Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE38601
2009-04-17 22:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

DEMARCHE TO VIETNAM CONCERNING GOODS AND ENTITIES

Tags:  PARM UNSC KN VM KNNP 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8601 1072226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 172206Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 038601 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2014
TAGS: PARM UNSC KN VM KNNP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO VIETNAM CONCERNING GOODS AND ENTITIES
TO BE DESIGNATED UNDER UNSCR 1718

REF: USUN 401

Classified By: EAP DAS Alex A. Arvizu, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 038601

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2014
TAGS: PARM UNSC KN VM KNNP
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO VIETNAM CONCERNING GOODS AND ENTITIES
TO BE DESIGNATED UNDER UNSCR 1718

REF: USUN 401

Classified By: EAP DAS Alex A. Arvizu, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request.


2. (C) The objectives of this demarche are to encourage
Vietnam to work together with us to reach
agreement on
U.S.-proposed designations in the DPRK
Sanctions Committee ("1718 Committee") of entities and
goods tied to the DPRK's proscribed WMD and
missile-related activities in order to meet the April 24
Presidential Statement (PRST)
deadline and keep this matter from returning to the full
Security Council for action;


3. (U) BACKGROUND: On April 13, the Security Council
adopted a Presidential Statement (PRST) that condemned the
April 5 launch by the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) and tasked the Security Council's DPRK
Sanctions Committee to "adjust" pre-existing sanctions by
April 24
through the designation of entities and goods. (NOTE: Per
UNSCR 1718, the DPRK Sanctions Committee
may freeze the assets of designated entities linked to the
DPRK's proscribed WMD and missile program, as well as
identify specific technical goods banned from transfer to
or from the DPRK. END NOTE.


4. (C) BACKGROUND (STATE OF PLAY): USUN formally
submitted a list of entities and goods to the Sanctions
Committee on April 14 (designation package at para 6) The
1718 Sanctions Committee met for a first time on April 14.
At that meeting, the Vietnamese delegate, remaining
noncommittal on the substance of the proposals,
reiterated Vietnam's position that the purpose of
sanctions is to modify behavior of a state threatening
international peace and that sanctions should avoid
unintended humanitarian consequences. In that same meeting,
China and Russia complained -- somewhat disingenuously --
about the short timeframe in which to review highly-technical
material. Vietnam may adopt this argument.


5. (C) POST MAY DRAW UPON THE TALKING POINTS BELOW:

-- The United States appreciated Vietnam's
support of the adoption of a UN Security
Council Presidential Statement (PRST) condemning the
DPRK's April 5 launch. The clear and united statement
criticizing the launch expressed the will of the
international community. Our actions in the Council

demonstrated the effectiveness of close multilateral
cooperation. We hope we can continue working together in
that spirit.

-- The DPRK Sanctions Committee has shared with the
Vietnamese delegation information from the United States
about what kind of
designations we intended to seek, including:

A) New technical items that could be used to support
the DPRK's WMD and ballistic missile-related programs and
associated proliferation activities;
B) Replacing S-2006-815 with the current
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Equipment,
Software and Technology Annex.
C) Eleven entities that have been tied to the DPRK's
WMD and ballistic missile-related proliferation activities.

-- On April 14, the United States formally submitted a
request to designate these items and goods to the DPRK
Sanctions Committee, along with information justifying
their designation.

-- We understand the concern expressed by the Vietnamese
delegation about the potential for adverse humanitarian
impact of sanctions on the people of the DPRK. We share
those concerns. You will note that each of the entities
and goods we have proposed be listed is specifically
targeted for its links to the DPRK,s ballistic missile or
WMD programs, and would have a direct effect on those
programs only. The United States does not seek to take
actions that would negatively impact the lives of the North
Korean people.

-- We have also heard the concern expressed by some
delegations in New York that some of the goods we have
proposed for designation have civilian uses, as well as ones
related to the DPRK,s ballistic missile program.

-- As you are aware, many goods can also be used in
military applications. We have proposed updating the list of
dual-use and missile items controlled under UNSCR because
these
items could still be used to advance the DPRK's ballistic
missile development efforts.

-- Because of the tight timeframe specified in the
Security Council's PRST on the DPRK, we would like to know as
soon as possible whether you anticipate significant
objections to this approach.

-- As you know, the Security Council has resolved to vote
on proposed designations by April 30 in the event the
Committee is unable to designate entities and items by
April 24.

-- The Security Council's adoption of the April 13 PRST
was the product of the
cooperation of all members of the Security Council on an
important issue of international
security. We hope we can continue working together in
that spirit. We hope this issue can be resolved
expeditiously in the Committee and that it does not come back
to the Council, as this would send an incorrect and
unfortunate signal to North Korea about international
resolve.

-- (IF ASKED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS) As
called for in the PRST, North Korea should engage through
the Six-Party Talks process to fulfill its commitments in
the September 2005 Joint Statement. The DPRK,s decision
to suspend disablement and expel U.S. and IAEA monitors is
a step in the wrong direction. This move strikes at the
core aim of the Six-Party Process, which is
denuclearization. The United States remains committed to
the Six-Party Talks process and wants to consolidate the
important progress we have made so far.



6. (SBU) TEXT OF U.S. PROPOSAL TO 1718 COMMITTEE:

April 14, 2009

Dear Ambassador:

In line with the Security Council's Presidential Statement
(PRST/2009/7) of April 13, 2009, the United States
Mission would like to propose to the Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) the designation of
additional entities and goods pursuant to paragraph 8 of
resolution 1718 (2006).

The United States has identified items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology (attachment 1) that should
be specified for the purpose of paragraph 8(a)(ii) of
resolution 1718 (2006). We have included information
specifying why these items "could contribute to DPRK's
nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other
weapons of mass destruction-related programs." All of
this information is publicly releasable.

The United States has also identified entities (attachment
2) that should be subject to the measures imposed by
paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006). We have
included information specifying why these entities meet
the criteria of "being engaged in or providing support
for, including through other illicit means, DPRK's
nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related
and ballistic missile-related programs, or by persons or
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction."
All of this information is publicly releasable.

The United States requests that the Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) consider these
proposals on a priority basis in order to meet the April
24
deadline requested by the Security Council. We suggest
that the Committee discuss this list at its next meeting,
including ways to amend or include additional information
about these goods and entities.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest
consideration.

Sincerely,

Susan E. Rice
Ambassador

Attachment: As stated.

His Excellency
Baki Ilkin,
Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1718 (2006),
New York, NY 10017.

Cc: Ms. Loraine Rickard-Martin,
UN Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch,
United Nations.

ATTACHMENT 1:

Proposed Items that should be specified for
the purpose of paragraph 8(a)(i) of resolution 1718
(2006).

PART A:

-- Resolution 1718 banned the transfer of items described
in the document S/2006/815.
-- The United States proposes circulating a new document
of the Council, which will include additions and updates
to this original list.
-- At the first meeting of the Committee, the United
States will explain the nature of this subsequent
document.

PART B:

-- The United States further proposes adding the
additional items as described below.
-- The acquisition of these items is especially critical
for states like the DPRK that are attempting to advance
their ballistic missile capability.

-"Nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steel (N-DSS)
having all of the following characteristics:

a) containing at least 18 percent by weight
chromium and 4.5-8.0 percent by weight nickel;

b) a ferritic-austenitic microstructure (also
referred to as a two-phase microstructure) of which at
least 10 percent is austenite by volume (according to ASTM
E-1181-87 or national equivalents); and

c) having any of the following forms:
i. ingots or bars having a size of 100 mm or more
in each dimension;
ii. sheets having a width of 600 mm or more and a
thickness of 5 mm or less; or
iii. tubes having an outer dimension of 600 mm or
more and a wall thickness of 5 mm or less."

Nitrogen stabilized duplex stainless steels very nearly
replicate the material strength requirements of titanium
stabilized duplex stainless steel, which is MTCR
controlled. This specialized steel is particularly useful
in liquid propellant missile applications given its high
strength, ease of welding and resistance to corrosive
liquid propellant oxidizers such as inhibited red fuming
nitric acid (IRFNA).

-"Graphite designed or specified for use in EDM
machines." Electrical discharge machining (EDM) graphite
has the ability to significantly contribute to ballistic
missile programs by virtue of its use in EDM machines
producing complex and highly precise cuts such as required
for liquid rocket engine components. This level of
machining is not required in the manufacture of farming
equipment, civilian construction projects, or in various
heavy industries not related to the production of
ballistic missiles.

-"5 mm or thinner stainless steel sheets." Stainless
steel in thin sheet form is highly sought after by some
ballistic missile programs of concern for rocket motor
casings and pressure vessels.

-"Para-aramid fiber (Kevlar and other Kevlar-like),
filament and tape." Para-aramid fibers such as Kevlar and
other Kevlar-like filaments and tapes are usable in the
fabrication of solid propellant rocket motor cases, rocket
motor nozzles and nozzle extensions, propellant tanks,
nose tips, and missile airframe and warhead structures.

-"Austenitic stainless steel." Certain austenitic steel
alloys possess the strength and corrosion resistance to be
employed in many liquid missile applications including
propellant tanks and missile interstages.

-"Aerospace-grade aluminum in bar and sheet form."
Aerospace grade aluminum alloys with high strength and
corrosion resistance are useful in liquid ballistic
missile structures and airframes.

-"Fine-grain spherical aluminum powder (500 micron and
below, with purity equal to or greater than 75 percent)."
Aluminum powder is used as a fuel substance in solid
rocket motor propellant formulations. The use of
spherical aluminum powder allows higher aluminum loading,
with a corresponding increase in propellant performance.

ATTACHMENT 2:

Proposed entities that should be subject to the measures
imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006).

The following entities are engaged in or providing support
for, including through other illicit means, the DPRK's
nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related
and ballistic missile-related programs, or are persons or
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction:

1) KOREA MINING DEVELOPMENT TRADING CORPORATION
(a.k.a. CHANGGWANG SINYONG CORPORATION; a.k.a. EXTERNAL
TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORPORATION; a.k.a. DPRKN MINING
DEVELOPMENT TRADING CORPORATION; a.k.a. &KOMID8). Central
District, Pyongyang, DPRK. The Korea Mining Development
Trading Corporation (KOMID) is the DPRK,s primary arms
dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to
ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID
offices are located in multiple countries and facilitate
weapons sales while seeking new customers for its
weapons.

2) KOREA RYONBONG GENERAL CORPORATION (a.k.a. KOREA
YONBONG GENERAL CORPORATION; f.k.a. LYONGAKSAN GENERAL
TRADING CORPORATION, Pot,onggang District, Pyongyang,
DPRK; Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK).
The DPRK defense conglomerate Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation specializes in acquisition for DPRK defense
industries and support to that country,s military-related
sales. An English-language DPRK trade journal (Foreign
Trade of the DPRK),has carried advertisements from
International Chemical, a subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong
General Corporation, offering ammonium diuranate (ADU),a
processed form of yellowcake, for sale on the
international market.

3) TANCHON COMMERCIAL BANK, f.k.a. CHANGGWANG
CREDIT BANK; f.k.a., KOREA CHANGGWANG CREDIT BANK. Saemul
1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Tanchon
Commercial Bank, headquartered in Pyongyang, inherited
from the Korea Changgwang Credit Bank Corporation (KCCBC)
the role as the main DPRK financial agent for sales of
conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and good related to
the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Since the
late 1980s, Tanchon,s predecessor, KCCBC, collected
revenue from weapons-related sales that were concentrated
in a handful of countries mainly located in the Mid-East
and several African states. These revenues provide DPRK
with a significant portion of its export earnings and
financially aid DPRK,s own development of nuclear-related,
other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic
missile-related programs and arms-related purchases.

4) HESONG TRADING CORPORATION. Pyongyang, DPRK.
Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent
company of Hesong Trading Corporation.

5) KOREA COMPLEX EQUIPMENT IMPORT CORPORATION.
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea
Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of
Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation.

6) KOREA INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL JOINT VENTURE
COMPANY. a.k.a. CHOSON INTERNATIONAL CHEMICALS JOINT
OPERATION COMPANY; a.k.a. CHOSUN INTERNATIONAL CHEMICALS
JOINT OPERATION COMPANY; a.k.a. INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL
JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION. Hamhung, South Hamgyong
Province, DPRK; Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK;
Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation is the parent company of Korea International
Chemical Joint Venture Company.

7) KOREA KWANGSONG TRADING CORPORATION.
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea
Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of
Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation.

8) KOREA PUGANG TRADING CORPORATION. Rakwon-dong,
Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Ryonbong
General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Pugang
Trading Corporation.

9) KOREA RYONGWANG TRADING CORPORATION. a.k.a.
KOREA RYENGWANG TRADING CORPORATION Rakwon-dong,
Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Ryonbong
General Corporation is the parent company of Korea
Ryongwang Trading Corporation.

10) KOREA RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE
CORPORATION. a.k.a. CHOSUN YUNHA MACHINERY JOINT OPERATION
COMPANY; a.k.a. KOREA RYENHA MACHINERY J/V CORPORATION;
a.k.a. RYONHA MACHINERY JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION.
Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu,
Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK.
Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company
of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation.

11) TOSONG TECHNOLOGY TRADING CORPORATION
Pyongyang, DPRK. Korea Mining Development Corporation
(KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading
Corporation.
CLINTON