Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL120
2009-01-23 00:48:00
SECRET
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
ROKG VIEWS ON CONPLAN 5029, SMA, AND AFGHANISTAN
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #0120/01 0230048 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 230048Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3007 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5199 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5307 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 2934 RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USD (P) /OASD-SOLIC// PRIORITY RUEHUL/USDAO SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
S E C R E T SEOUL 000120
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV KS AF
SUBJECT: ROKG VIEWS ON CONPLAN 5029, SMA, AND AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
S E C R E T SEOUL 000120
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV KS AF
SUBJECT: ROKG VIEWS ON CONPLAN 5029, SMA, AND AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (S) Summary. ROK National Security Advisor Kim
Sung-hwan discussed the ROKG's positions on Conceptual Plan
(CONPLAN) 5029, the new Special Measures Agreement (SMA),and
Afghanistan during a cordial and wide-ranging 30-minute
meeting at the Blue House on January 15 with United States
Forces Korea (USFK) Commander General Sharp and the DCM. Kim
said that CONPLAN was well prepared, but the assumptions
about China were "unrealistic." Kim thought that the new SMA
on burden sharing was a good agreement, but could not predict
the reception it would receive in the National Assembly.
Nonetheless, he expected the National Assembly to ratify the
agreement in February. Kim said that the ROKG would do as
much as it could to increase its support of Afghanistan,
within the constraints of domestic politics, and irrespective
of whether it received a request to do more from the incoming
U.S. Administration. Kim requested help with the ROK
Embassy's efforts to arrange meetings with NSA-designate
General James Jones, Michele Flournoy (designated for Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy),and Defense Secretary
Gates. End summary.
--------------
Tour Normalization
--------------
2. (U) General Sharp started the meeting by noting that the
Defense Secretary had approved tour normalization and that
USFK was constructing a website to attract personnel. (Note:
For most USFK personnel, tours are unaccompanied, one-year
assignments. With normalization, tours will be accompanied,
three-year assignments. End note.) Responding to an inquiry
from Kim, the General stated that currently there were about
2,000 USFK families, which USFK hoped to double by the
beginning of 2010. The end goal was 14,000 families.
--------------
CONPLAN 5029
--------------
3. (S) Kim said that while Conceptual Plan (CONPLAN) 5029
was well prepared, the assumptions about China were
"unrealistic." General Sharp agreed, particularly with
regard to contingency plans in the event China opposed U.S.
and ROK military action. Kim said that since the ROKG's own
CONPLAN encompassed the entire Government and not just the
military, the ROKG would not be ready to discuss it until the
summer.
---
SMA
---
4. (C) Kim thought that the SMA was a good agreement, but
could not predict how the National Assembly would receive it.
He believed that the SMA would pass if it were brought to a
vote in committee and the plenary, but worried that
opposition parties could try to block discussion in
committee. Still, noting that Korean legislators of both
parties would probably behave more cautiously following
recent fighting on the National Assembly floor, he thought
that the SMA could be ratified in February. In dealing with
the media, Kim thought that the best course of action for
both the Ministry of National Defense and USFK was to avoid
comment on the agreement until after the National Assembly
ratified it. General Sharp agreed.
--------------
Base Returns
--------------
5. (S) Noting that "in-kind" construction was a part of the
SMA, General Sharp stressed that it was "absolutely key" that
the construction of new USFK facilities had to be timely and
properly executed, because problems with construction would
delay USFK's realignment. Kim agreed, noting that local
governments were pressing for the return of the land from
which USFK forces would be withdrawn. Recounting his own
meeting the previous day with Mayor Oh Se-chang of
Dongducheon, General Sharp noted that local governments were
counting economically on the early return of land in which
their communities had already invested. General Sharp said
it was possible some portions of certain bases might even be
returned early if there were facilities built to which U.S.
forces could go. Kim concurred with the General that
returning some parcels of land around Dongducheon before 2016
was preferable to waiting until 2016 to return all the
parcels at one time. Agreeing, Kim said the General should
contact him if USFK encountered any impediments with funding
disbursements to the housing corporations working on USFK's
new facilities. Thanking Kim, General Sharp noted we were
all after the same thing, but leadership on both sides would
be required.
--------------
Afghanistan
--------------
6. (S) Turning to Afghanistan, Kim said that the ROKG would
do as much as it could, within domestic political contraints,
and irrespective of whether it received a request to do more
from the incoming U.S. Administration. The ROKG delegation
arriving in Kabul January 21 would be reviewing all
possibilities for assistance the ROKG might offer. In
response to General Sharp's observation on the need for
police trainers, Kim said the ROKG was considering sending
retired police as trainers.
--------------
Kim's Visit to Washington
--------------
7. (S) Kim said he was planning to visit Washington in
early February and requested help with the Korean Embassy's
efforts to arrange meetings with NSA-designate General James
Jones and Michele Flournoy, who has been designated for Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. He also requested a
courtesy call with Defense Secretary Gates and appropriate
meetings at State.
8. (U) USFK cleared this cable.
STEPHENS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV KS AF
SUBJECT: ROKG VIEWS ON CONPLAN 5029, SMA, AND AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (S) Summary. ROK National Security Advisor Kim
Sung-hwan discussed the ROKG's positions on Conceptual Plan
(CONPLAN) 5029, the new Special Measures Agreement (SMA),and
Afghanistan during a cordial and wide-ranging 30-minute
meeting at the Blue House on January 15 with United States
Forces Korea (USFK) Commander General Sharp and the DCM. Kim
said that CONPLAN was well prepared, but the assumptions
about China were "unrealistic." Kim thought that the new SMA
on burden sharing was a good agreement, but could not predict
the reception it would receive in the National Assembly.
Nonetheless, he expected the National Assembly to ratify the
agreement in February. Kim said that the ROKG would do as
much as it could to increase its support of Afghanistan,
within the constraints of domestic politics, and irrespective
of whether it received a request to do more from the incoming
U.S. Administration. Kim requested help with the ROK
Embassy's efforts to arrange meetings with NSA-designate
General James Jones, Michele Flournoy (designated for Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy),and Defense Secretary
Gates. End summary.
--------------
Tour Normalization
--------------
2. (U) General Sharp started the meeting by noting that the
Defense Secretary had approved tour normalization and that
USFK was constructing a website to attract personnel. (Note:
For most USFK personnel, tours are unaccompanied, one-year
assignments. With normalization, tours will be accompanied,
three-year assignments. End note.) Responding to an inquiry
from Kim, the General stated that currently there were about
2,000 USFK families, which USFK hoped to double by the
beginning of 2010. The end goal was 14,000 families.
--------------
CONPLAN 5029
--------------
3. (S) Kim said that while Conceptual Plan (CONPLAN) 5029
was well prepared, the assumptions about China were
"unrealistic." General Sharp agreed, particularly with
regard to contingency plans in the event China opposed U.S.
and ROK military action. Kim said that since the ROKG's own
CONPLAN encompassed the entire Government and not just the
military, the ROKG would not be ready to discuss it until the
summer.
---
SMA
---
4. (C) Kim thought that the SMA was a good agreement, but
could not predict how the National Assembly would receive it.
He believed that the SMA would pass if it were brought to a
vote in committee and the plenary, but worried that
opposition parties could try to block discussion in
committee. Still, noting that Korean legislators of both
parties would probably behave more cautiously following
recent fighting on the National Assembly floor, he thought
that the SMA could be ratified in February. In dealing with
the media, Kim thought that the best course of action for
both the Ministry of National Defense and USFK was to avoid
comment on the agreement until after the National Assembly
ratified it. General Sharp agreed.
--------------
Base Returns
--------------
5. (S) Noting that "in-kind" construction was a part of the
SMA, General Sharp stressed that it was "absolutely key" that
the construction of new USFK facilities had to be timely and
properly executed, because problems with construction would
delay USFK's realignment. Kim agreed, noting that local
governments were pressing for the return of the land from
which USFK forces would be withdrawn. Recounting his own
meeting the previous day with Mayor Oh Se-chang of
Dongducheon, General Sharp noted that local governments were
counting economically on the early return of land in which
their communities had already invested. General Sharp said
it was possible some portions of certain bases might even be
returned early if there were facilities built to which U.S.
forces could go. Kim concurred with the General that
returning some parcels of land around Dongducheon before 2016
was preferable to waiting until 2016 to return all the
parcels at one time. Agreeing, Kim said the General should
contact him if USFK encountered any impediments with funding
disbursements to the housing corporations working on USFK's
new facilities. Thanking Kim, General Sharp noted we were
all after the same thing, but leadership on both sides would
be required.
--------------
Afghanistan
--------------
6. (S) Turning to Afghanistan, Kim said that the ROKG would
do as much as it could, within domestic political contraints,
and irrespective of whether it received a request to do more
from the incoming U.S. Administration. The ROKG delegation
arriving in Kabul January 21 would be reviewing all
possibilities for assistance the ROKG might offer. In
response to General Sharp's observation on the need for
police trainers, Kim said the ROKG was considering sending
retired police as trainers.
--------------
Kim's Visit to Washington
--------------
7. (S) Kim said he was planning to visit Washington in
early February and requested help with the Korean Embassy's
efforts to arrange meetings with NSA-designate General James
Jones and Michele Flournoy, who has been designated for Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. He also requested a
courtesy call with Defense Secretary Gates and appropriate
meetings at State.
8. (U) USFK cleared this cable.
STEPHENS