Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09STATE103127
2009-10-02 21:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL

Tags:  CT PREL PTER UNSC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHC #3127 2752146
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 022126Z OCT 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 103127 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS: CT PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM -- RESPONSE TO INDIAN PROPOSAL

REF: A. A. USUN 840

B. B. STATE 62265

Classified By: IO ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER, FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 103127

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS: CT PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM -- RESPONSE TO INDIAN PROPOSAL

REF: A. A. USUN 840

B. B. STATE 62265

Classified By: IO ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRIMMER, FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D


1. (U) This is an action request. See paras 2, 7-9.


2. (C) Summary: Consideration of the stalled Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) is expected to
resume during upcoming UN Sixth Committee meetings in
October. USUN should maintain USG redlines in ensuring that
1) military activities are exempted from the scope of the
CCIT using standard language from previous counter-terrorism
instruments, and 2) violent acts of national liberation
movements (NLMs) are not/not excluded from the scope of the
CCIT. USUN is requested to reinforce approaches made to
Indian officials by the Department conveying that while the
U.S. believes that conclusion of a CCIT based on the 2002
coordinator's text is the preferred outcome, the U.S. is
prepared to support the new Indian proposal to add additional
preambular paragraphs to the 2002 Coordinator,s text if
their efforts to build a consensus around the proposal
succeed. USUN should also indicate to Indian officials that
with respect to their proposal, we prefer the specific
preambular language described in paragraph 5. In conveying
U.S. support, USUN should discuss with Indian officials how
the U.S. can most effectively support the Indian proposal.
Department is concerned that the Indian proposal will be
reflexively rejected by those opposed to the current text if
the U.S. openly supports or sponsors the proposal. End
summary.


3. (C) Background: The CCIT, which was initiated by the
Government of India in the late 1990s, has been stalled since
2001 due to efforts by the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) to 1) weaken the exclusion of state military
conduct from the scope of the CCIT and 2) exclude the actions
of NLMs from the scope of the CCIT. In advancing these
positions, the OIC has refused to accept standard language on
the exclusion of military activities that is now found in
five other counter-terrorism instruments. Given that the CCIT
does not offer any significant new additions to the
international legal framework for combating terrorism, the

United States would only support conclusion of a CCIT text
that did not undercut fundamental U.S. positions on both of
these issues. This is particularly important given the
"comprehensive" nature of the convention; the protections and
CT policy gains the United States has achieved in over twenty
years of negotiating the prior counterterrorism conventions
could become irrelevant or undermined if the CCIT replaces
the others as the standard legal instrument utilized by most
countries in countering terrorism.


4. (C) Since 2001, there have been multiple efforts to
resolve the objections by the OIC and conclude the
convention. Some of these efforts, such as the U.S.
agreement in 2002 to include a reference to "peoples" in
Article 18 on the understanding that this would achieve
agreement on the text, have involved substantive concessions
by the U.S. that were pocketed by the OIC and countered with
continued objections to the text. An effort to resolve the
impasse through the addition of preambular language favorable
to the OIC in 2005 resulted in language unacceptable to the
United States and insufficient for the OIC countries. In
2007, the Greek Coordinator offered the latest compromise
proposal, which involves substantive changes to the operative
language in the military exclusion article. To date, no OIC
countries have indicated that they could accept the Greek
coordinator,s proposal. The U.S., while not expressly
rejecting the Greek proposal, has indicated its preference
for the 2002 text and expressed concerns with supporting the
Greek proposal, particularly in the absence of any indication
that the OIC would accept the text without further
modification.


5. (C) The Government of India has recently indicated to
the U.S. on a number of occasions that they consider
completion of the CCIT to be a top priority for their
government at the UN. India shares our preference to
conclude the text on the basis of the 2002 language. Because
the GOI does not believe the 2002 language remains a viable
option, however, India has indicated a willingness to accept
the 2007 Greek Coordinator,s proposal, although Indian
officials have advised the United States that they share our
concerns with the manner in which the coordinator's proposal
erodes the standard exclusion text. During meetings between
Indian and U.S. officials, they have proposed a new approach
whereby the operative text of the CCIT would remain the same
as that found in the 2002 Coordinator,s text. However, two
additional preambular paragraphs would be added, as described
in reftel A. The first preambular paragraph would be drawn
directly from the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Bombings Convention). The
second preambular paragraph uses preambular language drawn
from the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CT
Strategy). Indian officials have requested U.S. support for
this proposal.


6. (C) The U.S. has no objection to the addition of
preambular language from the Bombings Convention. With
respect to the language from the preamble of the CT Strategy,
the Department is concerned, given the OIC,s objections to
the 2002 operative text, that the reference in the new
preambular text drawn from the CT Strategy to the "right of
self-determination of peoples which remain under colonial
domination or foreign occupation" will be used by OIC
countries to further an interpretation of the treaty as
excluding the violent acts of NLMs. Thus, even though this
is language that the United States has accepted in other
contexts (e.g. the CT Strategy and the 2005 World Summit
Outcome),including it here could undermine our position with
respect to NLMs. In order to minimize this risk while still
supporting the Indian approach, the Department,s preference
is for India to include a more limited preambular reference
to the CT strategy that does not quote the self-determination
language. Such an approach has the substantive benefits
described above as well as the tactical advantage of
providing some negotiating room around the specific text of
this preambular reference. While the U.S. could ultimately
accept the full preambular text if necessary to conclude the
Convention, proposing the more limited text might help elicit
a response from the OIC to the concept without prejudicing
the U.S. if the OIC attempts to pocket the language without
agreeing that it resolves the remaining issues in the
convention. Finally, the Department is concerned that open
U.S. support or sponsorship of this new Indian proposal will
lead the OIC to reject it as an inadequate resolution.


7. (C Rel India) Consistent with the guidance and
background provided above, USUN may inform Indian
counterparts that the United States is prepared to support
India,s effort to bring the CCIT text to completion through
new preambular language. In conveying U.S. support, USUN
should discuss with Indian officials how the U.S. can most
effectively support the Indian proposal to maximize its
chances of acceptance and avoid an outcome whereby the OIC
accepts the new preambular language, but still insists on
changes to the operative text. USUN should indicate that we
have no objection to including the preambular language from
the Bombings Convention. USUN should express to the Indians
a preference that their proposal incorporate more limited
language referencing the CT Strategy that tracks one of the
following formulations (or similar text that does not
expressly refer to self-determination):

"Noting the principles outlined in the 2005 World Summit
Outcome, which are recalled in the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy;"

OR

"Recalling also the 2005 World Summit Outcome and the UN
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including the rededication
of world leaders to support all efforts to uphold the
sovereign equality of all States and respect their
territorial integrity and political independence."



8. (C) In consulting with G-8 countries and other
like-minded missions, USUN should signal that there may be a
new proposal to introduce preambular language to the CCIT
text. USUN should indicate that the U.S. is of the view
that, to the extent the preambular language is drawn from
previously agreed text and does not involve a change in the
operative language of the convention, this would be a
preferable solution to the 2007 Coordinator,s proposal which
erodes the existing exclusion provision that has been adopted
in previous counterterrorism conventions. As such, the U.S.
is prepared to support new preambular language, drawn from
existing text, if it will bring CCIT negotiations to
conclusion.


9. (SBU) USUN should continue to avoid expressing support
for the 2007 Greek Coordinator,s proposal or any other
proposal (including moving the preambular language to
operative text) that involves changes to the operative text.
If there is indication that OIC countries may be moving
towards supporting the 2007 Greek Coordinator,s text, in
lieu of the Indian proposal to only add preambular language
while keeping the operative text the same, USUN should seek
further guidance from the Department as to a position on the
2007 Coordinator,s proposal.
CLINTON