HLTF ACTION REQUEST: U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 041124

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: HLTF ACTION REQUEST: U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE
STATUS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS
PACKAGE

REF: USNATO 115 ? March 12 HLTF Reporting Cable


Classified by Donna Phelan, VCI/CCA Acting Office
Director, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (SBU) This is an action request. USNATO is
requested to deliver the text in para 2 to the NATO
International Staff to distribute on April 24 as a U.S.
non-paper on the status of the elements of the Parallel
Actions Package. This paper was requested by Allies at
the March 12 HLTF and will serve as the basis for
discussion at the April 28 HLTF. If Allies request,
U.S. HLTF team will make available copies of the most
recent (end of December 2007) version of the Parallel
Actions Package, but Mission should not raise this in
passing the paper contained below to the I.S.


2. (C/REL NATO) Begin Text for delivery:

CFE Parallel Actions Package

Update on Status ? April 2009

At the HLTF on March 12, Allies requested that the U.S.
provide an update on the status of the parallel actions
package in order to help frame discussions on the
current CFE situation. The following points, which
provide both an overall assessment and an issue-by-issue
analysis of the current dialogue, should be useful as we
look ahead.

Recent Contacts:

-- A/S Gottemoeller will meet with Russian Security
and Disarmament Director Antonov on April 24. While
this meeting will focus on START issues, it will be an
opportunity for the U.S. to seek Russian reaction to
U.S. ideas on Georgia that were advanced by A/S Fried
in December 2008, and for Antonov to offer any new
ideas on the way ahead.

-- Secretary Clinton and FM Lavrov briefly discussed
CFE at their first meeting on March 6. Both
identified the need to develop a way ahead on CFE, and
Lavrov reiterated the Russian assessment that while
the original parallel actions package (October 2007)
had been a useful document, U.S. negotiators had
stepped back from its original content. (The USG
disputes this assessment.) The exchange on CFE was
brief since the meeting encompassed the full range of
U.S.-Russia bi-lateral and multi-lateral issues.

-- The most recent CFE discussions between Russian and
U.S. CFE teams took place in December 2008. The U.S.
advanced ideas, developed in coordination with
Georgian authorities, to update the content of the
Georgia section of the parallel actions package.
Russia raised many questions about those proposals,
but has not yet formally responded. The meeting
touched on all the major elements of the parallel
actions package, but focused on the flank, Georgia,
and Russia's suspension.

Elements of the Parallel Actions Package

Ratification of Adapted CFE Treaty: In discussions of
this section Russia has focused on eliciting as much
certainty as possible regarding Allies' plans for
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty with particular
interest in ratification by the U.S., the UK, Germany,
France and to a lesser extent, Georgia and Moldova. In
this regard, the Russian lead negotiator MFA Director
Antonov has stated he did not consider sufficient
efforts by Allies in fall 2007 to develop a three-phase
matrix of ratification plans and processes. His focus
has been on U.S. ratification. Russia wants Allies,
Georgia, and Moldova to begin ratification procedures
"immediately" following agreement on the package vice
"as soon as possible." Significantly, Russia views
"complete the ratification process" to include "deposit
of instruments." The U.S. has explained that NATO
Allies do not consider "ratification" to be the same
action as "deposit."

Respect for Adapted CFE Treaty: Russian comments on
this section have focused on provisional application,
and not on the generalized political commitment proposed
by NATO, that all parties would act in a manner
consistent with the object and purpose of the Adapted
Treaty (A/CFE) until it enters into force. The Russians
have made clear that the phrase "agree to consider
provisional application" is not sufficient to meet
Russian goals. They want provisional application of
A/CFE if it is not in force within 12 months of
agreement of the Package.

At this point no version of the text on provisional
application is agreed. Moscow has at several points
appeared to recognize the political reality that the
U.S. cannot move forward on provisional application
until the Senate has given advice and consent to
ratification of the Treaty; thus Russia as early as 2007
suggested language on the lines of "once a majority of
CFE states has ratified the Treaty, including the U.S.,
the States Parties will pursue an agreement on its
provisional application."

In spring 2008 and again in December 2008, the U.S.
stressed that many NATO Allies had made clear that they
will not consider provisional application while Russia's
suspension is in effect, and in December also noted that
Russia's military action in Georgia had made provisional
application even more difficult to consider.

Future Review/Flank Limits: *This section also contains
language on Russia's push for a collective ceiling on
NATO.* Collective ceiling: The U.S. has countered
Russia's proposal for a collective ceiling on NATO
Allies with the idea of lowering national equipment
ceilings after entry into force of the Adapted Treaty,
where possible. The Russian side has made clear that
its concerns on this point are related to prospective
NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia. Flank: During
an extensive discussion in December 2008, Antonov
insisted that there could be no deal on CFE if Russia's
concern about the flank was not addressed to Russia's
satisfaction. He ascribed this position to Prime
Minister Putin, underscoring that legal limits on where
Russia could locate equipment on its own territory had
to be eliminated, and called attention to the
Baluyevskiy flank proposal ? which would extend the
flank regime to cover all Russian territory in the Area
of Application. The U.S. observed that this proposal
would, in effect, eliminate the flank for Russia and
keep it for all other Treaty signatories. For many
Allies, Russian action in Georgia had reinforced the
need for the flank limits. The Russian team suggested
that CSBMS might be possible in combination with the
Baluyevskiy proposal, and indicated, when asked, that
Russia intended to abide by its political commitments
regarding equipment levels in the northern flank.

Accession: This section has not changed since December
2007, although Antonov at various points has expressed
dissatisfaction with the timeframe for discussions,
noting that Russia seeks to establish as soon as
possible the conditions for Baltic accession to the
Adapted CFE Treaty.

Substantial Combat Forces: The U.S. has consistently
made clear that a definition of "substantial combat
forces," as the phrase is used in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act, should only be developed in the context of
a deal on CFE. Such a discussion is not appropriate
for the OSCE in Vienna - this is a NATO-Russia, not a
CFE or OSCE issue. A/S Fried suggested in July 2008
that if Russia resumed implementation of CFE, the U.S.
would be prepared to "deepen" discussion of this issue
in the context of the U.S.-Russia bilateral channel.
Antonov welcomed the idea of deepened discussion but
stressed that resuming implementation for Russia would
be very difficult, given that Russia's suspension was a
Presidential-level decision.

Moldova: In December 2008 Antonov said that the U.S.
and Russia were "closest" to agreement on Moldova. That
said, particularly in the wake of the 2+1 statement on
March 18 it is clear that Russia's timeline for
transforming the current Russian-dominated PKF into an
OSCE-mandated, civilian observer presence is not the
same as that suggested by the U.S. The U.S. has asked
Moldovan authorities for their official interpretation
of point 4 of the 2+1 statement; but does not expect to
receive that until a new government is in place. It is
also worth noting that Antonov has set out many caveats
regarding the transparency elements of the package with
regard to munitions and personnel, and that these
elements are not settled. Munitions: As a step leading
toward withdrawal of stored ammunition, Russia says it
is ready to provide more information to the OSCE on its
munitions; but the Russians are not willing to pursue a
joint Russia-OSCE inventory. Russia is open to OSCE
inspection visits of Kolbasna, but in their proposal
visits are subject to Transnistrian veto and will begin
only when munitions withdrawal resumes. PKF: In the CFE
context, Russia has sought open-ended OSCE blessing to
continue the PKF presence on the basis of the 1992 cease
fire agreement, without any notion of gradual
civilianization of the armed PKF, until a political
settlement is agreed. Russia has said it is willing to
accept the presence of a small number of civilian
monitors in parallel with the current Russian presence.

Georgia: The current text in the parallel actions
package could not be agreed by either Russia or Georgia.
Russian actions in August 2008 further complicated
progress. In December 2008 the U.S. proposed new
elements to replace that portion of the package. Those
elements, agreed by Georgian authorities, are:

-- Withdrawal of all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment
(TLE) from the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia;

-- An international presence at Gudauta and other
relevant facilities;

-- A transparency and verification regime, using Adapted
CFE modalities to provide information on and monitor the
number and armament of:

-- Russian military, security and other forces in
the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, as a tool to observe and facilitate
full implementation of the military withdrawal
elements of the August 12 ceasefire agreement;
-- Russian military forces in the North Caucasus
Military District;
-- Comparable Georgian forces.

Suspension: The U.S. has insisted that if NATO Allies
are to move ahead with ratification of the Adapted CFE
Treaty, Russia will need to end its suspension. In mid-
2008 A/S Fried suggested that if Russia resumed
implementation, the U.S. would try to convince Allies to
engage in deepened discussions of elements of the
package. He also proposed intensifying U.S.-Russia
bilateral efforts and inviting a variable geometry of
Allies to join in discussions with the Russians.
Antonov was very interested in intensified and expanded
discussions, but regarding Russian resumption of
implementation, he has continued to underscore that a
reversal of the Putin decision on suspension would have
to be decided at the very top of the Russian
government. In December 2008 the U.S. again stressed
that Russia needed to find some way to resume
implementation of the Treaty. Fulfillment of data
exchange/information and inspection provisions would be
a useful step. Antonov reiterated that this would be
extremely hard, and that while implementation of the
verification and information provisions might be
possible in the context of agreement on the entire
parallel actions package, resumption of implementation
of the flank limits could not be expected.

END TEXT
CLINTON