Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE54790
2009-05-28 19:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

REPORT ON SECOND WEEK OF NPT PREPCOM III, MAY 9-15

Tags:  KNNP PARM PREL NPT 
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DE RUEHC #4790/01 1481916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281902Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 7973
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 3408
RHMFISS/NRC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO NPT COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 054790 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL NPT
SUBJECT: REPORT ON SECOND WEEK OF NPT PREPCOM III, MAY 9-15

REF: A. STATE 044744

B. STATE 052964

Classified By: VCI A/S Rose Gottemoeller, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 054790

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL NPT
SUBJECT: REPORT ON SECOND WEEK OF NPT PREPCOM III, MAY 9-15

REF: A. STATE 044744

B. STATE 052964

Classified By: VCI A/S Rose Gottemoeller, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Week Two continued discussions on peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and Withdrawal. A highlight of Week
Two was states parties review, consultations, and discussions
by delegations of the Chairman,s draft set of
recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon).
There was very little of the rancor that has tarnished recent
NPT meetings. The PrepCom ended on May 15 with agreement on
key procedural matters, but not on the set of
recommendations. The U.S. delegation achieved its primary
goal of strengthening the NPT and advancing the President's
nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. The delegation was
able to help gain consensus on key procedural arrangements;
frame the President,s Prague speech within the NPT context;
and reach consensus with other members of the P-5 on a
statement that reflects U.S. policy. The PrepCom,s
inability to reach agreement on a set of recommendations to
the RevCon is disappointing but not surprising. The
Chairman,s initial and revised drafts were seen by many
delegations as generally acceptable, but ultimately Parties
were not able to reach consensus on a text that many saw as
too broad and detailed in the current environment. In
particular, the NAM, France and China stuck to their concerns
about specific words and phrases that they feared would
constrain their options regarding RevCon final document
language. End Summary

-------------- -
Cluster Three: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
-------------- -


2. (SBU) The majority of statements delivered in this session
affirmed the right of all states to develop nuclear energy
for peaceful uses, while also stressing the need for
responsible management of nuclear energy, including efforts
to prevent proliferation. The NAM and developing countries
(joined by Switzerland) emphasized their &inalienable
right8 to develop all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle and
protested what they view as unjust imposition of non-treaty
requirements and restrictions on access to nuclear energy.
Switzerland concluded that it &did not envisage supporting

proposals that would have the effect of strengthening the
monopoly of those States in possession of sensitive nuclear
technologies, or proposals that aim in principle to restrict
the inalienable rights stipulated in Article IV of the NPT.8
Many delegations commented on the apparent nuclear
&renaissance8 and the role and responsibilities of the
International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) in managing
cooperation and safeguards. However, Indonesia and Cuba
expressed concern about the IAEA being undermined by attempts
to bring political considerations into its operations.


3. (SBU) Egypt presented an impassioned statement on the
right of all Parties to nuclear energy, which &exists with
or without a treaty, as does the right to use fossil fuels or
solar energy, even though no treaty has granted either of
them.8 Countries which rarely speak up at the PrepCom )
e.g., Namibia and Nigeria ) took the floor to talk about
their urgent need for technical assistance from the IAEA to
develop nuclear energy. Zimbabwe asked for recognition of
the constraints non-nuclear-weapons states face in achieving
peaceful use of nuclear energy and in retaining skilled
knowledge within their borders. It asked for assured and
predictable funding to support Article IV. Zimbabwe also
warned states to &guard against the use of technology that
runs counter to the purposes of the NPT.8 Iran had the
longest intervention, listing previously-delivered complaints
about the &illegality8 of United Nations Security Council
interference in NPT matters and claims for compensation for
the cost of that interference.

--------------
Cluster Special Session: Withdrawal
--------------


4. (SBU) Several delegations called for attention at the 2010
RevCon to withdrawal issues, including consideration of
measures on how to dissuade Treaty violators from withdrawing

STATE 00054790 002 OF 004


from the treaty and how to respond once they do withdraw.
All acknowledged the sovereign right of Parties to withdraw
from the Treaty. They differed, however, in their
interpretations of the obligations that follow Parties that
choose to withdraw. They also differed on the amount of
emphasis that should be placed on the issue of withdrawal
compared to other issues, such as balanced focus on the three
pillars of the Treaty. Australia referred specifically to
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to support the
argument that a withdrawing State still bears
responsibilities for violations that occurred while it is
Party to the Treaty. Others, such as Indonesia and Cuba,
argued that focusing on withdrawal was a distraction from the
purpose of the NPT review process ) to review the operation
of the Treaty to assure that the preamble and provisions of
the Treaty are being realized.

-------------- -
The P-5 Press Statement
-------------- -


5. (C) Several meetings were held among the P-5 members to
discuss potential wording and modalities of a P-5 Press
Statement. The original draft, circulated by France before
the PrepCom, was viewed by other P-5 members as too lengthy
and detailed. The United States offered a new draft at the
beginning of week two that became the basis for the agreed
version.


6. (C) China sought to remove a reference to promoting
entry-into-force of CTBT and negotiating an FMCT, citing
changes in its national policies. After some pressure from
Russia,s head of delegation, Anatoly Antonov, China,s
Ambassador Wang Qun eventually accepted language welcoming
those aims. China also sought to tone down language
supporting international fuel banks. China and Russia
jointly sought to remove references to safeguards
non-compliance by Iran and North Korea, but approved
substitute language seeking full compliance to safeguard
obligations by all states. Russia requested changing the
wording advocating expansion of peaceful uses of &nuclear
technology8 to &nuclear energy.8 France was troubled by
the lack of specific references to Iran and North Korea but
in the end accepted compromise language.


7. (C) The P-5 achieved consensus on the press statement on
Thursday, May 14, but held delivery until Friday afternoon,
at the request of the Russian delegation ) pending final
resolution of the Chairman,s proposed Final Document of the
PrepCom.

-------------- -
The Chairman,s Draft Recommendations Document
-------------- -


8. (SBU) The second week was dominated by discussion and
review of the Chairman,s draft set of PrepCom
recommendations to the Review Conference in 2010. The United
States Delegation, after consulting with Washington, had a
number of difficulties with the Chairman,s initial draft,
viewing it as far too detailed for the PrepCom to consider,
and too inclusive of elements more appropriately left to the
Review Conference. Moreover, the U.S. was in the position of
being unable to take positions on some of the elements in the
draft because it had not completed the Nuclear Posture Review
and Quadrennial Defense Review. At the Western European and
Others Group (or WEOG, an informal UN voting bloc) meeting,
the U.S. proposed a shorter and more broadly-worded set of
recommendations. Most responses were not supportive of this
approach, preferring instead that delegations try first to
build consensus on the Chairman,s draft and consider the
U.S. proposal as a fallback position.


9. (C) The UK said it would require only minimal changes in
wording to reach consensus. France required considerably
more changes, and was especially concerned about the lack of
emphasis on Iranian non-compliance and on the Additional
Protocol. It also expressed concern about the lack of
balance in the draft among the three pillars of the NPT.


10. (SBU) Among the P-5, Russia emerged as a strong supporter
of the U.S. position and rejected the &take it or leave it8
stance of the Chairman regarding the draft recommendations.
Russia stated its philosophical difficulties with the
document, focused mainly on the imbalance described by
France, especially the inadequate focus on nonproliferation,

STATE 00054790 003 OF 004


as well as the obligation of all states ) not just the P-5 -
to facilitate conflict resolution and create conditions for
nuclear disarmament in the Middle East and elsewhere. China
acknowledged that the NPT review process often pitted NWS
versus NNWS, asking pointedly during the P-5 discussion of
the document why the P-5 did not have a unified approach.
The United States and other members of the P-5 were keen to
avoid the any perception that they were obstructing progress
towards a final set of recommendations.


11. (SBU) During a lunch May 11 hosted by the Netherlands as
a follow-up to its NPT conference held earlier in 2009,
Chairman Chidyausiku said the PrepCom needed to agree to a
final document to guide the RevCon. Brazil, supported by
Germany and Norway, argued that the PrepCom should not
negotiate the Chairman,s text line-by-line. Norway also
pointed out that some elements (e.g., CTBT, FMCT, MENWFZ)
were beyond the ability of NPT delegations to resolve, but
that issues like withdrawal and institutional aspects of the
review process were clearly within their remit. Ukraine
commented that the U.S. opening statement improved the
atmosphere of the PrepCom significantly but called into
question why three PrepComs are needed as part of the NPT
review process. China supported seeking consensus on a final
document, but also argued that consensus was not necessary
for a successful RevCon. Egypt challenged Norway, arguing
that it is essential that Parties address Israel,s non-NPT
status, but that the withdrawal issue was sufficiently
addressed by the Vienna Law of Treaties. Indonesia put
forward the view that the Chairman,s final document could be
general in nature, but balanced.


12. (C) While other delegations indicated their ability to
live with either the Chairman,s initial or revised drafts,
fissures within both the WEOG and the NAM demonstrated that a
final document was unlikely. Importantly, the NAM as a
whole, and Egypt, Cuba, and Iran individually, stated that
consensus was impossible, but pulled back slightly from this
position after a U.S. intervention urging the Chairman to
continue his efforts to reach consensus. Finally, on Friday,
France and the NAM clashed openly about the binding nature of
the document, and about other aspects of the wording, with
China requesting a further word change. The Chairman took
the floor to note the ongoing difficulties over &small
words8 and the lack of time remaining to the PrepCom to
discuss. He announced his conclusion that consensus on a
final document was impossible. The United States expressed
regret that the Parties did not agree on draft
recommendations but a desire to rejoin such discussions at
the 2010 RevCon.

--------------
Closing and Wrap-up of the PrepCom
--------------


13. (U) The EU submitted two documents late in the
conference. The first, on &Regional Issues and
Implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution,8 stated
that the EU would organize a seminar on Middle East Security,
WMD non-proliferation and disarmament that would be open to
the region and to P-5 states. The EU also stated that it
supported a proposed Russian seminar on implementing the 1995
Middle East Resolution. The second EU document was on the
FMCT, promoting negotiation of a verifiable instrument.


14. (U) Delegations agreed that the Third PrepCom Chair will
open the Review Conference, and that NGO participation will
be allowed to continue, consistent with past practice. They
negotiated and agreed upon compromise language on the issue
of background documentation, and agreed upon a draft decision
on the allocation of items to the Main Committees at the
Review Conference. Delegations also agreed that the form of
the 2010 Review Conference Final Document would be decided
next year. Finally, they approved the final PrepCom Report,
which gave a factual overview of the conference,s work and
the decisions agreed by the Parties for the RevCon (rules and
procedures, agenda, president ) see Ref B).

--------------
Side-Events and Miscellany
--------------


15. (SBU) P-5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures to
Support Nuclear Disarmament. The UK hosted a P-5 breakfast
to discuss its proposal to hold a conference on
confidence-building measures regarding nuclear disarmament in

STATE 00054790 004 OF 004


September 2009. The UK tried to draw out comments from
Russian and Chinese representatives on their proposal and
described the conference as having three objectives: (1) to
demonstrate that the P-5 is getting together to discuss
disarmament; (2) to discuss technical issues on disarmament,
mindful of the difficulties; and (3) to hold political
discussions to understand better national positions among the
P-5. The United States affirmed support for the conference,
and offered views on the UK,s proposed final statement. The
French were generally positive and had three recommendations:
(1) informally discuss FMCT verification; (2) include
&nonproliferation8 in the title and substance of the
conference; and (3) pay particular attention to strategic
communication about the conference and its outcome. Russia
described CBMs and disarmament as inherently incompatible,
while China said it would await guidance from Beijing.


16. (U) Nuclear Posture Review Presentation. A joint U.S.
State Department-DoD delegation provided interested parties
with an overview briefing on the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.
Approximately 60 people attended, with the overwhelming
majority from non-governmental organizations (NGO). Overall
the reaction was positive. The briefing provided an overview
of the substance of the NPR and a range of specific
process-related issues. Australian and Russian
representatives approached the briefers after the
presentation and expressed interest in further information on
the NPR scope and process. NGOs used the question-and-answer
period to provide comments and recommendations, rather than
pose questions, and requested information on how NGOs and
other stakeholders could provide formal comments,
recommendations, and input to the NPR process.


17. (SBU) Lunch for RevCon President Libran Cabactulan:
Ambassador Ragsdale attended a lunch hosted by the
Philippines in honor of the 2010 NPT RevCon President Libran
Cabactulan. The Philippines revealed that Iran had
approached members of their government last January,
insisting that the focus of the RevCon should be on nuclear
disarmament and that there should be no mention of Iran in
the final document. Russia stated cautious support for the
Iranian position, but the United States reminded the group of
UN Security Council resolutions related to Iran and
emphasized that it was too early to discuss such a
commitment. The P-5 expressed general support for a final
document that balanced emphasis on the three pillars.
Cabactulan pledged transparency, balance, and consultations
in his role as President.
CLINTON