DEMARCHE REQUEST: PRESSING MOSCOW AND BEIJING ON

S E C R E T STATE 030123


C O R R E C T E D COPY - TEXT

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019
TAGS: UNSC PREL CM RU KNNP KN

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: PRESSING MOSCOW AND BEIJING ON
CONSEQUENCES OF A NORTH KOREAN LAUNCH

Classified By: EAP Acting A/S Alexander A. Arvizu, For Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request, see para 2.


2. (S/NF) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to press Russia
and China to support meaningful UN Security Council action in
response to a DPRK rocket launch, which North Korea has
announced will occur between April 4-8, 2009. Drawing on the
points in paras 3-4, posts should approach Chinese and Russian
Foreign Ministry officials at the highest possible level to
stress the importance of responding to a North Korean launch
via public messaging that condemns the launch, through private
diplomacy to discourage further North Korean provocations, and
by effective action in the United Nations:


3. (S/REL CHINA AND RUSSIA) Begin points on launch and
messaging responses.

-- The United States remains very concerned about North
Korea's announced plans to launch a Taepo-Dong 2 long range
missile between April 4-8, 2009.

-- This issue will undoubtedly be discussed between our
Presidents during their upcoming meetings in London.

-- We believe that the North Korean launch of a missile, even
if it is characterized as a space launch vehicle to place a
satellite in orbit, would violate United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, which requires that North
Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile
program and reinstate its missile launch moratorium.

-- We believe that we should respond quickly and send the
strongest possible message of disapproval at the United
Nations to respond to the violation of UNSCR 1718.

-- We want to work together with you closely on our UN
response in order to gain support in the P-5.
-- This is particularly important because you are also a
member of the Six-Party Talks.

-- We believe we should coordinate on our public messaging and
private diplomacy, and that we must be clear in condemning the
launch and warning North Korea against further provocative
action. In addition, we should work together to ensure that
there are appropriate consequences for North Korea for
engaging in activities related to its ballistic missile
program -- i.e., conducting a launch -- over the objections of
the international community.


4. (S/REL CHINA AND RUSSIA) Points related to UNSCR and UN
consequences:

-- As we have repeatedly made clear, any launch by the DPRK of
a long-range missile, such as a Taepo-Dong 2 (TD-2),would be
a provocative act and a violation of UNSCR 1718, even if the
DPRK characterizes it as a satellite launch. The equipment
and technology necessary to launch a satellite into orbit are
virtually identical to and interchangeable with the equipment
and technology necessary to launch a ballistic missile weapons
payload.

-- UNSCR 1718 requires North Korea to suspend all activities
related to its ballistic missile program, states that it
should re-establish its previous commitments to a moratorium
on missile launching, and requires the DPRK to abandon its
ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable, and
irreversible manner.

-- North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of
ballistic missiles, and missile-related materials, equipment,
and technologies pose a serious threat to the region and to
the international community.

-- Any launch of a rocket of this type would further the North
Korean ballistic missile development activities that UNCRS
1718 was intended to restrain, given the interchangeability of
the ballistic missile and SLV technology. UNSCR 1718's
requirement that the DPRK end all activity related to its
ballistic missile program was intended to deny any such
benefits to this program.

-- We are aware of the diplomatic outreach that the DPRK has
undertaken to characterize this launch as a peaceful attempt
to join the ranks of space-faring states. But we must view
the TD-2 system in the context in which it was developed: as a
military program designed to carry dangerous payloads over
great distances.

-- Condemnation by the Security Council of a North Korean
launch would by no means constitute an inappropriate
restriction on states' right to space exploration. The
restrictions of UNSCR 1718 apply only to the DPRK, in response
to its October 2006 nuclear test and the barrage of ballistic
missiles, including the TD-2 missile, it launched in July

2006.

-- It is important that we respond to any launch as a threat
to international security, and as a threat to the credibility
of the Security Council.
-- Furthermore, as permanent members of the Security Council,
we have an obligation to ensure that violations of Security
Council decisions are properly addressed.

-- It is for this reason that we believe the most appropriate
response is a new Security Council resolution condemning any
launch of a TD-2 missile or other rocket, no matter how the
DPRK chooses to characterize the launch.

-- We share the view held by many that we must not jeopardize
progress on denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks. North
Korea has threatened to pull back from the process if the UNSC
takes action, but as Permanent Members we cannot accept such
threats. In fact, we believe an appropriate response to North
Korea's launch at the UNSC is the best way to ensure that it
does not impede our ability to engage Pyongyang constructively
in the Six-Party Process.

-- We therefore do not propose the imposition of a new
sanctions regime on the DPRK at this time. The appropriate
response is to designate and take action against those North
Korean entities engaged in missile proliferation under the
existing UNSCR 1718 regime, and to revise the list of items,
materials, equipment, goods, and technology related to
ballistic missile programs in Security Council Document
S/2006/815 . The annex will include the following 11
entities, which already face sanctions under existing U.S.
law:

- Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation
- Tanchon Commercial Bank
- Korea Ryonbong General Corporation
- Hesong Trading Corporation
- Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation
- Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company
- Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation
- Korea Pugang Trading Corporation
- Korea Ryongwang Trading Corporation
- Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation
- Tosong Technology Trading Corporation

End Points for Beijing and Moscow.


5. (S/NF) Further details about the expanded annex for
enforcement of UNSCR 1718, including the 11 entities listed
above, are available from the Russia and China
desks. Please slug responses for EAP/K and ISN/RA.
CLINTON


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