CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE FOR

UNCLAS STATE 012311

SIPDIS
THE HAGUE FOR THE CWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: JA KTIA MARR PARM CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): GUIDANCE FOR
GOVERNMENT EXPERTS MEETING TO CONSIDER SCIENTIFIC
ADVISORY BOARD REPORT TO THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE

REF: A. NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT S/723/2008
DATED 15 DECEMBER 2008.

B. NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RC-2/DG.1 DATED 28
FEBRUARY 2008.

C. NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RC-2/DG.1/CORR.1
DATED 5 MARCH 2008.



1. Guidance in paragraphs 6-8.

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Overview
--------------


2. This cable provides information and guidance to the U.S.
delegation for use during 11-13 February 2009 meeting of
government experts to consider the report submitted by the
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to the Second Review
Conference. The meeting,s objective is to consider the
report,s suggestions and recommendations and prepare a
report for submission to the Executive Council. The outcome
of the meeting should be a lucid, objective report that
provides recommendation to the Council for future SAB efforts
and associated Secretariat support.


3. Ref A announced the meeting and called on States Parties
to nominate government experts to attend the meeting. The
U.S. plans to send Richard D,Andrea (DOS),Thomas Cataldo
(DOD),and Larry Denyer (DOC). Armando Alcaraz (LLNL) will
also attend as an advisor. Refs B and C provide the
Director-General,s assessment of the issues covered by the
SAB in its report and Ref B includes the subject report.


4. The SAB report provides a thorough assessment of advances
in science and technology and their implications for the CWC.
In general, the report a) characterizes broad trends with
implications for the CWC, b) reports on specific issues, many
of which were reviewed at the request of the
Director-General, and restates recommendations made; and c)
reports on ongoing developments and identified needs in
verification technology, international cooperation and
assistance, and public outreach.


5. The SAB report and the Director-General,s assessment are
divided into six main topics: (1) Advances in science and
technology, (2) Schedules of chemicals, (3) Verification, (4)

Destruction of chemical weapons, (5) Assistance and
Protection against the effects of chemical weapons, and
international cooperation, and (6) Education and outreach in
the context of the Convention. The previous meeting to
discuss the SAB report to the First Review Conference was
unproductive due largely to an overly broad agenda and a
dearth of genuine experts. This three day meeting to discuss
these wide ranging topics is fraught with opportunities for
technical and political mischief making. The difficulty will
be in keeping the meeting focused on providing direction for
future SAB deliberations of meaningful and practical issues
and avoiding technical and political dead ends.

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Guidance
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6. Delegation should endeavor to keep the meeting focused on
the agenda and promote U.S. positions such that the meeting
report reflects U.S. views for future SAB efforts on
meaningful and practical issues.


A. Specifically, the SAB should further assess:
- the convergence of chemistry and biology to determine
near-and medium-term implications for the CWC,
- whether saxitoxin should be moved to Schedule 2A,
-methods for the analysis of toxins, and
-advances in science and technology that provide for enhanced
protection from chemical weapons and international
cooperation and assistance.


B. Additionally, the SAB should monitor:
- developments in the discovery of new chemicals in the
chemical industry,
- developments in chemical production technology,
- the combination of nanotechnology and particle delivery
technologies,
- advances in analytical methods such as liquid
chromatography ) mass spectrophotometry,
- developments in new detection technologies, and
- developments in education and outreach especially those
coming out of collaborative efforts between the OPCW and
professional and trade organizations.


C. Del should avoid:
- discussion of chemical weapons destruction deadlines,
- debate on the relevance of the term &nonproliferation8 as
it applies to the CWC,
- using the term, non-lethal weapons, when discussing
incapacitants or toxic chemicals for law-enforcement,
- any discussion related to the recent disclosure of
Non-traditional Agents (NTA) information,
-debate on adding a new class of chemical weapons to the
schedules, and
- any topics not directly associated with the agenda.


D. Del should oppose the notion of establishing a standing
group of government experts to review SAB recommendations.
Del should draw on overview and the more detailed analysis
below regarding U.S. views during discussions with the other
government experts and the Technical Secretariat.


7. U.S. Objective. The U.S. objective for this meeting is a
lucid, objective report that provides recommendations to the
Council for future SAB efforts and associated Secretariat
support focused on the assessment and monitoring topics
above. However, Del should oppose completion of a report
that contains problematic text, and may propose or support a
proposal that such a report not be finalized.


8. The Del should report results of the discussions by cable
to Washington. Notify Washington immediately if the NTA
disclosure is raised.

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Analysis
--------------


9. This section summarizes the report,s suggestions and
recommendations and outlines a U.S. position or a way forward
for each topic that may be discussed.


A. Advances in Science and Technology
(1) Convergence of chemistry and biology. The report
mentions, but does not elaborate in any detail on the
convergence of chemistry and biology in the post-genomic era
along with the emerging ability to replicate life processes.
This convergence reinforces the overlap between the CWC and
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as does the
increasing number of toxins and potentially toxic
bioregulators being characterized. The DG is of the view
that this matter warrants further study and that additional
advice might be sought from the SAB, from States Parties that
have assessed these developments, and from stakeholders in
industry and academia; and such additional advice might be
considered by the policy-making organs in due course.
(2) Accelerated discovery of chemicals. The report notes
that biologically active molecules are being discovered and
characterized at an unprecedented rate, however, weaponizing
a new toxic compound would require a major offensive program
which somewhat mitigates the risk. The U.S. agrees and the
SAB should continue to monitor this topic.
(3) Nanotechnology. Legitimate, non-offensive work in the
expanding field of nanotechnology and particle engineering
offer opportunities to develop defensive measures against
chemical weapons. However, a number of important and useful
advances could potentially be misused for chemical weapons
(CW) purposes (see paragraph (4) below). This underscores
the importance of strict adherence to the general purpose
criterion (Article I),and the need for effective national
implementation measures that complement the CWC to help
ensure that chemicals, enabling technologies and materials
that have a CW proliferation potential are sufficiently
regulated.
(4) Technology for delivery systems. Many of the
considerations that promote the design of particles for the
effective and targeted delivery of drugs via the respiratory
system would be applicable to the dissemination of a CW
aerosol. The spray-drying equipment needed to create such
particles is widely available, although the optimization of a
well-engineered particle requires expertise and considerable
effort. The combination of nanotechnology and particle
delivery technologies could be misused for CW purposes and
developments warrant continued monitoring by the SAB.
(5) Production technologies. The SAB points out that new
production technologies such as use of microreactors, and
multipurpose production equipment could make CW production
more efficient and/or mask currently known signatures
indicative of CW production. However, the report also notes
that microreactors are not yet widely used in industry, and
they are being integrated into industrial-scale production
more slowly than some had predicted. As production
technologies change and the number of potential CW agents
increases, verification at other chemical production
facilities (OCPF) and the frequency of inspections becomes
more important. This regime needs to evolve further in terms
of the number of inspections conducted, the selection of OCPF
plant sites, and how inspection objectives are determined
with regard to unscheduled chemicals in order to ensure
compliance and that such sites are not being used for
purposes prohibited under the CWC. The U.S. strongly
supports increased OCPF inspections and improved OCPF site
selection methods, however, consideration of how inspection
aims are determined requires further elaboration and then
would require careful consideration in Washington.
Developments in chemical production technologies are an
important topic that the SAB and the Technical Secretariat
should closely monitor (&watching brief8) as developments
warrant.


B. Schedules of Chemicals
(1) Captive use of Schedule 1 chemicals. The SAB sees no
need for adjustments to Schedule 1 to accommodate captive use
issues. The U.S. considers this issue to have been fully
addressed by previous Conference decisions and sees no need
for further discussion.
(2) Salts of scheduled chemicals. The SAB reiterates its
view that &from the standpoint of the end user, there is no
essential difference between the free base and the
corresponding salt,8 and acknowledges that States Parties
have disagreed with its recommendations that all salts of
scheduled chemicals be treated in the same way as their
corresponding bases. The U.S. position is that only salts of
scheduled chemicals specifically listed in the Schedules of
Chemicals are currently covered. The schedules would need to
be revised if the salts were to be included. Furthermore,
the current U.S. position is that it is not particularly
useful to modify the schedules given the potential problems
that could be raised with regard to incapacitants or NTA.
(3) Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) Registry Numbers. The
SAB view is that CAS numbers are useful in the identification
of chemical compounds; however, this usefulness should not
lead to the assumption that they should have any regulatory
power within the context of the Convention. The SAB suggests
that it would be helpful, if the OPCW Declaration Handbook
were to provide references to the various CAS numbers that
are related to an entry in the schedules such as for
different isomers of a scheduled chemical. The U.S., for CWC
purposes, treats CAS numbers listed in the schedules as
having regulatory effect. While the listing of &related8
CAS numbers in the OPCW Declaration Handbook may be helpful
the U.S. recognizes that CAS numbers do not necessarily have
a one-to-one relationship with chemical structures.
(4) The SAB raises saxitoxin as an example of both the salt
and CAS number questions pointing out that the CAS number in
the CWC refers to the saxitoxin base while the CW agent of
concern was the hydrochloride salt. The SAB also notes past
discussions of whether Schedule 1 or Schedule 2A would be
more appropriate for saxitoxin, makes no recommendations, and
agreed to take the matter up at a future Session. The U.S.
agrees.
(5) Ricin. Ricin has multiple molecular forms and multiple
CAS numbers. The Director-General asked the SAB to consider
what, within the meaning of the Convention, constitutes
ricin. The SAB proposed that ricin requires the &native8
bipartite molecular structure, A-S-S-B, necessary for
mammalian toxicity, be present. Once the inter-chain S-S
bond is broken or the protein denatured, it is no longer
ricin. The U.S. supports the SAB view and for CWC purposes
considers as declarable only ricin in the form of 1) Ricinus
Communis Agglutinin II (RCA II),also known as ricin D or
Ricinus Communis Lectin III (RCL III); and 2) Ricinus
Communis Lectin IV (RCL IV),also known as ricin E.
(6) New toxic compounds. The SAB view is that adding a large
number of new toxic compounds to the schedules of chemicals
would introduce additional burdens on reporting requirements
and verification. The SAB instead calls for transparency in
chemical defense programs and assessment of the development
of toxic chemicals for law-enforcement purposes. The SAB
concludes that non-lethal chemicals and the associated
terminology surrounding so-called incapacitants require
further study. The U.S. agrees with the SAB that adding
numerous new toxic compounds to the schedules would introduce
additional burdens on reporting requirements and
verification. The U.S. also supports further assessment of
the development and availability of toxic chemicals such as
incapacitants for law-enforcement. The SAB should be asked
to specify or further elaborate on which toxic chemicals they
had in mind as they considered the subject of increased
transparency in the area of &new toxic compounds.8


C. Verification
(1) On- and off-site sampling and analysis. The SAB view is
that GC-MS in combination with the OPCW dual-mode software
containing the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) are
&fit for purpose8 and acknowledges that liquid
chromatography-mass spectrometry (LC-MS) has utility in
analysis of aqueous samples on-site. However, LC-MS in its
current design would only increase the logistic burden of
on-site analysis while the Secretariat is trying to reduce
the burden. The SAB recommends that it closely monitor LC-MS
developments. The U.S. agrees.
(2) Proficiency tests. The SAB notes the success of the
current system of proficiency testing used for designated
laboratories and those seeking designation. The SAB points
out, however, that current proficiency test protocols require
that spiked samples and blank samples be labeled as such, but
in real cases of off-site analysis such labeling would not be
used. The SAB recommends that the proficiency test format be
changed to accurately reflect how real samples would be
handled. The SAB further recommends that the OPCW consider
establishing a process whereby all sample handing, waste
management, and confidentially procedures be practiced more
regularly. The U.S. supports this view.
(3) Analysis of toxins. Analysis of toxins is difficult
because GC-MS methods do not work. Analytical methods exist
for saxitoxin and ricin, and the SAB recommends that the OPCW
determine which designated labs have those capabilities. The
SAB further recommends that if the overall capability is
deemed inadequate, then the Director-General should consider
utilizing laboratories outside the designated laboratory
system. This appears to be an obvious course of action,
however, it raises quality control, cost, and confidentially
issues that the SAB should identify and carefully consider
further.
(4) OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD). In certain
scenarios, particularly those involving allegations of
alleged use, the capability to analyze riot control agents
and degradation products of scheduled compounds is important
in the context of verification. The SAB recommends that riot
control agents (RCA) and degradation products of scheduled
chemicals be added to the OCAD. The U.S. has long supported
this position.
(5) Analysis of biomedical samples. The SAB points out that
the OPCW has no capability to handle or analyze such samples
and there is no system of designated laboratories for the
analysis of biomedical samples. The SAB Temporary Working
Group (TWG) on biomedical samples recommended that the OPCW
Laboratory &move forward on the issue of biomedical sampling
and analysis,8 and that the Director-General make sufficient
resources available to initiate and maintain the process.
The OPCW Laboratory has initiated efforts to determine what
information, training, and equipment would be required to
acquire this capability. The U.S. endorses this effort.

D. Destruction of Chemical Weapons
(1) Destruction of declared CW stockpiles. The SAB concludes
that technologies used in the destruction of declared CW
stockpiles appear to have matured to a point where
implementation of the requirements of the Convention requires
no further technological innovation or development. The U.S.
concurs.
(2) Destruction of Old and Abandoned CW (OACW). The SAB
notes that further research and development are needed for
the safe recovery of OACW both by excavation and by removal
from the sea at relatively shallow depths. The SAB also
notes that there is a continuing need for innovation in and
new approaches to, the destruction of recovered items.
The U.S. concurs.

E. Assistance and Protection Against the Effects of CW, and
International Cooperation
(1) Advances in science and technology. The SAB notes that
advances in the life sciences, information technology,
materials science, and nanotechnology have the potential to
help States Parties improve the level of protection they can
offer against chemical weapons. Effective defense should
discourage the development and use of CW. Enhanced
international cooperation in this field can act as an
incentive for States not Party to join the Convention. The
SAB should further explore this topic and identify specific
examples for enhanced international cooperation.
(2) Detection devices. The SAB acknowledges the considerable
amount of time and effort required to transfer a new
detection technology from laboratory instrumentation to a
reliable and robust field-detection device. The SAB opines
that technologies that have already matured will continue to
play a key role in the detection of CW agents over the next
five years and further speculates on other potential
technologies that may greatly expand the effectiveness of
inspections in the future given the appropriate design and
cost factors. The U.S. encourages the SAB to continue to
monitor the developments of such technologies.
(3) Medical countermeasures. The SAB notes that improvements
are necessary both in available treatments (for example,
antidotes that can be used against a broader range of
agents),and in the planning of medical countermeasures and
the management of casualties. Current emergency-response
procedures can be time-consuming and can delay the treatment
of victims. Best practices need to be identified and
followed, and training exercises are essential to maintaining
the required level of preparedness. This common sense
analysis warrants no further discussion.
(4) Decontamination. The SAB notes that decontamination
requirements are taking account of the changing nature of
such operations, which are more likely to take place in urban
areas and to affect civilians directly. Standard military
decontamination technology is often not appropriate under
such conditions or for decontamination of some industrial
chemicals. There is a need for smaller and
easier-to-transport decontamination equipment that requires
fewer personnel to operate it. Decontaminates should be
environmentally friendly, less corrosive, and less
aggressive. Advances in science and technology are expected
to contribute to further improvements in the field of
decontamination and medical treatment of CW victims. This
analysis warrants no further discussion.

F. Education and Outreach in the Context of the Convention
(1) Workshops, conferences and seminars. The report lists
the major CWC workshops, conferences and seminars dating back
to 2005 citing OPCW and International Union of Pure and
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) efforts in a number of European
countries. The U.S. encourages further collaborative
outreach efforts between the OPCW and professional and trade
organizations such as IUPAC, The European Chemical Industry
Council (CEFIC),The American Chemistry Council (ACC),and
the like.
(2) Written materials. The report cites written materials
that have been prepared on the issue of the multiple uses of
chemicals and the ethical questions it gives rise to. The
SAB opines that joint OPCW-IUPAC pilot studies have confirmed
the validity and usefulness of these materials, which have
been subsequently updated. Further pilot studies are being
considered and plans are being made for the written materials
to be translated into the six official CWC languages and to
be made available on the IUPAC website. The SAB should
continue to monitor such educational and outreach efforts.
CLINTON