DELEGATION GUIDANCE FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIA ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 058525

SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR CD DEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: CDG MCAP NASA PARM PREL RS TSPA UNGA UNGA
COPUOS, UNGA/C
SUBJECT: DELEGATION GUIDANCE FOR MEETING WITH RUSSIA ON
SATELLITE COLLISION AND SPACE TCBMS, JUNE 8, 2009

REF: A. STATE 54933

B. MOSCOW 1474

C. STATE 55545

Classified By: C.S. Eliot Kang; 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) BACKGROUND: In 2006 and 2007, Russia and the
United States signed military cooperation workplans, which
included various space-related activities. To date, none
of these activities have occurred. Also in 2007, Russia
submitted a list of proposals on space TCBMs to the UN
Secretary General. These Russian proposals included
information exchanges, familiarization visits,
notifications, consultations, and bilateral thematic
workshops on space research and use.


2. (SBU) On June 2, 2009, the Russian MFA Department for
Security and Disarmament (DVBR) responded positively to
the U.S. non-paper which invited Russia to preview on June
8 in Vienna (Ref A) our planned presentation regarding the
collision of U.S. and Russian satellites and to listen to
our ideas on bilateral TCBMs (Ref B). They understood
that the United States does not want to link TCBMs to
broader questions on the feasibility and desirability of
bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for
space, in particular to negotiations on proposals such as
the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space
Treaty (PPWT).


3. (C) This meeting, to be held on the margins of the
annual meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) (Ref C) will be an opportunity to
discuss proposals we support (e.g., exchanges of
information on national security policies and programs,
mil-to-mil familiarization visits, and bilateral thematic
workshops) and to begin scoping discussions on topics that
will require further study by the USG as part of its
ongoing space policy review (e.g., exchanges on orbital
parameters, notifications, and consultations),which the
Russians indicated an interest in discussing. END
BACKGROUND.


4. (SBU) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw upon the points in
paragraphs 5-10. Delegation also may draw upon the
contingency talking points in paragraph 11 on an "if
raised" basis.


5. (C/Releasable to the Russian Federation): U.S. opening
and preliminary points on the collision:

--We appreciate the non-paper and technical information
you provided regarding the collision.
--In addition, we welcome Russia's interest in resuming
discussions between experts on TCBMs relating to military
and other space operations. Such a pragmatic dialogue can
provide opportunities for considering the feasibility and
desirability of TCBMs for space activities.
--To help improve our mutual understanding of the
collision and its implications for the long-term
sustainability of the space environment, we are happy to
preview the presentations that we will be formally making
during the June 9 afternoon session to the COPUOS.


6. (SBU) The U.S. Delegation should give a presentation
on the February 2009 collision of a U.S. satellite with a
Russian satellite, note any response from the Russian
Delegation and answer their questions about the
presentation.


7. (C) Potential questions to be asked by U.S. Delegation
based upon the non-paper provided by Russia in March 2009:
-- What space surveillance and space situational
awareness capabilities does Russia currently
operate/utilize?
-- What are Russia's future plans for their space
situational awareness capabilities?
-- Your March 5, 2009 non-paper mentioned the importance
of transparency and confidence-building measures in space
activities such as the sharing of data related to orbital
parameters of space vehicles.
--- The U.S. already shares orbital parameters freely to
registered users on the space-track.org website to 37,000
users from 110 nations to promote spaceflight safety.
--- Does Russia intend to share freely in a similar
manner or only in bilateral type agreements?
--- Does Russia intend to share information on all
satellites or just the collision debris data?
--- What data would Russia be willing to share (two-line
element sets, maneuver plans, debris field data,
pre-launch parameters, etc.)

-- Your non-paper also stated that Russia would like
"consultations regarding ambiguous situations of concern
for spacefaring nations."
--- What types of concerns would be considered in this
category? Would these situations include emergency
notification of a potential conjunction, loss of control
of a satellite that is drifting, or orbital debris
information?
-------------- If asked: The U.S. will continue share this data via
the space-track.org website or other means, as appropriate.
--- How would Russia like to bring such ambiguous
situations to the attention of spacefaring nations?
Through what channels (i.e., UN, diplomatic channels)?
-- The U.S. intends to monitor and assess potential
collisions for all 800 maneuverable satellites against all
other satellites, looking for possible conjunctions. Would
Russia like to be notified of any possible conjunctions
with your satellites that we predict? Through what
channels (i.e., UN, diplomatic channels)?
-- Since we are all concerned with preventing more
collisions in space, do you agree that we should focus
most closely on this topic area and allow other fora to
discuss other issues space matters?
-- The U.S. and Russia are the most capable nations at
tracking space objects and are in the best position to
predict conjunctions that could have significant impact on
all users of space. What is Russia doing to predict
possible conjunctions? Does it intend to notify
owner/operators of possible conjunctions?
-- Is Russia willing to engage in bilateral
discussions/military-to-military/technical information
exchanges/visits regarding space data sharing?


8. (C/Releasable to the Russian Federation) The U.S.
Delegation may also provide the following U.S. points on
transparency and confidence building measures:

-- The collision serves as a reminder of the need for our
two governments to consult on the means for ensuring the
continued safe use of space.
-- We hope this discussion will serve as an impetus for
additional engagements such as military-to-military
familiarization visits, technical information exchanges,
and expert level policy discussions that complement our
other cooperative efforts to ensure the long-term
sustainability of the space environment and to strengthen
international security.
-- These additional engagements would complement the
bilateral U.S.-Russia Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC)
and Pre-Launch Notification System (PLNS),once they are
implemented and operational. However, we want to ensure
that we avoid duplication in our space security dialogues,
as our governments are currently involved in discussing
these JDEC and PLNS in separate channels.
-- We may want to consider how our governments might work
with other spacefaring nations to develop consensus on
pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs that are acceptable to the
greatest number of governments.


9. (C) The U.S. delegation is authorized to suggest the
following cooperation opportunities (in priority order):

-- A joint study by U.S. and Russian experts on the
long-term implications of orbital collisions for human
spaceflight safety and other space activities (as noted in
the non-paper provided to Russia on June 2, 2009).

-- Collaboration regarding several bilateral TCBMs such
as noted in Russias submission of May 11, 2007, to the
report of the United Nations Secretary General on
"Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer
space activities." (UN General Assembly document A/62/114,
dated August 3, 2007). These specific TCBMs are:

--- Familiarization visits, which may proceed as soon as
possible, in the following priority order:
-------------- Reciprocal visits by Satellite Movement Control
Specialists
-------------- Reciprocal visits by cadets to Mozhaiski Military
Space Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy
-------------- Reciprocal visits by space launch operations experts

--- Thematic Workshops, which may commence on or after
October 1, 2009:
-------------- Mil-to-mil Russian-American Military Space Seminar
-------------- Russian-American Space Security Dialogue involving
diplomatic and military experts in space policy and
strategy


9. (C) If raised, the U.S. delegation also may agree in
principle to include these items, as appropriate, on the
agenda for one of the thematic workshops noted in
Paragraph 8:

-- Collaboration regarding other bilateral TCBMs based
upon those noted in Russia's submission of May 11, 2007,
to the report of the United Nations Secretary General on
"Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer
space activities." (UN General Assembly document A/62/114,
dated August 3, 2007).

--- Exchange of information on:
-------------- The principles and goals of outer space policies of
the United States and Russia;
-------------- Major outer space research and use programs;
-------------- Orbital parameters of outer space objects;

--- Mechanisms for the notification of:
-------------- Scheduled spacecraft maneuvers that could result in
dangerous proximity to spacecraft of other States;
-------------- The beginning of descent from orbit of unguided
space objects and the predicted impact areas on Earth
(taking into account existing Interagency Debris
Coordinating Committee procedures for high-risk reentry
events);
-------------- The return from orbit into the atmosphere of a
guided spacecraft (taking into account existing
Interagency Debris Coordinating Committee procedures for
high-risk reentry events);
-------------- The return of a spacecraft with a nuclear source of
power on board, in the case of malfunction and danger of
radioactive materials descending to Earth (taking into
account Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Space contained in UN General Assembly
Resolution 47/68 of December 14, 1992 and the ongoing work
of the Joint Experts Group of the COPUOS Science and
Technology Subcommittee and the International Atomic
Energy Agency).

--- Consultations:
-------------- To clarify the information provided on outer space
research and use programs;
-------------- On activities that could potentially cause harmful
interference with the space activities of other nations,
as well as on other issues of concern;
-------------- To discuss the implementation of existing
transparency and confidence-building measures in outer
space activities

-- Exchange of perspectives on multilateral TCBMs,
including:
--- Substantive discussions of proposals in the
Conference on Disarmament's working group on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
--- Joint collaboration with the European Union on
proposals for a "Code of Conduct for Space Activities."


10. (C) If raised by Russia, the U.S. delegation should
not/not agree to include discussions for either bilateral
or multilateral notifications of planned spacecraft
launches in any thematic workshop on space TCBMs. This
topic is already being addressed in ongoing U.S.-Russian
discussions on the implementation of the Pre-Launch
Notification System and Joint Data Exchange Center.

END GUIDANCE.


11. (SBU) BEGIN CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS:

Space Arms Control:

-- Our bilateral and substantive discussions on pragmatic
and voluntary TCBMs should proceed without linkage to
broader questions on the feasibility and desirability of
bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for
space.

EU proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities:

-- The U.S. intends to play a leading role in advancing
TCBMs relating to space activities. TCBMs can help
increase transparency regarding governmental space
policies, strategies and potentially hazardous
activities. This can help to reduce uncertainty over
intentions and decrease the risk of misinterpretation or
miscalculation in a crisis.
-- In this regard, the Administration intends to continue
to work closely with our friends and allies in Europe and
elsewhere to develop, for the benefit of all nations,
voluntary TCBMs that all space-faring nations can support
and actively participate in.

U.S. Co-Sponsorship of UN General Assembly Resolution on
TCBMs:

-- As it did in 2007 and 2008, the United States remains
willing to consider co-sponsorship with Russia of a UN
General Assembly resolution that would commission a Group
of Government Experts study on pragmatic and voluntary
TCBMs.
-- Any such draft resolution should reflect the consensus
agreement reached in the Conference on Disarmament "to
discuss substantively, without limitation, all issues
related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space",
but without seeking the start of negotiations on proposals
such as the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space Treaty (PPWT) in the Conference on Disarmament or
other fora.

END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS.
CLINTON