GUANTANAMO CLOSING S/E FRIED SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 100312

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDRG KU
SUBJECT: GUANTANAMO CLOSING S/E FRIED SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING
WITH KUWAITI PM

REF: (A)KUWAIT 0755, (B)STATE 72438

CLASSIFIED BY S/E DANIEL FRIED. REASONS: 1.4 (B)&(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 21 meeting at the Kuwaiti
Permanent Mission in New York, S/E for the Closure of
Guantanamo, Dan Fried told the Kuwaiti PM that the way forward
to resolve the Kuwaiti detainee issue is to finalize the draft
diplomatic note outlining proposed GOK security measures.
Recalling President Obama's security concerns expressed to the
Amir on August 3 and the desire by both parties to avoid a
repeat of the April 2008 suicide attack in Mosul, Iraq by a
Kuwaiti released from Guantanamo, the note would put both
parties on the strongest possible footing to act on the Amir's
request while protecting the national security and foreign
policy interests of both countries.


2. (C) Welcoming the Administration's desire to work with the
GOK,the PM requested both al-Mutairi and al-Rabiaa, who
recently won his habeas case, be sent home together. FM al-
Sabah underscored the GOK's desire to be able to report to
Parliament the return of two detainees, followed by the return
of the other two upon conclusion of U.S. legal proceedings, as
well as the provision of U.S. intelligence on all four
detainees. Both the PM and S/E Fried agreed that Kuwait's
commitment at the most senior levels paved the way for
continued work in this area. Fried looked forward to GOK
feedback on the draft diplomatic note, the contents of which
could form the framework for the return of Kuwaiti detainees.
The note plus Kuwait's success with respect to its
rehabilitation center would be key factors in U.S.
consideration of the possible return of all Kuwaiti detainees.
END SUMMARY.


3. (C) Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay
Detention Facility, Ambassador Daniel Fried, met with Kuwait
Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Sabah at the
Kuwaiti Permanent Mission in New York September 21 to discuss
the contents of the proposed diplomatic note outlining
security measures to be undertaken by the GOK following the
transfer from Guantanamo to Kuwait those Kuwaitis found
eligible for transfer.


4. (C) Flanked by TV cameras, Sheikh Nasser warmly greeted
Ambassador Fried and ushered him into a large Majlis room
filled with the PM's entourage and other Kuwaiti diplomatic
staff. Recapping recent diplomatic developments, Fried praised
Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S. Sheikh Salem al-Sabah for
pushing forward the detainee issue and presenting a strong,
serious case on their behalf when the two met on July 9 (Ref
B). This meeting led to the visit of a USG interagency
delegation to Kuwait to discuss security measures with the GOK
and to tour the al-Salam Rehabilitation Center (Ref A). The
success of this visit paved the way for staff members of the
al-Salam Center to interview all four Kuwaiti detainees at
Guantanamo September 2/3.


5. (C) Citing the August 3 meeting between President Obama and
the Amir of Kuwait, Ambassador Fried reiterated the serious
security concerns raised by the President, but stressed the
President's desire to move forward. One detainee will be
returned to Kuwait (Khaled al-Mutairi (213)) he said, and
there is serious consideration for returning more. Raising
the draft diplomatic note, Fried said the USG looks forward to
receiving feedback from the GOK. Forewarned about GOK concern
regarding the point restricting detainee movement outside of
the house between dusk and dawn, Fried assured the PM that the
U.S. certainly did not intend to impede the religious practice
of attending mosque and that alternative language could be
developed to the satisfaction of both sides. (NOTE: This
language in fact is drawn from a Kuwaiti diplomatic Note
transmitted from the Kuwaiti Embassy July 23 to S/E Fried
outlining GOK security measures. END NOTE)


6. (C)Ambassador Fried stressed that the exchange of
diplomatic notes would put Kuwait and the U.S. in the
strongest possible position to move forward and achieve what
President Obama and the Amir discussed in their meeting.
(Fried did not comment on the release of any detainees not
already approved for release by the Interagency process.)


7. (C) Sheikh Nasser thanked the Obama Administration for its
consideration of the detainee issue, underscoring that the
Amir gave his personal word as guarantee regarding security
measures related to the return of the Kuwaiti detainees from
Guantanamo. Secondly, he raised the September 17 court
decision granting Kuwaiti detainee Fouad al-Rabiaa his
petition of habeas. Sheikh Nasser expressed his desire that
al-Mutairi and al-Rabiaa be returned to Kuwait together, and
lastly, the GOK will study the diplomatic note thoroughly. He
reiterated GOK concern that "no one can stop another from
performing his religious duty," referring to the dusk-to-dawn
movement restriction. Ambassador Fried stated that the U.S.
will not stand in the way of legitimate religious obligations,
and he will work with the interagency to find alternative
language that is acceptable to both parties. On al-Rabiaa,
Fried noted that the legal process of his case needed to be
concluded. Finalizing the exchange of diplomatic notes would
put the USG in a strong position to move forward by setting
the conditions to act on the Amir's request. Sheikh Nasser
said that Kuwait would like to see the return of the other two
"boys," reiterating the Amir's personal guarantee.


8. (C) Ambassador Fried recognized the Amir's request for the
return of all four detainees. Raising the unsuccessful habeas
case of Fawzi al-Awda (232),Fried said that this legal
outcome recognized the U.S. Government has the authority to
detain al-Awda, though that does not mean that the U.S. must
continue to detain him. We should not stop at al-Mutairi and
al-Rabiaa, he said, expressing his readiness to work with the
GOK towards the possible transfer of the other two detainees
(232 and 552). As President Obama said, there are serious
security concerns, hence the development of the diplomatic
note outlining security assurances. The last thing either
government wants is another incident like the suicide bombing
that occurred in Mosul,Iraq in April 2008 carried out by
returned Kuwaiti detainee Abdullah al-Ajmi. The way forward
is the exchange of diplomatic notes containing security
assurances. This will pave the way for the return of al-
Mutairi and, possibly, al-Rabiaa, whose success in the
rehabilitation center forms the strongest basis for resolution
of the detainee issue. Fried acknowledged the great effort
taken by the GOK to establish the rehabilitation center.


9. (C) Sheikh Nasser noted the positive response of the USG
interagency team upon conclusion of the visit to the al-Salam
Center. Ambassador Fried agreed, adding that the team was
impressed by the professionalism of the medical staff. Fried
said he wished other countries in the region would set up a
rehabilitation center of the same caliber as the al-Salam
Center. Fried said he will continue to work with Kuwaiti
Ambassador al-Sabah to expedite forward movement. He would
report to Secretary Clinton, NSA Jones and senior DOD
officials the seriousness and commitment of the GOK to
resolving this matter.


10. (C) Kuwaiti FM Sheikh Mohammed al-Sabah thanked Fried for
recognizing the seriousness of the Kuwaiti request and the
Amir's personal guarantee. He raised last month's arrest of a
network of Kuwaitis linked to al-Qaida planning to carry out
terrorist attacks targeting Kuwaiti and U.S. interests.
Speaking pointedly, Sheikh Mohammed conveyed to Ambassador
Fried his desire that Sheikh Nasser be able to report back to
the Kuwaiti Parliament that the PM had met with Kuwait's U.S.
allies and they had agreed to return two of the Kuwaiti
detainees for transfer into the al-Salam Center.
Additionally, Sheikh Nasser should be able to present a
timeline for return of the other two, as the U.S. will
conclude its legal review of their cases and turn them over.
Kuwait should not have to wait another six years for return of
its detainees. Lastly, the PM also must be able to tell the
Kuwaiti Security Services that intelligence on the detainees
will be forthcoming, claiming that none was made available to
them when the previous eight were tried in Kuwaiti courts
following their return in 2004.


11. (C) Ambassador Fried said that he would inquire about
intelligence on the four detainees. Both parties will engage
in intense discussions but it will not take another six years.
Talks to date have given the U.S. and Kuwait the best way
forward. The security undertakings contained in the note
should lead to progress on return of the first two, and,
possibly, subsequent progress on the other two. The U.S.
intends to prosecute all those who it believes it can
prosecute successfully. It is unclear if the U.S. will
prosecute two of the four Kuwaiti detainees. He reiterated
that he will remain in close touch with Ambassador al-Sabah
and work with him in a frank and transparent way.


12. (C) In closing, Sheikh Nasser expressed his pleasure at
having had the opportunity to discuss the detainee issue with
Ambassador Fried and hoped to see him again. Fried said he
hoped to visit Kuwait at some point to conclude this important
issue.
CLINTON