Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE117929
2009-11-16 14:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

RESPONSE TO GERMANY'S REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON

Tags:  MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA GE IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #7929 3201457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 161451Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 117929 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2034
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA GE IN
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO GERMANY'S REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON
EXPORT WITH MTCR "NO UNDERCUT" POLICY IMPLICATIONS (C)

REF: BERLIN 001362

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASON: 1.4 (C).

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 117929

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2034
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA GE IN
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO GERMANY'S REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON
EXPORT WITH MTCR "NO UNDERCUT" POLICY IMPLICATIONS (C)

REF: BERLIN 001362

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASON: 1.4 (C).


1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 4.


2. (C) On October 28, Germany's MFA Export Control Division
provided Embassy Berlin with a non-paper requesting U.S.
guidance by November 17 on a pending German export of
extruded aluminum plates to India that may be similar to an
export previously denied by the U.S., and therefore subject
to the Missile Technology Control Regime's (MTCR) "no
undercut" policy. Specifically, Germany is requesting more
detailed information on the denials to ascertain whether the
goods in the pending German application are the same. In
addition, Germany requests additional information on the
reason for the U.S. denials and the proliferation activities
of the end-user, Vikram Sarabhai Space Center, Department of
Space of the Government of India.


3. (C) We want to advise German officials that the MTCR "no
undercut" policy does not apply in this instance, as the
goods that were the subject of the U.S. denial were not MTCR
controlled and were denied pursuant to U.S. "catch-alls."
Germany is therefore under no obligation to deny the pending
German export case. However, we greatly appreciate Germany's
serious and thorough approach on export control issues, and
want to advise Berlin that we believe they would be justified
in denying this sale. The type of aluminum in the U.S. and
German cases is very similar, the end-user (VSSC) is the
same, and the stated end-use is nearly identical. We also
want to emphasize that, as has been discussed repeatedly in
the MTCR, technologies used in space launch vehicles (SLVs)
and ballistic missiles are interchangeable, and countries
that possess both SLV and ballistic missile programs find it
impossible to erect an impenetrable barrier between the two.
We also note that consistent with longstanding U.S. policy,
the U.S. does not support India's missile or space launch

vehicle programs. We therefore want to encourage Germany to
pursue a policy similar to our own; i.e., not providing
support to any of India's MTCR Category I programs - either
ballistic missile or SLV.


4. (C) Action Request: Request Embassy Berlin approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.


5. (C) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(CONFIDENTIAL//REL GERMANY)

-- We want to respond to a matter of export control concern
your government recently brought to our attention.

--Specifically, your MFA's export control division recently
requested U.S. guidance on a pending German export of extruded
aluminum plates to India.

--You noted that a similar export may have been previously
denied by the U.S. per 2005 information notifications MI-US
05-005 and MI-US-05-006, and pursuant to the MTCR's "no
undercut" policy, wanted to consult with us before approving
this export.

--You requested detailed information on the U.S. denials to
ascertain whether the goods in the pending German application
are the same, and also sought the reasons behind the U.S.
denials; in particular, whether the United States has
information pertaining to proliferation activities of the
end-user, the Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC).

--We value our close nonproliferation cooperation, and want
to
provide the following information.

--Because the aluminum that was the subject of the U.S.
"catch-all" denials was not controlled by the MTCR, the MTCR's
"no undercut" policy does not apply, and - unlike in a case
involving MTCR-controlled items - Germany is not obligated
to deny the export of the aluminum plates.

--However, we believe Germany would be justified in denying
this sale for the following reasons:

--The aluminum sheets subject to the U.S. denial consisted of
type AA2014-T4, AA2014-T6, and AA2014 (O),which are very
similar in composition to the aluminum German export
officials
are now reviewing for export to India.

-- Moreover, in both the U.S. and German cases, the aluminum
is intended to be used in an MTCR Category I space launch
vehicle.

--As you know, SLV and ballistic missile technology are
essentially interchangeable. As has been discussed
extensively by the MTCR Partners, countries that possess both
SLV and missile programs find it impossible to erect an
impenetrable barrier between the two, and gains made in one
program generally are not denied to the other.

-- Indeed, India's SLV program - including VSSC - is heavily
integrated with its ballistic missile program.

-- VSSC is a key organization in India's SLV program, and was
identified in the 2000 MTCR Information Exchange as being
associated with the Indian missile program.

-- This means that providing equipment and technology to VSSC
likely will have ramifications beyond the Indian space program
and contribute - directly or indirectly - to India's efforts
to develop increasingly longer-range military missiles.

-- Although there is no ban on U.S. exports to VSSC, and U.S.
licensing authorities do approve sales to the firm for certain
non-SLV/ballistic missile-related end-uses, VSSC is on the
U.S. Department of Commerce's Entity List, which is a list of
individuals, businesses, research organizations, and
government and private organizations that are subject to
specific license requirements for the export, re-export,
and/or transfer of specified items.

-- Especially in the context of today's heightened
proliferation concerns, even indirect support to India's
Category I programs could have a destabilizing effect on
security in South Asia.

-- As you are aware, the U.S. does not support India's missile
or space launch programs, and works actively to impede India's
access to missile-related technology and equipment.

-- Given our shared concerns about a missile race in South
Asia, we hope Germany will pursue a policy similar to our own
of not providing support to any of India's MTCR Category I
programs - either ballistic missile or SLV.

-- We appreciate your consultation with us on this issue, and
look forward to future cooperation on export control and
nonproliferation matters.


6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone:
202-647-1430). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR, SCA/RA, EUR/CE, and EUR/PRA.
CLINTON