Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SHANGHAI257
2009-06-12 02:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

(C) CHINA UNLIKELY TO FULLY IMPLEMENT UN SANCTIONS ON NORTH

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM CH KN KS JA TW 
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2866
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1834
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2215
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 2038
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2047
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0090
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 8676
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM CH KN KS JA TW
SUBJECT: (C) CHINA UNLIKELY TO FULLY IMPLEMENT UN SANCTIONS ON NORTH
KOREA: VIEWS FROM SHANGHAI

REF: A) SHANGHAI 246; B) SHANGHAI 135

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section
Chief, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, U.S. Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000257

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM CH KN KS JA TW
SUBJECT: (C) CHINA UNLIKELY TO FULLY IMPLEMENT UN SANCTIONS ON NORTH
KOREA: VIEWS FROM SHANGHAI

REF: A) SHANGHAI 246; B) SHANGHAI 135

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Section
Chief, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, U.S. Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Shanghai scholars believe North Korea, for
domestic political reasons, will not bow to international
pressure in the near term over its recent provocative actions.
Tension on the Korean peninsula is nearing a "climax," after
which a "cooling down period" will be necessary to bring the
DPRK back to the negotiating table. Even if new UN sanctions
are announced, China will not fully enforce their
implementation, said one scholar, since China needs North Korea
as a "strategic buffer" against the United States and cannot
afford to let the regime collapse. End summary.


2. (C) Poloff spoke with Liu Ming, Deputy Director of the
Institute of Asia & Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences (SASS) on June 9, and Shen Dingli, Director of the
Center for American Studies at Fudan University, in a separate
discussion on June 9, about recent North Korean provocations and
China's response. Liu is widely recognized as a leading scholar
in Shanghai on North Korean issues, recently serving as the key
presenter of a session on North Korea at a China-ROK-Japan-US
quadrilateral conference jointly hosted by the Shanghai
Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and Pacific Forum
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) on May 12
in Shanghai. Shen is an expert on non-proliferation and
security studies, and is often quoted in foreign and local media
on these issues.

(C) North Korea Will "Not Bow To Pressure"
--------------

3. (C) A strong international reaction to North Korea's recent
nuclear test and missile launches (i.e., new UN sanctions) will
be met by stronger North Korean "retaliation," warned Liu Ming
of SASS during our discussion on June 9. North Korea will "not
bow to international pressure," at least in the near term, as it

proceeds with its goal of becoming a "prosperous and powerful
state" by 2012. The DPRK needs to consolidate its nuclear power
status to achieve this goal, said Liu.


(C) Succession Issue
--------------

4. (C) Kim Jong-il (KJI) may also feel the need to speed up the
process towards becoming a "prosperous and powerful state," as
the succession issue comes to the fore amid his declining
health, said Liu. On rumors that KJI's third son, Kim Jong-un
(KJU),had been anointed KJI's successor, Liu said it is still
media speculation but that, if true, the successor would have to
prove his ability to boost the country's prestige in order to
control the military and its generals. One way to achieve this,
said Liu, is for KJU to preside over more nuclear and missile
tests.

(C) Approaching a "Climax"
--------------

5. (C) Liu does not think tension on the Korean peninsula has
reached its "climax," but that this "turning point" may be
reached with the announcement of new UN sanctions. Though he
believes North Korea will retaliate in response to new
sanctions, he is not sure what it would do, adding that there
are "limitations" to its response since it had already conducted
nuclear and missile tests. After the "climax" is reached, Liu
does not exclude the possibility of a return to talks after a
"calming down period."

(C) China's Reaction
--------------

6. (C) Liu said during the May 12 conference that China is
unwilling to take a hard line against North Korea, partly
because Chinese officials, scholars, and the general public are

SHANGHAI 00000257 002 OF 002


divided in their opinion of the DPRK. He feels that the timing
is not right for behind-the-scenes diplomacy by China, and
questioned "how much room" the United States would give China in
its diplomatic dealings with the North. China is concerned
about the risk of proliferation and will support, to some
extent, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),though it
will not join the initiative, predicted Liu during our June 9
discussion.

(C) DPRK is China's "Strategic Buffer" Against U.S.
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Even if China supports new and tougher UN sanctions,
China will not fully enforce their implementation since it does
not want the North Korean regime to collapse, argued Shen Dingli
on June 9. A DPRK collapse would portend redeployment of US
forces from South Korea, possibly to bases closer to Taiwan. If
the DPRK, China's "strategic buffer" against the United States,
collapses, the United States will be able to refocus its
attention on Taiwan. China needs to "buy more time" to develop
its military to counter any possible US interference in Taiwan,
said Shen. China remains concerned about pro-independence
forces in Taiwan and is not certain that the recent warming of
cross-Strait relations under Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou will
continue, especially if Ma is ousted from the presidency at the
next election. China is thus "hedging" against possible US
interference in Taiwan using the North Korean card, and North
Korea is happily manipulating China's "hedge," said Shen.

(C) China Already Violating UN Sanctions?
--------------

8. (C) China has long been violating UN Security Council
Resolution 1718 by exporting luxury goods to North Korea,
claimed Shen. China remains North Korea's "only link" to the
outside world, and China does not subject most cars and trucks
to inspection at the North Korean border, he said. Shen also
heard from one of his sources that China, whether knowingly or
unknowingly, has been sending conventional arms, including
tanks, to North Korea. (Note: Shen did not divulge the source of
this information. End note.) China will not obstruct new UN
sanctions since it wants to be viewed as a responsible player.
Any new UN sanctions, however, will be a "paper tiger," since
China's full support is needed for the sanctions to be
effective, but China will violate these sanctions, Shen
predicted.

(C) China Looking for U.S. Support on Taiwan
-------------- -

9. (C) The only way to break the logjam and get China's full
support for stronger action against North Korea would be to
eliminate North Korea's use as China's "strategic buffer"
against the United States, added Shen. The United States can
achieve this by announcing unequivocally that it supports the
peaceful reunification of mainland China and Taiwan, said Shen.
He acknowledged that this is a very difficult, "almost
impossible," task at present, but that a US announcement need
not be followed by any concrete action. Though only symbolic, a
US announcement would raise the US-China partnership to a new
level, argued Shen.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) Shen Dingli readily admitted that his ideas are "in the
minority," but argued that "sometimes the minority view turns
out to be correct." None of the scholars in Shanghai that we
have spoken to in recent weeks has a clear idea of what is
happening inside North Korea. Their comments, however, reveal
the depth of divergent views in China on how it should respond
to the crisis.
SCHUCHAT