Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE107748
2009-10-17 07:51:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S.

Tags:  KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHC #7748 2900812
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170751Z OCT 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 107748 

SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S.
DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON
TREATY, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, BEGINNING OCTOBER 19, 2009

REF: A. STATE 099070 AND 099072 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-003)

B. GENEVA 00869-00872 (SFO-GVA-V-031)

C. GENEVA 0744 (SFO-GVA-IV-013)

D. STATE 94665 (SFO-GVA-IV-005)

E. STATE 97474 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary, VCI.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T STATE 107748

SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S.
DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON
TREATY, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, BEGINNING OCTOBER 19, 2009

REF: A. STATE 099070 AND 099072 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-003)

B. GENEVA 00869-00872 (SFO-GVA-V-031)

C. GENEVA 0744 (SFO-GVA-IV-013)

D. STATE 94665 (SFO-GVA-IV-005)

E. STATE 97474 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary, VCI.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller will head the U.S.
delegation to the sixth round of START Follow-on treaty
negotiations with Russia in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning
on October 19, 2009. Following is guidance for the
beginning of this round. Delegation should request
further guidance when needed.

--------------
COUNTING OF "PHANTOM" DELIVERY VEHICLES
--------------


2. (S) With respect to empty Minuteman III and
Peacekeeper ICBM silos that are not in service and no
longer capable of operationally launching an ICBM absent
significant refurbishments, Delegation is authorized to
offer that these silos will be eliminated within seven
years after entry into force using simplified procedures
to be specified in the START follow-on Treaty. Because
the Minuteman III ICBM will be an existing type under the
treaty, the Minuteman III silos will remain accountable
until eliminated. Because, under the U.S. proposal, the
Peacekeeper ICBM would not be an "existing type," the
Peacekeeper silos would not be accountable under the
treaty, even prior to their elimination.


3. (S) To ensure that the launchers on the four converted
U.S. Ohio-class SSGNs do not count against the SFO treaty
limits, Delegation should maintain the position that the
C-4/Trident I will not be an "existing type" of SLBM under
the SFO treaty. Delegation is authorized to offer to
conduct a one-time exhibition of a converted SSGN to
demonstrate how it has been modified so that it is unable
to launch a C-4/Trident I SLBM.


4. (S) As a means to settle and record agreement on the

B-1B bomber issue, Delegation is authorized to propose the
following approach:

-- The United States will complete the conversion of the
remaining B-1Bs to a conventional-only configuration,
using the procedures that have been used previously to
convert B-1Bs. Each B-1B bomber will continue to count
against the treaty limits until it is converted. In
addition, 1 B1-B will be converted to static display,
using START procedures.

-- The United States will convert or use simplified
procedures to eliminate any B-1Bs currently stored at
Davis-Monthan AFB that will not be converted to a
non-nuclear capability. Each of these 16 B-1B bombers at
Davis-Monthan AFB will continue to count against the
treaty limits until it is so converted or eliminated.

-- The United States will agree to a prohibition on the
storage of nuclear warheads at B-1B bases and on
re-conversion of B-1Bs to a nuclear configuration.

-- The United States will agree to confidence-building
measures at air bases for heavy bombers converted to a
conventional-only role. The purpose of these measures
would be to confirm that the bombers have not been
re-converted to a nuclear configuration. This could be
confirmed by conducting a spot check of a randomly chosen
bomber once each year at a B-1B base chosen by the Russian
Federation.


5. (S) Regarding the B-52G heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan
AFB, Delegation should maintain the position that the
B52-G will not be listed as an existing type in the SFO
treaty and is excluded from accountability. However,
Delegation is authorized to agree to eliminate them using
simplified SFO elimination procedures.

-------------- -
COUNTING AND INSPECTING HEAVY BOMBER ARMAMENTS
-------------- -


6. (S) With respect to the question of counting and
inspecting nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, Washington
confirms the U.S. position that nuclear gravity bombs and
long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs (LRNA) located either on a
deployed heavy bomber or in a designated nuclear armaments
weapons storage area associated with air bases where heavy
bombers are deployed, should be counted and applied toward
the aggregate limit on warheads associated with strategic
delivery vehicles. Regarding the inspection of Russian
nuclear armaments, delegation should seek agreement that
U.S. inspectors would be permitted to inspect the LRNA
weapons storage areas associated with Russian heavy bomber
air bases to count the number of LRNA that are stored
there. Note: Washington understands that the Russian
practice is to store the LRNA warheads in a separate
nuclear weapons storage area removed from the base, and
therefore inspectors would adopt a "considered to contain"
rule when counting LRNA at Russian and U.S. heavy bomber
bases. End note.

--------------
MOU ISSUES
--------------


7. (S) Regarding warhead data in the MOU, Delegation
should take the position that both Parties should report
the number of warheads for each ICBM and SLBM launcher
once each six months in a classified MOU data update
notification, but should not provide a notification of
every change in that warhead data, as is required for all
other MOU data. Washington notes that this position
requires a tracking fix in the Notification Protocol to
make an exception for warhead data from the general
obligation to provide notification, no later than 5 days
after it occurs, of each change in data with respect to
items subject to the limitations provided for in the
Treaty. Washington also notes that this position is
consistent with the Russian proposal on notifications,
which includes the required tracking fix.


8. (S) Regarding the inclusion of throw-weight in the
technical data for ICBMs and SLBMs, Washington confirms
the U.S. position that for each type of ICBM and SLBM
there should be listed "the greatest throw-weight
demonstrated in flight tests" since START entry into
force.


9. (S) Regarding whether to list in the MOU the maximum
number of real and simulated warheads demonstrated during
any flight test for each type of ICBM or SLBM, and the
maximum number of nuclear armaments associated with each
type of deployed heavy bomber, Washington has determined
that there is no treaty basis for requiring that this data
be provided in the MOU. Therefore, the Delegation should
not seek to include these categories of data in the MOU.


10. (S) Regarding the Russian proposal to combine space
launch facilities and test ranges into one category in the
MOU, Washington confirms U.S. opposition to this proposal
on the grounds that the United States wants to maintain
the right to conduct inspections at test ranges, but does
not want to confer inspection rights at space launch
facilities.

--------------
ADDITIONAL CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION ISSUES
--------------


11. (S) Delegation is authorized to revise the Ref A U.S.
proposal on conversion or elimination procedures as
follows:

a. Delegation is authorized to use the term "conversion"
in the U.S. proposal to refer to procedures that render an
SLBM launcher incapable of launching an SLBM or heavy
bomber incapable of employing nuclear armaments, but allow
its use for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty.
Delegation is authorized to agree that converted items
will remain subject to the treaty's verification regime,
if Russia agrees that they will not be counted under any
of the treaty's central limits.

b. Delegation is authorized to insert, as appropriate
throughout the document, the option of other procedures,
determined by the Party carrying out the conversion or
elimination, that the other Party can confirm, and which
shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC.

c. Delegation is authorized to change the term "
demonstration" to "exhibition." Delegation should clarify
that exhibitions will be scheduled by the possessing
Party. For inspections to confirm the completion of
elimination and conversion procedures, delegation should
standardize the U.S. proposal to a 20-day inspection
window in all cases. Delegation also should develop and
propose to Washington any new notifications required for
these exhibitions and inspections related to elimination
and conversion.

d. While recognizing the interest of both sides in moving
procedural details to a third tier (ref B),Delegation
should not propose moving any sections of the elimination
and conversion provisions to a third-tier document.
Provisions relating to removal from treaty accountability
are central to the treaty, and should not be relegated to
a document that is intended for procedural details.
However, Delegation is authorized to trim unnecessary
language from the existing procedural details to reduce
the length of the Protocol.

e. Delegation should not agree to include specific
mandatory elimination procedures, but should maintain the
lists of procedures, any of which may be selected, as
originally proposed in ref A.

--------------
JOINT STATEMENT ON BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN
AND UKRAINE TO BE ISSUED AT THE
EXPIRATION OF THE START TREATY
--------------


12. (S) Background: During START Follow-On (SFO) Geneva
IV, the Russian Delegation handed over a Russian-proposed
text for a Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and
the United States on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in
connection with the expiration of the START Treaty (Ref
C). Delegation Head Anatoliy Antonov solicited the views
of the U.S. on the proposed text, as well as on questions
including at what level such a Joint Statement should be
signed, and whether and how such a statement should be
coordinated with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Ref
D). Ref E authorized the SFO Delegation to indicate that
the United States supports the idea of issuing a joint
statement either bilaterally or by the five START Parties
in connection with the START Treaty's expiration, and that
it would be important to consult the other START parties
regarding both the content and the timing of the
statement.


13. (S) Guidance. Washington has reviewed the
Russian-proposed text and has developed a
counterproposal. Delegation is authorized to table this
U.S.-proposed text (provided in para 18 below). Further
changes may be negotiated ad ref to Washington for final
approval. Any work on the text should take into account
the priority of the delegation work, which is to finish
the new treaty before December 5, 2009.


14. (S) Washington believes that the preferable approach
would be for the United States and Russia to
simultaneously inform Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine of
our intention to issue a joint statement in connection
with the expiration of the START Treaty. The draft text,
once agreed between the United States and Russia, should
be shared with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, but
Washington has no intention of, and does not support,
negotiating the text with the other three parties. The
United States and Russia could each present the
information and text to the three parties through
diplomatic channels on a coordinated date.


15. (S) Washington is still considering the issue of the
level at which the Joint Statement should be issued.


16. (S) Because the United Kingdom was a cosignatory of
the Budapest Memoranda on Security Assurances, Washington
plans to inform the United Kingdom of our work with Russia
on the statement to allow the United Kingdom time to
consider whether it wishes to issue any statement of its
own.


17. (S) In addition to any work on the Joint Statement,
Delegation may present the views contained in paras 14-16
above to the Russian delegation, solicit their reaction,
and report it back to Washington for further
consideration.


18. (S) Begin text of U.S.-proposed Joint Statement:

JOINT STATEMENT
by the Russian Federation and the United States of America
in Connection with the Expiration of the
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms

The Russian Federation and the United States of
America recognize the significant contribution of the
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine to successful implementation of the Treaty Between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty),and to the
reduction in strategic offensive arms required by the
Treaty.

The value of the START Treaty was greatly enhanced by
the commitments of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons
from their territories and accede to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as
non-nuclear-weapon states. Their actions have enhanced
the NPT regime, had a beneficial impact on international
security and strategic stability, and created favorable
conditions for further steps to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The United States of America and the Russian
Federation deeply appreciate the contribution of the
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine to strengthening international peace and security
as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. In this connection, the United States of America
and the Russian Federation would like to confirm that
their assurances recorded in the Budapest Memorandum of
December 5, 1994, remain in place after December 4, 2009.

End text.

--------------
Previous Guidance
--------------


19. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous
guidance remains in effect.

End guidance.
CLINTON