NANJING TAIWAN EXPERT COMMENTS ON TAIPEI POLITICS, MAINLAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000282

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR INR/EAP, EAP/RA/TC
NSC FOR LOI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/29/2034
TAGS: CH PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: NANJING TAIWAN EXPERT COMMENTS ON TAIPEI POLITICS, MAINLAND
OUTREACH EFFORTS

REF: 08 SHANGHAI 352

CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S.
Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: U.S.-China relations have become more stable
and "mature" in the view of the head of Nanjing University's
Taiwan Research Institute. This fact allows for more "space" to
address problems than in the past. The decision of Taiwan
President Ma Ying-jeou to become KMT Chairman was "painful" but
necessary to ensure passage of Ma's legislative program, the
academic believed. Beijing recognizes the need to reach out to
Taiwan's opposition and other constituencies on the island who
have not yet benefited directly from improved cross-Strait ties
in order to stabilize the relationship with Taiwan. The
academic characterized Taiwan analyses of the Mainland as
lacking objectivity and overly focused on negative phenomena.
End summary.

U.S.-China Relations "Mature"
--------------


2. (C) U.S.-China relations are "mature," and both sides are
clear as to each other's positions, according to Nanjing
University Taiwan Studies Institute Director Cui Zhiqing
(reftel). Meeting with Shanghai Deputy Principal Officer June
19, Cui stressed economic interests now form the basis of
U.S.-China ties, and this fact has give stability to the
relationship. Consequently, the United States and China have
been more able to come to agreement on issues of common concern
such as North Korea's nuclear program even though they continue
to hold different ideas on how best to address the issue.
Overall, there is more "space" in the U.S.-China relationship
for dealing with problems.

Ma Ying-jeou Faces "Painful" Choice on Party Chairmanship
--------------


3. (C) Cui labeled the decision by Taiwan President Ma
Ying-jeou to run for the chairmanship of the KMT as a "painful
choice." Although Ma has worked to separate himself from
partisan party politics and to present himself as the leader of
all the people on Taiwan, he needs also to be able to control
the KMT members of the Legislative Yuan (LY) in order to ensure
approval of his policy program. Consequently, in Cui's view, Ma
decided to assume the party chairmanship despite the criticism
such a move would inevitably draw from the opposition Democratic
Progressive Party. Cui also noted that once he becomes KMT
chairman, Ma will no longer be able to avoid responsibility for
whatever policy emerges from the highly partisan LY. One of
Ma's political advantages has been that he has been able to keep
himself relatively "clean," Cui observed, but that also means he
has no friends to whom he can turn to run the KMT on his behalf.
What Ma does have, however, is great self-confidence, which,
Cui felt, has served him well.

Mainland Outreach to Opposition, Disadvantaged Groups
-------------- --------------


4. (C) According to Cui, the Mainland authorities are hoping to
strengthen their ties to the Democratic Progressive Party and
those elements in Taiwan who have traditionally supported the
DPP. He recounted a recent conference in Nanjing which had
included some Taiwan opposition representatives and noted views
between the Taiwan and Mainland attendees had not been as far
apart as expected. Cui stressed that Mainland policy toward
Taiwan in the past had been basically passive because Beijing
felt it was too weak to influence the course of events on
Taiwan. Now, greater confidence in its own capabilities along
with increased interdependence between the United States and
China has increased the space for Mainland policymakers to be
more proactive.


5. (C) Beijing is looking for ways to increase mutual
confidence across the Strait step-by-step, Cui stated. Mainland
consideration of a higher profile for Taiwan in APEC and Taiwan
liberalization of Mainland investment were both signs of this
growing confidence. Fundamentally, Beijing wants to avoid a
political collapse in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Ma Ying-jeou would
like greater cooperation from the Mainland on the economic
front. Cui added the Mainland leadership realizes

SHANGHAI 00000282 002 OF 002


liberalization in the cross-Strait economic relationship to date
has largely not benefited the poorer elements of Taiwan society,
many of whom are supporters of the DPP. So far, Beijing has
focused on the business elite, for whom the Mainland represents
more of an opportunity than a threat. For its part, however,
the DPP remains excessively wedded to mass demonstrations as a
political tactic. "They are like the revolutionary rebels in
the Cultural Revolution," Cui stated. Considering the DPP's
weaknesses, Cui was confident Ma Ying-jeou would be able to win
another term as president in 2012.

Taiwan Experts Condescending of Mainland
--------------


6. (C) Cui evaluated Taiwan's analysis of Mainland policies,
characterizing most Taiwan observers as having a rigid, often
arrogant point of view. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
prevailing view of the Mainland on Taiwan was that the CCP
regime would collapse, particularly following the 1989 Democracy
Movement. In the later years of former CCP General Secretary
Jiang Zemin's tenure, Taiwan scholars were less convinced of the
fragility of the Communist Party regime but nevertheless
believed it would mishandle challenges like the return of Hong
Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. In general, Cui remarked,
Taiwan analyses of the situation on the Mainland have
overemphasized negative phenomena. Mainland academics may not
write as much about these negative phenomena but they are fully
aware of them, and factor them into their analyses. Although
Taiwan analysts have become somewhat more objective over time,
they still tend, in Cui's view, to misunderstand developments on
the mainland. Furthermore, they focus on Taiwan's own narrowly
defined interests in the relationship with the Mainland rather
than the larger picture, including broader common interests.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) If Cui is right that Beijing policymakers are more
conscious of the need to win over those segments of Taiwan
society that do not benefit directly from improved cross-Strait
ties, it will be interesting to see the extent to which this
actually plays out in terms of concrete action.
CAMP