MONTENEGRO AND NEXT STEPS ON NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 022056

SIPDIS
BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS MW
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO AND NEXT STEPS ON NATO

Classified By: Ambassador Roderick Moore, for Reasons 1.4(B,D)


1. (U) This message was drafted by AmEmbassy Podgorica.


2. (C) Summary: Even if MAP is unachievable, encouraging
gestures to Montenegro at the NATO Summit would advance our
objectives in the Balkans and beyond. Positive signals would
a) encourage pro-Western reformers throughout the region,
including in Serbia, b) parry increasing Russian
assertiveness in the region, c) keep Montenegro,s leadership
on a pro-NATO course, and d) reaffirm to the region, Europe,
and Russia that NATO,s door is still open. End Summary.

MONTENEGRO ) ON A POSITIVE TRAJECTORY
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3. (C) In the immediate term, Montenegro is the only
potentially viable candidate for MAP among the four
ex-Yugoslav countries (with Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo) outside
of MAP. Montenegro,s leadership is pursuing an aggressive
and unambiguous pro-NATO agenda, and it is the only non-MAP
Balkan state not facing intractable diplomatic or legal
challenges. Russia has not expressed qualms about
Montenegro,s NATO aspirations, and Montenegro is small
enough that it presents no significant institutional,
political, or military challenges. In February, a NATO team
gave Montenegro high marks on its PARP and IPAP assessments
in recognition of the country,s substantial progress on
defense, political, and economic reforms ) reforms in
significant part shaped and supported by the USG. In
addition, the GOM has made substantial progress on each of
the 11 NATO-related priority areas that the USG identified
last autumn as indicators of Montenegro,s readiness for
closer links with the Alliance.


4. (C) Despite relatively low levels of public support for
NATO in Montenegro, the GOM has assumed the political risks
of hewing to a strongly pro-NATO course. It is in USG
interest to encourage this sort of policy leadership
throughout the region. A failure by NATO to make a positive
gesture to Montenegro at the Summit could significantly
dampen GOM enthusiasm for taking the sort of risky political
moves it has recently taken at our urging (e.g, Kosovo
recognition, MANPAD destruction, Afghanistan infantry
deployment, Article 98, etc.).


5. (C) Some have argued that Montenegro is trying to move
too quickly toward MAP. In fact, Montenegro is already
moving at a slower pace than did the last country to be
invited into MAP ) Croatia in 2002. (Croatia progressed
from PFP to MAP in about 24 months. Montenegro has already
been in PFP for about 27 months).

STABILIZING SOUTH-CENTRAL EUROPE
--------------


6. (C) Integrating the remaining Balkan countries into NATO
(when they are ready) will help cement the permanent
stability that has eluded this region over the centuries.
However, behind Albania and Croatia (and Macedonia),there
are no others in the membership pipeline. Indeed, no country
has entered MAP in 7 years -- and only one (Croatia) since

1999. As a result, the credibility and, more importantly,
the carrot of NATO,s &open door8 mantra are under scrutiny
in the Balkans.


7. (C) Montenegrin progress toward NATO at the Summit would
send a strong signal to other ex-Yugoslav states that
positive behavior yields positive rewards. This signal would
be especially powerful in Serbia, given the interlocked
histories of the two countries.

PARRYING RUSSIA
--------------


8. (C) Signaling NATO,s interest in Montenegro at the
Summit would also help parry Russia,s renewed assertiveness
throughout the region. So far, Montenegro,s policies have
remained firmly pro-Western, despite sizeable Russian
investment earlier this decade. A strong gesture from NATO
would help ensure that the GOM does not drift away from its
pro-Western course.

REAFFIRMING THE REGATTA
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9. (C) In the next rounds of NATO and EU integration, some
Allies appear inclined to abandon the very successful and
powerfully motivating ®atta8 approach ) i.e., moving
countries ahead at the pace they set for themselves. Citing
Montenegro,s small size, some Allies argue that the
remaining Balkan countries (or at least Montenegro and
Serbia) should be coupled together on the path toward NATO.
However, holding back Montenegro) say, until Serbia sorts
out its ICTY and Kosovo issues, or Bosnia deals with
constitutional issues, or Kosovo obtains recognition by all
NATO members -- would undercut pro-NATO reformers here and
ultimately make Montenegro a less reliable partner and more
susceptible to Russian and nationalist inroads.

POSSIBLE SUMMIT OUTCOMES
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10. (C) An invitation to Montenegro to enter MAP in the
near future would probably require a determined USG push.
Some Allies have expressed reservations, but none has drawn
an indelible red line. If we determine that a MAP invitation
for Montenegro cannot be accomplished at the upcoming Summit
itself, the Alliance should consider other strongly
encouraging gestures to keep the GOM on its pro-Western
course and to limit the risks of the possible negative
ramifications discussed above. Possible outcomes at the
Summit could include:

-- A signal that Montenegro could join MAP later this year
(perhaps following an assessment of its IPAP/PARP progress at
an upcoming Ministerial)

-- A decision to send NAC Ambassadors to Montenegro to assess
Montenegro,s readiness for MAP;

-- A stand-alone reference to Montenegro (i.e., separate from
references to other non-MAP Western Balkan states) in the
Summit Communiqu congratulating Montenegro on its progress
and offering encouraging words about its prospects for MAP
and NATO integration

-- A decision to open a NATO Liaison Office in Podgorica
CLINTON