REQUEST FOR RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE IN STRENGTHENING

UNCLAS STATE 055511

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM PINR RS XG XH
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE IN STRENGTHENING
INTERNATIONAL FORENSICS COOPERATION

REF: CURRY-KLEPP E-MAIL DATED MAY 29 2009 WITH AN
INVITATION TO THE FORENSICS MEETING


1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Moscow. Please
see paragraph 4.


2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: Experts from the United States,
European Union, and the IAEA have developed a proposed
nuclear forensics framework to strengthen international
cooperation to end nuclear smuggling. While forensics
cooperation is desired in a number of areas (e.g.,
safeguards, attribution),opportunities to advance
international collaboration are probably greatest in
combating nuclear smuggling - a largely trans-national,
criminal phenomenon involving non-state actors. While
governments have had some success seizing smuggled nuclear
material, rarely are the sources of these materials ever
effectively investigated or prosecuted. Forensics
cooperation can produce investigative leads to link a seizure
by one country with a diversion in another to successfully
prosecute the people involved.


3. (SBU) The forensics framework would provide a basis for
cooperation on smuggling that has been either lacking or ad
hoc and would establish elements needed for forensics
cooperation in other areas. The framework includes a system
of national nuclear forensics libraries and a directory of
national points of contact. Together, these will allow law
enforcement officials to contact atomic energy experts in
neighboring countries to determine if seized material was
diverted from one of their facilities. The libraries will
include a range of data (e.g., isotopic composition, chemical
form) relevant to identifying nuclear material although
exchanging material is optional and at the discretion of each
individual government. On June 29, the IAEA will host
forensics experts from more than 35 countries, including
Russia, to initiate a technical review of the framework
(reftel). Mr. V. Erastov and Mr. V. Ostropikov from Rosatom
have been invited as has Ms. E. Kuteynikov from Bochvar. In
2006, at Umea, Sweden, Mr.
Erastov briefed the International Technical Working Group on
Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG),which is co-sponsoring the meeting
on June 29, regarding Russian efforts.


4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Drawing from the background above,
the Department requests that post inform the GOR that during
the June 16-17 plenary of the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),the United States will brief
international partners on the concept of national nuclear
forensics libraries and encourage Russia's participation in
the June 29th technical review. Post should invite the GOR
to share its experiences with forensic databases at the June
29th meeting and suggest the GOR join the United States in
encouraging additional governments to participate in the
meeting. Post may want to emphasize that the library concept
is simply a framework for strengthening cooperation and does
not obligate governments to share material. Additionally, the
Department requests that post pass the non-paper (para 6) to
the highest appropriate Russian officials and gauge GOR
interest in the national libraries concept and nuclear
forensics cooperation in general.


5. (SBU) REPORTING DEADLINE: Department Requests that post
respond via front-channel cable no later than June 10, 2009.


6. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER.

Framework for Nuclear Forensic Cooperation

Trafficking of nuclear material is one of the more likely
pathways for terrorists to acquire material needed for an
improvised nuclear device. While the frequency of known
incidents involving weapons-grade material and quantities of
seized material have generally declined since the mid-1990s,
smuggling of these dangerous materials continues.
Governments have shown some success seizing smuggled
material, but rarely are these incidents, particularly
diversions, effectively investigated or prosecuted.

To support cooperation between governments, international
experts envision a framework of national nuclear forensic
libraries and a directory listing national points of contact.
The libraries would contain forensically significant
information on nuclear and radiological material manufactured
by or on the territory of a particular country. This
framework would allow law enforcement officials to contact
atomic energy experts in neighboring countries to determine
if smuggled material was diverted from one of their
facilities. Governments would be encouraged to develop
procedures for making and responding to queries, but
cooperation would be at the discretion of each individual
government.

On June 29, 2009, the IAEA will host forensics experts from
more than 35 countries, including from Rosatom, to discuss
the proposed framework, and over the next twelve months, the
United States also will facilitate this technical review
among interested Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (GICNT) partners. At the June 16-17 plenary of the
GICNT, the United States will discuss the proposed framework
and encourage participation in the technical review.

Russia's advanced forensic capabilities, experience with
forensic databases, knowledge of the nuclear fuel cycle, and
co-chairmanship of the GICNT, give it a unique position to
assist in this effort. As the co-chair of the International
Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling, which is
helping IAEA organize the meeting on June 29, the United
States would welcome a presentation by the Russian Federation
on its experience on nuclear forensics databases.

The United States and Russia Federation have unique
capabilities to address nuclear terrorism threats. We hope
that Russia will favorably consider the invitation to
participate in the technical review of the national nuclear
forensics library proposal and share its experience in this
area.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER.


7. Washington appreciates Post's assistance. Contact Michael
Curry (currymr@state.gov, 202-736-7692) in ISN/WMDT for more
information on the details.
CLINTON