NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NON-NPT STATES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 011146

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC XB ZP ZO AE PK
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NON-NPT STATES

Classified By: ISN C.S. Eliot Kang for reasons 1.4 (b)(c)(d)

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ACTION REQUEST
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1. (U) Embassy Abu Dhabi is requested to deliver points in
para 4 to appropriate host country government officials.

End action request.

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SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
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2. (S) As reported by Post via email, on December 18, 2008
the Pakistani Embassy in Abu Dhabi called the U.S. Embassy
and inquired about the U.S.-UAE 123 nuclear agreement. During
the conversation, the Pakistani representative said that
Pakistani President Ali Asif Zardari offered to assist the
UAE with civil nuclear expertise during his November 2008
visit to Abu Dhabi. While we have no additional information
to substantiate this offer, we wish to reconfirm with the UAE
our understanding of its commitment to pursue nuclear energy
in a completely transparent manner consistent with
nonproliferation norms that would preclude cooperation with
Pakistan in the development of its peaceful civil nuclear
program. Pakistan is not a signatory of the NPT and has not
concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement or an Additional
Protocol with the IAEA. Its nonproliferation credentials have
been damaged by the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network.
For these reasons, we do not believe Pakistan would be an
appropriate partner for cooperation.

End summary and background.

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OBJECTIVES
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3. (S) Post should achieve the following objectives:

- Welcome the UAE,s commitment to pursuing the highest
standards of nonproliferation, and in particular note the
following statements from its policy White Paper: 1) to only
consider partnerships with companies having a history of
transparent operations and a reputation for excellence in
safety, and whose national governments are parties to the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and have
negotiated and implemented safeguards agreements as required
by the Treaty; and 2) to cooperate with the governments and
firms of friendly and responsible nations that adhere to the
highest standards of safety, security and nonproliferation.

- Ensure a common, explicit understanding that this precludes
cooperation with Pakistan.

End objectives.

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
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Begin Suggested Talking Points


4. (S/REL UAE)

-- We look forward to bringing into force the U.S.-UAE
Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement)
that was signed January 15. The Agreement will establish a
firm foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation in civil
nuclear energy.

-- This Agreement will serve as a model for other countries
in the region, and beyond, on the responsible pursuit of
civil nuclear energy by demonstrating the advantages of
transparency, engagement, and cooperation.

-- The United States welcomes the UAE,s commitment to
pursuing the highest standards of nonproliferation, including
foregoing uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.

-- We also take particular note of the following points from
your policy White Paper: 1) that the UAE would only consider
partnerships with companies having a history of transparent
operations and a reputation for excellence in safety, and
whose national governments are parties to the Treaty on the

STATE 00011146 002 OF 002


Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and have negotiated and
implemented safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty;
and 2) that the UAE would cooperate with the governments and
firms of friendly and responsible nations that adhere to the
highest standards of safety, security and nonproliferation.

-- We understand that the Government of Pakistan may have
offered you assistance with your civil nuclear program.

-- We note that Pakistan is not a signatory of the NPT and
has not concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement or an
Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Its nonproliferation
credentials have been damaged by the AQ Khan nuclear
proliferation network.

-- We presume therefore that your stated policies would
preclude cooperation, including training, with non-NPT
parties, including Pakistan, or with individuals or firms
from non-NPT states.

-- This is an approach that we strongly urge all countries
that are beginning development of nuclear power to take.

-- We would appreciate a specific confirmation that your
policies preclude cooperation with non-NPT parties, including
Pakistan. Such an explicit statement will have a
significant, positive impact on the Congressional review
process of our cooperation agreement.

-- We also hope that the UAE would proceed to implement its
other nonproliferation commitments at an early date.

-- Your stated intention to conclude an Additional Protocol
to your safeguards agreement, to adhere strictly to the
Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, and to adopt the 2005
Amendment expanding and strengthening the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) are all
indications of your strong commitment in this regard and
early action on these would also have a positive impact on
the Congressional review process.

-- We look forward to the completion of the governmental
review processes in both our countries and the early entry
into force of the Agreement.

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REPORTING DEADLINE
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5. (U) Please report response within ten working days of
receipt of this cable. Please include SIPDIS in all
responses.

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POINT OF CONTACT
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6. (U) Department point of contact for follow-up is Chris
Herrington ISN/CPI 647-5035.
CLINTON