Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE41125
2009-04-24 01:20:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

GUIDANCE FOR A/S GOTTEMOELLER AT U.S./RUSSIA

Tags:  PARM PREL KACT START JCIC US RS 
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DE RUEHC #1125 1140139
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 240120Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T STATE 041125 

SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR A/S GOTTEMOELLER AT U.S./RUSSIA
TALKS IN ROME ON A START FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 036942

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T STATE 041125

SIPDIS - GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2029
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR A/S GOTTEMOELLER AT U.S./RUSSIA
TALKS IN ROME ON A START FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 036942

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, will hold talks
regarding a START follow-on agreement with Russian MFA
Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy
Antonov, as proposed in Reftel. Accompanying A/S
Gottemoeller will be Dr. George W. Look, the NSC Senior
Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and Edward
(Ted) Warner, the Secretary of Defense Representative to
the START follow-on negotiations. The discussions are
scheduled to be held in Rome on April 24, 2009.


2. (S) GUIDANCE: In addition to discussing the
timing/pace of the negotiations and our bilateral process,
Delegation may draw on the points in paragraphs 3, 4, and
5 below to describe initial U.S. thinking and to seek
Russian views relating to a START follow-on agreement.
Delegation should report on this first meeting on a
follow-on agreement as expeditiously as possible.


3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Points on
U.S. views regarding elements for a START follow-on
agreement.

- The U.S. believes a START follow-on agreement should
include, at a minimum, the following elements:

a. An overall warhead limit on operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads;

b. An overall limit on the number of strategic offensive
arms;

c. Verification provisions drawn from START,
appropriately modified and simplified for the provisions
of the new treaty. This would include, for example,
reentry vehicle inspections (modified to confirm the
actual number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads),data update inspections, Conversion or
Elimination inspections, technical exhibitions, Portal
Monitoring at Votkinsk, telemetry provisions, etc.; and

d. Establishment of a data base and continuation of
appropriate data update and movement notifications,
building on that in START, updated with new categories as

necessary.


4. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Points on U.S.
views regarding the format for a July report to the
Presidents.

- The April 1 Presidential Joint Statement requires that
we report on progress achieved in working out a new
agreement. The U.S. believes it would be desirable for
the Presidents to sign a framework document in July. The U.S.
hopes that the Russian delegation can agree to work toward
that result.

- The United States does not intend that the document
signed would be a legally binding agreement, which could
give both the United States and Russia difficulty with our
respective legislatures.

- In the past, the U.S. has used a variety of instruments to
record common understandings with other countries that are
regarded as political commitments rather than legally binding
obligations.

- We are looking at previous documents as templates for
what the Presidents could sign in July.

- The most applicable example we found was the June 17,
1992, Washington Summit Joint Understanding regarding the
mutual understanding reached by the Presidents of the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms.


- The understandings recorded in the 1952 Joint Understanding
eventually evolved into the START II Treaty, which was
signed but never entered into force.

- If we can reach an understanding on key elements of a START
follow-on agreement, we could use those elements as the basis for
drafting a joint understanding, structured along the lines
of the 1992 instrument, to serve as a record of the
Presidents' decisions in July.


5. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Points on U.S.
views regarding effective verification for a START
follow-on agreement.

- Presidents Obama and Medvedev have determined that the START
follow-on agreement will include effective verification measures
drawn from U.S. and Russian experience in implementing the START
Treaty.

- We have already begun looking at the START Treaty's
provisions and are beginning to formulate recommendations
on what provisions should be carried forward as well as
what we may need to revise. The initial views are as
follows:

a. RVOSI will be an important inspection, but will need
to be modified and improved in order to verify the number
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
b. Procedures will be developed to verify the number of
operationally deployed nuclear warheads associated with
heavy bombers.

c. Conversion or Elimination requirements should be
retained; however, the provisions should be reviewed,
modified, and improved to reflect lessons learned from
START and to make them less burdensome, less expensive,
and more environmentally friendly.

d. Cooperative measures should generally be retained.

e. Other inspections should also be retained; however,
for some inspections, notably Facilities subject to
Suspect Site Inspection (SSI) and Formerly Declared
Facility inspections (FDF),there may be alternatives that
would reduce the burden of these inspections, e.g.,
removal from the inspection list and rely on "special
access visits," or extend the timeline for initiation of
the inspections.
CLINTON