(C) SHANGHAI SCHOLARS SAY CHINA CANNOT STOP NORTH KOREAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000135

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/23/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM CH KN KS JA
SUBJECT: (C) SHANGHAI SCHOLARS SAY CHINA CANNOT STOP NORTH KOREAN
MISSILE TEST

REF: A) SHANGHAI 73; B) BEIJING 280; C) BEIJING 254; D) BEIJING 302; E) 08 SHANGHAI 422

CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Pol/Econ Section Chief, U.S.
Consulate, Shanghai, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Shanghai scholars believe North Korea will
launch its missile (or satellite) as a means to influence U.S.
policy and drive a wedge between the United States and its
regional allies. Political normalization with the United States
is of paramount importance to North Korea, which prefers
one-on-one dialogue with the United States rather than
engagement through the Six Party Talks. If Pyongyang has
already made a decision to launch its missile, China can do
little to stop it, said the scholars. China's credibility as a
neutral broker has been marred by a perception that China is
using North Korea as a card to improve its own relations with
the United States. The North Korean succession issue remains a
guessing game. End summary.


2. (SBU) Poloff spoke with Shanghai scholars in early March
about North Korea's planned missile launch and the succession
issue. Scholars included Ren Xiao, Associate Dean of the
Institute of International Studies at Fudan University; Liu
Ming, Deputy Director of the Institute of Asia and Pacific
Studies at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS); and
Wu Xinbo, Deputy Director of the Center for American Studies at
Fudan University. The discussions took place before the
mid-March visit to China of North Korean Premier Kim Yong-il.

Motives for Missile Launch
--------------

3. (C) These Shanghai scholars were not surprised by North
Korea's recent announcement that it will launch a missile (or
satellite) in early April. The launch itself is only a means to
an end, said Wu Xinbo of Fudan University. The DPRK "knows" the
United States will eventually engage with Pyongyang; the
question is when and what kind of dialogue will take place. By
playing its missile card, North Korea hopes to a) force the
dialogue to take place sooner rather than later; and b)
influence U.S. policy towards North Korea in a direction more
accommodating to the North, said the scholars. Wu and Ren Xiao
see parallels between North Korea's actions now and its missile
launch in 1998. North Korea believes its missile launch in 1998
led to a softening of the Clinton Administration's policy
towards the DPRK, eventually culminating in then-Secretary of
State Albright's visit to Pyongyang, said the scholars. The
DPRK is looking for a similar "warming" of relations now that a
Democratic administration is in Washington, and hopes a soft
approach by the United States would cause a rift between the
United States and its regional allies, including the hard-line
conservative government of South Korea.


4. (C) For the DPRK, political normalization with the United
States is of paramount importance, but the North feels it must
be able to negotiate with the United States and other regional
powers on a more level playing field, said the scholars. The
DPRK has a "small nation complex," said Ren. It is a "shrimp
among whales" surrounded by big powers (China, Russia, Japan,
United States),but does not want to be treated as a small, weak
state. Its missile card is one of the few tools at its disposal
that it can use to level the playing field. North Korea also
prefers one-on-one dialogue with the United States, said Wu,
because it feels "isolated" and "weak" in the Six Party Talks
(6PT). Though China prefers dialogue through the 6PT mechanism,
North Korea feels that all parties in the talks, including
China, are "working against" the DPRK. Liu Ming of SASS thinks
North Korean military leaders see the current lull in the 6PT as
an opportunity to further develop the country's military
capability and, by launching a missile, demonstrate to its
domestic audience that North Korea is still a "powerful" state.
Once engagement through the 6PT or other mechanism restarts, Liu
believes North Korea will be more restrained in its provocative
behavior.

Satellite or Missile?
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5. (C) These scholars were unsure whether North Korea plans to
launch a satellite, as it claims, or a missile. They said that
China opposes any missile launch but that North Korea could make
a legitimate case for launching a satellite as its sovereign
right. "If others like Iran can launch satellites, why can't
North Korea do the same?" Liu Ming asked rhetorically. Liu
thinks the DPRK is trying to display its "transparency,"
"complying" with international organizations by presenting the
coordinates of its "satellite" launch. This semblance of
transparency will make it difficult for the international
community to coordinate efforts to pressure North Korea, he
said. If the DPRK does launch a missile, the scholars do not
believe the United States will intercept it since this action
would further escalate tension in the region. North Korea will
certainly "do something" in retaliation if its missile or
satellite is shot down, said Liu.

China Cannot Stop Missile Launch
--------------

6. (C) Although China still has some leverage over North Korea,
the scholars do not think China can pressure North Korea into
changing its mind. Once China and the DPRK reach agreement on
Chinese food and fuel aid during North Korean Premier Kim
Yong-il's visit to China in March, it will be hard for China to
renege on this agreement, even if the DPRK eventually fires a
missile, said Wu. Liu flatly stated that "the North Koreans
will not listen to China." China has already been working
through multiple channels to tone down North Korea's fiery
rhetoric, such as Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei's visit
to North Korea in February, but to little avail, he said.
According to Liu, China sent a senior official to Pyongyang in
2006 to dissuade the North from launching a missile that year,
but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (KJI) kept making excuses
not to meet the Chinese envoy, saying "there is no use for
meeting" and that North Korea had "already made a decision" to
launch a missile. Despite official pronouncements of
friendship, North Korea does not really trust China, said Wu.
He thinks the DPRK feels China is using North Korea as a card to
improve its own relations with the United States, further
reducing China's role as a neutral broker.

Succession Issue: Anyone's Guess
--------------

7. (C) The scholars said no one, except KJI himself, really
knows what is going on with the succession issue in the DPRK.
Despite recent widespread speculation about KJI's third son, Kim
Jong-un, possibly succeeding his father, all such speculation
was thrown out of the window when Kim Jong-un did not stand for
a legislative position during the recent elections for the
Supreme People's Assembly in North Korea. "We are now back to
the starting point in the guessing game," said Ren Xiao. Ren
thinks none of KJI's sons have the ability or experience to
become the country's leader, and he does not see KJI currently
making arrangements for any of them to succeed him. He believes
a collective leadership, including several of KJI's protigis and
family members, is the most likely outcome, in which case KJI
"does not have to rush the succession issue." It would take
more time to groom and prepare one of his sons for succession,
said Ren. Liu concurred that it will take many years for any of
KJI's sons to build a political base strong enough to allow him
to rule effectively, if chosen. The son "needs to build his own
credentials and show he is qualified, or else his power base
will be too fragile," said Liu. He believes it is too early to
tell if KJI has or has not selected one of his sons to succeed
him since KJI is "still healthy and does not want to appoint a
successor too quickly." Unlike Ren, however, Liu does not think
collective leadership is a likely outcome. Collective
leadership may be considered an option during a transitional
period, but eventually "a country like North Korea needs one
supreme leader," he said.
CAMP