Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL1288
2009-08-13 08:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

EXPERTS FRUSTRATED WITH LEE'S NORTH KOREA POLICY;

Tags:  PGOV PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1288/01 2250847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130847Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5333
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001288 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: EXPERTS FRUSTRATED WITH LEE'S NORTH KOREA POLICY;
DPRK SUCCESSION UNCLEAR

Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001288

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: EXPERTS FRUSTRATED WITH LEE'S NORTH KOREA POLICY;
DPRK SUCCESSION UNCLEAR

Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In August 10 meetings with poloff, two
leading experts, each of whom is close to the Lee Myung-bak
Administration, were sharply critical of Lee's North Korea
policy. They also agreed that the succession of Kim Jong-un
to his father's place as leader of North Korea is not yet
clear and were dismissive of media reports that Kim Jong-un
had orchestrated the DPRK's role in former President
Clinton's visit to Pyongyang. End Summary.


2. (C) Comment: It is striking that two conservative
academics, each of whom is close to the Administration, would
be so critical of Lee's North Korea policy, and probably
reflects broader frustration with his approach. The release
of ROK citizen Mr. Yoo from DPRK custody on August 13 is
likely to increase public demands for a more flexible policy
toward North Korea, but it is unclear if Lee is willing to
consider a change of course. End Comment.

--------------
Succession Still Up in the Air
--------------


3. (C) On August 10, poloff met with Professors Ryoo
Kihl-jae and Yoo Ho-ryul, prominent experts on the DPRK, to
solicit their views on the DPRK leadership succession. Ryoo,
a faculty member at the University of North Korean Studies
and Institute for Far Eastern Studies, quickly dismissed ROK
media reports of Kim Jong-un's involvement in the Clinton
visit, stating that such a rumor is "just a theory."
Pointing out that Kim Jong-un had neither been mentioned by
DPRK authorities nor officially nominated by KJI; Ryoo stated
that the succession issue was still not certain. For Ryoo, a
more important question regarding the future of North Korea
was not who, but what the future of North Korea would look
like.


4. (C) Similarly, Yoo Ho-yeol of Korea University viewed the
DPRK succession as uncertain, adding that now was a critical
time for Kim Jong-un. Yoo interpreted the fact that Kim
Jong-un has not been mentioned by name, but vaguely referred
to as the "young general," as a continuation of Kim Jong-un's
"trial period." He is still being tested by KJI and other
senior leaders as one among many potential candidates to
succeed KJI. Yoo acknowledged similarities between the
current 150-day march and the 70-day march in 1994 prior to
KJI's succession, but argued "nothing was certain." The
Clinton visit would be an exemplary showcase for Kim
Jong-un's leadership potential, but both academics agreed
that the mastermind behind the scene was probably KJI
himself, not anyone else.


5. (C) Both scholars pointed out that unlike the succession
issue, North Korean authorities have repeatedly and publicly
emphasized the importance of the year 2012, the target date
for the DPRK to become a "strong and prosperous nation."
Ryoo said it would be important to watch what steps North
Korea would take toward this goal, and predicted if Kim
Jong-un is indeed the designated successor, a formal
announcement of his succession would be related to 2012.

--------------
Kim Jong-un Bad for DPRK
--------------


6. (C) If Kim Jong-un was in fact named as KJI's successor;
it would be good news for the Kim regime, but not for the
DPRK, according to Yoo. No change could be expected under
Kim Jong-un, despite his overseas experience and western
education. Yoo predicted North Korea under Kim Jong-un would
continue the backward ways of his father's time, with no
consideration for realistic reform. Another hereditary
succession would prove that regime stability stands above all
else for the Kim family, not a more prosperous North Korea.

-------------- --------------
Even Conservative Scholars Frustrated with LMB Policy
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Ryoo served as an advisor on North Korea to the Lee
Myung-bak presidential transition team, but expressed
concerns with Lee's hard line approach to North Korea.
According to Ryoo, North Korea experts had been shut out of
the policy-making process, allowing President Lee "to do
whatever" on North Korea. Drawing from recent examples, Ryoo
thought abrupt discontinuation of rice and fertilizer aid to
North Korea was worse than not providing any aid from the

beginning of the Lee administration.


8. (C) Yoo was equally discontent with the Lee
administration's handling of North Korea policy, arguing for
the "depoliticization" of North Korea policy in South Korea.
Yoo hoped to facilitate dialogue in the near future between
scholars on both ends of the political spectrum.
STEPHENS