Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SKOPJE177
2009-04-17 15:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: GRUEVSKI RECEPTIVE TO ADVICE ON NAME,

Tags:  PREL PGOV KV GR MK 
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VZCZCXRO2897
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0177/01 1071552
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171552Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8174
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0514
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000177 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KV GR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: GRUEVSKI RECEPTIVE TO ADVICE ON NAME,
NATO ENGAGEMENT?

REF: A. STATE 33709

B. SKOPJE 156 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000177

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KV GR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: GRUEVSKI RECEPTIVE TO ADVICE ON NAME,
NATO ENGAGEMENT?

REF: A. STATE 33709

B. SKOPJE 156 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: PM Gruevski was receptive to the Ambassador's
advice on the name issue and continued engagement with NATO
in the course of a wide-ranging conversation April 15.
Ambassador pressed for retention of CHOD LTG Stojanovski, a
positive public tone and negotiating stance toward Greece on
the "name issue," and constructiveness on Kosovo. Gruevski
responded positively if cautiously on all counts. However,
harsh public comments on the name by FonMin Milososki the
very next day cast some doubts on the GoM's credibility. End
summary.

Get to Work
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador congratulated Gruevski on successful March
22 and April 5 elections, which generally met international
standards and were a vast improvement over parliamentary
elections last year. We were also impressed by the improved
tone during and afterwards, where Gruevski praised his
longtime nemesis, Branko Crvenkovski, for his service as
president, and presidential runner-up Ljubomir Frckoski
congratulated the winner, Gjorge Ivanov. Now, however, it is
time to govern: Gruevski's VMRO has control of both the
parliament and the presidency, plus 55 of 85 municipal
governments, with no new elections in sight.


3. (C) Ambassador reviewed the work he and the Embassy had
done to keep Washington and other allies engaged even as
Gruevski indulged in various actions against Greece following
the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit and appeared to distance
Macedonia from the Alliance. At the 2009 Summit, the
President clearly signaled our continuing desire to see
Macedonia join NATO pending a solution to the name issue, and
all the Allies overlooked the problems post-Bucharest to
reaffirm this. In turn, the Obama Administration needs
strong signals from the GoM that it is ready to move smartly
on the name issue and on reforms necessary for Euro-Atlantic
integration. Given our reaffirmed commitment and Gruevski's
domestic political capital, there are no excuses left.

Concrete Engagement Critical

--------------


4. (C) One step in this direction, Ambassador continued,
would be to retain CHOD LTG Stojanovski at least until the
2010 NATO Summit. (Rumors have been all over town for months
that one of Ivanov's first moves as President -- i.e., as
Commander in Chief -- would be to replace Stojanovski on
Gruevski's insistence, allegedly for being close to
Crvenkovski and the opposition SDSM party.) Stojanovski has
the full confidence of the Macedonian military, is trusted by
senior U.S. and other Allied officials, military and
civilian, is best positioned to advise Ivanov on military
reform, and has no apparent successor with the same
capabilities. Between now and next spring, the CHOD could
groom a successor with whom Ivanov would be comfortable.
Gruevski responded that "I have nothing against Stojanovski,"
and that he had never raised the issue with Ivanov. However,
Gruevski continued, the General has shown a predilection for
politics in the past and needs to be sure to be professional
at all times. (Comment: Post and other NATO Embassies here
see nothing to substantiate suggestions that Stojanovski is
at all political. End comment.) He added that he did not
see why Ivanov would want to replace him, and said he would
speak to Ivanov about the matter.


5. (C) Gruevski thanked us for President Obama's positive
statement on Macedonia at the NATO Summit, and appreciated
that the USG was still looking out for Macedonia's interests
up to the highest levels. He pledged not to provoke Greece,
but asked that the same message be given to Athens as well:
"We do not have 100 years to solve this problem." Gruevski
noted that he never raised the name issue during the election
campaign except when queried by reporters, and even then only
provided a short summary of what he understood to be the
Greek position without additional commentary except that he
hoped the issue could be solved after both countries'
elections (Greece holds European Parliament elections in
June).


6. (C) Unfortunately, Gruevski's measured tone was belied the
following day by harsh and gratuitous public comments by
FonMin Milososki. Responding to recent public comments by
Greek Ambassador to Washington Mallias that the name
"Republic of North Macedonia" could be an acceptable name for
Greece -- as well as some local press analysis suggesting

SKOPJE 00000177 002 OF 002


that the GoM might consider this -- Milososki came out
swinging. He accused those seeking to "make easy and clumsy
concessions" on the name of aiding and abetting the Greek
"agenda" to "harm the national and linguistic identity of the
Macedonian people and the Macedonian citizens. As
politicians, journalists, and citizens, we have a sovereign
right...and an obligation to protect our national identity."
We will make clear to Gruevski that his FonMin's comments
cast his commitment to a better tone into serious doubt.

Despite Complete Control, Fears Remain
--------------


7. (C) Gruevski cited a number of concerns on the name
negotiations. He worried that Karamanlis' weak political
position would make it hard for him to make a deal.
Amazingly, Gruevski even said he feared the opposition in
Macedonia; despite SDSM's weakened state, he saw Crvenkovski
as a formidable foe who could create major headaches for the
GoM, if not on the name than on other issues. Ambassador
responded that Gruevski must engage in skilled public
diplomacy, not provoking Greece while appearing reasonable
and open to serious negotiations. Additionally, Macedonia
must improve its engagement of the Alliance in Brussels,
either empowering its Ambassador there to engage more
actively or replace him with someone who will.

Getting to Yes on Kosovo Issues
--------------


8. (C) Deploying ref a points, Ambassador also pressed for
Macedonia's "yes" vote for Kosovo membership in the World
Bank and IMF. Gruevski responded that he could not see why
Macedonia would not support this in the course of normalizing
relations following its recognition of Kosovo in Oct 2008.
Clearly weighing bilateral ties with Belgrade, Gruevski added
that he did not envision that Serbia would see this as a
major additional blow. Ambassador also requested that
Gruevski seriously consider Kosovo's latest proposal in order
to complete the demarcation of the Macedonia-Kosovo border.
Gruevski listened but said he preferred options that would
not require him to approach the Parliament in order to change
the 2001 border agreement between Serbia and Macedonia, which
is the basis for the current demarcation exercise.

Economy Still Critical
--------------


9. (C) In addition to the name issue, Gruevski said he
remains focused on the same issues as before the election
campaign, specifically the economy and judicial reform. Even
during the campaign, he said he was meeting frequently with
economic experts, businesspeople, etc to alleviate the impact
of the global economic slowdown on Macedonia.
REEKER