Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE322
2009-01-03 03:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA

Tags:  AORC IAEA ENRG NPT PREL KNNP TRGY KTIA 
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O 030347Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 4942
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 000322 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA ENRG NPT PREL KNNP TRGY KTIA
PARM, MNUC, PGOV
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 000322

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA ENRG NPT PREL KNNP TRGY KTIA
PARM, MNUC, PGOV
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL


1. This is an action request. Please see paragraphs
15-17.

--------------
Summary
--------------


2. Summary: On December 30, 2008, the President signed
the instrument of ratification for the Protocol
Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of
America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for
the Application of Safeguards in the United States of
America ("the Additional Protocol"). He did so to
bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards
and thus to strengthen the ability of the IAEA to detect
clandestine nuclear programs, and to promote the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a
cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security
policy. The United States will continue to encourage
all states which have not done so to bring into force
Additional Protocols of their own. END SUMMARY

--------------
Objectives
--------------


3. Objectives:

-- To highlight the President's ratification and entry
into force of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol;

-- To urge host governments that have not done so to
take the steps necessary to bring into force
comprehensive safeguards agreements required by the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

-- To urge host governments that have not done so to
take the steps necessary to bring into force an
Additional Protocol. End Objectives.

--------------
Background
--------------


4. Background: To help guard against the spread of
nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (the "NPT") mandates acceptance of
safeguards to be implemented by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) by the non-nuclear-weapon states
(NNWS) that are States Party. These IAEA safeguards
increase confidence and provide assurances that nuclear

materials and technologies are not diverted from
peaceful uses to weapons uses in non-nuclear-weapon
states and provide a basis for international responses
to nonproliferation violations. The IAEA safeguards
system plays an indispensable role in implementing the
NPT, and in curbing nuclear proliferation and reducing
the threat posed by nuclear terrorism.


5. The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon States Party to
accept Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in all
of their peaceful nuclear activities. The United
States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT, is
under no legal obligation to accept such safeguards.
However, beginning with the U.S. Voluntary Offer
Safeguards Agreement in 1977, it has been the policy of
the United States to permit the full application of
Agency safeguards, excluding only those facilities
associated with activities with direct national security
significance to the United States. By submitting itself
to the same safeguards on all of its civil nuclear
facilities to which non-nuclear-weapon States Party are
subject, the United States in 1967 intended to
demonstrate that adherence to the NPT would not place
other countries at a commercial disadvantage, either
because of increased costs associated with safeguards or
because of the risk of the compromise of proprietary
information. This offer was critical to gaining the
acceptance of the NPT by countries such as Germany and
Japan.

6. At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world
learned that Iraq had clandestinely pursued an advanced
program to develop nuclear weapons, despite the
application of IAEA safeguards. The international
community recognized that the Agency's safeguards system
needed to be strengthened in order to increase its

STATE 00000322 002 OF 004

SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA
ADDITIONAL PROTOC
capability to detect secret nuclear programs. The Model
Additional Protocol for strengthening nuclear safeguards
was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in 1997.
An Additional Protocol based on this Model amends an
existing safeguards agreement by requiring non-nuclear-
weapon states to provide, inter alia, broader
declarations to the Agency about their nuclear programs
and nuclear-related activities, and by expanding the
access rights of the Agency.

7. During the negotiations of the Model Protocol, many
non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT urged the
United States, as the strongest proponent, to accept its
provisions on a voluntary basis. Following the example
of its safeguards agreement, the United States stated
during the negotiations that it would accept the
provisions of the Model Protocol, subject to a National
Security Exclusion. The success in achieving a strong
Model Protocol was critically dependent on this U.S.
commitment. The U.S. signature of the Additional
Protocol was in turn a significant factor in the early
decision by many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the
Protocol.

8. The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol is a bilateral
treaty that supplements and amends IAEA verification
arrangements under the existing Agreement Between the
United States of America and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the
United States of America of November 18, 1977, which
entered into force on December 9, 1980. The United
States signed the Additional Protocol on June 12, 1998.
The President submitted it to the Senate on May 9, 2002;
the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification
on March 31, 2004; and the required implementing
legislation, i.e., United States Additional Protocol
Implementation Act (P.L. 109-401),became law on
December 18, 2006. The President issued Executive Order
13458 on February 4, 2008, and on December 30, 2008, the
President signed the instrument of ratification for the
Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United
States of America and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United
States of America ("The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol").


9. The United States has long called for universal
adoption of the Additional Protocol; notably, the
President did so in a speech at the National Defense
University on February 12, 2004. Washington would like
to use the occasion of the President's ratification of
the Additional Protocol to continue to encourage NPT
non-nuclear weapon states that have not yet done so to
bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and
Additional Protocols. (The U.S.-IAEA Additional
Protocol will enter into force on the date that the IAEA
receives written notification from the United States
that U.S. statutory and constitutional procedures for
entry into force have been met. The United States
expects to make this notification shortly.)


10. The following states have Additional Protocols in
force with the IAEA: Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China,
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,
Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Seychelles,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, and
Uzbekistan.


11. The following states have signed an Additional
Protocol with the IAEA, but not brought them into force:
Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Gabon, Honduras, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of
Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Malaysia,
Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia,
Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, and
Vietnam.


12. The following states have had their Additional
Protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors but

STATE 00000322 003 OF 004

SUBJECT: ANNOUNCING RATIFICATION OF THE U.S.-IAEA
ADDITIONAL PROTOC
have taken no further action: Algeria, Central African
Republic, Chad, Cte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Republic of Moldova, Swaziland, and Timor-Leste.


13. The following NPT States Party have taken no action
on an Additional Protocol: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Republic of Congo, Djibouti,
Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Kenya,
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia,
Maldives, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar,
Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe,
Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United
Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Republic of Yemen,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


14. Thirty non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Party to
the NPT have not yet brought into force a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required by the
NPT. Eleven of these NNWS have signed such agreements,
but not brought them into force: Andorra, Bahrain,
Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Gabon, Mauritania,
Montenegro, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Six
NNWS have had their comprehensive safeguards agreements
approved by the Board of Governors but have not yet
signed them and brought them into force: Central
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique,
Qatar, and Timor-Leste. Thirteen NNWS have not yet
submitted comprehensive safeguards agreements to the
Board of Governors for its consideration: Angola, Rep.
of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Kenya, Liberia, Micronesia, Rwanda, S?o Tom and
Principe, Somalia, and Vanuatu. End Background.

--------------
Action Requested
--------------


15. Posts are requested to bring the President's action
to the attention of appropriate host government
officials who are responsible for nuclear
nonproliferation and IAEA matters. Posts may draw upon
the background above, as appropriate.


16. UNVIE, GENEVA, and USUN NEW YORK may draw upon
these points as appropriate in meetings with
counterparts from other missions. All posts should
deliver points in paragraph 17 below.


17. Points for all posts:

-- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (the "NPT") requires non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material
in all of their peaceful nuclear activities.

-- The United States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party to
the NPT, is under no obligation to accept such
safeguards.

-- Nonetheless, for over forty years, the United States
has permitted the full application of IAEA safeguards,
except for those facilities and activities excluded for
national security reasons.

-- It has been the policy of the Bush Administration to
encourage all states which have not done so to bring
into force Additional Protocols of their own.

-- On December 30, 2008, President Bush signed the
instrument of ratification for the U.S.-IAEA Additional
Protocol, and the Protocol will enter into force when
the United States notifies the International Atomic
Energy Agency in writing that its statutory and
constitutional requirements for entry into force had
been met and that it is prepared to deposit its
instrument of ratification.

-- The President's ratification of this agreement
reinforces longstanding U.S. support for the IAEA in the
fight against nuclear proliferation.

-- Specifically, this Additional Protocol expands the
types of nuclear and nuclear-related locations and
activities the United States will declare and, by
permitting access to these locations and activities in

STATE 00000322 004 OF 004


-- The United States will continue to pursue the
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply within the
Nuclear Suppliers Group as the President called for in
February 2004.

--The United States stands ready to assist countries in
their ratification and implementation of the Additional
Protocol, with the goal of universal implementation of
the Protocol.

End points for all posts.


18. Minimize considered.
RICE