ADDITIONAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CESIUM-137

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 032944

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM PINR GG ZJ
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CESIUM-137
SOURCE DISCOVERED NEAR KOPITNARI AIRPORT

REF: A. A) TBILISI 000449

B. B) TBILISI 000314

C. C) TBILISI 000275

Classified By: ISN/WMDT DIRECTOR, ACTING, THOMAS LOWE


1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Tbilisi.
Please see paragraph 3.


2. (C) BACKGROUND: According to Ref A, the Georgian
government has successfully recovered the four cesium-137
sources found near Kopitnari Airport. We are pleased that
the Georgians recovered the sources, but are concerned that
they did not follow proper procedures when responding to the
incident as outlined in the Addendum to the Joint Document of
Georgian and U.S. Delegations on Georgia's Priority Needs to
Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. The
Addendum (see para 6) obligates Georgia to follow the IAEA
Nuclear Security Series, which advises governments to
investigate radiation alarms for possible criminal activity
and preserve evidence for potential prosecutions. However, a
video of the recovery shared with us by the Georgian
government suggested that the Georgians were not prepared to
consider the possibility of opening a criminal case, since it
appeared there was no law enforcement presence during the
recovery operation, and no effort to follow proper procedures
for the preservation of evidence. Usually when radioactive
sources are "abandoned", they are left in their original
storage location and forgotten. In this case, it appears
several sources were removed from their place of origin and
buried in another location. It seems unlikely that this
could have been done lawfully. Even if there is not enough
evidence to prosecute, it would be helpful to know whether
the Georgians even considered the possibility that the
abandoned sources were connected with criminal activity.


3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to congratulate
the Government of Georgia on a successful recovery and
express Washington's interest in continuing efforts to
improve their capabilities to deter, detect, and disrupt
nuclear and radioactive material trafficking. In order to
clarify information gaps, Washington seeks answers to
additional questions (para 4) from appropriate Georgian
officials. Post is requested to provide a coordinated
response to Washington via front-channel cable.


4. (S//REL GEORGIA) FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS ABOUT SEIZED
MATERIAL:

-- Has the Government of Georgia considered pursuing this
case as a criminal matter? Has it completely ruled out the
possibility that the material was abandoned by smugglers?

-- Is the road on which the sources were detected a known
smuggling route for any other illicit activities, e.g.
narcotics or human trafficking?

-- How much confidence does the NRSS have that the material
was buried without any intention of transporting it in the
future?

-- Is there any record of other cases in Georgia where
radioactive or nuclear materials were discovered buried at
previously unknown locations?

-- Could the Georgians please elaborate on their explanation
that the sources were buried two or three years ago, and why
they do not think they will be able to determine their origin?


5. Washington appreciates Post's assistance in answering
these questions related to this case.


6. (SBU) ADDENDUM TO THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF GEORGIAN AND U.S.
DELEGATIONS ON GEORGIA'S PRIORITY NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS
CAPABILITIES TO COMBAT NUCLEAR SMUGGLING:

On February 2, 2007, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Georgia

STATE 00032944 002 OF 003


John F. Tefft and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Gela
Bezhuashvili signed in Tbilisi the Joint Document of U.S. and
Georgian Delegations on Georgia's Priority Needs to Improve
Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. Since that
time, the Government of Georgia has taken significant steps
to address the needs identified in that document and the
Government of the United States has secured commitments of
assistance from several U.S. and international donors to
assist Georgia in implementing those steps. In light of the
degradation of Georgia's capabilities to combat nuclear
smuggling caused by the events of August 2008, delegations of
the Governments of the United States of America and Georgia
have agreed to supplement the Joint Document with this
Addendum, which specifies additional and revised steps that
should be taken to restore and further improve Georgia's
capabilities.

PREVENTION

Securing Orphaned and other Dangerous Radioactive Sources

o Designate a ministry or agency with clear authority for
the management of disused radioactive sources.

o Complete the consolidation of sources that are
currently in temporary storage into the new interim storage
facility as soon as possible. (Georgian Ministry of
Environmental Protection and Natural Resources;
Andronikashvili Institute of Physics; U.S. Department of
Energy; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

o Establish a joint working group between the Customs
Control Department at the Revenue Service of the Georgian
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Georgia, and the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS)
at the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and
Natural Resources to develop procedures for responding to
radioactive material detections at the state border. As part
of this effort, this working group will define existing needs
at the border and present them to the U.S. side for
discussion.

DETECTION

Improved Border Security and Capabilities of Law Enforcement
Bodies

o Provide the MOIA, Patrol Police, Border Police, Customs
Service, and other agencies with which they interact,
reliable, robust, secure, and compatible communications
technology and infrastructure.

o Enhance the capability of the Georgian Coast Guard to
monitor Georgia's sea space. This may include:

- Additional patrol vessels;
- Portable radiation detection equipment;
- Communications equipment;
- Other equipment and infrastructure; and
- Training.

o Develop a plan for monitoring of Georgia's green
borders with aviation assets.

o Equip the Patrol Police and other relevant MOIA units
with radiation detection equipment and provide appropriate
training.

o Equip the Customs Service with appropriate radiation
detection equipment and provide related training.

o Establish a center to provide centralized repair,
maintenance, and calibration service for the radiation
detection equipment of all agencies.

RESPONSE

Prosecution and Nuclear Forensics

o Commit to follow the standards for responding to
incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive
material contained in the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series
Documents and other relevant international guidelines.

STATE 00032944 003 OF 003


Georgia may need additional equipment or training to carry
out some of these steps.

o Develop a written radiological and nuclear response
plan to codify implementation of these standards.

o Conduct regular exercises to ensure the effective
implementation of this plan.

o Participate in the Nuclear Forensic Workshop for the
Caucasus region sponsored by the International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC) and planned for December 2008.

International Cooperation and Information Sharing

o Participate actively in the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism. (MFA and other relevant Georgian agencies)

o Work with the governments of third countries to enhance
regional cooperation to facilitate investigation and
prosecution of illicit traffickers.

The delegations agreed that the Government of Georgia would
continue to work expeditiously to implement those steps in
the Joint Document of February 2, 2007, as well as the steps
enumerated above, that it is capable of carrying out on its
own, and where assistance is needed, the Government of the
United States of America would continue to seek to identify
sources, within either the U.S. government or the
international community, to provide such assistance.

End Cable
CLINTON