Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE3902
2009-01-14 21:26:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:
RUSSIAN UPDATE ON SUKHUMI RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
how-toVZCZCXYZ0013 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #3902 0142135 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 142126Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0000 INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 003902
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM PGOV PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN UPDATE ON SUKHUMI RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
REF: A. 08 STATE 126999
B. 08 MOSCOW 3605
C. 08 TBILISI 2172
Classified By: Anita Friedt for Reasons 1.4 B and D.
S E C R E T STATE 003902
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM PGOV PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN UPDATE ON SUKHUMI RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
REF: A. 08 STATE 126999
B. 08 MOSCOW 3605
C. 08 TBILISI 2172
Classified By: Anita Friedt for Reasons 1.4 B and D.
1. (U) This is an action request for Embassies Tbilisi and
Moscow. See para 6.
2. (C) In response to Ref A request for GOR update on the
status of radiation sources that had been located in Sukhumi,
working-level Russian MFA contacts were unable to provide
definitive information about these sources (Ref B),and even
speculated that they were still in Abkhazia. During a
session of the Strategic Security Dialogue in Moscow on
December 15, Acting U/S Rood followed up with DFM Ryabkov and
later with Rosatom Deputy Director Spasskiy by providing the
non-paper in para 3. In response, on December 31, Russian
Embassy Political Counselor Rybachenkov passed to T/FO the
non-paper in para 4. While passing the non-paper,
Rybachenkov noted that the sources had been removed to a safe
place in Russia, and requested that this information be
treated as confidential and not be made public.
3. (C) Begin text of U.S. non-paper:
December 15, 2008
Non-paper on Radioactive Sources in Sukhumi
The United States Government has sought the safe removal of
highly radioactive sources from storage at the Sukhumi
Institute of Physics and the Sukhumi Institute for
Experimental Pathology, as these sources remain vulnerable to
theft, diversion, or malicious use in a radiological
dispersal device. We are concerned that security at these
facilities is not commensurate with the potential threat
posed by these materials.
We ask the Russian Federation to consider again the safe and
expeditious removal of these high-activity and other
radioactive sources to a more secure location. We note
Rosatom,s interest, as stated in 2007, to resolve this
security threat on a practical, non-political basis and we
trust that all interested parties would treat the security of
the material as their paramount concern. We would appreciate
any updated information on the sources or their present
circumstances, in the interest of seeing this
nonproliferation issue successfully resolved.
End text.
4. (C) Begin text of December 31, 2008, Russian non-paper,
received in English only:
In view of the current military and political situation in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a team of specialists undertook a
series of measures on the premises of the Sukhumi Physics and
Technology Institute and the Experimental Pathology and
Therapy Research Institute of the Abkhaz Academy of Sciences
in August-September of 2008, which allowed to remove away
(sic) all radiation sources and place them in conditions that
guarantee their reliable physical protection and radiological
safety.
Government Corporation Rosatom has inspected the execution of
the work and indicates that the radiation background
throughout the premises of the above-mentioned institutes
corresponds to the natural level.
End text.
5. (C) Washington is satisfied that the Russian non-paper
and comments address U.S. concerns regarding these sources
and their security; at this point, no further inquiries or
actions regarding their security are required.
6. (C) Action request for Embassy Tbilisi: Per concerns
expressed in Ref C, Washington requests that Embassy inform
GOG interlocutors of this development, using the points in
para 7. The text of the Russian non-paper may not be passed
to Georgian officials. Action request for Embassy Moscow:
Please thank the GOR for its prompt response to the December
15 non-paper as well as its prompt action on this matter, and
encourage continued vigilance on such nuclear security
concerns.
7. (S//REL GEORGIA) Begin points:
-- As previously indicated, we have inquired with the
Government of Russia about the status of the radiation
sources that had been located in Sukhumi.
-- In response, we have received credible assurances from
senior levels in the Government of Russia that the sources
have been removed to safe storage and the facilities in which
they were stored are now cleaned out.
-- This development has resolved our concerns regarding the
security of these sources.
IF ASKED:
-- We were informed informally by the Russians that the
location to which the sources were removed is in Russia.
End points.
8. (U) Post assistance is appreciated. Please slug
responses for ISN/WMDT, EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS, and EUR/CARC.
RICE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM PGOV PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN UPDATE ON SUKHUMI RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
REF: A. 08 STATE 126999
B. 08 MOSCOW 3605
C. 08 TBILISI 2172
Classified By: Anita Friedt for Reasons 1.4 B and D.
1. (U) This is an action request for Embassies Tbilisi and
Moscow. See para 6.
2. (C) In response to Ref A request for GOR update on the
status of radiation sources that had been located in Sukhumi,
working-level Russian MFA contacts were unable to provide
definitive information about these sources (Ref B),and even
speculated that they were still in Abkhazia. During a
session of the Strategic Security Dialogue in Moscow on
December 15, Acting U/S Rood followed up with DFM Ryabkov and
later with Rosatom Deputy Director Spasskiy by providing the
non-paper in para 3. In response, on December 31, Russian
Embassy Political Counselor Rybachenkov passed to T/FO the
non-paper in para 4. While passing the non-paper,
Rybachenkov noted that the sources had been removed to a safe
place in Russia, and requested that this information be
treated as confidential and not be made public.
3. (C) Begin text of U.S. non-paper:
December 15, 2008
Non-paper on Radioactive Sources in Sukhumi
The United States Government has sought the safe removal of
highly radioactive sources from storage at the Sukhumi
Institute of Physics and the Sukhumi Institute for
Experimental Pathology, as these sources remain vulnerable to
theft, diversion, or malicious use in a radiological
dispersal device. We are concerned that security at these
facilities is not commensurate with the potential threat
posed by these materials.
We ask the Russian Federation to consider again the safe and
expeditious removal of these high-activity and other
radioactive sources to a more secure location. We note
Rosatom,s interest, as stated in 2007, to resolve this
security threat on a practical, non-political basis and we
trust that all interested parties would treat the security of
the material as their paramount concern. We would appreciate
any updated information on the sources or their present
circumstances, in the interest of seeing this
nonproliferation issue successfully resolved.
End text.
4. (C) Begin text of December 31, 2008, Russian non-paper,
received in English only:
In view of the current military and political situation in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a team of specialists undertook a
series of measures on the premises of the Sukhumi Physics and
Technology Institute and the Experimental Pathology and
Therapy Research Institute of the Abkhaz Academy of Sciences
in August-September of 2008, which allowed to remove away
(sic) all radiation sources and place them in conditions that
guarantee their reliable physical protection and radiological
safety.
Government Corporation Rosatom has inspected the execution of
the work and indicates that the radiation background
throughout the premises of the above-mentioned institutes
corresponds to the natural level.
End text.
5. (C) Washington is satisfied that the Russian non-paper
and comments address U.S. concerns regarding these sources
and their security; at this point, no further inquiries or
actions regarding their security are required.
6. (C) Action request for Embassy Tbilisi: Per concerns
expressed in Ref C, Washington requests that Embassy inform
GOG interlocutors of this development, using the points in
para 7. The text of the Russian non-paper may not be passed
to Georgian officials. Action request for Embassy Moscow:
Please thank the GOR for its prompt response to the December
15 non-paper as well as its prompt action on this matter, and
encourage continued vigilance on such nuclear security
concerns.
7. (S//REL GEORGIA) Begin points:
-- As previously indicated, we have inquired with the
Government of Russia about the status of the radiation
sources that had been located in Sukhumi.
-- In response, we have received credible assurances from
senior levels in the Government of Russia that the sources
have been removed to safe storage and the facilities in which
they were stored are now cleaned out.
-- This development has resolved our concerns regarding the
security of these sources.
IF ASKED:
-- We were informed informally by the Russians that the
location to which the sources were removed is in Russia.
End points.
8. (U) Post assistance is appreciated. Please slug
responses for ISN/WMDT, EUR/PRA, EUR/RUS, and EUR/CARC.
RICE