Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE4297
2009-01-15 20:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JANUARY

Tags:  EUN PREL PGOV ZL AF SU ZI UP BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1450
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 3371
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8450
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 6935
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4522
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 STATE 004297 

SIPDIS
BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: EUN PREL PGOV ZL AF SU ZI UP BO
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JANUARY
26-27 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

REF: PRAGUE 27

Classified By: N. Dean, Acting Director, EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 STATE 004297

SIPDIS
BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: EUN PREL PGOV ZL AF SU ZI UP BO
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JANUARY
26-27 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

REF: PRAGUE 27

Classified By: N. Dean, Acting Director, EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b,d).


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 25.


2. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their next
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
meeting in Brussels January 26-27. We expect the formal
agenda to include: Western Balkans, Sudan/Darfur, Zimbabwe,
Ukraine, Belarus, and a discussion of how the EU can assist
the United States with the closure of detention facilities at
Guantanamo. Afghanistan had been on the preliminary agenda
but we understand it has now been deferred, likely to the
February GAERC. Afghanistan points are still included in
this cable, and posts should deliver them along with the
other demarche subjects. A background section covering some
of these issues is provided prior to a section containing
talking points. Talking Points only are to be delivered as
soon as possible at the appropriate level to EU members only.
Other posts should not/not deliver these points. Posts are
requested to include the SIPDIS caption on their response
cables and to reference this cable. End Summary.

BACKGROUND
--------------

WESTERN BALKANS

KOSOVO/SERBIA


3. (SBU) EULEX now has most of its personnel on the ground in
Kosovo, including over 1,200 police, and UNMIK has largely
transferred the rule of law portfolio to EULEX. However,
EULEX has not yet announced a firm date for its &full
operational capacity,8 which would herald the formal end of
UNMIK Rule of Law activities in Kosovo. We remain concerned
that EULEX is dragging its feet on full implementation of its
mandate in deference to Belgrade. We also want to see EU
strategic planning on key rule of law issues ) including
customs, courts and police ) in a way that protects Kosovo
sovereignty but also keeps Belgrade engaged and Serb
hardliners contained, a point EUR A/S Fried stressed in his
January 9 meeting with EU political directors (reftel). The

myriad international organizations in Pristina (EU Special
Representative/ICO, EULEX, NATO and UNMIK) need a formal
coordination mechanism to ensure unity of message to both
Kosovo and Serb officials.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA


4. (C) There has been little progress towards completion of
the &5 plus 28 objectives and conditions for closure of the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) since the November 8
Prud/Odzak agreement. Prud/Odzak established a framework for
resolving the OHR objectives related to State and Defense
property. Despite a December 22 meeting among the
signatories to clarify elements of the agreement, it lacks
broad political support, and implementation has lagged.
Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik also continues to
object to a constitutional amendment solution to resolve the
status of Brcko District, another outstanding OHR closure
objective. Brussels has not shared a plan for how its new EU
Special Representative mission will manage post-OHR Bosnia.
Therefore, we do not expect to be in a position to agree at
the March meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)
to close OHR in July 2009. During their January 9 meeting
with EUR A/S Fried, EU political directors said Bosnia was
far from genuine integration, and that the EU was working to
advance visa liberalization in order to increase contact the
orientation of Bosnia towards the EU (reftel). A/S Fried
encouraged the EU to provide more support for moderate
Bosniaks.

MACEDONIA

STATE 00004297 002 OF 009




5. (SBU) With its NATO and EU perspectives clouded by the
name issue, Macedonia risks falling backwards. PM Gruevski
has shifted to a more nationalist agenda that could strain
inter-ethnic relations and further isolate Macedonia in the
region. Ahead of March 2009 presidential and local
elections, Gruevski has taken steps that intimidate and
constrain the opposition, media and independent civil
society. The EU needs to find a way to engage with Macedonia
at senior levels, and we must both work together with the PM
to give us the tools to help keep Macedonia moving forward on
its Euro-Atlantic path.

CROATIA


6. (SBU) We continue to encourage the EU to sustain a
transparent, equitable accession process for Croatia,
especially in view of the border dispute with Slovenia and
possible enlargement fatigue among member states. The
failure of the French initiative in December (which would
have allowed the opening and closing of new chapters in the
acquis without prejudice to the border dispute) was a
discouraging blow to the GOC.

ALBANIA


7. (SBU) Tensions are high between the Prime Minister and the
judiciary, most recently over the Lustration Law. The EU
shares our misgivings over PM Berisha,s excesses and has
conveyed them to the Albanian leadership, but has generally
refrained from public statements.

AFGHANISTAN


8. (C) NSC, Joint Staff, and CENTCOM policy reviews have
recommended that the incoming U.S. administration maintain
our current &clear, hold, build8 counterinsurgency
strategy, but strengthen its implementation. We need to
increase the international troop presence, accelerate the
expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces, help
improve governance, support government outreach to tribes and
villages, and help improve the Afghanistan-Pakistan
relationship.


9. (C) Afghanistan will hold a pivotal presidential election
this year. The European Commission has indicated EU support
will equal or exceed support for previous elections. NATO
needs help addressing election security, a critical concern.


10. (C) In July 2008, the EU agreed to double the EUPOL
police mission to 400 authorized personnel, but international
staff on the ground still number less than 200. Afghan
Minister of Interior Atmar traveled to Brussels in December
seeking accelerated EU support for police reform. EUPOL has
an effective new head of mission. The EU should empower him
with the resources and flexible mandate EUPOL needs in order
to make an impact.


11. (C) We plan to deploy as many as four additional combat
brigades to Afghanistan in 2009, depending on the security
situation in Iraq, with the first brigade (roughly 3,750
troops) arriving this month. The deployment of up to 30,000
troops will nearly double the U.S. troop presence in
Afghanistan, with many of our forces deploying to southern
Afghanistan in support of our Allies.

CHAD/SUDAN


12. (SBU) To address the twin crises in eastern Chad and
Darfur, the international community must continue its
humanitarian efforts, its support for domestic political
dialogue and regional peace initiatives, and its
contributions to the relevant peacekeeping operations. The
March 2008 Dakar Agreement called on the two countries to
discontinue support for armed groups in the other country and
established a Chad-Sudan Contact Group of African nations to
facilitate relations. In November 2008, following the
resumption of diplomatic relations between Chad and Sudan,
the Contact Group agreed to establish a border monitoring and
security mechanism consisting of joint operations by the

STATE 00004297 003 OF 009


Chadian and Sudanese militaries. The EU,s financial
contributions and its EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central
African Republic have helped protect refugees, facilitated
the delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensured the safety of
UN personnel.


13. (SBU) In Darfur, the U.S. remains concerned with the slow
pace of UNAMID (United Nations-African Union Mission in
Darfur) deployment and operations and the President
demonstrated U.S. commitment to UNAMID during his meeting
with the Sudanese VP on January 5. EUR A/S Fried highlighted
this concern to EU political directors January 9 (reftel).
Politically, 2009 national elections established in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) are critical for
stability in Sudan and for a democratic transition. We are
eager to make additional progress in Darfur and fully support
AU/UN Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole,s effort to develop a
shared set of principals from the Doha platform provided by
the Government of Qatar. We are mindful of the value of a
possible ICC arrest warrant on Sudanese President Bashir in
generating an improvement in the behavior of the Government
of Sudan, and we are looking for opportunities to use this
potential opening to advance key initiatives.

ZIMBABWE


14. (SBU) In Zimbabwe's 2008 presidential elections, Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Tsvangirai won 47% of the
popular vote, while President Mugabe won 43%. Tsvangirai
then dropped out of a sham run-off marked by intimidation and
violence. POTUS and the Secretary have both called for
Mugabe to step down. The people of Zimbabwe are suffering
from a largely man-made humanitarian crisis brought about by
repression, corruption, and neglect on the part of the Mugabe
regime. Cholera has infected close to 40,000 and caused more
than 2000 deaths, unemployment is above 90 percent, virtually
all schools and hospitals are closed, and the rate of
inflation is estimated in the billions. EUR A/S Fried raised
these issues with EU political directors January 9; despite
agreeing on the dire situation, the EU side anticipated that
Mugabe would remain in charge for the foreseeable future
because African leaders (SADC, AU, and South Africa) to not
want outsiders to assist, yet do not themselves act to apply
pressure for Mugabe to step down (reftel).


15. (SBU) Notwithstanding U.S., UK, and French calls for
Mugabe to step aside, the MDC has indicated it will
participate in a government with him, provided that certain
key issues are addressed: allocation of ministries/key
posts; due process for detainees; and a commitment to new
elections. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
continues to advocate power-sharing as espoused in the
September 15 agreement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Though
our principled position is that Mugabe must go, we will
support the MDC in a credible power-sharing agreement if it
contains real checks on ZANU-PF and benchmarks for a fair and
democratic disposition of government power.


16. (SBU) The U.S. will continue providing humanitarian aid
to Zimbabwe ($226 million since October 2007) but will not
provide development assistance until there is concrete
evidence of a democratic transition. Similarly, we will not
lift targeted U.S. sanctions on individuals and entities tied
to the Mugabe regime (OFAC Specially Designated Nationals
sanctions) until there is evidence of democratic change. The
EU announced its most recent round of targeted Zimbabwe
sanctions (similar in scope to ours) on December 8, bringing
its total to 183 entities and individuals. We plan to work
with EU member states, as well as African Union and SADC
states, to pursue UNSC actions if the situation does not
improve.

UKRAINE


17. (SBU) The September 9 EU-Ukraine Summit decided that the
enhanced cooperation between the EU and Ukraine will be
incorporated in the framework of an Association Agreement.
The AA will strengthen Ukraine,s political and economic
integration with the EU. Negotiations on the AA are on-going
with a prospect of being concluded in 2009 (realistically

STATE 00004297 004 OF 009


during the Swedish Presidency).


18. (SBU) The Dec 11-12 European Council endorsed the Eastern
Partnership (EaP),the objective of which is to strengthen
the EU,s Eastern policy. Intra-EU discussions will continue
on the EaP, which is expected to be adopted at the March 2009
European Council. Although the crisis in Georgia has
increased the EU,s interest in deepening cooperation with
its Eastern neighbors, Member States still have diverse
positions concerning the EU,s proposed level of engagement
with EaP countries.


19. (SBU) In December the IMF approved a $16.4 billion loan
for Ukraine, and the World Bank a $500 million loan.
However, economic conditions are worsening, with negative
growth and rising unemployment predicted for 2009.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE GAS DISPUTE


20. (SBU) Gazprom,s decision to reduce gas flows to Ukraine
on January 1 and the subsequent January 5 shut-off combined
with Russian PM Putin,s statement politicizing the dispute,
caught many Europeans by surprise. The initial reluctance of
the EU and the Czech Presidency to get involved in the
dispute also faded as gas reductions of varying degrees of
severity occurred in many EU Member States. The Czech
Presidency called an extraordinary meeting of the COREPER I
Ambassadors on January 5, sent a fact finding mission to
Ukraine, and issued a joint statement with the Commission on
January 6 demanding that gas supplies to the EU be restored
and made the crisis the centerpiece of discussions at the
General Affairs Council on January 8.


21. (SBU) After a flurry of stop-and-start negotiations in
Kyiv and Brussels, Ukrainian and Russian representatives
signed an agreement on January 12 to allow EU, Ukrainian and
Russian monitors to verify gas flows from Russia to Europe
via Ukraine. Following a meeting of the EU Energy Council in
Brussels on January 12, EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs and
Czech Trade Minister Riman said Russia would restart
deliveries of gas to Ukraine on January 13. Nevertheless,
continued disagreements over the pricing of fuel gas used to
operate pipelines in Ukraine have prevented the parties from
restarting gas flows to Europe. PM Putin and PM Tymoshenko
plan to meet January 17 to address the situation.

GUANTANAMO DETAINEE RESETTLEMENT


22. (C) There are approximately 250 detainees at the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility. A number of these
detainees are currently approved for release or transfer, but
cannot be transferred to their home countries due to humane
treatment concerns. Over the past several years, the USG has
approached more than 70 countries in an effort to resettle
these detainees, but thus far, Albania has been the only
country to accept detainees that are not its nationals. On
December 11, Portuguese FM Amado announced Portugal,s
willingness to accept cleared detainees*making Portugal the
first EU Member State to do so*and urged other EU countries
to follow suit. On December 22, German FM Steinmeier
publicly asked his government to examine options for
accepting detainees; Germany would reportedly be most
interested in resettling the 17 Uighur detainees who face
likely persecution if returned to China. Other European
governments have privately expressed willingness to consider
accepting detainees. On December 26, France called for a
common EU position on the Guantanamo resettlement issue. To
date, France has not expressed willingness to accept
detainees. Over the next year, Czech leadership in the EU
will be critical for our efforts to resettle Guantanamo
detainees, which is a prerequisite for closure of Guantanamo.
When EUR A/S Fried raised this issue with EU political
directors January 9, the EU side cautioned that accepting
detainees for resettlement would likely be politically
difficult with EU member state domestic audiences, as well as
from the legislative/judicial perspective (reftel).

BELARUS


23. (SBU) The IMF Board approved a USD 2.5 billion stand-by

STATE 00004297 005 OF 009


agreement with Belarus on January 12. The U.S. opposed the
loan because of its lack of structural reform conditionality.
This follows a USD 2 billion loan Russia agreed in November
to provide. Belarus remains active in seeking external
financial assistance, including asking Russia for an
additional USD 3 billion. Belarus and Russia have also
reached agreement in principle on 2009 gas prices, but no
document has yet been signed.


24. (SBU) Czech colleagues have told us the EU will likely
invite President Lukashenka to a summit to launch the Eastern
Partnership Initiative in Prague this spring. The EU will
ostensibly extend an invitation on the basis of &goodwill
gestures8 from Belarus; we expect the invitation to go out
unless Belarus makes major missteps. We oppose an invitation
at this time as it sends the wrong message to Lukashenka on
the need for reform.


25. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as possible
(in advance of the January 26-27 GAERC).

BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT

WESTERN BALKANS

--Congratulations on a very good first month for EULEX. The
clear challenges in the north demonstrated the need to act in
close coordination with KFOR and other international actors
to respond to recent violence. Are plans still on track for
EULEX assuming final operational capability in the coming
weeks?

--As UNMIK draws down and cedes control of rule of law issues
in Kosovo, we must ensure that no vacuum ensues. EULEX and
ICO will need to fill that space.

--There is an urgent need for formal, institutionalized
coordination on the ground among EULEX, ICO, KFOR, OSCE and
what remains of UNMIK. We strongly encourage ICR Feith and
EULEX HOM de Kermabon to lead in pulling together a process
that protects Kosovo sovereignty, keeps Belgrade engaged and
Serb hardliners contained, and treats northern Kosovo and
Serb enclaves the same as the rest of Kosovo.

--We look to EULEX to quickly develop concrete proposals for
customs, courts, police and other sensitive issues. Failure
to do so could severely damage EULEX,s credibility, tempt
UNMIK to continue to take a larger political role that is
warranted, and greatly increase the risk of instability.

--The U.S. strongly welcomes Serbia,s EU integration, and we
believe that its participation in the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement (SAA) process will strengthen both
President Tadic and the push for reforms. We are also
encouraged by GOS moves to implement the interim trade
agreement with the EU. What is the EU plan for engaging
Belgrade going forward?

--We're also encouraged by the cooperation between Hungary,
Austria, Germany, and Serbia on providing gas supplies to
Serbia during the recent gas cutoff. It will be interesting
to see if the crisis affects relations between Serbia and
Russia, although we note Tadic has publicly sought to place
the blame on Ukraine.

--We are concerned by the slow pace of progress on
implementation of the Prud/Odzak agreement. There has also
been virtually no progress on the outstanding &5 plus 28
objectives and conditions for closing OHR. Therefore, it is
highly unlikely that the PIC will be prepared in March to
decide to close OHR in July.

--Where does the EU,s post-OHR transition planning stand?
BiH will require intrusive international engagement beyond
next summer, particularly from Brussels on EU accession and
constitutional reform issues.

--We need to find ways to bolster moderates who are prepared
to compromise to advance BiH,s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and

STATE 00004297 006 OF 009


to isolate those who put their narrow personal or ethnic
agendas first.

--It is critical that Macedonia hear clearly and distinctly
from both the U.S. and EU that its prospects for NATO and EU
membership remain strong and real. Macedonia, however, must
ensure free, fair and peaceful presidential and local
elections in March 2009 and needs to address the serious
shortcomings evident in flawed elections in June 2008. Full
and timely implementation of OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to
prevent electoral misconduct, fraud, intimidation and
violence is critical.

--We hope the EU remains clear, firm and fair in its
benchmarks for Macedonia,s accession. The U.S. will
continue to press PM Gruevski to avoid letting the name
dispute undermine progress on reforms necessary for the
country and its EU and NATO accession. The region will bear
the costs of instability if Macedonia is allowed to flounder,
increasingly isolated and without a Euro-Atlantic perspective.

--We encourage the EU to find a way to move forward with
Croatia,s accession negotiations, based upon the real
progress already made, that would keep alive the goal of
concluding talks by late 2009. Forward progress is important
not just for Croatia, but also for future membership
prospects of other countries in Southeastern Europe.

AFGHANISTAN

--The presidential election is the most important event in
Afghanistan in 2009. We urge generous EU support for the
2009 presidential elections, which will likely take place in
August or September.

--We urge the EU to urgently proceed with plans to expand
EUPOL to 400 authorized international staff. We encourage
the EU to set a benchmark to have all 400 authorized staff on
the ground before the 2009 presidential election.

--In order to be effective, EUPOL staff should deploy to the
district level as part of international Police Mentoring
Teams. The EU and Member States should provide vehicles,
housing, and force protection to enable district-level
deployment.

--We urge the EU to significantly expand assistance levels
for Afghanistan as the Commission begins formulating its
2010-2013 Afghanistan assistance package.

--We call upon our European Allies and Partners to join the
U.S. in committing more forces to the ISAF combat and
training mission.

CHAD/SUDAN

CHAD

--As an observer, the U.S. supports the Contact Group and
urges Chad and Sudan to cease support for opposing rebel
groups. The U.S. supports the deployment of a robust UN
Mission in the Central African Republic and the Chad
(MINURCAT) follow-on force.

--We appreciate the contribution made by the EU,s EUFOR
mission to protect refugees in Eastern Chad and the CAR

--The U.S. looks forward to participating in a joint U.S.-EU
mission to eastern Chad from January 25-31 to review
humanitarian operations. We welcome this opportunity to more
closely coordinate our programs.

DARFUR

--The U.S. is concerned CPA milestones (2009 elections, the
2011 referendum, and border demarcation of the Abyei, Nuba
Mountains, and Blue Nile) may become flashpoints for renewed
violence. This makes us all the more concerned with the slow
pace of UNAMID deployment; we should press for faster
progress.

STATE 00004297 007 OF 009



--The U.S. urges more action from international community to
encourage parties to agree to an election date and to create
a political climate necessary for free and fair elections
including changes to current legislation, the end to media
suppression, and freedoms to campaign and for NGOs to provide
assistance without harassment.

ZIMBABWE

--We continue to call on Mugabe to leave power in order to
end the terrible man-made disaster in Zimbabwe.

--Should the MDC enter a power-sharing government with
Mugabe, it will be crucial for the U.S., EU, and other
like-minded international actors to continue to pressure
Mugabe to negotiate and act in good faith and withhold
development assistance until there are concrete changes.

--It is important to continue to raise Zimbabwe in the UN, as
well as with AU and SADC members. While Mugabe decries
Western meddling, he cares what African leaders say. More
African nations need to speak out against Mugabe. We should
continue to pressure South Africa in particular to do so.

--We welcome the EU,s continued commitment to targeted
sanctions against Mugabe regime cronies. We intend to
maintain ours until we see real changes. Such pressure is
hurting the regime, and is one of the few levers we have to
encourage a change in behavior.

--We would also welcome continued dialogue with the EU to
explore how we can support each other,s autonomous sanctions
efforts.

--We continue to desire to see a UN Security Council
resolution on Zimbabwe in the very near future.

UKRAINE

--We urge the European Union to continue to work with Ukraine
and keep it on a path toward EU membership. Ukraine has
already clarified its European direction and the EU should
not abandon it.

--We encourage the EU to conclude negotiations on the
Association Agreement with Ukraine.

--We support the EU plans to help its Eastern neighbors,
reforms in the context of the Eastern Partnership, and bring
them closer to the EU.

--The recent gas crisis shows that Ukraine still needs
assistance with the development of a transparent energy
market and stronger institutions that meet European
standards. We are willing to assist, but this will require
European leadership. New members have experience with making
needed reforms and have much to offer.

--We both should emphasize to the Ukrainian leadership that
government unity is needed if Ukraine is to move forward by
implementing policies that will increase confidence in
Ukraine,s currency and its banking sector.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE GAS DISPUTE

--The United States welcomes the agreement brokered by the
Czech Presidency of the European Union to restore gas flows
to European customers.

--The Czech Republic,s leadership during this crisis has
been impressive.

--Now that the monitoring agreement is in place, we call upon
Russia to restore the flow of gas immediately.

--The EU needs to ensure the fair implementation of the
agreement by both sides.

--We also urge Russia and Ukraine to conclude a transparent

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commercial agreement on the sale and transit of gas.

--The March 2009 EU conference on rehabilitating Ukraine,s
transit network is a very positive first step toward engaging
Kyiv on energy sector reform.

--This incident once again underscores the importance of
diversifying energy supplies, particularly natural gas, and
of transparent market-orientated arrangements for the sale
and shipment of natural gas.

--Now is the time for the EU to focus on forging a common
policy on diversification of gas supplies, the development of
the Southern Corridor and interconnectivity of EU gas and
electrical grids.

--Bypass pipelines such as Nord Stream and South Stream do
not deal with the fundamental problems of Russia-Ukraine gas
transit, increasing European reliance on Russian gas, or the
lack of gas-on-gas competition in many Central and Southern
European markets.

GUANTANAMO DETAINEE RESETTLEMENT

--We encourage the EU to discuss and evaluate what it can do
to help close Guantanamo Bay. The detainee issue is a
priority for the U.S., and President-elect Obama,s views on
the topic are known. Although the new administration may not
be in a position to immediately engage in detail with the EU
on this issue, any progress on resettlements will undoubtedly
be appreciated.

--A significant obstacle to closing Guantanamo is finding
appropriate resettlement locations for those detainees who
cannot be returned to their country of nationality due to
humane treatment concerns. It is with this group of up to 50
detainees that European states can be most helpful, as
resettling these detainees is essential to closing
Guantanamo.

--The USG has approached a number of countries bilaterally in
an effort to find resettlement solutions. We have also
supported efforts to put together a collection of European
countries that could move simultaneously to accept a few
detainees each. We look to the EU leadership to support
these ongoing efforts.

--In addition to resettlement, European states can also help
by providing capacity-building assistance to the detainees,
countries of origin. In many cases, assistance could help
countries to both mitigate the threat posed by transferees
and to treat them humanely, thereby overcoming obstacles that
currently prevent repatriation.

--In considering this request, we hope that the EU will bear
in mind that (contrary to allegations by Special Rapporteur
Nowak and others) there are a significant number of
individuals at Guantanamo who continue to present a real
threat to the US and its allies, and who the US may need to
hold even after Guantanamo ultimately closes. Please
recognize the burden we have shouldered and will continue to
shoulder when considering what you can do to help bring
Guantanamo to closure.

--We are ready to provide specific information on detainees
if helpful.

BELARUS

--We urge the EU to extend an Eastern Partnership Summit
invitation to President Lukashenka only on the basis of
significant, demonstrable reforms. An invitation is
international recognition that Lukashenka has long sought,
and it should be considered with regard to our shared
democracy and human rights goals in Belarus.

--Belarus has taken small steps on democracy and human
rights, including distributing two independent newspapers
through state systems and registering former presidential
candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich,s &For Freedom8

STATE 00004297 009 OF 009


organization.

--However, we should not mistake promises of reform )
including on media freedom, electoral reform, and dialogue
with independent organizations ) with actual reform or
confuse circumscribed actions with broad-reaching, systemic
change.

--In terms of the systemic reforms that we want to see from
Belarus, the following would reflect genuine improvements in
media freedom, civil society and other areas:

-- Allowing distribution of all independent papers;
-- Revising the repressive new media law that increases
internet censorship, and which is scheduled to come into
force in February;
-- Allowing all NGOs and independent organizations to
register and operate freely;
-- Openly engaging civic groups and opposition political
parties on domestic reform;
-- Enacting electoral reform, per OSCE/ODIHR recommendations,
ahead of 2010-2011 presidential elections; and
-- Permitting real freedom of assembly and ending harassment
of regime opponents.

--The U.S. and EU should continue to coordinate our efforts
to bring about genuine change in Belarus.
RICE