IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

S E C R E T STATE 016285

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2029
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SYR TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

CLASSIFIED BY: ISN - C. S. ELIOT KANG, ACTING FOR
REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraphs 6-9.

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SUMMARY
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2. (SBU) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director General (DG) ElBaradei released his latest
reports on the status of the IAEA's investigations into
Iran and Syria's nuclear programs on 19 February 2009.
Both reports conformed to expectations in describing the
absence of any meaningful steps by either country to
address the serious issues that exist with respect to
their nuclear programs.


3. (SBU) With respect to Iran, DG ElBaradei's
description of the dichotomy between the stalled
investigation and rapid pace of Iran's centrifuge
advances is stark. The report underscores the number of
outstanding issues that need to be clarified regarding
possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program.
The IAEA simply notes that it has "still not received a
positive reply from Iran" regarding its request for
access to relevant "information, documentation,
locations or individuals." Consequently, "the Agency
has not made any substantive progress on these issues."
Iran's failure to cooperate with the IAEA in this regard
suggests Iran continues to wish to hide the nature of
these activities.


4. (SBU) At the same time, the IAEA reported that, far
from having complied with its UNSC obligation to suspend
its uranium enrichment and heavy water-related
activities, Iran has continued to expand its activities
at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Arak Heavy
Water Research Reactor. Approximately 5,500 centrifuges
are operating, up from approximately 3,800 in November

2008. Of particular concern, the IAEA notes that since
February 2007, Iran has produced 1,010 kilograms of low
enriched uranium (LEU),a substantial increase over the
630 kilograms reported in November 2008. Approximately
1,300 kilograms of LEU would be sufficient for one
nuclear weapon if Iran decided to go that route.
Currently, this material remains under IAEA safeguards.
Nevertheless, the risk posed in an Iranian breakout
scenario, either from diversion of safeguarded nuclear
material or through the covert enrichment of undeclared
nuclear material, is higher than in the past. Morever,
Iran continues to deny the IAEA access to the Arak
reactor to conduct a Design Information Verification
inspection which would provide the IAEA assurances that
the construction of the reactor does not serve as a
pathway to divert nuclear material for weapons purposes.


5. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's report on Syria reinforces our
conclusion that Syria was engaged in a clandestine
effort to construct and operate a nuclear reactor at Al
Kibar. The report also helps to confirm that uranium
found via environmental samples collected at the site is
not naturally occurring, lending credence to the fact
that the facility in question was a reactor. Although
the report does not categorically dismiss Syria's
explanation that the uranium was from Israeli missiles
used in the attack on the reactor in September 2007, it
suggests that this explanation is highly unlikely.
Syria delivered an eleventh-hour letter on 17 February
2009 attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation
immediately before the report's release. The report
notes that the responses in the Syrian letter "were only
partial ... and did not address most of the questions
raised in the Agency's communications." Importantly,
the report also calls on Syria to allow access to other
locations and allow inspectors to take samples of the
debris removed from Al Kibar as soon as possible, noting
that these measures are "essential" for the IAEA to be
able complete its assessment.

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Action Requests
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6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS: Posts are
requested to convey U.S. views regarding the IAEA
reports to appropriate host governments. Posts should
underscore that these reports demonstrate that neither
Iran nor Syria have taken any meaningful steps to
cooperate with the IAEA in the past six months. Posts
should stress that Syria's refusal to do so only deepens
concerns regarding the nature of its clandestine nuclear
activities. With respect to Iran, Posts should
emphasize that while Iran has stalled the IAEA's
investigation and still refuses to provide the IAEA with
requested transparency, its centrifuge program continues
to make progress. The net result is that in neither
case can the international community have confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of these nuclear
programs. For Iran, the UN Security Council has imposed
a mandatory requirement that it suspend all
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate
fully with the IAEA. On Iran, we should stress that
with international rights, come responsibilities. Iran
needs to live up to those responsibilities. We believe
that Iran's continued failure to do so is another
opportunity lost.


7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS CONT: With
respect to the upcoming 2-6 March 2009 IAEA Board of
Governors' meeting, Posts should stress the need for the
following from host governments:

-- Strong national statements on Iran and call on Iran
to impement its international nuclear obligations
without delay. Statements should urge Iran to take
advantage of this critical opportunity for engagement by
addressing the concerns of the international community
and underscore the need for full transparency with the
IAEA (including Iran's implementation of the Additional
Protocol) and cooperation with the IAEA's investigation,
as well as suspension of all proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities;

-- Strong national statements on Syria and a demand that
Syria cooperate with the IAEA's investigation;

-- Strengthened statements on Iran and Syria from
regional or other groups, e.g., European Union, the
Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement, the
Group of Latin America and the Carribean; the Africa
Group, etc. To the extent possible, Posts should
encourage host goverments to instruct their delegations
not to accept statements from any group to which they
are a member that would downplay the factual reports of
the IAEA, or undercut the Agency's ability to obtain the
necessary information and access needed to resolve these
serious issues; and,

-- Board members should support, by vote if necessary,
releasing the Syria report to the public. This is
essential for the public to appreciate the serious
nature of Syria's failure to cooperate with the IAEA.
This report will also demonstrate the level of
transparency in IAEA affairs that we believe Syria
should manifest in its approach to the IAEA.


8. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR UNVIE: In addition to
conveying these messages to local IAEA Missions, UNVIE
should continue working to promote support within the
IAEA Secretariat and among IAEA Board Members for
continuing and expanding the investigation into both
Iran and Syria's nuclear activities and pressuring both
to cooperate with the respective investigations.
Mission is requested to place maximum effort into
securing strong national statements demanding Iranian
and Syrian cooperation with the IAEA by as many Board
members as possible, particularly those in the EU.
Mission should also work to support a P5+1 statement on
Iran. Mission's efforts to build support for such
statements should begin as soon as possible, and will be
facilitated by technical briefings on Iran and Syria's
nuclear efforts to Board members in Washington and
Vienna the week prior to the Board meeting. These
briefings will be provided by State and IC
nonproliferation experts. Mission is also requested to
ensure that the IAEA Director General's forthcoming
report on Syria is made public, including by laying the
groundwork for a vote in the Board if necessary. If
possible politically and statutorily, Mission should
seek the concurrent release of the November 2008 Syria
report, which was denied public release by NAM/Arab
intervention at the November 2008 Board meeting.
Mission should begin coordinating with likeminded Board
members at the earliest possible date.


9. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW,
BERLIN, AND BEIJING: In addition to conveying U.S.
views regarding the Iran and Syria reports, Posts should
stress that the United States believes that the Iran
report reinforces the need for a strong P5+1 statement
demanding Iran's immediate and full cooperation with the
IAEA. Discussions regarding specific texts will be
addressed in Vienna and Washington.

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POCS AND REPORTING DEADLINE
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10. (SBU) Mission is requested to report on the status
of its efforts in advance of the Board. Richard Nephew
(202-647-7680) and Matt Goldstein (202-647-4196) are the
Department's POCs for this issue.
CLINTON