SPANISH METAL MERCHANT SUPPLIES SYRIAN ENTITIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN (S)

S E C R E T STATE 004134

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2034
TAGS: MTCR, PARM, PREL, ETTC, MNUC, TSPA, SP, SY
SUBJECT: SPANISH METAL MERCHANT SUPPLIES SYRIAN ENTITIES
OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN (S)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS
1.4 (B),(C),AND (D).

1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Madrid
please see paragraph 4.

2. (S) Background: The U.S. has information indicating
that since at least 2003, the Spanish firm Aceros IMS
has maintained a business relationship with the Syrian
firms Mechanical Construction Factory, Handasieh,
and Industrial Solutions - firms we believe could be
acting on behalf of the Scientific Studies and Research
Center (SSRC),the entity responsible for overseeing
Syria's WMD and missile programs. Aceros has been
involved with MCF, Handasieh, and Industrial Solutions
in negotiations for the supply of a variety of steels
and aluminum alloys, including 7075-T6 aluminum and
2024-T6 aluminum. Both of these materials can be used
in structural support components in ballistic missiles
and in some forms are controlled by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. In November
2008, Aceros supplied Industrial Solutions with over
two metric tons of aluminum and steel. This
consignment was shipped from the Spanish port of
Castillon to Lattakia, Syria aboard the M/V Fast
Independence.

3. (S) Objectives: We want to share this information
with Spanish officials and urge them to take all
appropriate measures to ensure that Aceros is not
acting as a supplier to Syrian entities of
proliferation concern. We also want to advise the GOS
that sanctions pursuant to U.S. law could be imposed on
Aceros if the firm is found to have supplied Syria with
regime-controlled items.

4. (U) Action Request: Request Embassy Madrid approach
appropriate Spanish government officials to deliver
talking points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and
report response. Talking points also may be provided
as a non-paper.

5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL SPAIN)

-- We would like to raise with you a matter of
proliferation concern and request your government's
assistance in investigating this activity.

-- We have information indicating that the Spanish firm
Aceros IMS has, since at least 2003, maintained a
business relationship with several Syrian entities that
have sought materials that may be diverted to Syria's
weapons development programs, possibly via the
Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC).

-- As you will recall from Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Information Exchange meetings, the SSRC
is the agency responsible for overseeing Syria's WMD
and missile programs.

-- Aceros has been involved in negotiations for the
supply of a variety of steels and aluminum alloys with
the following companies: Mechanical Construction
Factory, Handasieh (also known as the General
Organization for Engineering Industries),and
Industrial Solutions.

-- We do not know the quantity of material supplied by
Aceros to Syria, but believe that at least some of it
was specifically intended for use in Syria's ballistic
missile program.

-- Among the materials Aceros and the companies were
discussing were 7075-T6 and 2024-T6 aluminum. Both of
these materials are suitable for use in structural
components in ballistic missiles and in some forms are
controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar
Arrangement.

-- In addition, as recently as early November 2008,
Aceros shipped a consignment of over two metric tons of
aluminum and steel aboard the M/V Fast Independence
from Castillon, Spain, for eventual discharge in
Lattakia, Syria, where the end-user was Industrial
Solutions.

-- We encourage you to investigate this information and
take appropriate measures to ensure that Aceros is not
acting as a source of supply to Syria's weapons
development programs.

-- We also want to advise you that sanctions pursuant
to the U.S. Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act could be imposed on Aceros if the
firm is found to have supplied Syria with regime-
controlled materials.

-- We appreciate your cooperation on nonproliferation
matters and look forward to hearing the results of your
investigation.

End talking points/nonpaper.

6. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul
Herrmann with any questions or follow-up issues
related to this case (202-647-1430 -
herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug any
reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/WE and
EUR/PRA.

7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE