Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SKOPJE457
2009-09-16 17:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CLOSING AIRSCAN IN

Tags:  MOPS NATO PREL KFOR KV MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSQ #0457 2591712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161712Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8532
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3768
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000457 

SIPDIS

EUCOM PLEASE PASS SHAPE FOR SACEUR STAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: WHEN MACEDONIA JOINS NATO
TAGS: MOPS NATO PREL KFOR KV MK
SUBJECT: POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CLOSING AIRSCAN IN
SKOPJE

Classified By: DCM Tom Navratil for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SKOPJE 000457

SIPDIS

EUCOM PLEASE PASS SHAPE FOR SACEUR STAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: WHEN MACEDONIA JOINS NATO
TAGS: MOPS NATO PREL KFOR KV MK
SUBJECT: POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CLOSING AIRSCAN IN
SKOPJE

Classified By: DCM Tom Navratil for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) We have learned that a decision memo has been
forwarded to SACEUR recommending, among other options, that
the Airscan operation based at the Skopje airport cease
entirely. NATO has used Airscan since 2003 to provide aerial
surveillance for KFOR. (For operational reasons, Airscan was
based in Macedonia as opposed to Kosovo.) In 2008, the GoM
notified NATO that Airscan would have to move -- essentially
at its own expense -- to a new facility at the airport.
After extensive negotiations between the GoM and NATO (with
active U.S. Embassy engagement with the Macedonian
leadership),the GoM finally offered to pay all costs (U.S.$
500,000) associated with the move.


2. (C) We are not in a position to judge the military
necessity of this asset. However, closing Airscan would have
certain political-military ramifications here. NATO's
decision at the 2008 Bucharest summit not to offer membership
to Macedonia until the "name issue" with Greece is solved
dealt a serious blow to the population and the government and
undermined the Alliance's credibility, though without
diminishing the consistent 90% public support for joining.
While professing that Euro-Atlantic integration remained its
top goal, the psychological impact -- for both the
government and the public -- of Bucharest should not be
underestimated. This in turn may have contributed to the
leadership's initial disinterest in ensuring Airscan stay in
Macedonia, but the government's eventual positive decision
demonstrated its understanding that engagement and commitment
are a two-way street.


3. (C) Therefore a decision to close Airscan could send a
message to Macedonia that NATO in general (and the U.S. in
particular, as Airscan is an American company and given the
outsized role of the U.S. as a champion of Macedonia's
Euro-Atlantic integration) is reneging on its engagement with
Skopje. In addition, senior leaders such as CHOD LTG
Stojanovski and MoD Konjanovski did expend political capital
to ensure that the GoM did the right thing and work to keep
Airscan in Macedonia. They -- and Prime Minister Gruevski as
well -- could well feel burned if they felt they spent this
capital for nothing.


4. (C) Finally, should indeed SACEUR determine that Airscan
will close, we would recommend that NATO engage at the most
senior level to send a clear message to the Macedonian
leadership that this was purely an operational call. At the
same time, part of the message should also be that this is a
final decision and not a hint that the Alliance wants to
re-negotiate the move of the facility. We strongly recommend
telling the Macedonian government that NATO is ceasing
Airscan operations only when this is a final decision with no
foreseeable need to reconsider. If NATO were to change
direction again it would exacerbate the aforementioned
problems, and it may be problematic to re-start Airscan here
once the operation has been pulled out.
REEKER