MEETING WITH ROK POLMIN SUNGNAM LIM: FRUSTRATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SHENYANG 000200


E.O. 12958: DECL: 5 YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV CH PMIL ROK
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ROK POLMIN SUNGNAM LIM: FRUSTRATIONS
IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: Consul General Stephen Wickman, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)



1. (SBU) ROK Political Minister Lim Sungnam, a relative
newcomer in Beijing (two months, overlapping by his account
somewhat awkwardly with his predecessor),dropped by Shenyang
briefly on November 9 before jetting off to Harbin as part of
a Northeast familiarization tour. Lim asked the Consul
General whether he had heard anything from local experts on
North Korea issues. The CG said experts here tend to talk
among themselves about such issues and suggested Lim visit
Yanji and Yanbian Prefecture to see the Sino-Korean
experience firsthand. Lim said he was also traveling there
later in the week.


2. (C) Lim's meetings with scholars at the Liaoning Academy
of Social Sciences (interestingly not with LASS Director and
Chinese media darling Lu Chao) produced what he thought were
interesting insights. First, the analysts he talked to see
stability in the Korean peninsula continuing under almost any
scenario. Secondly, the same said scholars speak of
unification of the two Koreas in a positive light, as if it
is a real possibility at some point. Lim offered the caveat
the he does put too much stock in the value of Chinese
intellectual opinion on the subject.


3. (C) Lim said he sees two opposing schools at work in
Chinese government views on the Korean Peninsula--the burden
school and the buffer school. The burden school sees the
DPRK as nothing but a burden to the Chinese. The view is
espoused by younger members of the Chinese Communist Party
and forward-leaning intellectuals. The buffer school of
thought, which sees the DPRK in a more conventional light as
a buffer zone between China and the United States, is
espoused by elder members of the Party leadership. Lim sees
both schools of thought at work in the behavior of the
Chinese he deals with: they talk to ROKG reps in terms of
the burden school but they tend to act in accordance with the
buffer school.


4. (C) Lim believes the DPRK will never give up its nuclear
weapons now that they have successfully tested them twice, so
he thinks the best thing to do is to act to prevent 1) a
third nuclear test of nuclear capability; 2) proliferation of
any DPRK nuclear capabilities; and/or 3) a major increase in
DPRK stockpiles that could destabilize the region. Lim is
personally quite pessimistic about the Six-Party Talks
achieving its stated goals but thinks it is an important
forum, in which all parties could agree to exchange ideas and
keep in regular working-level contact. Some ten years down
the line, Lim opined, it could form the basis for a new
Northeast Asia security cooperation architecture.


5. (C) When asked about his assessment of the level of
bilateral cooperation he sees from the Chinese, Lim was most
negative. The Chinese perception is that the current
leadership in the ROK wants to cut China out of the
negotiations and diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula,
so the authorities punish the ROK by being less responsive to
ROK Embassy contact requests and other inquiries than in the
past. In response to a number of requests on important
issues, for example, the requests to turn over the aged POW
defectors recently in the South Korean news, "we are getting
a much colder reception from the Chinese," Lim said. He
blamed this partly on mistaken perceptions and partly on what
he termed the "Commercialist Characteristics of Chinese
Diplomacy." Lim described this as a propensity to link
everything, engaging in tit for tat on even wholly unrelated
issues. Lim says this works at all levels of their sometimes
difficult bilateral relationship.

WICKMAN