Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE107194
2009-10-15 18:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

EURASIAN ENERGY POLICY: PRESS GUIDANCE

Tags:  ENRG EPET PPD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1459
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHC #7194/01 2890411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151842Z OCT 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 3730-3733
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 8981-8984
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0853-0856
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1414-1417
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 8193-8196
INFO RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 107194 

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING SENSITIVE CAPTION)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EPET PPD
SUBJECT: EURASIAN ENERGY POLICY: PRESS GUIDANCE

STATE 00107194 001.4 OF 004


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 107194

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING SENSITIVE CAPTION)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EPET PPD
SUBJECT: EURASIAN ENERGY POLICY: PRESS GUIDANCE

STATE 00107194 001.4 OF 004



1. (SBU) The purpose of this cable is to provide Embassies
with talking points and general press guidance that they can
draw on as needed regarding our Eurasian Energy policy. We
continue to believe that diversity ) of energy suppliers,
transportation routes and energy sources ) is the key to
energy security. This belief guides our work to encourage
new oil and gas production in Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. We continue to work with
producers in Central Asia and the Caucasus to find new routes
to market including new routes for oil and natural gas to be
delivered to Europe and markets beyond. We call this route
the &Southern Corridor8 which includes the Nabucco and
Turkey-Greece Italy Interconnector (TGI) pipelines for
natural gas. We are also working with some of the countries
of the region to increase energy efficiency and to develop
new clean, energy alternatives.


2. (SBU) There are two major areas in which our policy
differs from the previous Administration. The first is our
emphasis on engagement; we recognize that we cannot achieve
our energy goals alone. We need the help and support of our
allies and we must open a dialogue on energy security issues,
even when we don,t agree. This new approach is most
apparent in our relationship with Russia, where the
Administration has set a new, positive tone, but it also
applies to Europe and others. The second area of difference
relates to the scope of our Eurasian energy policy. New
resources and new pipelines alone are not enough to increase
European or global energy security. We must also support
efforts to increase market competition, to build new LNG
facilities, gas and power interconnections, and gas storage
capacity, to explore opportunities to develop unconventional
gas, and to create a single, integrated European market for
energy.


3. (SBU) Below are provided cleared responses for Posts,
use as needed regarding what we believe might be the
&difficult8 questions on Eurasian energy. You can find
this guidance at http://eeb.e.state.sbu. We will work to
keep it updated. We welcome your comments and requests for
additional guidance as needed.


4. (U) Begin guidance in the format of questions and answers.


--Why is the U.S. focused on European energy security?
Isn,t this a problem for Europe to solve?

A: Taking goods and services together, the EU and the U.S.
account for the largest bilateral trade relationship in the
world. The significant amount of bilateral trade and
investment illustrates the high degree of interdependence of
the two economies. We have an interest in maintaining this
level of commercial and economic activity with Europe and
therefore have an interest in an economically strong Europe.
In addition, Europe is our partner on any number of global
issues.

Of course, Europe is composed of many different states and
energy security is a more pressing issue for some than for
others. And, it is true that we can,t be more European than
the Europeans.

However, we do see that Europe is taking steps to enhance its
energy security. Since the January 2009 gas cut-off to
Europe, the European Commission has increased funding for
electricity and gas interconnections, gas storage facilities
and alternative energy.

--What is the U.S. policy on Russian gas for Nabucco?

A: According to the commercial structure of the Nabucco
consortium, third parties have the right to bid on purchasing
up to 50% of the total capacity of the pipeline. Third
parties are not entitled to ownership or managerial stakes in
the consortium. Whether or not Russian gas will be included
in Nabucco is a decision for the consortium members, as well

STATE 00107194 002.4 OF 004


as for Russia, which to date has not stated whether or not it
would consider participating.

If Russian gas is included in the Nabucco project, doesn,t
that undermine the objective, which is to encourage the
diversification of suppliers to Europe (i.e., not Russia) and
means of transport for Caspian gas (i.e., not Russian
pipelines).

The Nabucco pipeline would be an integral part of a Southern
Corridor to transport Caspian (and potentially Iraqi) gas to
Europe. It would represent a diversification of sources for
the European Union and a diversification of export routes for
Caspian and Middle Eastern producers. Some Russian gas
shipped through the pipeline would not fundamentally alter
that design, since it still would carry primarily Caspian
and/or Iraqi gas.

--Will there be another Russian-Ukraine gas cut off/dispute
this winter?

A: We have been working closely with Ukraine, Russia and the
EU, as well as the international financial institutions, to
develop strategies to avoid another crisis. We encourage
Russia, Ukraine, and Europe to work together on gas transit
issues and make every effort possible to avoid another
crisis. We support efforts by the EU and international
financial institutions to help Ukraine reform its energy
sector and modernize its gas transit infrastructure.

We will continue our discussions on this issue with our
partners in the EU and at international financial
institutions, as well within the context of our Strategic
Partnership Commission with Ukraine.

--What will the US and Russia discuss about energy issues?

A: The U.S. and Russia cooperate on a number of energy
issues, and are looking for more ways to deepen this
cooperation. As President Obama said at the U.S.-Russia
Summit in Moscow in July, &the United States and Russia have
more in common than they have differences.8 The White House
has announced a new bi-national Presidential Commission that
will cover a host of important bilateral issues. In
particular, the bi-national commission will broadly cover
three energy topics: energy efficiency; clean energy
technologies; and energy security.

We are working to have an open dialogue with Russia and
identify areas of mutual interest and benefit. On some
issues, we may disagree, but that doesn,t mean we shouldn,t
have a discussion. In any event, we will continue to
strongly support Europe,s initiative to diversify its energy
sources and routes.

Russia is and will continue to be a major player in energy
markets. It is in all of our interests for Russia to
increase production of oil and gas resources. That is not
inconsistent with seeking diversification or competition.
We will continue to strongly support Europe,s initiative to
diversify its energy sources and routes.

Another potential area for cooperation is on energy
efficiency and savings. Increasing energy development and
production cannot achieve energy security alone; we must
think about conservation too. Increasing energy efficiency
helps producers and consumers, allows for a better allocation
of scarce resources, and is also integral to our overall
climate goals.

--Does the U.S. support the Russian-backed projects Nord
Stream and South Stream?

A: The U.S. neither supports nor opposes either of these
pipelines. In general, U.S. policy is to support transparent
and commercially-viable pipeline projects that meet
environmental safety standards.

On Nord Stream, we understand that some European countries
view the project as beneficial to their energy security while
others have raised environmental and other concerns about the
project. These concerns should be addressed before the
pipeline is built.


STATE 00107194 003.4 OF 004


South Stream is still in the conceptual phase. There are
some major questions about its technical and commercial
viability.

--Where will the gas come from for Nabucco?

A: There are a several possibilities for gas supply and
clearly this should be the focus of the work of the Nabucco
consortium in this next phase of project development.
Exploration of Azerbaijan,s Shah Deniz field is continuing
and we have heard from the companies developing the field
that the resource base looks promising, with potential
production of up to 15-16 BCM. In addition, there are
several other offshore fields that could provide additional
production over the longer term.

Nonetheless, as a practical matter, Azerbaijani gas is
necessary but not sufficient to launch Nabucco. There are
other potential suppliers that could supply gas for the
project. Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov recently stated
his desire for Turkmenistan to participate in Nabucco. We
are encouraging the Turkmen government to work cooperatively
with international oil companies, which have the capital and
expertise to help raise the level of gas production for
export. We are hopeful that Azerbaijan,s President Aliyev
and Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov will be able to come to
an agreement on shipping Turkmen gas to the West.

Iraq is another potential supplier. At the July 13 signing
ceremony for the Nabucco IGA, Prime Minister Maliki said Iraq
would like to supply up to 15 BCM to Nabucco. However, here
are many practical questions about how and when Iraqi gas
would be available for Nabucco. It,s not clear how much gas
Iraq needs for domestic consumption and in what timeframe.
If the gas came from northern Iraq, it would require an
agreement between the Kurdish government and the central
government in order to be exported. If the gas came from the
south, in the form of associated gas, significant new
investment in exploration and production and transportation
infrastructure would be needed. Western Iraq could also
provide gas for Nabucco, but this would also require
extensive investment and development.

The Nabucco consortium is now talking about the project
beginning operation in 2014, five years from now. That is
something to keep in mind when people talk about Iraqi gas
not being available until 2016 or about the long time it will
take to get Turkmen gas going westward.

--Is Nabucco anti-Russian?

A: Nabucco is not anti-Russian. Nabucco is designed to
provide access to diverse energy sources and competition for
the Central and Southeastern European nations. It simply
mitigates risk and that is good policy. Diversification
makes good economic sense. More broadly, our Eurasia Energy
Policy is not anti-Russian and we do not view our respective
policies on energy in this region as a &zero-sum game.8

--What is the U.S. policy on Iranian gas for Nabucco?

Our position on Iran has not changed. We oppose Iranian gas
in the Southern Corridor at this time. Although the
Administration is committed to engagement with Iran,
outstanding issues, such as the nuclear issue, must be
resolved before we can think about Iran as a participant in
any Southern Corridor projects.

--Does the U.S. prefer Nabucco over the Turkey-Greece-Italy
pipeline (TGI) or the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP)?

A: We don,t favor one pipeline over another. What is
important is to build a Southern Corridor that will connect
the resources of the Caspian with growing markets in Turkey
and Europe. Nabucco is a strategically important project.
It is a larger pipeline that would supply more gas to Europe
once that gas is available. The July 13 signing ceremony of
the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) gave it new impetus.
However, there are still many issues that need to be resolved
before the project becomes reality. The Turkey-Greece-Italy
pipeline project is somewhat smaller but would supply gas to
certain areas in Europe. In fact, Bulgaria and Greece
announced a deal to build an interconnector so that Bulgaria
could benefit from TGI. This is also a very important

STATE 00107194 004.4 OF 004


project.

We understand TAP plans to include Iranian gas and as a
matter of policy and law, we do not support the development
and export of Iranian gas at this time.

--Do we support the Caspian Development Corporation (CDC)?

A: The Caspian Development Corporation (CDC) is a concept
developed jointly by Turkey and the EC. The idea is to
bundle the purchasing power of private sector gas companies,
so that Turkmenistan can negotiate with the one company
(consortium leader) for a large gas sales-purchase agreement,
rather than negotiate with several companies for smaller
deals. In essence, CDC is designed to make it easier for
Turkmenistan to ship gas west. The World Bank is currently
managing a feasibility study of the concept and may have some
suggestions on the structure and operation of CDC by the end
of the year.

We applaud EC efforts to promote Europe,s energy security
through the diversification of energy supplies and support
efforts that will encourage Turkmenistan and other Caspian
countries to develop their gas reserves and send them to
Europe through a Southern Corridor. For that reason, we
support the feasibility study that is now underway. We also
want to ensure that free market forces and the private sector
are encouraged as the primary means through which gas is
produced and transported. We also want to make sure CDC
doesn,t disadvantage U.S. companies who want to do business
in Turkmenistan.

--Does the United States support development of Trans-Caspian
pipelines?

A: The United States believes that diversification of routes
and market enhances the economic and energy security of both
producer and consumer countries. We support the development
of commercially viable pipelines and we believe that a
Trans-Caspian pipeline would offer new options for exporters
and better access to world markets for Caspian producers.

The development of Trans-Caspian pipelines has been under
discussion for years. However, delimitation issues and
competition from existing pipelines have kept the idea on the
drawing board. Currently oil and gas exports from Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan primarily transit Russia. Kazakhstan
exports some oil to Azerbaijan, China and Iran. Turkmenistan
exports some natural gas to Iran and probably will being
shipping gas to China in late 2009 or early 2010. Kazakhstan
is developing a new tanker-based oil transport network to
increase export across the Caspian to Azerbaijan and beyond.
Our Trade and Development Agency (TDA) is funding a study of
Azerbaijani-Kazakhstan Trans-Caspian oil and gas transport
pipelines.

--Does the U.S. support the export of Turkmen gas to China?

A: The export of Turkmen gas to China is a logical,
market-driven development. It serves to diversify
Turkmenistan,s customer base for its natural gas resources
and serves Chinese energy needs. Turkmenistan also is
looking to sell gas to European markets though a Southern
Corridor, which we continue to encourage.

China is becoming an increasingly important player in Central
Asia. China and Kazakhstan have completed an oil pipeline
which now transports over 200,000 bpd of crude from eastern
Kazakhstan to western China. The PRC is building a pipeline
to bring up to 40 billion cubic meters per year of natural
gas from Turkmenistan and possibly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
to western China. That pipeline, which should become
operational in 2010, will greatly alter natural gas markets
in Central Asia by allowing Central Asian suppliers to
diversify their export routes.
CLINTON