Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE4103
2009-01-15 15:37:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:
(S) POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN SHIPMENT OF
how-toO P 151537Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LUANDA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000 CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 004103
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC AO CG SF KN
SUBJECT: (S) POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN SHIPMENT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN
REF: A. 06STATE180512
B. 05STATE173768
Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia A. McNerney
E. O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d)
SUMMARY
--------
S E C R E T STATE 004103
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC AO CG SF KN
SUBJECT: (S) POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN SHIPMENT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN
REF: A. 06STATE180512
B. 05STATE173768
Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia A. McNerney
E. O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) We have received information that a delegation from
the North Korean weapons trading firm Korea Mining and
Development Corporation, or KOMID, will travel to Sub-Saharan
Africa. We believe, based on the timing, that this trip is
likely related to a shipment en route to the region aboard
the North Korean-flagged merchant vessel BI RO BONG. The BI
RO BONG departed the North Korean port of Nampo on 13
December.
2. (S) While the nature of the cargo is unknown, the travel
of KOMID officials coinciding with the arrival of the cargo
in the region suggests that it is military-related. In the
past, the USG has sanctioned KOMID for its material
contributions to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction or their means of delivery. The USG also has
approached all nations with whom we have diplomatic relations
to warn about KOMID's activities. (REF A). KOMID has also
been involved in conventional arms trade. Cooperation with
KOMID could result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions,
including the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation
Act (INKSNA),on those entities involved.
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
2. (S) Posts are instructed to approach appropriate level
host nation officials to request that they refrain from doing
any military-related business with KOMID. Posts also are
instructed to request that host nation officials deny
bunkering or other services to the BI RO BONG should it
bunker in territorial waters or make a port call at host
nation ports, unless the vessel agrees to an inspection.
Posts may draw from objectives and talking points/non-paper
below.
OBJECTIVES
--------------
3. (S) Posts should seek to achieve the following:
-- Discourage host nations from purchasing military-related
items from North Korea in general and KOMID in particular.
-- Encourage host nations, in accordance with their national
legislation and consistent with international law, to prevent
the transit of items that are in violation of UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718.
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
--------------
4. (S//REL NAMIBIA AND DRC) Begin Talking Points/ Non-paper
FOR WINDHOEK AND KINSHASA ONLY:
-- We have received information that a delegation from North
Korea's primary weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining and
Development Corporation (KOMID),is planning to travel to
possibly Angola and/or THE DRC in mid-January. This travel
is scheduled to coincide with the arrival of a shipment
probably aboard the North Korean vessel M/V BI RO BONG.
-- The M/V BI RO BONG departed North Korea in mid-December.
Its cargo and destination are currently unknown, though the
travel of KOMID officials coinciding with the arrival of the
cargo in the region suggests that it is military-related.
-- Our information indicates that M/V BI RO BONG would likely
deliver cargo at Angola and/or the DRC. M/V BI RO BONG could
arrive at Walvis Bay, Namibia, on or about January 17, and at
Matadi, the DRC, on or about January 22. Intermediate port
calls in South Africa and Angola are also possible, as are
port calls to other destinations.
-- While it is unclear whether BI RO BONG's cargo is
conventional arms or WMD related, transfers of WMD-related or
military items would raise serious questions of noncompliance
with UNSCR 1718 and we therefore urge you to refrain from
doing any military or WMD-related business with KOMID.
-- In the past, we have asked your government and governments
worldwide to join us in a concerted and coordinated effort to
curtail North Korea's arms sales in order to hamper
Pyongyang's ability to fund its ballistic missile and weapons
of mass destruction programs.
-- As part of this effort, we encourage you to discontinue
any existing military trade with North Korea, refrain from
purchasing military or dual-use equipment from the DPRK, and
refrain from seeking any form of defense trade cooperation
from Pyongyang.
-- Cooperation with KOMID could result in the imposition of
U.S. sanctions, including the Iran, North Korea and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),on those entities involved.
-- In addition, we would like to request that, should the BI
RO BONG make a port call at your ports, or request bunkering
or other services while in your territorial waters, that you
either deny such services, or condition the provision of
these services on requiring the vessel to be boarded for
inspection.
-- Should the vessel submit to such an inspection, we ask
that you share with us any details of the cargo or end-user
that you obtain, and take appropriate actions to detain any
cargo that might be in violation of UNSCR 1718.
END POINTS FOR WINDHOEK AND KINSHASA ONLY
5. (S//REL ANGOLA) Begin Talking Points/Non-Paper for LUANDA
ONLY:
-- We have received information that a North Korean vessel
containing unspecified cargo, the BI RO BONG, could make a
call at an Angolan port, or request bunkering or other
services while in your territorial waters. Evidence suggests
that the BI RO BONG may be delivering goods to various
African ports of call on behalf of North Korea's primary
weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining and Development
Corporation (KOMID). While it is unclear whether the BI RO
BONG,s cargo is conventional arms or WMD related, transfers
of WMD-related or military items would raise serious
questions of noncompliance with UNSCR 1718 and we therefore
urge you to refrain from doing any military or WMD-related
business with KOMID.
-- In the past, we have asked your government and governments
worldwide to join us in a concerted and coordinated effort to
curtail North Korea's arms sales in order to hamper
Pyongyang's ability to fund its ballistic missile and weapons
of mass destruction programs.
-- As partners in the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI),we appreciate any cooperation or information your
government can provide regarding any possible port visit by
the M/V BI RO BONG.
END POINTS FOR ANGOLA.
6. (U) REPORTING REQUIREMENT: Posts are requested to report
the results of their efforts within seven days of receipt of
this cable.
7. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: Washington POC for follow-up is
Mark Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov.
8. (U) Department thanks posts for their assistance. Please
slug responses for AF, EAP, ISN, and T.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC AO CG SF KN
SUBJECT: (S) POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN SHIPMENT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN
REF: A. 06STATE180512
B. 05STATE173768
Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia A. McNerney
E. O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) We have received information that a delegation from
the North Korean weapons trading firm Korea Mining and
Development Corporation, or KOMID, will travel to Sub-Saharan
Africa. We believe, based on the timing, that this trip is
likely related to a shipment en route to the region aboard
the North Korean-flagged merchant vessel BI RO BONG. The BI
RO BONG departed the North Korean port of Nampo on 13
December.
2. (S) While the nature of the cargo is unknown, the travel
of KOMID officials coinciding with the arrival of the cargo
in the region suggests that it is military-related. In the
past, the USG has sanctioned KOMID for its material
contributions to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction or their means of delivery. The USG also has
approached all nations with whom we have diplomatic relations
to warn about KOMID's activities. (REF A). KOMID has also
been involved in conventional arms trade. Cooperation with
KOMID could result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions,
including the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation
Act (INKSNA),on those entities involved.
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
2. (S) Posts are instructed to approach appropriate level
host nation officials to request that they refrain from doing
any military-related business with KOMID. Posts also are
instructed to request that host nation officials deny
bunkering or other services to the BI RO BONG should it
bunker in territorial waters or make a port call at host
nation ports, unless the vessel agrees to an inspection.
Posts may draw from objectives and talking points/non-paper
below.
OBJECTIVES
--------------
3. (S) Posts should seek to achieve the following:
-- Discourage host nations from purchasing military-related
items from North Korea in general and KOMID in particular.
-- Encourage host nations, in accordance with their national
legislation and consistent with international law, to prevent
the transit of items that are in violation of UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718.
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
--------------
4. (S//REL NAMIBIA AND DRC) Begin Talking Points/ Non-paper
FOR WINDHOEK AND KINSHASA ONLY:
-- We have received information that a delegation from North
Korea's primary weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining and
Development Corporation (KOMID),is planning to travel to
possibly Angola and/or THE DRC in mid-January. This travel
is scheduled to coincide with the arrival of a shipment
probably aboard the North Korean vessel M/V BI RO BONG.
-- The M/V BI RO BONG departed North Korea in mid-December.
Its cargo and destination are currently unknown, though the
travel of KOMID officials coinciding with the arrival of the
cargo in the region suggests that it is military-related.
-- Our information indicates that M/V BI RO BONG would likely
deliver cargo at Angola and/or the DRC. M/V BI RO BONG could
arrive at Walvis Bay, Namibia, on or about January 17, and at
Matadi, the DRC, on or about January 22. Intermediate port
calls in South Africa and Angola are also possible, as are
port calls to other destinations.
-- While it is unclear whether BI RO BONG's cargo is
conventional arms or WMD related, transfers of WMD-related or
military items would raise serious questions of noncompliance
with UNSCR 1718 and we therefore urge you to refrain from
doing any military or WMD-related business with KOMID.
-- In the past, we have asked your government and governments
worldwide to join us in a concerted and coordinated effort to
curtail North Korea's arms sales in order to hamper
Pyongyang's ability to fund its ballistic missile and weapons
of mass destruction programs.
-- As part of this effort, we encourage you to discontinue
any existing military trade with North Korea, refrain from
purchasing military or dual-use equipment from the DPRK, and
refrain from seeking any form of defense trade cooperation
from Pyongyang.
-- Cooperation with KOMID could result in the imposition of
U.S. sanctions, including the Iran, North Korea and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),on those entities involved.
-- In addition, we would like to request that, should the BI
RO BONG make a port call at your ports, or request bunkering
or other services while in your territorial waters, that you
either deny such services, or condition the provision of
these services on requiring the vessel to be boarded for
inspection.
-- Should the vessel submit to such an inspection, we ask
that you share with us any details of the cargo or end-user
that you obtain, and take appropriate actions to detain any
cargo that might be in violation of UNSCR 1718.
END POINTS FOR WINDHOEK AND KINSHASA ONLY
5. (S//REL ANGOLA) Begin Talking Points/Non-Paper for LUANDA
ONLY:
-- We have received information that a North Korean vessel
containing unspecified cargo, the BI RO BONG, could make a
call at an Angolan port, or request bunkering or other
services while in your territorial waters. Evidence suggests
that the BI RO BONG may be delivering goods to various
African ports of call on behalf of North Korea's primary
weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining and Development
Corporation (KOMID). While it is unclear whether the BI RO
BONG,s cargo is conventional arms or WMD related, transfers
of WMD-related or military items would raise serious
questions of noncompliance with UNSCR 1718 and we therefore
urge you to refrain from doing any military or WMD-related
business with KOMID.
-- In the past, we have asked your government and governments
worldwide to join us in a concerted and coordinated effort to
curtail North Korea's arms sales in order to hamper
Pyongyang's ability to fund its ballistic missile and weapons
of mass destruction programs.
-- As partners in the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI),we appreciate any cooperation or information your
government can provide regarding any possible port visit by
the M/V BI RO BONG.
END POINTS FOR ANGOLA.
6. (U) REPORTING REQUIREMENT: Posts are requested to report
the results of their efforts within seven days of receipt of
this cable.
7. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: Washington POC for follow-up is
Mark Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov.
8. (U) Department thanks posts for their assistance. Please
slug responses for AF, EAP, ISN, and T.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text