerning the armed forces of
Russia and NATO would be far more relevant.


4. (C) Moldova: The Czech Republic, NATO IS, UK and U.S.
reported on contacts by Moldovan representatives regarding
their position on the Russian PKF in Moldova. Regarding the
2 1 Joint Declaration of March 18, Moldova informed the
Czech Republic that this was purely a political statement for
domestic purposes during the election and stressed to the UK
Moldova,s continued attachment to host nation consent.
Contacts with the NATO IS and U.S. focused on the Russian
aide memoire which includes a proposal to reaffirm the 1992
Russia-Moldova Peace Agreement. Moldova clarified that its
position on the full withdrawal of Russian forces remains
firm, and that it does not regard the 1992 cease fire
agreement as constituting host nation consent to the presence
of the Russian PKF: Moldova continues to support
civilianization of the peacekeeping forces under a new
mandate (such as OSCE).

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U.S.-Russia Bilat; Plans for Expanded Small-Group Meeting
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5. (SBU) The U.S. reported on the upcoming June 3 bilateral
meeting per reftel and floated the idea (proposed
conceptually by Turkey and others at recent HLTF meetings) of
a small self-selected group of 7-9 Allies meeting with the
U.S. and Russia on June 9, just prior to the June 10 Berlin
meeting, to augment the ongoing U.S.-Russia bilateral track.
The U.S. assured that this meeting would be followed by a
debrief to all Allies. Reception of this "concrete idea" was
positive. During discussion, it became evident that the
self-selecting process (despite helpful calls from the IS
Chair for exercising self-restraint) might result in too
large a group. This would detract from the possibility of a
productive meeting. On the margins, several Allies offered
to remain out of the group if the U.S. was able to keep the
numbers low, so this potential problem appears to be
manageable.

-- Portugal in plenary (and others on the margins - Hungary,
Canada and Czech Republic) indicated a willingness to opt out
if the group was kept below a threshold of about 10. Some
(Turkey, Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary) were supportive of
the idea of a small-group and the increased efficacy if
numbers were low, but expressed timing concerns. This
emerged as an acute problem for the Turks, who had
reservations about attending the Berlin meeting for reasons
unrelated to CFE.

-- Germany was supportive of an Allied meeting with Russia
(as a small group or in force). However, following the Away
Day, as host of the Berlin meeting, they opted to set up an
open-ended June 9 meeting to which all Allies would be
invited. In the end, the U.S. agreed to the German plan, and
the small-group meeting will be coordinated and planned for a
later date, hosted by the U.S. as an adjunct to the
U.S.-Russia bilateral process.

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Russia's Aide Memoire: Allied Actions for Russian Promises?
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6. (SBU) Overall Reaction: There was consensus among Allies
that there is little new in Russia's non-paper, but most who
spoke also acknowledged that Russia's agreement to work with
the Parallel Actions Plan was positive, while the submission
in writing of its positions would be helpful as a basis for
further discussion. Only a few gave general (rather than
issue-specific) comments on the Aide Memoire. Those who
spoke broadly (Turkey, Romania, Norway, Italy, Luxembourg)
stressed that Russia had laid out maximalist "preconditions"
which would result in an "adapted, adapted CFE Treaty" prior
to ratification, and said they considered that a non-starter.
The parallel actions package - which Allies continued to
characterize as the "only show in town" - should be a vehicle
to get to the adapted Treaty and not an end that changes the
Treaty itself.


7. (SBU) Germany remarked that the core issue regarding the
package was resolving what is "parallel" and what is
"consecutive" (essentially taking up the RF "actions for
promises" banner.) Germany noted that Russia wants to
negotiate a clear document that addresses all of its
concerns, but recognized the resulting "serious revision of
A/CFE" would present ratification difficulties for many.
Germany suggested consideration of political commitments to
overcome the major, substantive stumbling blocks (the flank,
implementation, Georgia and Moldova) but did not provide any
specific ideas beyond the articulated Alliance position.


8. (SBU) In a lengthy discussion, Allies reviewed the
Russian Aide Memoire point-by-point to identify areas
requiring clarification, possible negotiating room, and
definitive red lines:

-- Points 1 and 2 - Ratification of the Agreement on
Adaptation and Provisional Application: Addressing these
points together, many noted these were largely procedural
matters. There might be some flexibility on ratification
timelines but only after resolving the key substantive
issues. Discussion of provisional application as Russia has
currently posed the idea (automatic after 6 months) was
confused by CFE experience: the original CFE Treaty was
provisionally applied in its entirety after it had been
ratified by nearly all States Parties (including all NATO
Allies). Allies did not exclude flexibility consistent with
the basics - for the U.S. and many others, ratification must
precede provisional application. For Turkey, flexibility on
both ratification timelines and provisional application was
possible as long as the flank was not at issue. Turkey was
clear: Russia would have to drop the demand to eliminate the
flank regime for Russia. Others agreed there may be room for
flexibility noting that Allied steps toward ratification and
some means of provisional application could serve as tools
that would provide negotiating space.

- Romania cautioned that political conditions were not
sufficiently ripe for moving forward on ratification and some
(Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary) stressed that Russia was
attempting to front-load the process by calling for
provisional application of A/CFE by Allies, while only
offering in return to address Russia's continued failure to
implement CFE through the possible consideration of
implementing selected, reciprocal, bilateral measures rather
than the entire treaty. A key issue that emerged out of this
discussion was the need for clarification of Russia's
proposed "goodwill gesture" regarding implementation: would
Russia implement CFE or A/CFE, and would this include the
"sub-ceilings" (that is, the flank limits)?

- The UK suggested that an alternative to provisional
application might be the possibility of a "trial
implementation" phase with a set end date, noting this
approach could provide negotiating space and also assist
those who can not provisionally apply prior to ratification.
The UK said this should not be on offer with Russia, but
rather an internal discussion; Germany was keener to explore
the idea further with Russia. Canada expressed concern that
some seemed willing to "trade" provisional application for
any form of Russian implementation of a Treaty that Russia
should already be implementing.

- During the discussion, Germany registered its position that
"completing the ratification process" does include depositing
instruments as Russia argues; no other Ally spoke to this
specific issue, but that is not NATO's previous position.

-- Point 3 - Abolish Flank Regime for Russia: Reinforcing
that this is one of the core substantive issues, Turkey,
Norway, Italy and Czech Republic said unambiguously that
abolishing the flank regime for Russia is an unacceptable
pre-condition for an agreement. Russia's concerns are
strictly political, not security-based; this should be an
aspect of future review of the Treaty (point 7) following
entry into force of A/CFE. Several suggested Allies ask
Russia to clarify and justify its new argument that the flank
limits obstruct the fight against terrorism. The Dutch
commented acidly: "if Russia could overrun a country
(Georgia) without significantly exceeding the Adapted Treaty
flank limit, wouldn't it be reasonable to suppose that the
limit would allow sufficient forces for countering some
terrorism?" Allies urged that Russia explain also why the
flank regime should remain for others, especially for the new
non-CFE NATO members, when they accede, if it does not remain
for Russia.

- Germany noted that Russia's position on the flank was not
understandable, but unhelpfully went on to minimize the
significance of the flank as incorporated in the Adapted
Treaty. Germany suggested asking Russia for more specifics
on its proposed Confidence and Security Building Measures to
explore the possibility of any negotiating room and to better
assess the impact on Alliance security. This prompted Norway
and others to stress the importance of the flank in Adapted
CFE, and the qualitative difference between A/CFE
legally-binding commitments as opposed to mere political
commitments.

-- Point 4 - Equipment Reductions for NATO States Parties:
There was general agreement that Russia needed to further
clarify the language in this point: A number of Allies
agreed that the language suggested Russia had moved toward
the NATO idea of considering lower national equipment
ceilings rather than insisting on a collective ceiling for
NATO and noted that the actual holdings of many Allies (and
other CFE States Parties including Russia) are far below
national ceilings. This could present space for negotiation,
but reductions must be on a national, voluntary basis and
focus on ceilings, not actual holdings. (The UK, for
example, underscored that it has many forces currently
outside the CFE Area of Application that would return into
the AOA "when peace breaks out.") Several Allies - led this
time by France and The Netherlands, with support from Germany
- noted that a collective ceiling in any form runs counter to
the Adapted Treaty and would not be acceptable.

-- Point 5 - Conditions for Accession: Estonia, Slovenia and
Latvia expressed concern at the implication that their terms
of accession would be part of the package and that any forum
to which they do not belong would approve decisions impacting
their security. (Germany unsuccessfully tried to "allay"
these fears by explaining how simple the process was and
repeating its support for the consideration of regional
measures.) On Albania and Croatia, the IS reported that on
May 25 FM Lavrov sent to the NATO SYG "the standard letter
for new NATO members" that noted Albania and Croatia should
take steps to adhere to A/CFE once its viability was restored
and, in the meantime, should comply with its objectives and
goals. Albania noted accession was under consideration and
offered to get back to Allies, while Croatia remained silent.


-- Point 6 - Definition of "Substantial Combat Forces" All
Allies who spoke averred that defining "substantial combat
forces" as it is used in the NATO-Russia Founding Act is a
NATO-Russia issue that is not/not appropriate for discussion
in other formats. Germany, seconded by Italy, said it might
be useful to remind Russia that this political commitment was
made in a context where CFE was considered a pillar of
European security, and was being implemented by all,
including the flank regime, and might not apply when those
conditions did not exist.

-- Point 7 - Future Review: There was considerable openness
to the idea of sketching elements for future review, as long
as Allies proceeded with caution on wording - too much detail
would complicate ratification.

-- Point 8 - Moldova: While there was extensive discussion
of Moldova and Georgia issues generally (see separate tics,
following point 9, below),the Moldova-specific discussion
was brief and the message was clear: inclusion of the 1992
RF-Moldova Peacekeeping Agreement as part of the Parallel
Actions Package (as suggested by Russia's Aide Memoire) is
not appropriate, and Moldovan agreement on how to treat
Moldova issues will be essential. Several delegations,
including the U.S., noted recent Moldovan demarches
indicating that the Moldovan government continued to favor
full Russian withdrawal of its forces, reflecting an apparent
Moldovan assessment that Voronin's joint statement with
Medvedev and Smirnov had gone too far. Romania (echoed by
Canada) noted Russia's proposal was limited to the PKF and
did not address the munitions at Kolbasna, or the guards.

-- Point 9 ) Georgia and Regional Transparency-related
Issues: Germany advocated a pragmatic approach that would
contribute to stability and security in Georgia in arms
control terms, on the lines of the ideas advanced by the U.S.
to the Russian Federation in December, which Germany
described as a regional arms control regime for the northern
Caucasus. Turkey expressed serious concern about the notion
of a regional regime as part of the Parallel Actions Package
since it is not part of the NATO position (the Turkish rep
indicated on the margins that he feared Germany intended a
regional regime to be used as justification for abandoning
the flank). Allies agreed that it would be useful to elicit
details from the Russians regarding their specific ideas on
transparency for the "transcaucasus."

-- Broader Considerations on Moldova and Georgia: Allied
comments on the Istanbul commitments and CFE were at times
discursive, at times very tough. Several Allies (e.g.,
Germany, Spain) - who stressed there was no intent to abandon
the outstanding Istanbul commitments - suggested the need to
redefine or reframe the Istanbul commitments in the
post-Georgia context. Germany also reminded Allies that CFE
could not solve all the problems in the Russia-Georgia
relationship, but could only address some aspects, as the
December proposals had attempted to do. Apart from Turkey's
misgivings about regional transparency regimes for the flank,
no Ally disputed this point. But the Germans ran into
implacable opposition by asserting that CFE was not the right
tool for addressing host nation consent, which it
characterized as a firm principle of international law better
suited for the International Court or UNSC.

-- Norway said there was no dodging the Istanbul commitments:
no matter how we labeled them, those issues would not go
away, and they would affect ratification. The UK slammed the
notion of "redefining" the Istanbul commitments: there could
be no redefining the basic principle of host-nation consent,
and in the Parallel Actions Package NATO had already gone a
long distance to recharacterizing what was required by
Istanbul. The UK recalled that NATO countries had not been
able to agree on a definition of the remaining Istanbul
commitments two years earlier and cautioned that a renewed
attempt would risk breaking Alliance unity without achieving
anything material, since Moldova and Georgia's concerns still
had to be sufficiently satisfied for them to ratify the
Adapted CFE Treaty in any case. Allies needed to
"recalibrate the message without trying to re-define the
commitments;" we needed an approach with which Moldova and
Georgia were comfortable. The U.S. noted that Russia had so
far not reacted positively to the December proposals on
Georgia. Acknowledging that Allies held a range of views on
the Istanbul commitments and CFE, it was nevertheless
important for ratification of A/CFE in the U.S. that these
issues be addressed to the satisfaction of Georgia and
Moldova. Italy noted that Russia's hint of possible
transparency measures could indicate a willingness to exhibit
flexibility, while agreeing with the U.S. that ultimately a
viable solution would need the consent of Moldova and
Georgia. Italy opined that Russia's position as it stands is
not something the Alliance can deliver.

-- Point 10 - Mechanism for Approving Package: Only Slovenia
spoke to this point, stressing serious concerns about any
mechanism that entailed a forum in which non-CFE NATO members
were not represented (the Russian Aide Memoire proposed a CFE
Extraordinary Conference as an approval mechanism.)

-- Point 11 - Russian Implementation of CFE: Another brief
discussion (Turkey, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary and
Luxembourg),but clear message: If this limited "gesture of
good will" is the most Russia can offer in terms of returning
to implementation - especially when combined with a demand to
abolish the flank - we are "wasting time." This must be
conveyed to Russia in no uncertain terms. Germany and
Hungary noted it was unclear how Russia's implementation
proposal meshed with its provisional application idea, with
Germany stressing that the key issue for resolving the
impasse was how to get Russia to return to implementation.

-- Point 12 - Intensified Efforts to Resolve CFE Impasse:
Allies welcomed Russia's willingness to intensify efforts but
also agreed that any effort to disaggregate the package -
e.g., by assigning specific projects to the JCG for
discussion - would complicate resolution, enable Russia to
pocket gains, and potentially derail the whole process
entirely. The U.S.-Russia bilateral track (with the
possibility of augmenting it with an expanded group
discussion) must maintain primacy. The focus should be
agreement on the complete package.

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Calibrating the NATO message for Berlin:
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9. (SBU) Discussion of the upcoming meeting in Berlin on
the Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe centered on
the need for common themes and a common approach to ensure a
productive and positive dynamic, and to avoid a repeat of the
confrontational tone that developed in previous large-format
meetings in Paris and Bad Saarow. Allies agreed that unity
was paramount. The IS Chair emphasized that para 57 of the
April NATO Summit Declaration (on which "the ink is not even
dry") spells out the Alliance position as agreed by all 28
Heads of State/Government. There was universal agreement
that the Strasbourg-Kehl declaration and other agreed NATO
documents should be the basis for and set the boundaries of
Allies' comments. Some Allies (e.g., Turkey, Romania, U.S.,
Italy, UK) expressed continued concern about the open-ended
second part of Germany's annotated agenda, which calls for a
discussion on "Challenges and Options for the Future." There
appeared to be a consensus not to broach topics (such as new
technology, specifically UAVs) for which there is not an
agreed Alliance position, but rather to engage in discussion
on broader levels. Allies want to avoid backing Russia into
a corner ("no Russia bashing") and avoid any surprises by
maintaining Alliance cohesion. Canada summed it up: "we
can't prevent surprises from the Russians, but there
shouldn't be any from our own side of the table."

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Quad Airs Concerns about Germany's Draft Chairman's Statement
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10. (SBU) On the margins of the Away Day meetings, quad
Allies met briefly to discuss general plans for the June 10
meeting in Berlin and to review Germany's draft "chairman's
statement" which had only been distributed within the quad.
UK concerns about the statement mirrored those of the U.S.
(per reftel); Germany was receptive to inputs for modifying
language on most points. On the issue of discussing
"progress in technology and military capabilities," Germany
stressed ) in the quad meeting and the next day in plenary -
that this item was not/not meant to focus on new weapon
systems, but rather on new force structure and integrated
warfare enabling smaller rapid reaction forces, which could
have a regionally destabilizing effect. Germany sought to
dispel concerns by assuring Allies that this would not be an
issue if no one took the floor.


11. (C) Comment: Both in the quad and in plenary, Germany
had a unique spin in explaining the genesis and goals of the
Berlin meeting. German rep Biontino noted that when the
meeting was announced in December 2008, movement on CFE was
at a "standstill." Germany felt the need to give impetus to
a "new process" on the broader future of arms control, and
felt that such a new process would need to be all-inclusive
(thereby explaining the broader guest list.) The U.S., UK,
and French delegations all commented afterward on the
contradiction in the German explanation of Berlin's genesis:
in December German HLTF rep Biontino had asserted the Berlin
meeting was intended to promote progress on CFE, not/not
establish another regime or new negotiation. He had disputed
concerns that the Berlin meeting would give the Russians an
excuse to abandon negotiations on the Parallel Actions
Package. In the plenary session in Oberammergau, Biontino
became agitated when Allies reiterated previously expressed
concerns about its concept paper for the meeting, asserting
that Germany had been fully transparent in developing its
plans, had taken earlier stated Allied concerns into account,
and wished that Allies had raised these concerns before this
late date. The Turkish representative was plainly infuriated
(and on the margins, depressed). Many Allies at one point or
another during the two-day meeting approached members of the
U.S. delegation to express concerns about German intentions
for Berlin; Biontino's commentary reinforced the validity of
Allies' oft-expressed suspicions that Germany had intended to
use Berlin to launch a poorly conceived, politically
motivated (by FM Steinmeier) new process all along. End
Comment.


12. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. Allies agreed that the HLTF should
meet next on July 9, following the June 10 German-hosted
seminar on "The Future of Conventional Arms Control," the
Corfu Ministerial, and the U.S.-Russia Summit.
CLINTON