Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09SEOUL1070
2009-07-07 07:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
LEE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES TO DEFENSE REFORM 2020
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #1070/01 1880709 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 070709Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4938 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6238 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1577 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8962 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1619 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9983 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2228 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 6326 RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1835 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 3919 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 4687 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 3661 RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5// PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1220 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001070
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PREL PGOV KS KN JA CH TW
SUBJECT: LEE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES TO DEFENSE REFORM 2020
Classified By: A/DCM JOSEPH YUN. REASONS: 1.4 (b),(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001070
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PREL PGOV KS KN JA CH TW
SUBJECT: LEE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES TO DEFENSE REFORM 2020
Classified By: A/DCM JOSEPH YUN. REASONS: 1.4 (b),(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) On June 26, the ROK Government announced significant
revisions to the "National Defense Reform 2020" plan. In
short, the plan will increase the ROK's
counterstrike/counterfire capability in the face of the
growing North Korean missile threat, while reducing the
numbers of ROK troops by 138,000, yet better equipping the
remaining 517,000. The revised DR 2020 calls for building a
"ROK-led operating system under a new combined defense system
based on the ROK-U.S. strategic alliance." It reduces the
overall defense budget the ROKG estimates will be needed to
fulfill the plan to USD 466 billion, but focuses new money on
the development of much needed C4I and ISR capabilities.
Reflective of the ROK's desire to play a larger role in
addressing security concerns elsewhere in the world, the plan
calls for the development of a permanently-trained and ready
peacekeeping force of 3,000 personnel. Finally, with a nod
to future warfare scenarios, the plan calls for refurbishing
ROK defense facilities to protect against electromagnetic
pulses and the creation of a new "Cyber Warfare Command."
ROKG officials cite the economy as the reason for reductions
in the plan, but since the overall ROK national budget has
increased at a faster rate than defense spending, we conclude
it is a matter of competing domestic political programs over
economics. END SUMMARY.
--------------
REVISED NATIONAL DEFENSE REFORM 2020
--------------
2. (C) On June 26, 2009, General (ret.) Lee Sang-hee, ROK
Minister of National Defense, and ROK JCS Chairman General
Kim Tae-young unveiled significant revisions to the country's
long-term defense reform plan. The "National Defense Reform
2020" plan (DR 2020) was first introduced in 2005 by the
previous Roh Moo-hyun Administration. It was designed to
streamline and modernize all branches of the ROK Military.
It was, however, conceived before North Korea stepped up its
missile launches in July 2006 and before it conducted its
first nuclear explosion in October of that year. When Lee
Myung-bak succeeded Roh as ROK President in February 2008, he
entered office with the stated intention of conducting a full
review of DR 2020 and promised to make appropriate
adjustments to that plan after careful study of the overall
defense and security environment. The conclusions of that
process, embodied in a revised National Defense Reform 2020
plan approved by President Lee, are as follows:
--------------
NEW MISSION
--------------
3. (C) The overall mission in the original 2005 DR 2020 plan
was to build what was described by the Roh Government as a
"Cooperative Self-Reliant National Defense." The 2009
revised DR 2020 has recast that mission. It calls for
building a "ROK-led operating system under a new combined
defense system based on the ROK-U.S. strategic alliance."
The revised mission has therefore been influenced by the
scheduled 2012 transfer of wartime OPCON to the ROK military,
the June 16 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement calling for a
more strategic partnership, and President Lee's firm
rededication to South Korea's bilateral alliance with the
United States.
--------------
REDUCED BUDGET
--------------
4. (C) The new DR 2020 reduces the overall defense budget
the ROKG estimates will be needed to fulfill the plan from
Korean Won (KW) 621 trillion to KW 599 trillion, which equals
approximately USD 466 billion. The original DR 2020 plan
envisioned extremely large (9-11 percent) annual increases in
defense spending that never materialized. The last actual
ROK annual defense budget, approved by the National Assembly
in December 2008, was USD 23.78 billion, which was only a 7.1
percent increase over the previous year's defense budget, and
well below the actual 8.8 percent annual increases over the
two previous years. These figures show that ROK defense
spending is holding steady at 2.75 percent of GDP. Many
security experts are seeking more funding, arguing that at
least 3 percent of GDP annually be dedicated to defense to
assure full implementation of DR 2020.
--------------
REDUCED TROOPS
--------------
5. (C) Under the revised DR 2020, the number of ROK troops
will be reduced from the current level of 655,000 to 517,000.
This will decrease the number of Army corps from 10 to 7 and
the number of Army divisions from 47 to 28, with cost savings
to be applied toward modernizing the remaining forces in a
bid for quality over quantity. While this marks a
significant reduction in the overall number of South Korean
forces, it should be noted that more troops are being
retained under the LMB plan than was envisioned by the
previous government. The number of reservists will also
remain higher, numbering 1.85 million.
--------------
FORCE IMPROVEMENTS
--------------
6. (C) Repositioning of funds will allow MND to increase by
12.2 percent that portion of the budget devoted to Force
Improvement Programs (FIP). The revised DR 2020 plan cut
over Korean Won 17 trillion from the original FIP plan, but
force improvement programs still represent the most robust
part of the ROK Military's modernization effort. The new DR
2020 contains two key elements that respond directly to the
North Korean nuclear and missiles threat.
-- The ROK Military will seek to acquire high-tech military
assets capable of monitoring the DPRK, most likely by
acquiring the U.S.-made Global Hawk High Altitude
Unaccompanied Vehicle (UAV).
-- The ROK Military will expand its strike and counterstrike
capabilities to deter a DPRK first strike by targeting North
Korea's known or suspected nuclear weapons facilities and
missile bases. This will include the purchase of as many as
1000 K-9 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS),and the
procurement of Patriot (PAC-3) interceptor missile systems
and SM-3 and SM-6 missiles.
--------------
ENHANCED READINESS FOR PKO MISSIONS
--------------
7. (C) Reflecting the ROK's desire to play a larger role in
addressing security concerns elsewhere in the world, the Lee
Administration has including in its defense reform plan the
development of a permanently-trained and ready peacekeeping
force of 3,000 personnel that could be sent to assist in
multinational missions elsewhere in the world. While the
enabling legislation remains to be passed by the National
Assembly, the plan is to establish a 1,000 strong standing
unit, a 1,000 strong reserve unit, and 1,000 specialized
troops (medics, transport, rescue, etc.) to support them.
--------------
CYBER WARFARE
--------------
8. (C) With a nod to future warfare scenarios, the ROK
Military also plans to refurbish its defense facilities to
protect against electromagnetic pulses that could be emitted
by a controlled nuclear explosion in the atmosphere. Like
the United States, the ROK also plans to create a new "Cyber
Warfare Command."
--------------
MODERN WARFARE
--------------
9. (C) National Defense Reform 2020 is deliberately modeled
after other successful military modernization programs around
the world, and those in the United States and France in
particular. As Defense Minister Lee put it in his forward to
the 2008 Defense White Paper, the ROK seeks to develop an
"Elite and Advanced Military." The overall goal being to
transform from a manpower-intensive force focused on the
North Korean conventional threat to a more joint, networked,
high-tech force with the ability to counter North Korea's
asymmetrical threats, while building stronger regional power
capabilities overall. Under this plan the undisputed
dominance of the ROK Army over the other services will be
somewhat diminished in favor of further development of the
ROK Navy's blue water capabilities, and a beefed up ROK Air
Force. Finally, the plan is meant to address the need for
much needed improvements in the ROK's Command, Control,
Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I)
infrastructure and to develop South Korea's own Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability.
10. (C) Quoting from the revised DR 2020 plan, the South
Korean Military "should reinforce its capacity to perform
surveillance and reconnaissance, conduct precision-guided
strikes and make interceptions (of missiles)." This
reinforcement is aimed at "stemming and eliminating to a
maximum degree the asymmetrical threats (nuclear and missile
programs) posed by the DPRK." In announcing the new plan,
MND made it clear it has neither the means nor the intention
of developing a preemptive strike capability, but rather
seeks to become better equipped to stop a barrage of DPRK
missiles if the North Korean military were ever to once again
launch an unprovoked attack on the South.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
11. (C) Our own defense experts will likely applaud
President Lee's decision to strengthen the ROK's
counterstrike, C4I and ISR capabilities, and the ROK decision
to go forward with the acquisition of Global Hawk will be
particularly well-received. Overall, however, there will be
some disappointment with the modest budget and 138,000 troop
reduction. With a conservative government in power, North
Korea rattling its sabers more loudly than ever, the transfer
of wartime operational control looming just over the horizon,
and the long lead time necessary to field modern military
programs, many had hoped the ROKG would be planning to do
much more to further build up its own defense capabilities at
this time. ROKG interlocutors frequently cite global
economic conditions as an obstacle to increased domestic
spending on defense, but we note that the ROKG's overall
government budget increased by 11.5 percent in 2009, up from
a 10.8 percent increase in 2008, and significantly more than
the 7.4 percent increase the year before that. In
comparison, defense spending was up an average of 8.2 percent
for those three years. Hence the conclusion by security
experts that full implementation of DR 2020 was stymied more
by competing domestic political programs than by economics.
STEPHENS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PREL PGOV KS KN JA CH TW
SUBJECT: LEE ADMINISTRATION CHANGES TO DEFENSE REFORM 2020
Classified By: A/DCM JOSEPH YUN. REASONS: 1.4 (b),(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) On June 26, the ROK Government announced significant
revisions to the "National Defense Reform 2020" plan. In
short, the plan will increase the ROK's
counterstrike/counterfire capability in the face of the
growing North Korean missile threat, while reducing the
numbers of ROK troops by 138,000, yet better equipping the
remaining 517,000. The revised DR 2020 calls for building a
"ROK-led operating system under a new combined defense system
based on the ROK-U.S. strategic alliance." It reduces the
overall defense budget the ROKG estimates will be needed to
fulfill the plan to USD 466 billion, but focuses new money on
the development of much needed C4I and ISR capabilities.
Reflective of the ROK's desire to play a larger role in
addressing security concerns elsewhere in the world, the plan
calls for the development of a permanently-trained and ready
peacekeeping force of 3,000 personnel. Finally, with a nod
to future warfare scenarios, the plan calls for refurbishing
ROK defense facilities to protect against electromagnetic
pulses and the creation of a new "Cyber Warfare Command."
ROKG officials cite the economy as the reason for reductions
in the plan, but since the overall ROK national budget has
increased at a faster rate than defense spending, we conclude
it is a matter of competing domestic political programs over
economics. END SUMMARY.
--------------
REVISED NATIONAL DEFENSE REFORM 2020
--------------
2. (C) On June 26, 2009, General (ret.) Lee Sang-hee, ROK
Minister of National Defense, and ROK JCS Chairman General
Kim Tae-young unveiled significant revisions to the country's
long-term defense reform plan. The "National Defense Reform
2020" plan (DR 2020) was first introduced in 2005 by the
previous Roh Moo-hyun Administration. It was designed to
streamline and modernize all branches of the ROK Military.
It was, however, conceived before North Korea stepped up its
missile launches in July 2006 and before it conducted its
first nuclear explosion in October of that year. When Lee
Myung-bak succeeded Roh as ROK President in February 2008, he
entered office with the stated intention of conducting a full
review of DR 2020 and promised to make appropriate
adjustments to that plan after careful study of the overall
defense and security environment. The conclusions of that
process, embodied in a revised National Defense Reform 2020
plan approved by President Lee, are as follows:
--------------
NEW MISSION
--------------
3. (C) The overall mission in the original 2005 DR 2020 plan
was to build what was described by the Roh Government as a
"Cooperative Self-Reliant National Defense." The 2009
revised DR 2020 has recast that mission. It calls for
building a "ROK-led operating system under a new combined
defense system based on the ROK-U.S. strategic alliance."
The revised mission has therefore been influenced by the
scheduled 2012 transfer of wartime OPCON to the ROK military,
the June 16 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement calling for a
more strategic partnership, and President Lee's firm
rededication to South Korea's bilateral alliance with the
United States.
--------------
REDUCED BUDGET
--------------
4. (C) The new DR 2020 reduces the overall defense budget
the ROKG estimates will be needed to fulfill the plan from
Korean Won (KW) 621 trillion to KW 599 trillion, which equals
approximately USD 466 billion. The original DR 2020 plan
envisioned extremely large (9-11 percent) annual increases in
defense spending that never materialized. The last actual
ROK annual defense budget, approved by the National Assembly
in December 2008, was USD 23.78 billion, which was only a 7.1
percent increase over the previous year's defense budget, and
well below the actual 8.8 percent annual increases over the
two previous years. These figures show that ROK defense
spending is holding steady at 2.75 percent of GDP. Many
security experts are seeking more funding, arguing that at
least 3 percent of GDP annually be dedicated to defense to
assure full implementation of DR 2020.
--------------
REDUCED TROOPS
--------------
5. (C) Under the revised DR 2020, the number of ROK troops
will be reduced from the current level of 655,000 to 517,000.
This will decrease the number of Army corps from 10 to 7 and
the number of Army divisions from 47 to 28, with cost savings
to be applied toward modernizing the remaining forces in a
bid for quality over quantity. While this marks a
significant reduction in the overall number of South Korean
forces, it should be noted that more troops are being
retained under the LMB plan than was envisioned by the
previous government. The number of reservists will also
remain higher, numbering 1.85 million.
--------------
FORCE IMPROVEMENTS
--------------
6. (C) Repositioning of funds will allow MND to increase by
12.2 percent that portion of the budget devoted to Force
Improvement Programs (FIP). The revised DR 2020 plan cut
over Korean Won 17 trillion from the original FIP plan, but
force improvement programs still represent the most robust
part of the ROK Military's modernization effort. The new DR
2020 contains two key elements that respond directly to the
North Korean nuclear and missiles threat.
-- The ROK Military will seek to acquire high-tech military
assets capable of monitoring the DPRK, most likely by
acquiring the U.S.-made Global Hawk High Altitude
Unaccompanied Vehicle (UAV).
-- The ROK Military will expand its strike and counterstrike
capabilities to deter a DPRK first strike by targeting North
Korea's known or suspected nuclear weapons facilities and
missile bases. This will include the purchase of as many as
1000 K-9 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS),and the
procurement of Patriot (PAC-3) interceptor missile systems
and SM-3 and SM-6 missiles.
--------------
ENHANCED READINESS FOR PKO MISSIONS
--------------
7. (C) Reflecting the ROK's desire to play a larger role in
addressing security concerns elsewhere in the world, the Lee
Administration has including in its defense reform plan the
development of a permanently-trained and ready peacekeeping
force of 3,000 personnel that could be sent to assist in
multinational missions elsewhere in the world. While the
enabling legislation remains to be passed by the National
Assembly, the plan is to establish a 1,000 strong standing
unit, a 1,000 strong reserve unit, and 1,000 specialized
troops (medics, transport, rescue, etc.) to support them.
--------------
CYBER WARFARE
--------------
8. (C) With a nod to future warfare scenarios, the ROK
Military also plans to refurbish its defense facilities to
protect against electromagnetic pulses that could be emitted
by a controlled nuclear explosion in the atmosphere. Like
the United States, the ROK also plans to create a new "Cyber
Warfare Command."
--------------
MODERN WARFARE
--------------
9. (C) National Defense Reform 2020 is deliberately modeled
after other successful military modernization programs around
the world, and those in the United States and France in
particular. As Defense Minister Lee put it in his forward to
the 2008 Defense White Paper, the ROK seeks to develop an
"Elite and Advanced Military." The overall goal being to
transform from a manpower-intensive force focused on the
North Korean conventional threat to a more joint, networked,
high-tech force with the ability to counter North Korea's
asymmetrical threats, while building stronger regional power
capabilities overall. Under this plan the undisputed
dominance of the ROK Army over the other services will be
somewhat diminished in favor of further development of the
ROK Navy's blue water capabilities, and a beefed up ROK Air
Force. Finally, the plan is meant to address the need for
much needed improvements in the ROK's Command, Control,
Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C4I)
infrastructure and to develop South Korea's own Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability.
10. (C) Quoting from the revised DR 2020 plan, the South
Korean Military "should reinforce its capacity to perform
surveillance and reconnaissance, conduct precision-guided
strikes and make interceptions (of missiles)." This
reinforcement is aimed at "stemming and eliminating to a
maximum degree the asymmetrical threats (nuclear and missile
programs) posed by the DPRK." In announcing the new plan,
MND made it clear it has neither the means nor the intention
of developing a preemptive strike capability, but rather
seeks to become better equipped to stop a barrage of DPRK
missiles if the North Korean military were ever to once again
launch an unprovoked attack on the South.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
11. (C) Our own defense experts will likely applaud
President Lee's decision to strengthen the ROK's
counterstrike, C4I and ISR capabilities, and the ROK decision
to go forward with the acquisition of Global Hawk will be
particularly well-received. Overall, however, there will be
some disappointment with the modest budget and 138,000 troop
reduction. With a conservative government in power, North
Korea rattling its sabers more loudly than ever, the transfer
of wartime operational control looming just over the horizon,
and the long lead time necessary to field modern military
programs, many had hoped the ROKG would be planning to do
much more to further build up its own defense capabilities at
this time. ROKG interlocutors frequently cite global
economic conditions as an obstacle to increased domestic
spending on defense, but we note that the ROKG's overall
government budget increased by 11.5 percent in 2009, up from
a 10.8 percent increase in 2008, and significantly more than
the 7.4 percent increase the year before that. In
comparison, defense spending was up an average of 8.2 percent
for those three years. Hence the conclusion by security
experts that full implementation of DR 2020 was stymied more
by competing domestic political programs than by economics.
STEPHENS