US APPROACH TO 2010 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 STATE 126209

SENSITIVE SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP PARM ENRG PREL IAEA NPT MNUC KTBT
SUBJECT: US APPROACH TO 2010 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE

STATE 00126209 001.2 OF 009




1. (U) SUMMARY: This is an action request
(see para 11 below). As we reach the six-
month mark before the start of the May 2010
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference (NPT RevCon),posts are requested
to use all appropriate opportunities with host
government officials and in public diplomacy
fora to highlight the U.S. commitment to
strengthening the NPT and overall
nonproliferation regime. The year 2009 saw a
dramatic shift in U.S. nonproliferation and
arms control policy that reinforces our
efforts to encourage a constructive, balanced
review of the NPT next May. We hope that the
NPT RevCon will, in turn, give impetus to new
initiatives and on-going efforts that can
accelerate and broaden international
nonproliferation efforts in the ensuing years.


2. (U) Outreach to non-nuclear-weapon states
in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G-
77, which make up the largest segment of the
NPT membership, is particularly important. We
seek to underline to them and others that the
United States is fully committed to an
ambitious arms control and disarmament agenda
to achieve the peace and security of a world
without nuclear weapons, to the expansion of
cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy
(consistent with the NPT's nonproliferation
obligations),to effective verification by the
IAEA, to full compliance by all states with
the NPT's nonproliferation obligations, and to
the universalization of the NPT. We will work
to achieve a balanced review of the NPT at the
2010 RevCon, and urge others to join us in
this endeavor. END SUMMARY

CONTEXT
--------------


3. (U) The year 2009 marked a dramatic shift
in U.S. nonproliferation policy. This shift
began with President Obama's April 5 speech in
Prague, in which he stated that the United
States seeks the peace and security of a world
without nuclear weapons and, toward this end,
is working to strengthen the NPT as the basis
for international cooperation on nuclear
nonproliferation. Among other major impacts
on the global nonproliferation and disarmament
discussion, the speech helped spur the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to
adopt a program of work for the first time in
12 years. That program of work included
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty (FMCT),an important element in the
President's nonproliferation agenda. The July
6 U.S.-Russia Summit in Moscow reaffirmed the
commitment of the United States and Russia to
seek to finish a START follow-on agreement.


4. (U) Alongside the UN General Assembly this
fall, President Obama chaired an historic UN
Security Council Summit on Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Disarmament; the Council
Summit unanimously adopted UN Security Council
Resolution 1887, which endorsed a broad
framework of actions to reduce global nuclear
dangers including specific steps to strengthen
the NPT and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Secretary Clinton led U.S.
participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Article XIV Conference
on facilitating entry into force of the
treaty, the first time that the United States
had attended in ten years. The UNGA First
(Disarmament) Committee in October 2009
provided a forum in which the U.S. again
demonstrated its commitment to increased
multilateral engagement on nonproliferation
and disarmament issues, reducing the number of
its negative votes from 23 to 10, and in no
case voting "no" in isolation.


5. (U) Looking forward, the United States will
continue to work with other CD members to try

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to implement the 2009 program of work and
begin FMCT negotiations promptly when the CD
convenes on January 18. Washington expects to
complete its Nuclear Posture Review early in

2010. The Nuclear Security Summit in
Washington on April 12-13, 2010 will provide a
forum for countries to come to a common
understanding of the threat posed by nuclear
terrorism and to recognize that nuclear
material, whether in civilian or military use,
should not be vulnerable to that threat.


6. (U) The United States also is engaged in
an ongoing process of intensive work with the
defense, intelligence, and scientific
communities to prepare the ground to seek the
advice and consent of the Senate to the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
we also are working with friends and allies to
encourage other countries to ratify the CTBT
and allow it to enter into force. Finally,
the NPT RevCon itself will be an opportunity
for the United States and the other NPT
parties to reaffirm their commitment to the
Treaty and its principles, and to agree on
measures that can be taken to improve
implementation of the Treaty and strengthen
the global nonproliferation regime.

NPT BACKGROUND
--------------


7. (U) The NPT, with nearly 190 States Party,
is a key element in the global
nonproliferation regime. From May 3-28, 2010,
NPT Parties will meet at the United Nations in
New York for the 2010 NPT Review Conference
(RevCon). The Treaty provides for a
conference of the Parties every five years "to
review the operation of this Treaty with a
view to assuring that the purposes of the
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are
being realized." The Treaty text (which is
less than 2300 words) can be found at
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm.


8. (U) The 2010 RevCon convenes at a time of
great challenge to the NPT and the broader
nonproliferation regime. Although the basic
bargain of the Treaty remains sound and
relevant, the regime is challenged, among
other things, by the failure of a handful of
NPT Parties - most notably, Iran and the DPRK
prior to its announcement of its intention to
withdraw from the NPT - to comply with their
NPT nonproliferation and IAEA safeguards
obligations; the growing commercial
availability of sensitive nuclear technology;
and weaknesses in the IAEA verification
system.


9. (U) The RevCon is a key opportunity to
address these challenges, and we would like it
to reaffirm the Parties' commitment to the
Treaty and to agree on actions to strengthen
its implementation. We seek a balanced RevCon
that strengthens all three NPT pillars -
nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful
uses. A successful RevCon will not only
revitalize the Treaty, but also contribute
valuable momentum to our collective efforts in
Vienna at the IAEA, in New York at the UN, in
Geneva at the CD, in capitals, and elsewhere
to deal with challenges to the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. Specific U.S.
objectives are detailed in the talking points
in para 12 below.


10. (SBU) Through the use of these points, we
seek to:

-- Reach out to NAM and G-77 states that are
NPT parties, emphasizing our common interests
in an effective nuclear nonproliferation
regime and seeking their constructive
participation and full engagement in order to
achieve RevCon decisions and outcomes to
strengthen that regime;

-- Demonstrate the U.S. commitment to its
disarmament obligations under Article VI of
the Treaty by highlighting our actions in
undertaking START follow-on negotiations,

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pursuing a verifiable FMCT in the Conference
on Disarmament, and working toward U.S.
ratification of the CTBT;

-- Describe active U.S. efforts to support a
strengthened NPT in other ways, including by
providing greater resources for the IAEA and
strengthening its safeguards system; working
with others to promote cooperation on peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, consistent with the
NPT's nonproliferation obligations; and
working with others to deter abuse of the
Treaty's withdrawal provision, such as by
Parties that violate the NPT prior to
withdrawal.

-- Highlight U.S. leadership in funding and
promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the
pillar of most interest to many NPT member
states in the NAM and G/77; and

-- Avoid allowing the NPT to be overshadowed
by Middle East nuclear issues. The
determination of Egypt and other Arab Parties
to single out Israel for criticism of its
nuclear program, while largely ignoring the
Iran threat, is so strong that it could divert
attention from our core NPT objectives, which
include increasing NPT compliance,
strengthening the IAEA, and preventing abuse
of the Treaty's withdrawal provisions.

ACTION REQUEST


11. (U) Posts are requested to seek
appropriate opportunities to draw on the
points in para 12 below for use with host
governments and in public diplomacy fora.
Another cable containing more detailed points
on U.S. activities in support of IAEA
technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy is forthcoming. In the coming
weeks, the Department will make the talking
points below available in the other official
UN languages (Arabic, Chinese Mandarin,
French, Russian, and Spanish).

The point of contact for questions and
reporting of host country reactions to these
points is:

William Menold
ISN/MNSA (202)647-7662
menoldwi@state.gov


12. (U) Begin Text of Talking Points:

--------------
General:
--------------

-- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of
the international nonproliferation regime, and
the essential foundation for progress towards
nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-- The NPT entered into force in 1970 for a
duration of 25 years, with provisions for a
review conference (RevCon) every five years.
At the 1995 RevCon, the Parties decided to
extend the Treaty indefinitely.

-- The basic bargain of the NPT is sound:
Countries with nuclear weapons will move
towards disarmament, countries without nuclear
weapons will not acquire them, and all
countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.

-- Although this bargain remains sound and
relevant, the global nonproliferation regime
is under great stress, challenged by the
growing commercial availability of sensitive
nuclear technology, gaps in the IAEA
verification system and detection, and the
failure of a handful of states to comply fully
with their NPT and IAEA safeguards
obligations.

-- The challenges to the regime never have
been greater, but neither have been the
opportunities to address them. The May 2010

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NPT RevCon is a significant opportunity to do
so.

-- The United States would like the 2010
RevCon to reaffirm the Parties' commitment to
the Treaty and its core principles, and to
agree on actions that they can take to
strengthen its implementation.

-- It is especially important that Parties
avoid allowing their differences to overshadow
their vital common interest in a strong Treaty
and regime.

-- As President Obama said in his statement to
the third NPT PrepCom in May, "we must define
ourselves not by our differences, but by our
readiness to pursue dialogue and hard work to
ensure the NPT continues to make an enduring
contribution to international peace and
security."

-- The United States believes that it is very
important that NPT Parties work together to
prevent proliferation, including by ensuring
that there are consequences for violating the
Treaty.

-- All Parties, including non-nuclear-weapon
states, have a responsibility to strengthen
the Treaty system, including by preventing
further proliferation, helping to foster
regional security in order to reduce
proliferation pressures, securing nuclear
materials against theft or other illicit use,
contributing constructively to multilateral
disarmament negotiations, e.g., FMCT, and
working collectively to enforce compliance
with the Treaty.

-- The President's ambitious disarmament
agenda - including negotiating a follow-on
agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty, negotiating a verifiable Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty, and ratifying the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty -
demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the
Treaty's Article VI (on disarmament) and to
the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

-- We fully support the right, reflected in
the NPT, of all Parties to develop the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, consistent
with the Treaty's nonproliferation
obligations. We believe that Parties should
agree to support measures to facilitate access
to nuclear energy without increasing the risks
of proliferation.

--------------
Nonproliferation:
--------------

Strengthening NPT Compliance
--------------

-- It is essential that all Parties fully
comply with the Treaty's provisions.
Otherwise, the confidence necessary for
Parties to take measures to strengthen the NPT
further will be eroded, with dire consequences
for the maintenance of international peace and
security.

-- President Obama stated in his April 2009
Prague speech that there must be "real and
immediate consequences for countries caught
breaking the rules."

-- Unfortunately, we know that some Parties -
including Iran and North Korea - have broken
the Treaty's rules. NPT Parties that violate
their Treaty obligations must come back into
compliance.

-- The United States believes that NPT Parties
should agree on the importance of enforcing
compliance with the NPT's nonproliferation
obligations, and of taking actions to ensure
that Treaty violators face consequences for
their violations.

Abuse of NPT Withdrawal Provision (Art. X)

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--------------

-- The United States and other NPT Parties
have raised concerns about abuse of the
Treaty's withdrawal provision to pursue
nuclear weapons programs prohibited by the
Treaty.

-- The importance of this issue was reflected
in its inclusion in UN Security Council
Resolution 1887, which was adopted unanimously
by the UN Security Council Summit on Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Disarmament chaired by
President Obama on September 24, 2009 on the
margins of this year's UN General Assembly.

-- In UNSCR 1887, the Council undertakes to
address any State's notice of withdrawal from
the NPT, and affirms that a State remains
responsible under international law for
violations of the NPT committed prior to its
withdrawal.

-- We fully recognize that the Treaty
enshrines in Article X the sovereign right to
withdraw from the Treaty if a State Party
decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of the Treaty have
jeopardized its supreme national interests.

-- The United States fully supports that
provision.

-- We want to be clear that we have no
intention to seek to amend the Treaty.

-- However, Parties to the NPT have every
right to consider the ramifications for their
individual and collective security of such a
withdrawal, including cases in which a state
has breached its Treaty obligations prior to
withdrawal and continues to benefit from
technology acquired while it was a party.

-- We strongly believe that NPT Parties should
come together to develop effective mechanisms
to dissuade both the violations and any
subsequent withdrawal, and to ensure that
materials and equipment previously provided in
accordance with peaceful use obligations are
not used to develop nuclear weapons.

Supporting the IAEA
--------------

-- We are committed to ensuring that the IAEA
has the resources that it needs to accomplish
its mission. Parties must work together to
strengthen the Agency's safeguards system,
which is the Treaty's major tool for verifying
compliance with the NPT's peaceful use
undertakings and that peaceful nuclear energy
programs are not diverted to nuclear weapons.

-- The IAEA's vital mission is expanding
faster than its resources, and its safeguards
responsibilities now require it to gather and
assess a wide range of information to detect
not only diversion of declared nuclear
material, but also the presence of any
undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Safeguards Agreements and the Additional
Protocol
--------------

-- In addition, the IAEA cannot do its job
without the necessary legal authorities. We
urge all NPT Parties that have not yet brought
into force the "comprehensive" safeguards
agreement required by Article III of the NPT
to do so as soon as possible.

-- As the IAEA's experiences in Iraq
demonstrated, and as we see in other cases
today, comprehensive safeguards agreements
alone are not sufficient to detect undeclared
nuclear material and activities.

-- With that in mind, the IAEA and its Member
States have adopted the Additional Safeguards
Protocol. The Protocol is an essential
element of the nonproliferation regime.

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-- It is critical that all Parties work
together to make the Protocol universal. We
urge all states that have not yet done so to
negotiate and bring into force an Additional
Protocol as soon as possible.

-- The U.S. Protocol entered into force on
January 6, 2009, and we are in the process of
implementing its provisions.

Middle East
--------------

-- The United States continues to fully
support a Middle East free of all weapons of
mass destruction and the means of their
delivery.

-- Indeed, we fully support all of the
objectives of the Resolution on the Middle
East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference
(which includes a call for a Middle East WMD
free zone),and will continue to work with all
states, within and outside the region, towards
implementing the Resolution's objectives at
the earliest possible date.

-- We believe that a Middle East free of all
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems is an achievable goal, but it will not
happen overnight, or without a concerted
effort by the international community to make
it a reality.

-- However, we recognize that such goals can
be achieved only in the context of progress
towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle
East, and evidence that Iran and Syria are
fully implementing and upholding the existing
international agreements to which they are
parties.

-- The United States urges all states to take
practical and concrete steps, in a
constructive and collaborative manner, to
remove the obstacles to achieving this goal.

-- The United States long has supported
universal adherence to the Treaty. We
continue to urge all non-parties to join the
Treaty and to accept full-scope safeguards by
the International Atomic Energy Agency, as
required by the Treaty.

Nuclear Security
--------------

-- The possibility that terrorists might
acquire a nuclear weapon is the most immediate
and extreme threat to global security.
Consequently, the challenge of accounting for
and physically securing nuclear materials and
facilities has become an even higher priority
for the international community.

-- The United States will seek support from
others to implement President Obama's proposal
for a new international effort to secure all
vulnerable nuclear material around the world.
As part of this effort, we will host a Global
Summit on Nuclear Security next April.

-- We seek to elevate this issue on the
international agenda and set new standards,
expand our cooperation with Russia, and pursue
new partnerships to lock down these sensitive
materials.

--------------
Disarmament:
--------------

-- President Obama has committed the United
States to take concrete steps towards a world
without nuclear weapons, the goal envisioned
under the NPT's Article VI provision, which
states: "Each of the parties to the Treaty
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament

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under strict and effective international
control."

-- To this end, the United States is
negotiating a START follow-on agreement with
the Russian Federation; is pursuing
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty; and has pledged its support for
negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament
end to verifiably end the production of
fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

-- We urge other states to identify and
implement practical steps that they might take
to support their Article VI obligations.

START
--------------

-- The President said in Prague that: "We
will seek a new agreement [to replace the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] by the end of
the year that is legally binding and
sufficiently bold~ This will set the stage
for further cuts, and we will seek to include
all nuclear weapon states in this endeavor."

-- In Moscow on July 6, 2009, President Obama
and Russian President Medvedev signed a Joint
Understanding setting forth key elements of a
follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START).

-- The United States and Russia have been
intensively negotiating the new treaty as
Presidents Obama and Medvedev stated when they
met in Singapore in early November.

-- This agreement will lay a foundation and
set the stage for deeper nuclear reductions in
the future.

CTBT
--------------

-- The permanent and legally binding cessation
of all nuclear weapon test explosions
constitutes another meaningful step towards
nuclear disarmament, and long has been a goal
of NPT Parties.

-- President Obama confirmed in Prague that
the United States will pursue U.S.
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT). We have commissioned a
study by the National Academy of Sciences that
addresses the technical advances that have
occurred during the ten years since the United
States Senate declined to give its advice and
consent to the CTBT in 1999. We continue to
consult with the scientific, defense, and
intelligence communities to address relevant
issues related to reconsideration of the CTBT
by our Senate. We also will launch - and
encourage your support for - a diplomatic
effort to bring on board the other states
whose ratifications are required for the
treaty to enter into force.

-- Pending the entry into force of the CTBT,
the United States reaffirms its moratorium on
nuclear testing, and calls on other states to
do likewise.

FMCT
--------------

-- The United States is seeking a new treaty
that verifiably ends the production of fissile
materials intended for use in nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices - a Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty - which is another
long-standing international objective.

-- Following the President's Prague speech,
for the first time since 1998, the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva reached
consensus in May 2009 on a program of work
that included negotiations on an FMCT.
Although procedural objections by one CD
member state precluded the start of such
negotiations in 2009, the United States is

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working with members of the CD to try to
ensure that negotiations can begin when the CD
convenes for its 2010 session on January 18.

-- Pending the successful negotiation and
entry into force of an FMCT, the United States
reaffirms its decades-long unilateral
moratorium on the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons, and calls on
others that have yet to do so to join us.

U.S. Nuclear Reductions
--------------

-- The United States continues to make
extraordinary progress in reducing its
stockpile of nuclear weapons, strategic
delivery systems, fissile materials for
weapons, and the associated nuclear weapons
infrastructure.

-- We have dismantled more than 13,000
warheads since 1988. Under current plans, the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile by 2012 will be
less than 25 per cent of its 1991 total, and
at its lowest level since the 1950s.

-- The United States has reduced the number of
operationally-deployed nuclear weapons from
approximately 10,000 in 1991 to approximately
2,250 as of December 31, 2008.

-- The United Stated has dismantled more than
3,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, removed
all such weapons from surface ships and
aircraft, and reduced their deployment in
support of NATO in Europe by 90 percent from
the peak of the Cold War.

-- To date, the United States has declared 374
tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 61.5
tons of plutonium (Pu) excess to nuclear
weapons needs and removed that material from
the weapons inventory - enough material, based
on the IAEA definition of significant
quantities of nuclear materials, to produce
more than 20,000 nuclear weapons.

ONLY If asked about the Nuclear Posture Review
-------------- -

-- The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is
authorized by the U.S. Congress periodically.
It will analyze the role of nuclear weapons in
our national security strategy, the size and
composition of nuclear forces necessary to
support that strategy, and the steps necessary
to maintain a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrence posture for the next 5-10
years.

--------------
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy:
--------------

-- The U.S. strongly supports the NPT's
Article IV provisions affirming "the
inalienable right of all the parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with
Articles I and II~" and that "All the parties
to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and
have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy...."

-- Peaceful uses of nuclear energy include
programs that apply nuclear science and
technology to advance human and economic
development needs, including: food safety,
nutrition, disease prevention, medical
diagnostic and therapeutic capacities, and
water resource management.

-- The United States is the largest
contributor to the IAEA's peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and technical cooperation
programs. We continue to explore possible
areas in which we can expand and deepen our
support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in
ways that can benefit the most vulnerable,

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particularly in the areas of cancer diagnosis
and treatment, disease prevention, and potable
water and food security.

-- The President's commitment to ongoing
support of peaceful uses is reflected in the
continuation of our long-held status as the
leading funder of peaceful uses programs in
the IAEA.

-- Peaceful uses also include efforts to
promote nuclear power and enhance the safe use
and handling of nuclear material.

-- If deployed with the highest possible
standards of safety, security, and
nonproliferation, nuclear energy will play an
essential role in combating climate change,
while advancing peace and promoting
sustainable development worldwide.

-- The need for a new framework is ever
growing, as more and more countries express
interest in new civil nuclear power programs.
At last count, more than 60 states had
expressed some level of interest in
introducing civil nuclear power into their
energy mix.

-- These "nuclear newcomers" will be faced
with many challenges in establishing the
robust infrastructures necessary for the safe,
secure, and safeguarded deployment of nuclear
energy and its applications.

-- In response to the growing interest in
civil nuclear power, advanced nuclear states
rapidly are expanding infrastructure
development programs with newcomer states.

-- For example, the United States and others
are providing assistance with the development
of necessary legal infrastructure to ensure
that civilian uses of nuclear technology will
be properly regulated, and will incorporate
the highest international safety and security
standards.

-- Worldwide expansion of nuclear power must
not be accompanied by a dramatically increased
threat of nuclear proliferation.

-- Any successful, broadly supported approach
must assure countries expanding or embarking
on nuclear power programs that they will have
reliable access to peaceful nuclear
technologies and fuel services and - at the
same time - must serve the international
community's collective security interest in
avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons
production capabilities.

-- In his Prague speech, President Obama
declared: "We should build a new framework
for civil nuclear cooperation, including an
international fuel bank, so that countries can
access peaceful power without increasing the
risks of proliferation. That must be the
right of every nation that renounces nuclear
weapons, especially developing countries
embarking on peaceful programs."

-- We are working with the IAEA and others to
pursue these goals and concepts, such as
international fuel cycle centers (as proposed
by Russia),and reliable fuel supply
assurances.

-- Over time, these arrangements can be
broadened to include not only fuel banks, but
international enrichment centers, fuel
fabrication cooperation, fuel-leasing
approaches, and spent fuel take-back and
management schemes.

END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS.
CLINTON