SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MACEDONIA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000214

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR REEKER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS GR KV MK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MACEDONIA

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY


1. (SBU) Your visit presents an opportune moment to
underscore to Macedonians that the Obama Administration is
not "pro-Greek," that the United States is prepared to engage
in active behind-the-scenes support for developing a
reasonable solution to the name dispute -- working with BOTH
sides -- and that we expect better performance from the
Gruevski government on building a genuinely multiethnic,
democratic, law-based society.

Key points to make:

--It is time for real negotiations on the name issue, to
replace FYROM with something acceptable and to work out a
deal on the remaining details. The identity that the United
States sees at stake here is Macedonia's identity as a full
member of the Euro-Atlantic community.

-- The United States wants to help you achieve this goal this
year but we can only do so with your active involvement. I
understand you doubt Greek willingness to conclude a deal,
but I need your pledge to test that doubt by negotiating
seriously.

-- The U.S. is seeking to support the UN process, not replace it.

-- Significantly greater progress on reaching modern European
standards on interethnic relations, rule of law, and
political dialogue is critical to Macedonia's future.
Well-functioning democratic practices and good governance
will produce the stability and prosperity that all your
citizens want.

Additional objectives/points:

--Thank Gruevski for his positive approach to Kosovo
(recognition, support for IMF membership) and urge formal
diplomatic relations ASAP.

--Reconfirm the GoM's commitment to send an additional 50-75
troops to Afghanistan with the Vermont National Guard in
late 2009/early 2010.

Gruevski in Control



2. (SBU) Your visit comes as PM Nikola Gruevski and his VMRO
party have consolidated almost complete political control:
VMRO controls an outright majority in parliament, the
Presidency, and 56 of 85 municipal governments following 2008
parliamentary elections and March/April 2009 presidential and
local elections. Gruevski will not have to face the voters
again until 2012, (though he may be tempted to call early
elections again),and now has a clear opportunity to tackle
the name dispute with Greece. The Alliance reaffirmed
Macedonia's readiness to join NATO -- pending resolution on
the name issue -- at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit, and
President Obama's statement gave the always-insecure
Macedonians (of all ethnicities) reassurance of U.S. support.
But Gruevski must understand that
this deadlock cannot continue in perpetuity.

Getting to Yes on the Name Issue



3. (SBU) The Bucharest outcome was a psychologically
devastating blow to Macedonia's fragile confidence.
Following the summit, Gruevski called early elections,
indulged in anti-Greek rhetoric, and pursued other follies
bound to annoy Athens, such as suing them at the ICJ, sending
multiple letters to world leaders, naming roads and other
public spaces after Philip of Macedon and Alexander the
Great, and unveiling plans to build an enormous (22 meter)
statue of Alexander in the center of Skopje. Gruevski
admitted to me six months ago that he "may have been wrong"
in his strategy to "remind everyone that the Greeks pay a
price too." He is reluctant to acknowledge publicly,
however, that his actions have gained him nothing but ill
will in Washington and European capitals. In keeping with his
pledge to me, he calmed down his own public statements
(though he has failed to reel in his Foreign Minister,
Antonio Milososki).


4. (SBU) Gruevski, his VMRO party faithful, and many others
in the press, have recently emphasized that any deal on the
name must "preserve our identity as Macedonians," claiming
that the Greeks want "to change our language and our
nationality." The trouble is that it is next to impossible
that the GoG would ever agree to a document that would define

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the citizens of this country as "Macedonians" or the language
as "Macedonian." If negotiations actually progress, this
issue may prove the sticking point. I recommend that you
tell Gruevski that we are sympathetic on this question, but
in the end an agreed name and its scope of use may have to be
the sole focus of any agreement. "Diplomatic finesse" is a
concept seemingly alien to Macedonians.

Close the Deal on Kosovo Relations



5. (SBU) At our urging, Macedonia finally recognized Kosovo
as an independent state in October, but Gruevski has refused
to establish formal diplomatic ties with Pristina pending
final demarcation of their mutual border. The two sides are
nearly there, and the GoK has offered a territorial offset
(involving around 100 hectares of remote land) in order to
avoid having some querulous Kosovars owning land on the
Macedonian side of the border. Gruevski is considering this,
but believes that for complex legal reasons he must take the
issue to parliament, which he is reluctant to do (despite the
fact that he controls a majority of the seats and his ethnic
Albanian coalition partner, DUI, wants a deal now). While
thanking Gruevski for voting yes on Kosovo's IMF/World Bank
membership bid, you should urge him to close this matter
ASAP.

More Help for ISAF



6. (SBU) Macedonia has been a serious ally on the
international security front, sending troops to both Iraq and
Afghanistan since the beginning. (Their troops left Iraq at
the end of 2008, with the expiration of UNSCR 1790.)
Macedonia has 168 troops in Afghanistan and told us in our
bilateral defense review last December that it would send an
additional 50-75 troops to serve for one year with the
Vermont National Guard contingent deploying late this year or
in early 2010. You should ask Gruevski for his firm
commitment to this plan.

Concerns on Interethnic Relations, Rule of Law, and Political
Dialogue


7. (SBU) The ethnic Albanian community is increasingly
discontented, and murmurs of separatism are starting to
grow. Ethnic Albanians are concerned that Gruevski is
running away from Euro-Atlantic integration by refusing to
negotiate meaningfully on the name issue. This concern is
compounded by Gruevski's lack of interest in interethnic
relations or in full implementation of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement (OFA),which -- with heavy U.S. involvement --
ended the brief civil conflict in 2001. Ministers from DUI,
the largest e-Albanian party and Gruevski's coalition
partner, are increasingly complaining that they are
marginalized in the government and not treated as equal
partners. E-Albanians were deeply unhappy with VMRO's
presidential candidate (now President) Gjorge Ivanov, who
opposed the OFA and who made no attempt to reach out to
e-Albanian voters in his campaign. This anger is now
compounded by Gruevki's plan to build a large Orthodox
Christian church -- with taxpayer money -- on Skopje's main
square; such a move is not only insensitive to the
e-Albanians, but also a questionable use of resources even as
the economic situation has compelled the GoM to cut its
budget by 6.2%, including an 18% cut in defense.


8. (SBU) Political dialogue and rule of law -- key EU
benchmarks as well as issues of importance to us -- are on
the decline. Problems include excessive pretrial detention,
a corrupt and pressured judiciary, inadequate parliamentary
deliberation of government initiatives. Even by Macedonia's
standards, Gruevski rarely reaches across the aisle nor even
to his e-Albanian coalition partner on issues large or small,
preferring ad hominem attacks to genuine discussion.
Government ministers and officials regularly interfere in the
judiciary. A 200 million Euro judgment against Austrian
electricity distributor EVN followed a trial chock full of
irregularities, despite the presence of international
observers. This cannot help but have a chilling effect on
foreign investment as well.


REEKER