SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 103130

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG CH ENRG FR KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL RS UK
UNGA, IAEA, NPT
SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAPAN

Classified By: ISN/SSRN Susan Burk, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. Ambassador Susan Burk, Special
Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation,
met with key interlocutors on preparations for the 2010
Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Japan from
August 25-30 on the margins of the 21st UN Conference on
Disarmament Issues in Niigata. The support and enthusiasm
for the President and his nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation agenda was palpable throughout the trip.
His message of U.S. "moral responsibility" for leading global
nuclear disarmament efforts resonates deeply with the
Japanese and has laid a solid base of goodwill to build upon.



2. (C) In addition, through bilaterals with key figures
among the participants, Amb. Burk was able to survey support
for U.S. approaches and find areas for future cooperation on
a range of issues. Senior Japanese Government officials
voiced their gratitude to the United States for its strong
support for DG Amano,s election, and promised to work with
the United States on our mutual objectives at the 2010 NPT
RevCon and on the broader nuclear nonproliferation agenda.
Egypt previewed a hard-line stance on Israel and the NPT, and
a soft attitude towards Iran and compliance, while asserting
a right to all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.


3. (C) NPT RevCon President Ambassador Libran Cabactulan
voiced a strong desire to work with the United States and was
interested in knowing U.S. priorities and goals for the
RevCon. He presented himself as an "honest broker," a role
that we have promoted. He also stated his intention to
survey key States Parties to develop common approaches and
positive outcomes for the RevCon. The Philippines Government
is forming an NPT policy advisory board for Cabactulan, with
a key meeting scheduled for early October in New York.
Meetings with Kazakhstan, Norway, Ireland, Indonesia, and
Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku, the 2009 NPT PrepCom Chair,
also elicited offers of support for the President,s nuclear
nonproliferation priorities. Numerous interlocutors
expressed intense curiosity about and relationship among the
upcoming high-level U.S. initiatives, including the
late-September UN Security Council summit and the April 2010
nuclear security summit. End Summary

-------------- --
Day 1 (August 26): Bilaterals
-------------- --


4. (C) Amb. Knut Langeland (Norway MOFA) offered his support
to the United States in ensuring a successful 2010 NPT RevCon
and emphasized the ongoing work Norway was conducting with
the UK on nuclear warhead dismantlement verifiability and
transparency.


5. (C) Ambassador Takashi Nakane (Japan, Ambassador to IO in
Vienna) expressed his thanks to the United States for their
support for DG Amano, saying he worked behind the scenes in
Vienna to make that happen. Nakane was thankful for
Ambassador Burk,s statements emphasizing a balanced approach
to the three pillars. Nakane noted that he will chair Main
Committee 3 ) traditionally a quiet committee, but
undoubtedly a contentious one in 2010 with topics such as
nuclear supply assurances and withdrawal. He stated his
skepticism of progress on supply assurances and international
fuel banks, owing to G-77 resistance. He said there was some
opportunity, however, given the lack of unanimity within the
NAM on the issue as evidenced by national statements on the
subject that diverged from the G-77 statement. Nakane opined
that without demonstrable progress on the Middle East
Resolution, Egypt will disrupt the GC in Vienna. He also
said that the NAM will assert there was no evidence of Syrian
non-compliance, mov
e to condemn Israel for their attack, and say that the
safeguards standard articulated in Article III is no more
than the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. He advised
close consultations with Egypt.


6. (C) Mr. Kanat Saudabayev (Secretary of State of
Kazakhstan) held a brief bilateral/media opportunity with
Amb. Burk, stating his support for global nuclear
non-proliferation and President Obama,s disarmament and

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SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP
nuclear security initiatives, and seeking U.S. support for
the UN establishment of August 29 as a day for the
renunciation of WMD. He praised the role of Laura Holgate in
furthering nuclear security efforts in Kazakhstan, and
invited Amb. Burk to visit. Amb. Burk reviewed broad USG
priorities for the 2010 NPT RevCon.

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Day 1 (August 26): Conference Highlights
-------------- --------------


7. (U) Day 1 of the conference examined the prospects for
disarmament within the context of the NPT and the
denuclearization of North Korea. Speakers on the prospects
for disarmament included Yoriko Kawaguchi and Gareth Evans
from the International Commission on Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND),and Ambassador
Burk. Emmanuel Besnier (French Embassy),Khaled AbdelHamid
(CTBTO),and Amb. Akio Suda (Japan Del to the CD) discussed
the prospects for the CTBT and the FMCT. Denuclearization of
North Korea was addressed by current and former Japanese MOFA
experts. Of note, the ICNND co-chairs spelled out the scope
of the final recommendations they will deliver on the NPT and
enhancing the global non-proliferation regime. Their
recommendations will include short-term recommendations to
2012 (focused on minimizing the role of nuclear weapons),
medium-term recommendations to 2025 (including broadening
nuclear disarmament beyond U.S. and Russia, and beyond the
P-5),and longer-term recommendations
beyond then (to facilitate verifiability and transparency to
facilitate world free of nuclear weapons). Specifically,
they will seek to re-articulate the "13 practical steps" of
the 2000 RevCon to ensure that we do not have to re-negotiate
but instead build a new international nuclear consensus.
During the North Korean panel, the South Korean delegate
(Dong-ik Shin, ROK MOFA) called for Parties to agree to
measures strengthening the withdrawal provisions of the NPT
at the 2010 RevCon.


8. (U) During the question and answer session, there were
questions on the emphasis the United States has placed on
nuclear security, asking how to counter the claims that this
is a concern only for rich nations. The Chinese attendee,
Yingfeng Jiang (Chinese MOFA),asked if there was a
contradiction in the Japanese call for disarmament and their
need for extended deterrence, and whether the commission will
call for the other NWS to offer NSAs to the NNWS, as China
has done. Kawaguchi answered that the security conditions of
the world need to improve for full disarmament to take place.
Evans answered that changes in the nuclear doctrine of the
NWS need to take place so that legally-binding NSAs can be
offered to NNWS. Burk answered that all countries are
threatened by nuclear terrorism, including NNWS from threats
such as dirty bombs. In reply to a question on the prospects
for CTBT ratification, Burk stated that no timetable has been
set but that thorough efforts will be made to prepare the way
for Sena
te ratification.


9. (U) Following the discussion of the CTBT and FMCT,
questions were asked on verifiability and scope of the FMCT.
Ambassador Suda answered that the Trilateral Initiative and
START implementation prove that verifiability of weapons
material is possible. On existing stocks, Suda replied that
the FMCT will cover whatever can be reached by consensus.
Jiang volunteered that China has not offered a voluntary
moratorium on fissile material production because such a
declaration would be ill-defined, unverifiable, and could
undercut momentum towards a verifiable FMCT. AbdelHamid said
that P-5 ratification of CTBT could lead towards efforts on
provisional application of the Treaty. Responding to
questions on the prospects for a Northeast Asian NWFZ, all
the panelists agreed that none of the conditions necessary
for consideration of such a zone are present.

--------------
Day 2 (August 27): Bilaterals
--------------


10. (C) Amb. Toshio Sano (DG of Disarmament,
Non-Proliferation, and Science/MOFA Japan) discussed a range
of issues, including a strong word of thanks for U.S. support
for the DG election of Yukiya Amano, noting that Amano will
visit UN HQ after his swearing-in in December, then
Washington. He highlighted upcoming U.S.-Japanese dialog on
the IAEA in October at the Director level (Samore). He said
Japan is adamant that Israel, India, and Pakistan join the
Treaty as NNWS, and expressed his distaste for the U.S.-India
deal ) stating bluntly that the United States "twisted our

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SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP
(Japan,s) arm" to support the deal. On the RevCon, he said
Japan,s criteria for success would be modest. He stated
that he knew of the September 3-4 UK-hosted P-5 disarmament
meeting, and said that P-5 solidarity poses risks for Japan.
When pressed, he said that China would dilute to the "lowest
common denominator" any P-5 position on disarmament,
transparency, and verifiability. On the RevCon, he asserted
that the criteria for me
asuring success at the RevCon should remain modest. At
minimum, the RevCon should contain a strong word on the
fulfillment of Article VI, similar to the 13 steps, and
address Syria, Iran, and DPRK non-compliance, the Middle East
Resolution, and the issue of withdrawal. Sano reminded Burk
that the ICNND final report will be finalized and issued in
December, after their October 2009 meeting in Hiroshima.
Sano also said that Japan has created a CTBT "road show" to
help convince the remaining Article II countries to ratify
the Treaty. He said only the U.S. and Japan care about
Additional Protocol universalization and that Japan requires
an AP to cooperate on nuclear power.


11. (C) Mr. Khaled Abdel Rahman Shamaa (Egypt MOFA) met
informally with Amb. Burk, focusing on the 1995 RevCon
Resolution on the Middle East. Shamaa asserted that Israel
as a non-signatory to the NPT presented a greater problem
than Iran as a non-compliant signatory. Burk countered that
such a position seems like an endorsement of Iranian
non-compliance. Shamaa acknowledged Burk,s assertion that
the security situation in the Middle East had become more,
not less, complicated, including the questions surrounding
the Syrian nuclear program. On a separate topic, Shamaa
stated that multilateral fuel assurance proposals were
designed to deny NNWS their right to ENR technology, an
approach rejected by the recent G-77 statement. Amb. Burk
pointed out that through her consultations, she detected a
lack of unanimity within the G-77 on this issue.


12. (C) Ambassador Libran Nuevas Cabactulan (Philippines,
RevCon President) met with Amb. Burk several times throughout
the week to discuss the RevCon. Through these discussions,
he sought to better understand the U.S. key objectives, share
his schedule, and discuss the procedural matters that still
need to be decided. He highlighted the importance of the
decision on establishing subsidiary bodies to the Main
Committees, and the selection of the chairmen, vice-chairmen,
and vice-presidents at the RevCon. He shared a draft
proposal on subsidiary bodies, which only listed one on
disarmament and negative security assurances, and one on the
Middle East. No mention was made of a subsidiary body to
address other issues including Article X, as had been the
case at the 2007, 2008 and 2009 PrepComs. He outlined the
major NPT RevCon preparatory events he will attend, including
a South Korea-hosted conference in November, a Wilton Park
conference in December 2009, a Philippines-sponsored
conference in February 201
0, and the Annecy Conference in March 2010. In addition, he
said the Philippines Government is setting up a high-level
advisory committee to support him in the run-up to the
RevCon. The committee is being organized by his MOFA and
will be made up of the Philippines, ambassadors to Vienna,
the Conference on Disarmament, and Japan. They will meet in
New York from September 20 to October 20.

-------------- --------------
Day 2 (August 27): Conference Highlights
-------------- --------------


13. (U) Day 2 saw sessions on strengthening the NPT,
prospects for NWFZs, conventional arms control, and the roles
of the news media and public in nuclear disarmament.
Speakers on the RevCon included Witjaksono Adji (Thailand
Mission to the UN),Amb. Seyed Abbas Aragchi (Iranian
Ambassador to Japan),Amb. Takeshi Nakane (Japanese
Representative to IOs in Vienna),Amb. Volodymyr Yel,chenko
(Ukrainian Representative to IOs in Vienna),Chris Rampling
(UK FCO),and Ambassador Libran Cabactulan (President-elect
of the 2010 RevCon). Speakers on NWFZs were Khaled Abdel
Rahman Shamaa (Egyptian MOFA) and Arman Baisuanov (Kazakhstan
MOFA). Representatives of Laos, Switzerland, and Oxfam spoke
on conventional weapons, and various NGOs and Japanese
officials spoke on public and news media engagement on
nuclear disarmament. The Thai statement was balanced,
emphasizing the importance of all three pillars, and called
for negative or positive security assurances from the NWS to
the NNWS, as well as verifiability and tr
ansparency in nuclear weapons dismantlement, de-alerting, and
decreasing the roles of nuclear weapons in defense policy.
He also stated that U.S. ratification of CTBT would lead
immediately to ratification by several other Article II

STATE 00103130 004 OF 006



14. (U) Iran,s statement decried nuclear cooperation with
non-Parties to the NPT and criticized the IAEA for asking
NNWS to accept the AP while the NWS select which parts of
their nuclear programs are subject to safeguards, and refuse
to fulfill their Article VI obligations. He ended his
statement stating clearly that the IAEA should not act as a
"UN Watchdog," but should instead focus on promoting
cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Ukraine
supported discussion of NSAs, fulfilling promises on
disarmament, implementing the Middle East Resolution,
improving Article X implementation, strengthening compliance,
and examining the Canadian proposals for changing the Review
Process at the RevCon. The UK stated that they are examining
Egypt and Russia,s proposals on formal steps to implementing
the Middle East Resolution. He also said that the IAEA
needed to find cost-savings measures within before they ask
for more budgetary resources. On declaratory policy, he
reminded everyone that the "doctrin
e of nuclear deterrence has proven to be contagious." He
replied to the Iranian statement, retorting that countries
that call for disarmament progress as a condition of
non-proliferation cooperation are attempting to shirk their
legal obligations. The Chair (Norway) noted that there is a
paper under consideration at NATO on NSAs


15. (U) Kazakhstan said they were willing to engage with the
P-5 on their questions related to Articles 4 (transit) and 12
(Treaty of Tashkent) of CANWFZ, and announced a conference of
the CANWFZ signatories in October to discuss implementation
of the Treaty. The Kazakh rep said that Russia had agreed,
in their ratification package, to include a renunciation of
the rights granted under the Treaty of Tashkent to deploy
nuclear weapons in the Zone, although the question on transit
was still outstanding. He advocated that the other P-5
countries should open dialog with the C-5 as soon as
possible. Amb. Cabactulan outlined his approach to the NPT
RevCon, highlighting the success of the PrepCom Chairman,s
final document in identifying matters of agreement and
disagreement among Parties. He sketched his consultative
process, saying he would listen to Parties over the next six
months, seek consensus on those issues that can be agreed
upon, and work on text to bring to the RevCon. He reminded
parties that the
13 practical steps were no longer able to be implemented
without change. He said some Parties, "willingness to
compromise will require a meaningful injection of
flexibility" from others to realize progress. He listed all
the issues facing the Parties, and suggested practical action
plans as an achievable final product of the RevCon. He
praised the P-5 statement at the PrepCom for deflecting
perceptions of a lack of substance decided there and
highlighted that the UN Security Council Summit in September
might yield substantial results.


16. (U) Egypt stated that the 1995 decision to extend
indefinitely the NPT was tied directly to the 1995 Middle
East Resolution. He said implementation had drifted until
the 2009 PrepCom, but still no progress had been made. He
acknowledged that the conditions in the Middle East had
changed, but that further progress on the 1995 resolution
would remain the litmus test for the efficacy of the NPT. He
called for the final decisions of 1995 and 2000 to be
reaffirmed ) that disarmament should progress gradually, but
a lack of progress on the Middle East Resolution would
legitimize proliferation in the region. He said that if
countries seek to single out countries in the Middle East by
name, they must include Israel, with consistency and
even-handedness. He also called for all four countries
outside the Treaty to abide by it unconditionally and that
all facilities in the Middle East must be subjected to
comprehensive safeguards as soon as possible.


17. (U) During the question and answer session, Iran,s
remarks, especially the statement on the non-verification
role of the IAEA, and accusation of double standards, drew
fire from the audience who pointed to Iran,s noncompliance.
Iran back-peddled that the IAEA might have a safeguards
verification mission, but that technical cooperation is more
important. He said they suspended implementation of the AP
because they suspended all relevant nuclear activities in
2005, and that they would never give up their rights to
enrichment. Darkly, he said the international community was
"punishing Iran for a crime that we have not committed yet."
Cabactulan, answering a question about the participation of
the four nonparties in the RevCon, said that this was up to
the States Parties, which had not figured out how to engage

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SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP
them. He said in the Chairman,s draft statement from the
PrepCom called upon all remaining States to sign the Treaty
as NNWS and all Parties to the Treaty to engage with them
towards this goal
. He said 2010 must look forward, and hoped the three Main
Committee chairmen would work with him to strike the right
balance between evaluating the operation of the Treaty and
looking forward to positive steps that could be taken to
improve the Treaty. Adji said that he hoped the President,s
Prague speech signaled a new U.S. policy on NSAs and NWFZs.
Ukraine echoed this sentiment and said that while Ukraine did
not expect the question of NSAs for NNWS to be solved at the
RevCon, serious work needs to be done. He also said the
current NPT review process made the life of the Main
Committee chairs miserable and that Parties should seriously
consider the Canadian proposals, in a subsidiary body at the
RevCon.

-------------- --------------
Day 3 (August 28): Conference Highlights
-------------- --------------


18. (U) Day 3 included the summary of the conference and
travel to Tokyo. Significant additional comments included
China,s imprecation that countries stop putting too much
emphasis on their role in the DPRK crisis, noting that DPRK
actions are in response to the policies of South Korea, Japan
and the United States and in particular their desire for
bilateral relations with the United States. In her
concluding remarks, Hannelore Hoppe of the UN Office of
Disarmament Affairs said that we are in a unique and
watershed moment in history, and that all States must seize
this opportunity to pursue disarmament. She said she hoped
this conference served as a venue for quiet diplomacy that
could contribute to success at the 2010 RevCon.

-------------- --------------
Day 4 (August 29): Inaugural Meeting of the Japan Association
of Disarmament Studies, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo
-------------- --------------


19. (U) After a morning meeting with US Embassy/Japan, Amb.
Burk addressed the inaugural Annual Meeting of the Japan
Association of Disarmament Studies, held at Hitotsubashi
University in Tokyo. The meeting included two sessions in
Japanese, on Disarmament and Verification and Disarmament
Studies, and one session in English, on "How to Create
Momentum for the Success of 2010 NPT Review Conference. Her
co-panelists included Ambassador Cabactulan, Ambassador Suda,
and Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki of the University of Tokyo and
Pugwash. Cabactulan revisited his comments from Niigata,
spelling out how he intends to reach a successful RevCon
outcome. Suda discussed the Japanese perspective on the NPT,
emphasizing that it is the only country to have been attacked
with nuclear weapons. He said that the NPT is important to
Japan because it is the basis for solving the DPRK crisis,
safeguards, and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear
power. The problems facing the Treaty include undeclared
weapons activities, w
ithdrawal from the Treaty by the DPRK, perceived imbalances
in implementation, and weakness in Article VI implementation.
He said the way forward includes universalization of the AP,
a reaffirmation of the balanced approach to the three
pillars, dealing with countries that withdraw while violating
the Treaty, implementing the Middle East Resolution,
establishing consensus on fuel guarantees without
surrendering the right to peaceful nuclear technology, and
demonstrating progress on NSAs/NWFZs.


20. (U) Suzuki pointed out that two key steps in the fuel
cycle - both enrichment and reprocessing - are the most
important steps towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
He said that HEU was mainly in the hands of the U.S. and
Russia, but only small amounts could make a bomb, whereas
separated plutonium is prevalent in the civil nuclear sector,
but the predicted demand for plutonium fuel has not
materialized. Dealing with this nonproliferation problem has
led to various proposals to control the fuel cycle, offered
by the UK, Russia, Japan, NTI, and the IAEA. The United
States, he noted, tried GNEP to trade fuel for caps on the
spread of fuel cycle technology. The problem with all the
proposals is that they originate from the haves, not the
have-nots, and this dynamic raises suspicion among the
have-nots. None of the proposals address spent fuel. Any
solution would have to be multi-lateral, transparent, and
economically viable. At the same time, the massive global
excess in HEU and Pu must be reduc
ed by halting all reprocessing world-wide, exhausting all
global stocks. Enrichment and reprocessing should only be

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SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AMBASSADOR SUSAN BURK,S VISIT TO JAP
allowed in countries that have a comprehensive burn plans to
consume all fuel produced by such capabilities, to prevent
stockpiling and the unnecessary spread of ENR technology.
This happens to some extent with enrichment, but reprocessing
occurs globally irrespective of demand for plutonium.
Industry, he concluded, must have a code of global
non-proliferation norms that they follow scrupulously.


21. (U) In the Q and A session, Suzuki criticized the
Russian/Angarsk fuel bank proposal because of its lack of
standards on who it sells to, and a lack of take-back
provisions. Cabactulan pointed out that the problem of Iran
poses the biggest security threat to Saudi Arabia and the
other Gulf states ) not Israel. He continued the criticism
of the Iranian statement from the Niigata conference, saying
that all sides, not just the NWS, have to fulfill their NPT
obligations. He said he understood that the United States
must maintain a safe and reliable stockpile as long as
nuclear weapons exist, but called on the NWS to establish a
stockpile baseline, create a reliable and consistent report
on progress towards disarmament, and perform disarmament in a
verifiable and transparent manner. He said that once those
conditions were fulfilled, dismantlement in this manner
should be expanded to the non-NPT NWS. He closed by
reminding attendees to focus their energies on the real
pressure points ) for example, Pre
sident Obama wants the CTBT ratified, but it is the U.S.
Senators that hold that power.
CLINTON