HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MARCH 12 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 023176


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR MARCH 12 MEETING

REF: (A) STATE 7036 - January 29 HLTF Guidance Cable, (B)
USNATO 52 ? January 29 HLTF Reporting Cable, (C) HLTF-
A(2009)0002(INV) PROPOSED AGENDA FOR MAR 12


Classified by Donna Phelan, VCI/CCA Acting Office
Director, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) The March 12 High Level Task Force (HLTF)
meeting will take place on the heels of the NATO Foreign
Ministerial and Secretary Clinton's bilateral meeting
with FM Lavrov in Geneva. Discussion will center on a
CFE "stocktaking" exercise (called for by Turkey at the
January 29 HLTF) and preparations for the 60th
Anniversary Summit, specifically agreeing on themes for
the Alliance message on CFE to include in the
communique. Regarding the way ahead, we expect the
focus to be on how best to shape FM Steinmeier's
proposal for a June 10 senior-level seminar in Berlin on
conventional arms control. As the new administration
continues to review plans for addressing the CFE impasse
in the context of broader proposals on European
security, we will want to ensure that the format and
substance are well-prepared, so we can advance a unified
and constructive message.

Primary U.S. goals for the March 12 HLTF and related
meetings are to:

-- continue to emphasize that our priority remains to
sustain a unified NATO position and deliver a consistent
message on CFE that encourages Russia to engage
constructively on CFE;

-- support a solid and consistent message on CFE for the
upcoming NATO Summit in April;

-- encourage Allies to work toward consensus on how we
can best structure the Steinmeier-proposed senior-level
seminar to support the broader negotiating effort;

-- seek clarification from the Germans on the concepts
underlying the German paper and how these might differ
from the rationale behind the current Alliance approach,
e.g. on the flank; and

-- finalize the HLTF input for the draft report to the
SPC on "Raising NATO's Profile in the field of Arms
Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation." HLTF-N
(2009)0002-REV6 (INV).

CONTACTS and BILATERALS.


2. (C) Allies will be keen for a read out of Secretary
Clinton's March 6 meeting with FM Lavrov in Geneva as it
pertains to CFE. Most should already have a readout of
the briefing provided by EUR A/S Fried on March 9.

-- U.S. rep may indicate that CFE was briefly discussed
by Secretary Clinton and Minister Lavrov. Lavrov raised
the issue, citing the Russian view that the "parallel
actions" approach advanced in Moscow in October 2007 had
been a good basis for work, but that the U.S. had
stepped back from that approach in the period since.
The Secretary expressed U.S. readiness to work to
resolve the current impasse. The exchange on CFE was
brief, since the meeting encompassed the full range of
U.S.-Russia bi-lateral and multi-lateral issues.

CFE "STOCKTAKING"


3. (C) At the January 29 HLTF, Allies agreed to
Turkey's proposal ? aimed at stabilizing the current
approach on CFE during the U.S. transition by mitigating
the possibility of any Ally promoting alternative paths
in the near term ? to use the next HLTF as an
opportunity to engage in a CFE "stocktaking" discussion
(that is not/not intended to involve any papers or
written assessments). As appropriate, U.S. rep may draw
on the following to stress that the focus, for now,
should be for Allies to remain on-message in encouraging
Russia to engage on CFE:

-- The HLTF input for the draft report to the SPC
developed by the HLTF-Deputies since the last HLTF
provides a solid review of where we are on CFE and the
key events that led us to this point.

-- The Russians have identified CFE as an area on which
they would like to work with the new Administration to
find a way forward. The U.S. is committed to engaging
Russia on arms control. The Parallel Actions Package
remains on the table. The new team will need time to
organize, however, and the timeline of a next U.S.-
Russian discussion on CFE is not yet decided.

-- The main lines of NATO policy on CFE ? stressing our
commitment to the CFE regime and support for the
Parallel Actions Package as the way ahead ? remain
valid. At this point, our agreed aims would be served
best by maintaining a proactive approach that solidly
demonstrates NATO unity and does not risk complicating
the possibility of reaching agreement on the Parallel
Actions Package.

-- Allies should direct a clear message at Russia
stressing that resolving the CFE impasse depends on
Russia's willingness to engage seriously and
constructively on a way forward on CFE.

-- We agree with Allies that CFE is a critical element
of Europe's security architecture, a point that is
particularly significant in light of Russia's continued
diplomatic push for a new, yet still ambiguous, European
Security Treaty. This point was highlighted in the NATO
SYG's comments on NATO-Russia issues following the
Foreign Ministerial.

-- In the context of President Medvedev's European
Security Treaty proposal recently addressed by DFM
Grushko at the OSCE, Russia has clearly indicated that
in terms of disarmament and arms control Russia has no
intention of replacing the CFE Treaty (as well as the
Open Skies Treaty and Vienna Document 1999.) NATO
Allies should capitalize on this assurance by urging
Russia to follow up on this message through productive
engagement on CFE.

-- Part of our message should underscore that we agree
with Russia that arms control regimes play a key role in
strengthening European security and are confident that
existing mechanisms within the Euro-Atlantic security
system, when implemented fully, provide for a
comprehensive approach to security that benefits all of
us.

PREPARATIONS FOR NATO SUMMIT IN APRIL


4. (C) Allies indicated at the previous HLTF strong
support for including CFE language in the communique
that sends a message to Russia, and others, that NATO
continues to attach great importance to CFE. We agree
with Allies that the December Ministerial language is
appropriate and balanced, and should serve as the basis
for CFE language in April, barring any major
developments diplomatically or on the ground. At this
stage, U.S. rep should urge the I.S. to circulate
soonest a draft text which draws from the balanced
message of the Bucharest Summit and December Ministerial
communiques. Our aim should be to preserve the right
balance between positive themes: NATO's commitment to
CFE and readiness to work with Russia to solve the
current impasse and reiteration of basic positions of
principle regarding territorial integrity and host-
nation consent for the presence of military forces.

GERMAN SEMINAR ON THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE


5. (C) Germany assured Allies that there would be
several rounds of "negotiations and consultations" with
Allies to develop the goals and objectives for its June
10 seminar in Berlin on "The Future of Conventional Arms
Control in Europe." Germany initially shared with the
U.S. (and the UK and France) a paper of the same title
characterizing its concept and goals for this meeting.
The U.S. raised a number of concerns with some of the
more far-reaching aspects of this paper on the margins
of the January 29 HLTF, and Germany indicated a
willingness to discuss it at senior levels before
circulating. Instead, Germany distributed a paper,
which closely resembles its original form, via HLTF-
Deputies on March 5. The German Embassy in Washington
has stressed that we should view this document as a
vehicle for shaping the conference. The U.S. rep should
raise the following points on the margins and in the
HLTF, as appropriate, with the intent of shaping the
seminar and focusing its objectives:

-- Germany's proposal for a senior-level seminar on CFE
usefully focuses the need for priority attention to
conventional arms control. We will need to shape the
agenda for the meeting to support ongoing efforts on CFE
as well as broader discussions on European security.

-- NATO Allies will need to agree on a common objective
and goals for the meeting.

-- As we prepare for the seminar and form common goals,
we are interested in others' views on the current
approach on CFE, ideas for enhancing efforts and for how
best to shape this upcoming seminar.

-- We welcome discussion of the role of conventional
arms control in the current Euro-Atlantic security
environment as called for in the paper. As the new U.S.
administration has made clear on Russia's European
Security Treaty proposal, we are ready to talk about the
concerns and challenges to the current security
architecture, but we should not allow existing
principles or institutions to be undermined.

-- We are particularly interested in learning what
Germany's intended outcome for the seminar is
considering the ambitious agenda of the paper, and the
intended broad audience. What goals should the Alliance
have for the seminar? How does Germany intend to engage
in further discussions with Allies on shaping the
seminar to serve those goals? And what are German
intentions for moving forward with seminar planning as
far as distributing the paper more widely than the HLTF?

-- The German paper appears to suggest defining the
"scope and parameters" of future changes to the Adapted
Treaty. A decision to identify specific areas for
renegotiation of the Adapted Treaty would require
decisions at the highest levels of NATO governments. To
identify those areas where the Treaty would likely be
amended in advance of ratification of the Adapted Treaty
could seriously complicate prospects for ratification of
the current Adapted Treaty (as signed at Istanbul). We
would be interested in Allies' assessment on this point.

-- As we work on seminar planning, we need be careful in
characterizing the urgency of the current CFE situation.
We agree it is a priority issue that requires active
engagement. But the status of the Treaty will not
change materially, unless either Russia withdraws from
the regime, or NATO Allies stop implementing. The
Alliance has maintained a measured and balanced approach
successfully, and this deliberate process is one that
will continue to serve our goals best. We do not want
fears of imminent disaster to lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy.

-- Additionally, the notion that only Russia's concerns
are at the core of the "crisis" misleads the reader. It
takes no account of the damage done to CFE by Russia's
suspension, while suggesting that the current situation
is one-sided and that our current approach does not
address Russia's concerns. Neither is accurate as our
efforts have centered on a comprehensive approach that
addresses the concerns of all States Parties and not
just one.

--We would appreciate clarification of some of the
concepts behind the German paper, in particular the
division between "strategic" and "regional".

-- It appears that the greatest challenge to stability,
and thus to the strategic relationship, is no longer in
Central Europe but on the northern and southern flank.
Is the flank issue considered "regional" or "strategic?"

-- How does the German concept deal with the flank
regime, in particular, reciprocal restraint in the
numbers of deployed forces on both sides of Russian
northern and southern borders?

-- How does the German concept deal with the principle
of host nation consent to the presence of foreign
forces? Does the German approach assume a prior
resolution in this area in A/CFE?

-- How might new CSBMs contribute to preventing
misunderstanding or enhancing early warning of conflicts
such as occurred in Georgia?

-- How would new measures solve the problem of
potentially effective agreed measures, such as Vienna
Document and CFE inspections, which been refused in the
Caucasus for a variety of reasons?

"RAISING NATO'S PROFILE IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL,
DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION."


6. (C) Since the last HLTF, the HLTF Deputies have been
working on the HLTF input for the draft report to the
SPC on "Raising NATO's Profile in the field of Arms
Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation." The
document has undergone a number of revisions in an
effort to ensure its accuracy and to focus the paper
more coherently. The latest version (HLTF-N(2009)0002-
REV6 (INV)) which is based on a Chairman's proposal and
incorporates most of our input will be reviewed and
finalized at the HLTF. U.S. rep should seek agreement
on a final text based on the Chairman's proposal with
minimal edits as agreed by the I/A. U.S. rep should
also note we appreciate efforts to work the CFE portion
of this report and look forward to reviewing this
language in the context of the whole document.

DATE OF NEXT HLTF MEETING


7. (SBU) There will certainly be a need for at least one
HLTF following the April Summit and prior to the German
seminar in June. HLTF rep should support a meeting in
early May, noting that an additional meeting can be
scheduled if warranted.


CLINTON