HCOC - ENCOURAGING INDIA TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE HCOC

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 040824

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2034
TAGS: MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC TSPA
SUBJECT: HCOC - ENCOURAGING INDIA TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE HCOC

REF: A. 06 STATE 64555

B. 06 NEW DELHI 2787

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS
1.4 (B),(D),AND (H).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Summary: Department requests Embassy to
encourage India to subscribe to the Hague Code of
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).
This overture is consistent with India's positive
efforts related to preventing the spread of ballistic
missiles via harmonization and adherence to the Missile
Technology Control Regime, and its 2006 indication that
it would look at the HCOC after progress had been
achieved in reaching a peaceful nuclear cooperation
(123) agreement with the United States. Promptly
subscribing to the HCOC would allow Indian officials to
attend the Eighth Regular Meeting of the HCOC
Subscribing States, to be held May 28-29 in Vienna.
This would provide a good opportunity for India to help
guide the future operation of the HCOC, and to discuss
key HCOC implementation issues, particularly
confidence-building measures. End Summary.

OBJECTIVES
--------------


2. (U) Department requests Embassy New Delhi to pursue the
following objectives:

-- Approach appropriate senior-level host government
officials at the earliest opportunity and urge them to
subscribe to the HCOC. (Talking points which may be
left as a nonpaper are at Para 7.)

-- Provide GOI interlocutor(s) with HCOC text (Para 8),
list of HCOC subscribing states (Para 9),and example
of the Note Verbale (Para 10).


REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


3. (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable
slugged for ISN/MTR with "HCOC" in the subject line before
May 15, 2009.

BACKGROUND
--------------


4. (C) The United States, last HCOC outreach to India
was in April 2006 (Ref B),when Indian officials
promised to take a look at the HCOC, but advised us
that they were first hoping for progress on the U.S.-
India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement). Although
previous HCOC overtures to India have not yielded
positive results, and India abstained on a 2008 United
Nations General Assembly resolution supporting the
HCOC, we believe India may now be more open to
considering subscribing given the conclusion of the 123
Agreement (entered into force December 6, 2008) and the
steps taken by India to shore up its nonproliferation
credentials to enable such cooperation. Among these
steps were adhering to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Guidelines and Annex and harmonizing its
export control lists with the MTCR. India's agreement
to take these steps indicates, inter alia, a commitment
to preventing the spread of ballistic missiles and
associated equipment and technology, as well as an
acknowledgement of the dangers of ballistic missile
proliferation - an acknowledgement that may now make
the GOI more willing to consider HCOC subscription.



5. (SBU) The HCOC is aimed at bolstering efforts to
curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide, and to
further delegitimize such proliferation, but does not
require subscribing states to forego their own
indigenous ballistic missile programs. The HCOC
consists of a set of general principles, modest
commitments, and limited confidence-building measures.
It is intended to supplement, not supplant, the MTCR,
and is administered collectively by all of the
countries that subscribe to it. There is no formal
secretariat or implementing organization, and thus we
do not foresee any financial burden for most
Subscribing States. As of April 1, 2009, 130 countries
have subscribed to the HCOC (see para 7). The HCOC
will hold its Eighth Regular Meeting on May 28-29, 2009
in Vienna.


6. (SBU) By subscribing to the HCOC, India will - like
the United States and 129 other subscribing states -
make a political commitment to "exercise maximum
possible restraint in the development, testing and
deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction." Making such a commitment
is consistent with support for the international
nonproliferation regime and unilateral adherence to the
MTCR. However, the United States - like other
countries - understands this commitment as not limiting
our right to take steps in these areas that are
necessary to meeting national security requirements.
This includes the ability to maintain a deterrent
umbrella for our friends and allies, and the
capabilities necessary to defeat weapons of mass
destruction. We therefore believe that subscribing to
the HCOC would not impose any costs on the security of
India or any other country, just as it imposes no costs
on the United States.


7. Begin text of talking points/non-paper:

(CONFIDENTIAL//REL INDIA)

-- The United States urges India to join us and 129
other countries to actively support international
missile nonproliferation efforts by subscribing to the
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC).

-- We have approached your government previously
concerning the HCOC because the U.S. and the other 129
Subscribing States view the HCOC as an important and
meaningful way to help curb the proliferation of
ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) - proliferation declared by the
UN Security Council in Resolution 1540 to represent a
threat to international peace and security.

-- When we last discussed the HCOC with your government
- in April 2006 - Indian officials advised us that they
were open to the possibility of subscribing to the
HCOC, but that they first wanted to see progress on the
U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement).

-- Since that time, the 123 Agreement has been signed
by our respective leadership and, as of December 6, has
entered into force.

-- In concluding this agreement, we acknowledged the
positive steps taken by India on nonproliferation
matters.

-- Among these steps were adhering to the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines and Annex
and harmonizing India's export control lists with the
MTCR.

-- India's agreement to take these steps indicates,
inter alia, a commitment to preventing the spread of
ballistic missiles and associated equipment and
technology, as well as an acknowledgment of the
dangers of ballistic missile proliferation.

-- We believe that India, as a possessor of ballistic
missiles, can further this commitment to international
missile nonproliferation efforts by subscribing to the
HCOC.

--Taking such a step will allow India to make a further
contribution to international efforts aimed at
addressing the global missile threat.

-- We hope you consider this matter seriously and act
promptly to subscribe.

-- Promptly subscribing to the HCOC would allow Indian
officials to attend the Eighth Regular Meeting of the
HCOC Subscribing States, to be held May 28-29 in
Vienna. This would provide a good opportunity for
India to help guide the future operation of the HCOC,
and to discuss key HCOC implementation issues,
particularly confidence-building measures.

-- India can subscribe by simply sending a Note Verbal
to the Government of Austria (HCOC@bmeia.gv.at),which
is the Executive Secretary of the HCOC. (Hand over
example note at para 10.)



END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS


8. (U) The government of the Netherlands distributed
the HCOC text to all countries invited to the November
2002 Launching Conference. The text is repeated below.


Begin text of HCOC:

International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation

Preamble

The Subscribing States:

Reaffirming their commitment to the United Nations
Charter;

Stressing the role and responsibility of the United
Nations in the field of international peace and
security;

Recalling the widespread concern about the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery;

Recognizing the increasing regional and global security
challenges caused, inter alia, by the ongoing
proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction;

Seeking to promote the security of all states by
fostering mutual trust through the implementation of
political and diplomatic measures;

Having taken into account regional and national
security considerations;

Believing that an International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation will contribute to the
process of strengthening existing national and
international security arrangements and disarmament and
non-proliferation objectives and mechanisms;

Recognising that Subscribing States may wish to
consider engaging in co-operative measures among
themselves to this end;


1. Adopt this International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Code');


2. Resolve to respect the following Principles:

a) Recognition of the need comprehensively to
prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction and the need to continue pursuing
appropriate international endeavors, including the
Code;

b) Recognition of the importance of strengthening,
and gaining wider adherence to, multilateral
disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms;

c) Recognition that adherence to, and full
compliance with, international arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation norms help build
confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states;

d) Recognition that participation in this Code is
voluntary and open to all states;

e) Confirmation of their commitment to the United
Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and
in the Interest of All States taking into particular
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 51/122
of 13 December 1996);

f) Recognition that states should not be excluded
from utilising the benefits of space for peaceful
purposes, but that, in reaping such benefits and in
conducting related cooperation, they must not
contribute to the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction;

g) Recognition that Space Launch Vehicle programmes
should not be used to conceal Ballistic Missile
programmes;

h) Recognition of the necessity of appropriate
transparency measures on Ballistic Missile programmes
and Space Launch Vehicle programmes in order to
increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of
Ballistic Missiles and Ballistic Missile technology;


3. Resolve to implement the following General
Measures:

a) To ratify, accede to or otherwise abide by:
- the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1967),
- the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (1972),
- the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (1975);

b) To curb and prevent the proliferation of
Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction, both at a global and regional level,
through multilateral, bilateral and national
endeavours;

c) To exercise maximum possible restraint in the
development, testing and deployment of Ballistic
Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction, including, where possible, to reduce
national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of
global and regional peace and security;

d) To exercise the necessary vigilance in the
consideration of assistance to Space Launch Vehicle
programmes in any other country so as to prevent
contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, considering that such programmes may be
used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes;

e) Not to contribute to, support or assist any
Ballistic Missile programme in countries which might be
developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in
contravention of norms established by, and of those
countries, obligations under, international disarmament
and non-proliferation treaties;


4. Resolve to implement the following:

a) Transparency measures as follows, with an
appropriate and sufficient degree of detail to increase
confidence and to promote non-proliferation of
Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction:

i) With respect to Ballistic Missile programmes to:
- make an annual declaration providing an outline of
their Ballistic Missile policies. Examples of openness
in such declarations might be relevant information on
Ballistic Missiles systems and land (test-) launch
sites;
- provide annual information on the number and generic
class of Ballistic Missiles launched during the
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in
tiret iii);

ii) with respect to expendable Space Launch Vehicle
programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic
confidentiality principles, to:
- make an annual declaration providing an outline of
their Space Launch Vehicle policies and land (test-)
launch sites;
- provide annual information on the number and generic
class of Space Launch Vehicles launched during the
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in
tiret iii);
- consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the
degree of access permitted),inviting international
observers to their land (test-) launch sites;

iii) with respect to their Ballistic Missile and Space
Launch Vehicle programmes to:
- exchange pre-launch notifications on their Ballistic
Missile and Space Launch Vehicle launches and test
flights. These notifications should include such
information as the generic class of the Ballistic
Missile or Space Launch Vehicle, the planned launch
notification window, the launch and the planned
direction;

b) Subscribing States could, as appropriate and on a
voluntary basis, develop bilateral or regional
transparency measures, in addition to those above.

c) Implementation of the above confidence building
measures does not serve as justification for the
programmes to which these confidence building measures
apply;


5. Organisational aspects

Subscribing States determine to:

a) Hold regular meetings, annually or as otherwise
agreed by Subscribing States;

b) Take all decisions, both substantive and
procedural, by a consensus of the Subscribing States
present;

c) Use these meetings to define, review and further
develop the workings of the Code, including in such
ways as:
- establishing procedures regarding the exchange of
notifications and other information in the framework of
the Code;
- establishing an appropriate mechanism for the
voluntary resolution of questions arising from national
declarations, and/or questions pertaining to Ballistic
Missile and/or Space Launch Vehicle programmes;
- naming of a subscribing state to serve as an
immediate central contact for collecting and
disseminating Confidence Building Measures submissions,
receiving and announcing the subscription of additional
States, and other tasks as agreed by Subscribing
States; and
- others as may be agreed by the Subscribing States,
including possible amendments to the Code.



9. (U) List of Subscribing States as of April 1,

2009.


1. Afghanistan

2. Andorra

3. Albania

4. Argentina

5. Armenia

6. Australia

7. Austria

8. Azerbaijan

9. Belarus

10. Belgium

11. Benin

12. Bosnia and Herzegovina

13. Bulgaria

14. Burkina Faso

15. Burundi

16. Cameroon

17. Cambodia

18. Canada

19. Cape Verde

20. Chad

21. Chile

22. Colombia

23. Comoros

24. Cook Islands

25. Costa Rica

26. Croatia

27. Cyprus

28. Czech Republic

29. Denmark

30. Dominican Republic

31. Ecuador

32. El Salvador

33. Eritrea

34. Estonia

35. Ethiopia

36. Fiji

37. Finland

38. France

39. Gabon

40. Gambia

41. Georgia

42. Germany

43. Ghana

44. Greece

45. Guatemala

46. Guinea

47. Guinea-Bissau

48. Guyana

49. Haiti

50. Holy See

51. Honduras

52. Hungary

53. Iceland

54. Ireland

55. Italy

56. Japan

57. Jordan

58. Kazakhstan

59. Kenya

60. Kiribati

61. Latvia

62. Liberia

63. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

64. Liechtenstein

65. Lithuania

66. Luxembourg

67. Madagascar

68. Malawi

69. Maldives

70. Mali

71. Malta

72. Marshall Islands

73. Mauritania

74. Micronesia
(Federated States of)

75. Monaco

76. Mongolia

77. Montenegro

78. Morocco

79. Mozambique

80. Netherlands

81. New Zealand

82. Nicaragua

83. Niger

84. Nigeria

85. Norway

86. Palau

87. Panama

88. Papua New Guinea

89. Paraguay

90. Peru

91. Philippines

92. Poland

93. Portugal

94. Republic of Korea

95. Republic of Macedonia

96. Republic of Moldova

97. Romania

98. Russian Federation

99. Rwanda

100. Samoa

101. San Marino

102. Senegal

103. Serbia

104. Seychelles

105. Sierra Leone

106. Slovakia

107. Slovenia

108. South Africa

109. Spain

110. Sudan

111. Suriname

112. Sweden

113. Switzerland

114. Tanzania

115. Tajikistan

116. Timor-Leste

117. Tonga

118. Tunisia

119. Turkey

120. Turkmenistan

121. Tuvalu

122. Uganda

123. Ukraine

124. United Kingdom

125. United States

126. Uruguay

127. Uzbekistan

128. Vanuatu

129. Venezuela

130. Zambia


10. (SBU) Begin text of example Note Verbale:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of (country) presents
its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Government of Austria and has the honour to inform
the Republic of Austria that (country) wishes to become
a subscribing state to the Hague Code of Conduct
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which was
adopted at an international launching conference held
at The Hague on 25 and 26 November 2002, and that it
wishes (country) to be included in the list of
Subscribing States that will serve as an annex to the
aforementioned Code of Conduct.

Done at (capital)

Date

Seal

POINT OF CONTACT
--------------


11. Department appreciates post's help in this matter.
Washington POCs are John Paul Herrmann (202-647-1430 -
herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and Sarah Ayers (202 647-
1142 - AyersSL@state.sgov.gov). Please slug any
reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR.
CLINTON